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Paul J. du Plessis
The centre of gravity of legal development therefore from time immemorial has not lain in 
the activity of the state, but in society itself.
(Ehrlich 1962: 390)
In his 1995 book, The Spirit of Roman Law (Athens, GA 1995), Alan Watson 
included a chapter provocatively titled ‘Cicero the outsider’. By locating 
this chapter towards the end of the book, Watson hinted that any discus-
sion of Cicero in the context of the spirit of Roman law (a difficult concept 
in itself) could only really form part of an appendix (in this case Appendix 
A) to a book of this kind. The gist of this chapter, following the then 
dominant Romanist view, is that ‘Cicero’s outlook [was] remarkably dif-
ferent from that of the Roman jurists’ (at 200).1 As this statement implies, 
for Watson, Cicero stood outside the traditional narrative of the Roman 
jurists.2
This view of Cicero as ‘an outsider’ is based on two assumptions. The 
first is that a fundamental distinction between the ‘jurist’ and the ‘advocate’ 
(orator) existed in Roman law –  a distinction that, according to its support-
ers, seems to have originated already in the mid to late Republic. Jurists 
were engaged in an intellectual endeavour, removed from the cut and thrust 
of legal practice, while orators were very much at its centre and utilised the 
art of persuasion (rhetoric) in courts of law, often with limited attention to 
(or indeed need for) the intellectual intricacies of Roman law. Such a system 
was made workable by the formula procedure operating in the Roman courts 
where the praetor and the jurists dealt with matters of law, while the lay 
iudex merely decided on the application of the law to the facts of the matter. 
The origins of this view about the perceived divide between the jurist and 
the orator are complex and may be traced at least to nineteenth- century 
German conceptions of law as a Wissenschaft, in which the ‘scientific’ study 
of law and those who were engaged in it were foregrounded at the expense of 
 1 Cf. Dirksen 1858; Costa 1899; Greenidge 1901; Roby 1902a, 1902b; Costa 1927; Coşkun 
2011 (reprint) as well as Thomas 11f. elsewhere in this volume.
 2 This also explains the title of this book, a play on the famous statement in Top. 51: ‘Nihil hoc 
ad ius, ad Ciceronem.’
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legal practice.3 This view also finds support to some extent in Cicero’s own 
statements about the endeavours of jurists, of whom he seems at times quite 
critical (although these should be treated with circumspection as they were 
produced within a specific context).4
The second assumption concerns the nature of Roman law in the late 
Republic itself. The narrative of the development of Roman law during this 
period (as found in many textbooks on Roman law) focuses on key figures 
(all great men belonging to the upper classes) such as Servius Sulpicius Rufus 
or the Scaevolae and their contribution to the creation of the ‘science’ of 
Roman law.5 Although information about these individuals and their contri-
butions to the law are very limited, they have nonetheless been elevated in 
most of these works to the status of the vanguards, steeped in Greek philo-
sophical learning, of the ‘classical period’ of Roman law in the following 
three centuries. They have also been used to justify various key features of 
the narrative about the shape and function of juristic interpretation in ‘clas-
sical’ Roman law (intellectual isolation and scientification).6 Owing to the 
belief that the ‘science’ of Roman law (whatever this means in the context 
of antiquity) was somewhat removed from the practice of law in the courts, 
the narrative concerning the development of Roman law in the late Republic 
has become largely insular (and rule- focused). Issues such as the impact of 
the political turmoil of the period (war, proscriptions, expropriation of land 
and the granting of greater rights to the Italian allies, and so on) on the devel-
opment of Roman law and the operation of the courts are only occasionally 
investigated, and generally to a limited extent (for example largely with refer-
ence to criminal or public law).7
Since then, this view of Cicero as ‘an outsider’ has undergone revision. 
Cicero has become part of a larger debate concerning the divide between the 
jurist and the orator in the last century of the Roman Republic and concern-
ing the nature of Roman law itself.8 Not only has it been proposed that the 
dichotomy was not as watertight as previously assumed, but it has also been 
suggested that the legal world of the late Republic was far broader and more 
diverse than the picture presented by Cicero.9 In light of these new insights, 
Cicero and the state of the law of the late Republic need to be re- examined.
This book is designed to engage with this debate. If, as has been suggested 
 3 See comprehensively Tellegen-Couperus and Tellegen in du Plessis 2013. See also the same 
authors elsewhere in this volume. An important work in this regard is that of Tuori 2007.
 4 Cf. Gildenhard 2011. See the chapters by Benferhat 71f. and Hilder 166f. elsewhere in this 
volume.
 5 Cf. Harries 2006. See also Harries 123f. elsewhere in this volume.
 6 See, extensively, on law as a ‘science’ in antiquity, Giaro 2007. 
 7 Notable exceptions are Riggsby 1999 and Alexander 2002 for criminal law and the many 
publications of Lintott on public law.
 8 Cf. Harries 2006; Saénz 2010.
 9 Cf. Lehne-Gstreinthaler 88f. elsewhere in this volume.
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by recent scholarship, Cicero should no longer been seen as ‘an outsider’ 
in the narrative of Roman law of the late Republic, the question must be 
asked whether and to what extent this narrative will change if Cicero is 
treated differently. At this point, a word of caution is required. For a project 
of this kind to deliver meaningful results, it is important to treat Cicero’s 
works with due sensitivity.10 Cicero always had his prospective audience 
firmly in mind, whether in private correspondence or in published speeches. 
Furthermore, as an orator, he was not averse to bending the facts to match 
his version of events (Lintott 2008: 33; Steel 2004: 233–52). As Lintott (2008) 
has therefore rightly pointed out, Cicero’s works can never be used as a 
factual account of historical events (at 3). Certain filters have to be applied 
in order to arrive at a more balanced picture. Nonetheless, if Cicero’s own 
comments are approached with caution (using the tools of our sister disci-
plines such as philology, literary criticism and more specifically narratology) 
and interpreted in light of the existing narrative about Roman law in the late 
Republic, a more balanced picture can be achieved. This is one of the aims 
of this volume.
In this book, Cicero’s contribution to modern understanding of the 
state of Roman law in the late Republic is treated under three headings: ‘the 
nature of law’, ‘the nature of the legal profession’ and ‘the impact of legal 
practice’. These three subheadings have been specifically chosen to provide 
a broad- spectrum view of the ‘legal world’ to use Fantham’s (2004) term, in 
which Cicero operated. This ‘legal world’ not only comprised legal theory as 
traditionally investigated by scholars of Roman law. It clearly also encom-
passed the practice of law in the courts. By sketching a panoramic view using 
these three broad headings, this volume aims to broaden the contemporary 
vision of the nature of late Republican Roman law by placing it in context 
(du Plessis 2013).
Already in his 1985 book on the rise of the Roman jurists, Frier argued 
that while the jurists played an important role during the late Republic, 
Roman law during this period was also influenced by larger societal factors.11 
Since ‘society’ is also the natural province of culture, it seems logical also to 
investigate the idea of Roman ‘culture’ in this context, especially in light of 
an emergent strand of scholarship based on Lawrence Friedman’s concept 
of ‘legal culture’.12 First coined in the early to mid- 1970s, the term has been 
10 Lintott 2008.
11 Frier 1985: 273. Compare MacKendrick and Bennett 1995.
12 Friedman 1969, 1969–70: 29–44. See also Smith and Reynolds 2014. Although contempo-
rary socio- legal theory has moved beyond the idea of ‘legal culture’, it is my contention that 
‘legal culture’ as a socio- legal concept remains particularly useful when dealing with the legal 
world of the late Republic, for two reasons. First, it draws many of its basic ideas from the 
first generation of socio- legal scholars such as Eugen Ehrlich (1862–1922) whose work grew 
directly out of their knowledge of Roman law. In second place, the concept of legal culture 
is particularly useful when analysing a period in Roman society when law and culture were 
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used with great effect in contemporary socio- legal scholarship.13 Though 
useful as a concept, it is not without its critics, who have focused their criti-
cisms primarily on two points, namely the inherent vagueness of the term 
and a general inability by its supporters to explain whether legal culture is the 
cause or the effect when it comes to legal change.
In light of these criticisms, it seems important to explain how the concept 
of legal culture will present itself in this work. While there is something to be 
said for maintaining an air of vagueness when using this term, ‘legal culture’ 
in this context will be used to denote a subset of Roman culture more general-
ly.14 Thus ‘Roman legal culture’ will be used to describe all those phenomena 
(including the economic) that can be related, whether directly or indirectly, 
to the workings of the law in the late Republic.15 This casts the net rather 
wide, and deliberately so. It is important to state at this juncture, though, that 
Roman legal culture is not a static concept. It changes with time and all that 
can really be attempted here is a ‘still picture’, to use the phrase of Crook, 
that captures the events of the late Republic.16 It is also important to remem-
ber that Roman legal culture is not modern legal culture and that conclusions 
about the behaviour of the legal profession in the modern period cannot nec-
essarily be applied to the Roman situation. Thus, for example, Friedman, in 
his earlier works, distinguished between ‘internal legal culture’ (the culture of 
the legal profession) and ‘external legal culture’ (more general societal factors 
affecting the law).17 While useful to describe certain aspects of modern law 
in the USA, this distinction should be approached with great care in relation 
to the late Republic. In fact, I would go as far as to suggest that it should be 
abandoned altogether when investigating the legal world of the late Republic. 
The reasons for this are, as more recent research by Tellegen- Couperus and 
Tellegen have shown, that the legal ‘profession’ of Republican Rome was 
more porous than first imagined.18 Thus, Roman legal culture appears to have 
been far more embedded in Roman culture and society more generally.
One of the main criticisms of Friedman’s concept of legal culture is that 
closely linked, such as the late Republic. For a survey of the work of Eugen Ehrlich and a 
modern reassessment, see Hertogh and Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of 
Law 2009.
13 See, for example, the criticisms of Cotterrell and Von Benda- Beckmann and Von Benda- 
Beckmann in their chapters in Nelken 2012.
14 See the chapter by Friedman in Nelken 1997.
15 Nelken 1994: 1–26. See Nelken for a survey of the range of meanings of the term. I have 
chosen the term ‘relate to’ rather than ‘impact on’ deliberately to enable the authors also to 
capture subtle influences.
16 Crook 1967.
17 Friedman and Schreiber 1996. The distinction between ‘external legal culture’ and ‘culture’ 
more generally has been one of the major sources of criticism of Friedman’s theory.
18 Compare the chapter by Tellegen- Couperus and Tellegen in du Plessis 2013. I use the term 
‘profession’ here with some reservation as no ‘legal profession’ in the modern sense existed 
in the late Republic.
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it fails to explain whether legal culture is the cause or the effect. It is not 
my intention to stake my claim regarding this matter here, since in my view 
much more work is required before an assessment can be made about the 
role of legal culture in the formation and change of law in Roman society.19 
It is perhaps best to state at this point both that culture can give rise to law, 
and that law can also change culture. Countless examples from history can 
attest to this. It is therefore perhaps wise not to draw the net too restrictively 
in this regard.
Having laid down these parameters, the astute observer may ask whether 
a focus on legal culture will add anything novel to the mix. Permit me to 
explain. Law is not insulated from society. It exists within and is surrounded 
by society. Law also responds to society in various ways. If this premise is 
used as a starting point, then the idea of legal culture becomes an impor-
tant tool. The late Republic is a well- documented period in the history of 
Rome.20 Not only was it a period of great socio- political change, accompa-
nied by violence and instability, but there is also clear evidence of a legal 
system in  turmoil –  the suspension of the courts, accusations of corruption 
in the courts and in the administration of justice, and widespread political 
meddling.21 Coupled with these are the profound changes to the legal system 
introduced under Sulla and a general sense, expressed by a number of influ-
ential figures during this period, that Roman law had become somewhat 
unmanageable and that it had to be written down. Among all of this, we find 
Cicero, legal practitioner and keen observer of the human condition. And 
it is in this respect that Cicero becomes indispensable. As someone who 
not only lived the period, but was also actively involved in legal practice, 
Cicero’s ‘legal consciousness’ (that is, how he responded to the law and 
turned to the law when it was required) provides a fascinating insight into 
the period.
Meta- level studies such as those by Frier 1985 and Harries 2006, coupled 
with the comprehensive investigations by Watson into various branches of 
private law of the late Republic, as well as the insightful 2004 collection by 
Powell and Paterson on Cicero’s practice as an advocate, provide a uniquely 
rich picture of Roman legal culture of the last century of the Republic. In 
addition, recent works on the Roman jurists and their dialogue with Cicero 
have done much to uncover the relationships between juristic pursuits and 
legal practice in this period.22 The aim of this work is to call for a greater 
19 There is something to be said for reflecting back upon Ehrlich 1962 and his use of the term 
‘custom’ as the source of all law. ‘As late as the end of the Republic, the Romans considered 
their national customary law, the ius civile, at least as valuable as a source of law as the leges’ 
(at 18).
20 Treble and King 1930. See also the comprehensive recent works by May 2002 and Steel 2013 
and the chapters collected therein. On Roman social history generally, see Alföldy 1975.
21 It is noteworthy that many of the ‘saviours’ of the Roman Republic served a term as praetor.
22 For example, Fantham 2004.
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 synthesis between all of these different strands of scholarship, using Cicero 
and the concept of legal culture as its central focus. While a history of 
Roman law in the late Republic is yet to be written, this book is an initial 
attempt to start the conversation.
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A Barzunesque View of Cicero:  
From Giant to Dwarf and Back
Philip Thomas*
1. PROLOGUE
Cicero’s cover letter to Trebatius introducing his Topica has been a frequent 
object of study in attempts to interpret the source of this work.1 However, 
another letter to Trebatius is deserving of attention.2 Cicero wrote to 
Trebatius since the latter had mocked him during drinks for saying that 
it was a moot point whether an heir can institute the actio furti for a theft 
committed from the hereditas iacens. Once back at home he looked it up 
and made a note, which he sent to Trebatius the following day, stating that 
this opinion, which according to Trebatius was held by no one, was in fact 
held by Sextus Aelius, Manius Manilius and Marcus Brutus, but that he, 
Cicero, agreed with Scaevola and Testa. This short, informal note to a friend 
persuades more that Cicero was indeed advocate and jurist, rather than the 
positivistic criticism that he was a mere rhetorician with superficial legal 
knowledge hiding his ignorance by over- reliance on equity.
  * This work is based on research supported wholly by the National Research Foundation 
of South Africa (grant- specific unique reference number [UID] 85777); the Grant- holder 
acknowledges that opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in any 
publication generated by the NRF- supported research are those of the author, and that the 
NRF accepts no liability whatsoever in this regard.
 1 Cic. Fam. 7.19; Reinhardt 2003: 368f.
 2 Fam. 7.22. ‘Illuseras heri inter scyphos, quod dixeram controversiam esse, possetne heres, 
quod furtum antea factum esset, furti recte agere. Itaque, etsi domum bene potus seroque 
redieram, tamen id caput, ubi haec controversia est, notavi et descriptum tibi misi: ut scires 
id, quod tu neminem sensisse dicebas, Sext. Aelium, M. Manilium, M. Brutum sensisse. Ego 
tamen Scaevolae et Testae assentior.’ (‘You made game of me yesterday over our cups for 
saying that it was a moot point whether an heir can properly take action for theft in respect 
of a theft previously committed [fn. 837. i.e. in the interval between the testator’s death and 
the heir’s taking possession]. So when I got home, though late and well in tipple, I noted 
the relevant section and send you a transcript. You will find that the view which, according 
to you, has never been held by anybody was in fact held by Sext. Aelius, Manius Manilius, 
and M. Brutus. However, for my part I agree with Scaevola and Testa.’ Translation by D. R. 
Shackleton Bailey.) It is difficult to understand how Harries 2006: 44 interprets this letter as 
‘a somewhat inebriated consultation of Q. Mucius’.
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2. INTRODUCTION
The global modernisation of legal studies makes the perennial question 
whether the law is an art, a craft or a science topical. In his short story 
‘In the Park’ Primo Levi3 created a fantastic country inhabited by literary 
characters. There are five or six Cleopatras: Pushkin’s, Shaw’s, Gautier’s, 
Shakespeare’s version, and so on. Some years after his arrival Antonio 
notices that he is becoming diaphanous and understands that the memory 
of him is extinct. He takes leave of his new friends and waits for his flesh 
and spirit to dissolve into light and wind. The relevance of this fiction to this 
chapter is twofold: for centuries many versions of Cicero have competed, 
but in Capogrossi Colognesi’s ‘Un futuro senza storia?’4 Cicero will become 
more transparent5 eventually turning into the invisible man. Evelyn Waugh 
parodied this development in his novella ‘Scott- King’s Modern Europe’: in 
1946 Scott- King had been a classical master at Granchester for twenty- one 
years. When he arrived the school was almost equally divided into a classical 
and a modern side. Now out of 450 boys scarcely fifty read Greek. When 
the school reassembled in September the headmaster told him that the year 
started with fifteen fewer classical specialists as parents wanted to qualify 
their boys for jobs in the modern world and stated that there may be some-
thing of a crisis ahead.6
The above literary fragments are metaphors for Roman law and legal 
history. It is a tragic irony that as modern research in these disciplines sub-
jects the tenets propounded in the great treatises of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries to critical analysis and develops new interpretative narratives, 
these contributions remain limited to a diminishing elite,7 while the desired 
interdisciplinary collaboration proves an illusion even within the faculties. 
A regrettable by- product is that the supra- national codification of wisdom 
on the internet relies on the traditional version of dated or dating standard 
works. The purpose of this chapter is to link a number of new ideas, thus 
spinning a web that may hopefully provide a safety net for the casualties of 
unquestioning positivism. Gero Dolezalek explains his choice of expertise 
on the basis that the people and ideas at the beginning of a movement are 
interesting and important. In legal practice, however, the compilers at the 
 3 Levi 2007: 57–71. Baldini 2006: 65–73 explains how in the first story the writer Antonio 
Casella encountered James Collins, a character he had created. Collins told him about the 
park in which all literary characters live as long as they are remembered. Casella writes his 
autobiography so he can live in this park as well.
 4 Capogrossi Colognesi 2011: 43–57.
 5 Chalkomatas 2004, in his review of Tobias Reinhardt’s Marcus Tullius Cicero, Topica, 
rejoices in the number of modern commentaries on some of the major works of Cicero 
published in the recent past.
 6 Waugh 1967: 195–250.
 7 Elite simply means the best of a kind.
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finish are indispensable tools and authorities. This has made Justinian’s 
codification the focus of both study and practice of law during many centu-
ries, while the pre- classical paradigm shift has been contained in an outdated 
continental European narrative.8
Diliberto has convincingly argued that the ‘system’ of the Twelve Tables 
is anachronistic,9 but his work has also demonstrated that the source mate-
rial makes the development of an alternative theory a gigantic if not fantastic 
enterprise. Reconstructing the sources of classical Roman law has met with 
more success, but as both humanists and interpellationists became a danger 
to legal certainty as well as legal theory, the codification bell has tolled for 
both paradigms. This chapter intends to follow the communes opiniones that 
classical Roman law represents the zenith of Roman law and Roman juris-
prudence; that the latter was perfected by the great jurists of this period; 
that great changes in legal practice and jurisprudence had taken place during 
the last centuries of the Republic and that Greek culture pervaded Roman 
society during the same period. The proposition is that application of 
Barzun’s theory of aspect10 to the person of Cicero is overdue and that to 
view this thinker from a different perspective may lead to a reassessment of 
his place in the development of Roman jurisprudence. Arguments will be 
found in places as different as the so- called divides between common law and 
civil law and orators and jurists, Schulz’s Geschichte,11 legal argumentation 
and artificial intelligence, Tobias Reinhardt’s Marcus Tullius Cicero, Topica, 
and the work of the Tellegens and Tuori.
3. THE COMMONALITIES BETWEEN ROMAN LAW AND 
ENGLISH LAW
The traditional view is to point out the divide between civil law and common 
law, which is then explained by the fact that civil law is based on Roman 
law. However, in the chapter ‘Common law and civil law: neighbours yet 
strangers’, Van Caenegem12 draws attention to the fact that modern civil 
law is based on the academic teaching and study of the Corpus Iuris Civilis. 
However, Roman law of the classical period was much closer to the English 
common law than to modern civil law systems and their foundation, learned 
Roman law, as studied and taught at European universities. This  observation 
 8 Established during the second half of the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century by 
communis opinio doctorum. Mommsen (1856), Schulz (1961) and Wieacker (1965, 1967) are 
used in this chapter as examples of authoritative protagonists of this paradigm.
 9 Diliberto 2005: 217–39.
10 Barzun 2000: 47–8, 174, 246–7, 250, 253, 430–1, 435–7, 568–74, 652–6, 759–63, 768–9.
11 Schulz 1961: 44–117 decribes his vision of ‘Die Hellenistiche Periode der Römischen 
Rechtswissenschaft’. In spite of his scathing opinion of Cicero’s legal knowledge, his foot-
notes show that he relies for his source material virtually exclusively on this ‘non- jurist’.
12 Van Caenegem 2002: 38ff.
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had been made in 1935 by Pringsheim13 and taken up and amplified by 
Stein.14 Van Caenegem sets out the differences between the two legal tradi-
tions, but accentuates that the differentiating characteristics were shaped 
during the second period of Roman law, in other words between the twelfth 
and twentieth centuries.
It is obvious that Van Caenegem addresses the position of the judge and 
the adversarial/inquisitorial divide. Another aspect in this context, namely 
that the civil law adheres to the curia ius novit principle15 while the common 
law relies on judicial unpreparedness,16 is of relevance for the argument 
of this chapter. In the adversarial procedure of the common law the court 
is limited to the legal arguments raised by parties.17 Viscount Kilmuir has 
remarked that the first and most striking feature of the common law is that it 
puts justice before truth,18 and it can be argued that this characteristic shared 
between original Roman law and common law is often neglected. The pre-
dominance of the law of procedure as the engine of legal development and 
the oral courtroom tradition are other similarities of note,19 which brings us 
to the distinction between jurists and orators.
4. THE DIVIDE BETWEEN ADVOCATES AND LAWYERS?
An interesting aspect of the causa Curiana is the legal representation of the 
respective parties, namely Quintus Mucius Scaevola and Marcus Licinius 
Crassus,20 who had been consuls together previously. Volumes have been 
filled with the literature on this case from Cicero21 onwards. It is impossi-
ble to address all interpretations and references to Stroux,22 and Vaughn,23 
Wieacker24 and Tellegen and Tellegen- Couperus,25 must suffice to provide 
beacons of orientation. In particular the work of the last two authors has 
introduced persuasive arguments that the separation of the professions and 
the absolute beliefs in the law/rhetoric, jurist/orator divides are question-
able, and the product of nineteenth- century Dichtung rather than Wahrheit. 
13 Pringsheim 1935: 347–65. Contra Watson 1990: 247–68.
14 Stein 1991–2: 1591–603.
15 Thomas 2012: 237–53; 2014c: 341–53.
16 Mann 1977: 369; von Wobeser 2011: 201; Baxter 1979: passim.
17 The curia ius novit principle is unknown in the common law tradition. Cowen 2004: 7; Mann 
1977: 368; Zimmermann 1984: 306.
18 Baxter 1979: 535. Viscount Kilmuir 1960: 42–3.
19 Birks 1987: 446–50, in particular 447 fn.10; Laws 2002: 401–16.
20 Wieacker 1967: 151–64.
21 Inv. rhet. 2.122f; Caecin. 51ff, 67ff; De or. 1.180, 1.242ff, 2.24, 2.140f, 2.220ff; Brut. 39, 44f, 
52, 149–53, 199; Top. 44.
22 Stroux 1926: passim.
23 Vaughn 1985: passim.
24 Wieacker 1967: passim.
25 Tellegen and Tellegen- Couperus 2000: passim.
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It is ironic that the seed for the division of labour can be found in Cicero’s 
own œuvre, in particular Pro Murena. However, the facts of this case should 
be remembered to place Cicero’s argument that under the circumstances 
an experienced war hero should be at the helm of the Roman state rather 
than a jurist, however excellent. In his comparison between military and 
legal experience and their suitability to defend the state against her enemies, 
Cicero parodies legal practitioners as obsessed with bagatelles, but includes 
himself in their ranks.26 Another text upon which the theory regarding the 
dichotomy between law and rhetoric has been built has been Cicero’s bon 
mot on how Gallus27 used to say that ‘this is not a matter for the law, but for 
Cicero’, when anyone came to him with a case revolving around facts.28 The 
Tellegens have clearly and definitely dealt with this question.29 However, 
it should be mentioned that the notion that factual questions are outside 
the domain of the jurist is questionable. In his inaugural lecture at the 
University of Cape Town, Gero Dolezalek stated the obvious, namely that 
most cases are decided on the facts and that in order to find some interest-
ing points of law thousands of pages of mere fact- finding have to be read.30 
It is quite another matter that within the profession, division of labour and 
specialisation have established certain corners where the experts do not 
deal with factual questions. It is also a commonplace that within each pro-
fession a hierarchy develops and snide remarks abound. ‘Nihil hoc ad ius; 
ad Ciceronem’ may be one of these. Even today some advocates have very 
successful practices without setting foot in the courtroom, and Cicero has 
the last word in Topica 71:
If to support citizens with advice and do it with help are to be held in the same 
esteem, then those who give advice on legal matters and those who defend people 
26 Mur. [21] ‘Summa in utroque est honestas, summa dignitas; quam ego, si mihi per Servium 
liceat, pari atque eadem in laude ponam. Sed non licet; agitat rem militarem, insectatur totam 
hanc legationem, adsiduitatis et operarum harum cotidianarum putat esse consulatum. 
“Apud exercitum mihi fueris” inquit; “tot annos forum non attigeris; afueris tam diu et, cum 
longo intervallo veneris, cum his qui in foro habitarint de dignitate contendas?” Primum 
ista nostra adsiduitas, Servi, nescis quantum interdum adferat hominibus fastidi, quantum 
satietatis. Mihi quidem vehementer expediit positam in oculis esse gratiam; sed tamen ego 
mei satietatem magno meo labore superavi et tu item fortasse; verum tamen utrique nostrum 
desiderium nihil obfuisset.’
27 The jurist Gaius Aquilius Gallus (c. 116–44 bc), a pupil of Quintus Mucius Scaevola. Gallus 
was a friend of Cicero and praetor during the same year as the latter (66 bc).
28 Top. 51: ‘Nihil hoc ad ius; ad Ciceronem, inquiebat Gallus noster, si quis ad eum tale quid 
retulerat, ut de facto quaereretur.’
29 Tellegen- Couperus and Tellegen 2006: 381–408 and 382 fn.2 for their earlier publications on 
the topic.
30 Dolezalek 1989: 18: ‘All experienced lawyers know from practice that most cases do not pose 
any problem of law so that only the facts of the case need to be disputed. Evidence is brought 
to prove the contested facts and the judge merely has to decide whether the evidence was or 
was not satisfactory.’
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in court must have equal share of glory; but the first holds; therefore what follows 
(holds).31
Wieacker professed his belief in this segregation in his monograph Cicero 
als Advokat, where he states categorically that as a rule in the courtroom 
none of the participants is a lawyer, as the jurists remain outside and above 
the case.32 Nevertheless he also opined that Cicero was usually well- informed 
concerning the law,33 but as an advocate had a cavalier attitude vis-à-vis the 
truth, as he used every trick in the book to persuade rather than convince.34 
However, his archetype jurist Scaevola had proven himself well versed in 
rhetoric and when so required would argue the opposite view.35 Moreover, 
Wieacker’s example of how a real Roman jurist would have condensed the 
case into two sentences and answered respondi posse, saving us the reasoning 
as trivial and a waste of words, provides no insight into the never- to-be- 
equalled art of decision making.36 Finally, Wieacker’s opinion that the causa 
Curiana had been wrongly decided37 is illustrative of the continental profes-
sor38 during the nineteenth and greater part of the twentieth century and 
outside the world of both common law and pre- classical Roman law.
Another literary character to provide context and support regarding the 
multiple divisions and hierarchies within the ranks of lawyers is Soames 
Forsyte, the main character in The Forsyte Saga and its sequel, A Modern 
Comedy.39 A prosperous and well- respected solicitor, Forsyte respects Senior 
Counsel and the Bench, but feels insulted to be called an attorney.40 This 
not only proves that it is extremely difficult to understand the different ech-
elons of lawyers in another society, but indicates how difficult and danger-
ous it is to make judgements about the position of lawyers during the late 
Roman Republic on the basis of little inside jokes by Cicero, for example.41 
However, the belief in the dichotomy between jurist and orator has taken 
root so much that it appears impossible to eradicate it. Thus, Jill Harries in 
31 Reinhardt’s translation of: ‘Si consilio iuvare cives et auxilio aequa in laude ponendum est, 
pari gloria debent esse ii qui consuluntur et ii qui defendunt; at quod primum est; quod 
sequitur igitur’, Reinhardt 2003: 339.
32 Wieacker 1965: 7.
33 Idem: 14 and 25.
34 Idem: 13ff.
35 D. 34.2.33 Idem (= Pomponius) ‘libro quarto ad quintum Mucium.’
36 Wieacker 1965: 26: ‘eine Entscheidungskunst, die sich allein durch das spezifische juristische 
Sachproblem leiten liess.’
37 Wieacker 1967: 161.
38 Van Caenegem 2002: 45f.
39 The author John Galsworthy was the son of a solicitor and studied law at New College, 
Oxford. He was called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn in 1890. 
40 Galsworthy 1926: 54: ‘“He called me an attorney,” said Soames with a grim smile, “and she 
called me a liar. I don’t know which is worse.”’
41 De Brauw 2006: passim.
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her important contribution to the history of Roman law categorically states 
that the realities of Roman ‘interdisciplinary’ thinking are not accurately 
reflected by adherence to anachronistic ‘disciplinary’ boundaries,42 and 
describes Cicero as a student of both Scaevolae who had a lifelong conversa-
tion with the law. She discusses his versatile legal authorship,43 but repeats 
the mantra that Cicero was never a jurist.44 Nevertheless, this chapter will 
express the belief that Cicero was a jurist and that he played an important 
role in the development of Roman law.
5. THE FOUNDING OF LEGAL SCIENCE
Tuori has made an impressive contribution to the debate on the birth of 
legal science.45 He clearly points out that beliefs about what constitutes 
science have always been far from uniform; in short science is all things to 
all men. Another interesting feature of his work is an obsession with system 
and science. The conclusion may be drawn that in the absence of a commu-
nis opinio, personal beliefs sway the scales, and even authoritative authors 
waver. In his introduction to the causa Curiana Wieacker states that every 
Romanist knows that the decisive achievements of Roman law had already 
been concluded during the late Republic,46 but admits limited knowledge 
and division of opinion on the influence of Greek civilisation during this 
period. In Cicero als Advokat, the same author calls the Roman achievements 
an art and places the origin of legal science in the High Middle Ages.47
In consequence, it may be advisable to abstain from seeking the origins 
of legal science and rather investigate the methodology of Roman law, as 
methodology is a less loaded term since it refers to the methods, principles 
and rules of a discipline, whether in the arts or the sciences. It is common 
knowledge that during the later Republic a paradigm shift took place, which 
laid the foundation for classical Roman law. It is also uncontested that the 
cause of this development was the influence of Greek science. However, 
42 Harries 2006: 232. See also 34, where Schulz’s definition of ‘legal science’ and ‘jurist’ are 
cited with approval, but without drawing the conclusion that Cicero was a jurist (neither did 
Schulz himself).
43 Idem: 52–5, 93 where it is stated that De Inventione reads at times like a law textbook; 134f, 
146–8 where Cicero’s work regarding civil rights and citizenship are discussed; 210ff where 
Cicero’s preoccupation with Roman constitutional law in the Philippics are dealt with. See 
Hilder 166f. elsewhere in this volume.
44 Even the title Cicero and the Jurists gives an indication. Express statements of this belief are 
numerous, for example at 27, 37, 56, 68, 101, 104, 230. See also 50, where a definition of 
lawyer is not offered. Also Watson 1991: 101.
45 Tuori 2007: 21–69.
46 Wieacker 1967: 151.
47 Wieacker 1965: 27: ‘Als die Europäer im Hochmittelater durch die Digesten mit dieser 
grossen Kunst der römischen Juristen bekannt wurden, entwickelte sich daraus für alle 
Zeiten eine sachlich und technisch bestimmte Rechtswissenschaft.’
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agreement is limited to eliminating Euclid as a force in this regard, as no 
unanimity appears possible as to whether philosophy or rhetoric, and which 
school and/or which scholar, was influential.
6. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, TOPICA
Corpus Christi professor Tobias Reinhardt provides impetus to the renais-
sance of Cicero with his editio maior of the neglected Topica.48 Reinhardt has 
established a modern, authoritative text with critical apparatus, translation 
and commentary, preceded by an extensive introduction, that makes invalua-
ble contributions to the various disciplines of which he is a maestro,49 as well as 
to Roman law, legal history and legal argumentation. However, the unavoid-
able hazard of interdisciplinary work is that it is impossible to gauge whether 
the authorities of other disciplines reflect submerging or emerging paradigms. 
As to be expected, Reinhardt’s focus is more directed to Cicero’s sources in 
the Greek and Hellenistic literature than to any potential original contribution 
to legal methodology by Cicero himself. Thus the introduction to Topica and 
the cover letter to Trebatius are taken at face value and not as false modesty.50
6.1 Thetical rhetoric
Reinhardt draws attention to the fact that Cicero had a predilection for 
abstraction and in consequence made a distinction between thetical and 
hypothetical rhetoric.51 A perfect example is found in Pro Caecina, where 
Cicero moves from the hypothesis of Caecina to the thesis of the rule of 
law.52 Cicero credits Aristotle for this methodology and refers to the latter’s 
teaching of topics as indications of where to find arguments to speak genera-
tim, that is on a general level.53 In the Orator Cicero refers to the importance 
48 Reinhardt 2003: passim.
49 Ancient rhetoric and poetics, Latin literature and ancient philosophy.
50 Cic. Fam. 7.19. Reinhardt 2003: 177–81, 369f. The same excuse for writing as well as the 
‘no books available’ story was still in use more than sixteen centuries later. De Groot wrote 
a book, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, ostensibly for the instruction of his 
nephews as he claimed in the preface, but in reality the book had other aims. It was the 
first systematic treatment of Dutch law as a national legal system. He wrote this book while 
imprisoned in the Loevestein Castle. Since he was the foremost intellectual of his time, he 
was allowed books and these were brought to him daily in a large book chest. He escaped by 
hiding in the chest and fled abroad where he spent the rest of his life. The only other refer-
ence to the nephews is found in Boswell’s The Life of Samuel Johnson, where a nephew of 
Hugo Grotius asked for charity as he was poor and infirm, see Butler 1826: 208.
51 For the origins of thetical rhetoric, Philo of Larissa and Cicero’s championship of thetical 
rhetoric see Reinhardt 2003: 7–17.
52 Caecin. 70–7; also Sest. 91–2; Cf. Harries 2006: 160 where she values Cicero’s excellence as an 
advocate as based on the fact that he argued not on fact but on principle in De Domo Sua.
53 De or. 44–6; Reinhardt 2003: 3ff.
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of the invention of arguments and calls this a matter of intelligence, which 
should, if possible, be moved to a general level. His reference to the status 
theory as defined by Hermagoras of Temnos54 indicates Cicero’s combina-
tion of an abstract application of this method to determine the legal question 
with topical argumentation in his Topica.55 After a short introduction to 
topoi, Cicero elaborates on the diverse sources of argument. Thereafter he 
sets out his ideas on thesis56 and links topics with the status theory.57 In para-
graphs 91ff he indicates how to find correct topics for certain theses. This is 
not the place to enter the topoi debate, and the chapters entitled ‘The short 
history of the topos’ and ‘The anonymous Seguerianus’ by Reinhardt provide 
an excellent and clear exposition of the topic.58
6.2 Cicero’s Topica and Roman legal methodology
Reinhardt devotes a special section of his introduction to the legal aspects of 
the Topica. He follows the orthodox narrative established during the nine-
teenth century and the ruling paradigm for most of the following century, 
namely that jurist and advocates belonged to totally different professions;59 
that Cicero had limited legal knowledge60 and that Quintus Mucius Scaevola 
was the founder of Roman legal science.61 As set out above these assump-
tions are no longer generally accepted. Not only has the role of private 
law been over- emphasised,62 but the absolute ignoring or ignorance of the 
common law distinction between barristers and solicitors has been made 
common knowledge by increasing awareness of comparative law, globali-
sation and legal harmonisation. However, more than anything else the 
unquestioning acceptance that for centuries ‘legal science’ operated without 
any theoretical underpinning, but on intuition and authority has become 
difficult to acknowledge.63 Reinhardt admits Cicero’s interest in law,64 and 




58 Reinhardt 2003: 18–35 and 36–52.
59 Idem: 54, 56, 59, passim.
60 Stein 1978: 184: ‘(C)icero, whose knowledge of law was superficial rather than profound’; 
Reinhardt 2003: 54, fn.4: ‘Cicero himself was not considered a iurisconsultus by his 
contemporaries.’
61 Reinhardt 2003: 53–72.
62 Idem: 54–7, 68. It should be kept in mind that in everyday life criminal law plays a bigger role 
for people and lawyers.
63 Idem: 54. Rationality always relies on method, which is one of the subtexts of Kahnemann 
2011.
64 Idem: 59: ‘Cicero has a keen interest in legal matters, which is not as obvious for a Roman 
advocate as it might seem.’
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views Cicero’s prolepsis in De Oratore65 as announcing the future publication 
of the (fictional) De iure civili in artem redigendo. Reihardt never considers the 
Topica to have been the promised book. It is submitted that the so- called 
lost work (De iure civili in artem redigendo) qualifies as a suitable subtitle to 
the Topica.66 However, a close reading of Reinhardt’s analysis of passages in 
Cicero’s other work, the causa Curiana, and the contemporary intellectual 
context justify the hypothesis that Cicero’s combination of thesis with topos 
in his Topica was meant to be the definitive textbook of legal methodology. 
It is submitted that Reinhardt himself veers in this direction: he refers to 
Cicero’s ideas about juristic methodology,67 and he suggest as much in his 
discussion of Cicero’s proposals for a reform of the ius civile68 and rhetorical 
versus legal invention,69 where he concludes that a number of Cicero’s loci 
still feature as types of legal arguments; that Cicero was the first to develop 
a theory of causality in law and how the Topica set out the methodology of 
legal argumentation.70 However, Reinhardt’s objectives were different and 
he relied on the continental legal tradition and a legal historical narrative 
constructed by authorities ranging from Schulz and Wieacker to Frier,71 
Stein and Watson to provide his context.72
Indications of the internal contradictions are for example Reinhardt’s 
comment on Crassus’ remark in De Oratore that orators have made fools of 
themselves by not knowing the law properly and Reinhardt’s explanation 
that this refers to cases before the praetor in the formula procedure.73 The 
causa Curiana clearly shows that Scaevola, an educated patrician and most 
prominent jurist, was well versed in rhetoric and a skilled advocate at the 
bar,74 which explains the character of his writings.75
65 In De or. 1.188 Cicero proposes by way of Crassus that after defining the objective of law the 




69 At 66–8. At 66 the classical point of view that a jurist will look at a case in an impartial way 
is proposed. An interesting example of the locus ex contrario is one of the foundational texts 
of international law, De jure praedae, written by Grotius, commissioned by the monopolistic 
Dutch East India Company to defend freedom of the seas and freedom of trade. See www.
brittannica.com/EBchecked/topic/153610/De- Jure-Praedae (consulted on 6 March 2015); 
also Thomas 2003: 361–82.
70 At 67f.
71 Frier 1985: passim; Birks 1987: passim; Cohen 1988: passim.
72 For the exalted role of the Roman jurist in this tradition see Thomas 2014a: 41–59.
73 At 60: ‘I have remarked above how the replacement of the system of the legis actiones by the 
formulary procedure had made the law more flexible and more adaptable to the particular 
case. However, this flexibility came with an increased complexity of the legal material an 
orator had to be familiar with (at least if compared with the relatively concise framework 
provided by the Twelve Tables and the legis actiones).’
74 Thomas 2014b: 727–41.
75 Reinhardt 2003: 57ff.
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The belief that during the second and first century bc Roman legal science 
came into being without theoretical underpinning, and that the accession of 
equites to the ranks of jurists was the main reason requiring argumentation 
for legal opinions76 should be met with scepticism. It is suggested that even 
before the Twelve Tables some form of theory underpinned Roman juris-
prudence, of which unfortunately little information exists.77 It is also highly 
plausible that during the last two centuries bc societal changes necessitated 
transparency and rationalisation in jurisprudence and that Scaevola formed 
part of this movement. This is not the place to go into detail about the topoi, 
and the question as to which were Cicero’s sources. It is submitted that if the 
late Republican legal development is re- assessed without the myth of antago-
nism between jurists and orators, but rather in the context of increased 
specialisation within the legal profession, the Topica would receive not only 
a different reception, but another evaluation as well.
7. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL 
ARGUMENTATION
The champions of ‘legal science’ believe in codification and/or in natural 
law, the system and the correct legal solution, that is to say they accept a 
number of premises as axiomata and syllogistic logic suffices. Legal historians 
are subversives as they point out that many of these axiomata have actually 
undergone change or disappeared in the course of legal history, for example 
the paterfamilias and his ius vitae necisque; the legal position of women; the 
concept of ownership78 and freedom of contract and testation. Another 
interesting critique is found in the world of artificial intelligence. Bench-
Capon, Prakken and Sartor79 commence their essay by pointing out that a 
popular belief is that artificial intelligence can do no more than deduce the 
consequences of a precisely stated set of facts and legal rules. They surpris-
ingly continue that this makes many lawyers sceptical as such a mechanical 
approach leaves out the most important part of legal reasoning. After setting 
out the development of the AI systems for legal argumentation they conclude:
Legal reasoning has many distinctive features, which include: any proposed set 
of rules inevitably contain gaps and conflicts; many of its concepts are impre-
cisely defined meaning that interpretation is required; precedent cases play an 
76 Idem: 56.
77 Watson 1991: 9: ‘(l)aw in the legal period . . . (t)he provisions taken together form a harmoni-
ous system.’
78 La Déclaration des Droits de l’homme et du citoyen. Décret des 20,21,23 et 26 Août 1789. Article 
XVII. ‘La propriété étant un droit inviolable et sacré, nul ne peut en être privé, si ce n’est 
lorsque la nécessité publique, légalement constatée, l’exige évidemment, et sous la condition 
d’une juste et préalable indemnité.’
79 Bench- Capon et al. 2015: 1–20.
22 On Law
 important role; procedural issues can influence the status of arguments; much 
legal  argumentation is adversarial and dialectic in nature; the facts of a case need to 
be selected and characterised; many decisions express a preference for particular 
values and purposes; and all its conclusions are defeasible, subject often to formal 
appeal. All of these features mean that deduction cannot provide an adequate 
model of legal reasoning and instead argumentation must take centre stage to 
allow for these contextual, procedural and interpretative elements.80
A similar conclusion is voiced by Reinhardt who states: ‘Legal decision- 
making refers to values and value- hierarchies, and corresponding consid-
erations may affect or determine the scope of a legally relevant term; it is 
partly for this reason that legal argument resists to some extent a “logical” 
treatment’.81
8. CONCLUSION
The crux of this chapter is the paradox that the main source of late Republican 
law has been written off as an orator, a non- jurist, by continental legal his-
torians. In 1965 Wieacker begins his Cicero als Advokat with the statement 
that this facet of Cicero, that is his being an advocate, is usually not part of 
the general knowledge of a cultured person. He described Cicero’s place in 
the curriculum of the gymnasiast and how his work on rhetoric, philosophy, 
ethics and politics has formed Roman and European culture well into the 
nineteenth century. However, the sheer mass of the body of Cicero’s work, 
his varied talents and interests, the date and mode of his death, the discovery 
of his private correspondence and the concomitant insight into the variance 
between the public mask and the private person, as well as the less savory 
aspects of his character, all combined to denigrate this proto- renaissance 
man as a failed politician, a translator and simplifier of Greek rhetoric and 
philosophy, a mere orator.
Tuori has dissected the foundation myth and found that in spite of widely 
diverging narratives general agreement appears to exist that for the founda-
tion of legal science two elements were required, namely Roman law and 
Greek science. The methodological foundation of Roman jurisprudence has 
remained obscure as the Romanists who researched the influence of Greek 
science on Roman law focused on Greek philosophy and followed Plato’s 
denigration of rhetoric. The discussion stagnated around the question as to 
which Greek philosophical school exercised influence, which may well have 
been one of the questions of the sphinx. It is more than interesting that on 
the basis of a few words, for example generatim, whole theories have been 
lanced, but the notion that Cicero, the principal source of information on 
80 At 17.
81 Reinhardt 2003: 219.
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both of these elements, might have been more than a mere reporter has never 
even provided the seed, let alone the thesis, that this multi- talented, Greek-
educated, versatile intellectual could have stood at the cradle of Roman legal 
methodology. Reinhardt’s commentary on Cicero’s Topica provides a clear 
indication that the methodology of argumentation derived from a variety of 
Greek authors and paradigms, which were absorbed by Cicero and reworked 
by him for application in Roman law. Although constricted by his own 
areas of interest and the extrinsic locus of Romanist authorities, Reinhardt’s 
comments clearly state that Cicero had a thorough knowledge of Greek 
philosophy in the widest sense and was prone to theoretical reflection; he 
also expected his readers to be acquainted with the basics of logic that made 
him take the underlying principles for granted. Finally, the division between 
philosophy and rhetoric varied through antiquity and of the two aspects of 
the latter the theatrical has overshadowed the theoretical, which facilitated 
the painting of Cicero’s portrait by Mommsen and continues to minimise his 
originality and contribution to legal methodology.
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Chapter 3
Reading a Dead Man’s Mind: Hellenistic Philosophy, 
Rhetoric and Roman Law
Olga Tellegen-Couperus and Jan Willem Tellegen
1. INTRODUCTION
A recurring topic of discussion, both in Roman antiquity and in modern 
times, is the connection between philosophy, rhetoric and law. Of the many 
philosophers and their schools that existed in Roman antiquity there are two 
that may have been particularly relevant to the development of Roman law: 
the Hellenistic schools of Stoicism (Middle Stoa) and the New Academy. In 
the second century bc, the Roman military conquest of Greece led to the 
Greek cultural conquest of Rome, introducing Greek philosophy and, in 
its wake, rhetoric. In that very same century, the praetor was put in charge 
of jurisdiction, legal procedure was innovated with the formulary proce-
dure, and many new legal institutions were introduced. It is now generally 
assumed that there was a connection between the rise of Roman law and the 
arrival of Greek philosophy and rhetoric in Rome. However, the question 
which of the two philosophical schools was most relevant to the develop-
ment of Roman law has not yet been answered satisfactorily.1
In attempting to answer this question, we will use the concept of volun-
tas testatoris as a case study. We will first briefly consider to what extent 
the  sources –  mainly Justinian’s Digest and the rhetorical and philosophi-
cal works of  Cicero –  can be of use (section 3.2). Next, we will summarily 
explain the modern views on the voluntas testatoris and the knowledge theo-
ries of the Stoa and the New Academy in antiquity (section 3.3). We will 
then describe the modern interpretation(s) of the causa Curiana (the first case 
in which the voluntas testatoris is mentioned), relate it to Stoic epistemology, 
and compare it with the rhetorical sources (section 4). Finally, having ana-
lysed four responsa from the Digest that are generally assumed to deal with 
the voluntas testatoris (section 5), we will conclude (section 6) that even though 
the Roman jurists did not develop a blanket theory of voluntas testatoris, if 
they did follow a particular philosophical school when solving legal prob-
lems like those caused by an unclear will, it would more likely have been the 
New Academy rather than the Stoa.
 1 For a clear and differentiated overview, see Wieacker 1990: 618–21.
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2. THE SOURCES AND THE DEBATE
In trying to determine which of the two schools had the greater impact on 
the development of Roman law, we submit as an initial observation that the 
guidance or direction offered by the sources is relatively sparse. True, the 
early Roman works on philosophy and rhetoric, of which those written by 
Cicero in the first century bc are the most important ones, do contain refer-
ences to law. In his De Legibus, Cicero describes law as ‘the highest reason, 
implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids 
the opposite’, using ideas and concepts that are typical of the Stoa.2 Yet in 
his Academica, Cicero argues against the knowledge theory (epistemology) of 
the Stoa. Then again, in this context he does not refer to law. In De Oratore, 
Cicero describes the ideal orator as being well versed in philosophy and law, 
and in the context of inventio –  the first duty of the  orator –  he shows that 
the New Academy is much more useful for inventing legal arguments than 
the Stoa (2.157–9). His other works on rhetoric too, such as the Partitiones 
Oratoriae and the Topica, are clearly linked to the Academy.3 The upshot is 
that Romanists tend to view Cicero as an eclectic and, more to the purpose 
of our argument, believe that his works on philosophy and rhetoric cannot 
reliably help ascertain which philosophical school held sway in the evolution 
of Roman law.
How about specifically legal sources? Whether the Roman jurists referred 
to philosophy in their opinions on legal problems we simply cannot know, 
because the original opinions have not come down to us. We know them 
mainly through the sixth- century collection of Justinian’s Digest, in which 
they were probably included in a much shortened form. These excerpts 
contain hardly any references to philosophy at all, the well- known exception 
being Marcian’s reference to the once famous Stoa leader Chrysippus (D. 
1.3.2). In sum, the legal sources do not appear to offer tangible, usable clues 
about the prevailing philosophical influence on Roman law either.
The middle of the nineteenth century saw the beginning of the debate 
on the indebtedness of Roman law to philosophy. It was argued and 
assumed that Stoicism had been very influential on, for instance, the con-
cepts of ius naturale, ius gentium, and ratio naturalis, and that Cicero and 
the Roman jurists alike would have known something that is comparable 
to the modern concept of human rights. To this day this view has its 
adherents,4 but it has also been disputed; while opponents admit that the 
 2 Cic. Leg. 1.18: ‘lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohi-
betque contraria.’ For the Stoic concepts of nature and reason, see Sandbach 1989: 31–4.
 3 So Gaines 2002: 475. In his early treatise De Inventione, Cicero was still struggling how to find 
a place for philosophy in rhetorical theory; thus Corbeill 2002: 40.
 4 For an overview of the discussion, see Crifó 2005: 240–69. See also Mantovani and 
Schiavone 2007 and Giltaij 2011.
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Roman jurists would have been well acquainted with the various philo-
sophical schools, they are adamant that the Roman jurists, when giving 
opinions about legal problems, would have done so without heeding 
philosophy.5
In the course of the twentieth century, the debate on the influence of 
philosophy on Roman law extended to other topics, such as the method 
the Roman jurists used. A particular bone of contention was (and is) 
whether they applied Stoic logic; this was much debated. A large number of 
prominent Romanists have assumed that they did.6 In his recent book The 
Invention of Law in the West, Schiavone argues that jurists like Q. Mucius 
Scaevola integrated Stoic logic into Roman law, thereby creating ‘a new 
way of conceiving law, which would transmute its protocols into those 
of a science without equal in antiquity, no less compact and conceptually 
dense than the great classical philosophy’. There was no room for rhetoric.7 
Nonetheless, the Roman jurists themselves do not explicitly call themselves 
adherents of Stoicism, and so the question remains whether Stoic theory and 
lifestyle really did help shape Roman jurisprudence.8
It is remarkable that in this debate it is Stoicism that has virtually 
monopolised attention. Whether the New Academy has had any influence 
on the development of Roman law has hardly been investigated.9 This lop-
sidedness may have something to do with the Romanists’ view of Roman 
law as a science, that is, as an organic system based on logic.10 The scientific 
character of Roman law is usually explained by connecting it with the dia-
lectical method that was introduced by Plato and that was also practised by 
the Aristotelian and Stoic schools. To Plato, this method meant the study 
of forms (genera and species) and was to lead to the discovery of principles 
governing the forms and explaining individual cases.11
What is usually not explained is that as a form of logic the dialectical 
method is based on two principles: the principium contradictionis –  two con-
tradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same  time 
–  and the principium tertii exclusii –  of two contradictory propositions one 
must be true, the other false: there is no third alternative. Stoicism used these 
two principles within the framework of its knowledge theory. Not only were 
these principles not generally accepted, they were in fact fiercely opposed by 
the adherents of the New Academy. Stripped down to its essence, the debate 
between the two schools turned on the question of whether it is possible 
 5 Thus, for instance, Van der Waerdt 1990.
 6 See Wieacker 1990: 630–9.
 7 Schiavone 2012: 186. Elsewhere, 198, he adds that there was no room for rhetoric.
 8 Thus Bund 1980: 145.
 9 Formigoni 1996 is an exception.
10 On this topic, see Tellegen and Tellegen- Couperus 2013.
11 Thus Schulz 1953: 62–3. There are, however, no sources to prove that the Roman jurists 
used the dialectic method to construct a legal system.
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to know anything for certain: according to the Stoa it was, according to the 
New Academy it was not.12
The question whether any knowledge can be certain may also be relevant 
in a legal context. An almost archetypal case in point is when someone has 
made a will that is unclear or that may not hold in the light of changed cir-
cumstances. In Romanist literature, it is assumed that Roman jurists, when 
interpreting such a will in accordance with the testator’s intention, wanted 
to ascertain the testator’s real, or at the very least presumed, intention. 
Consequently, and inevitably so, it is also assumed that in the jurists’ view 
it was possible to know that intention. Since infallible knowledge was at the 
heart of the debate between the Stoa and the New Academy, attempting to 
find out whether the jurists really held that view is a worthwhile pursuit. In 
this way, we may learn more about the relationship between Roman law, 
rhetoric and the Hellenistic schools of philosophy.
3. INTERPRETATION OF THE VOLUNTAS TESTATORIS 
AND EPISTEMOLOGY
In this section we will briefly outline modern views on the interpretation of 
the voluntas testatoris and the knowledge theories of the Stoa and the New 
Academy.
The concept of voluntas testatoris is related to the law of succession. 
When someone has made a will that is unclear or that may not hold in the 
light of changed circumstances, the question arises how the will should be 
interpreted. In Roman antiquity, textbooks on rhetoric like Cicero’s De 
Inventione provided various answers to that question. Similarly, the responsa 
of the Roman jurists contain many examples of the interpretation of unclear 
or ambiguous wills. In modern Romanist literature, both types of sources 
have been used to study the concept of voluntas testatoris.
Over the past century or so, the interpretation of wills in Roman law has 
generated a variety of views.13 Around 1900, it was generally assumed that 
the classical jurists interpreted unclear wills in accordance with the wording 
of the will, that Justinian favoured an interpretation based on the testator’s 
intention, and that the compilers adapted the classical texts accordingly. 
However, in 1926, Johannes Stroux argued that as early as the late Republic 
the Roman jurists had begun to interpret unclear wills on the basis of the 
testator’s intention and that they had done so by using the status theory of 
rhetoric and particularly the status verba-voluntas as introduced by the Greek 
rhetorician Hermagoras (second century bc). Stroux’ view triggered a lively 
discussion, which resulted in a wide variety of opinions, but on one issue 
most scholars agreed: there was no connection between law and rhetoric. 
12 See Hankinson 1995: 105–8, with sources.
13 Wieling 1972: 56–65.
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Today, the view most commonly held is that the Roman jurists originally 
interpreted wills literally, that in the late Republic they also used other crite-
ria, such as definition, the voluntas testatoris and the favor heredis, but that in 
Justinian law the voluntas prevailed.
The only Romanist to provide an elaborate explanation of the voluntas 
testatoris and its interpretation is Voci. In Chapter 4 of his handbook on 
the Roman law of succession, Voci discusses the voluntas in the disposi-
tions mortis causa and particularly the relationship between declaration and 
intention. In this context, he argues that they are of equal importance, the 
declaration being instrumental to the intention. If the declaration does not 
correspond with the intention, the clause is invalid. If the declaration and 
intention differ only partially, the declaration must be interpreted on the 
basis of language or logic.14 In Chapter 5, Voci discusses the interpretation of 
dispositions mortis causa: when interpreting a will, one should try to discover 
the testator’s intention. Difficult though it may be to probe the testator’s 
mind, it can be done, because the testator is assumed to have been a reason-
able human being who can be assumed to have made a reasonable will.15
According to Voci, the interpreter must first try to discover the testa-
tor’s real intention on the basis of historical, thus provable facts (the volontà 
effettiva). If that proves impossible, the interpreter can use the criterion of 
reasonableness to attribute a presumed intention (the volontà induttiva) to the 
testator. Voci distinguishes two forms of presumed intention: the volontà 
verosimile (it is likely that the testator will choose the most reasonable and 
opportune of two possible results) and the volontà implicita (it is assumed 
that the testator implicitly means to include a certain disposition in his will). 
The only time the criterion of reasonableness cannot be applied is when the 
testator’s intention appears to be contraria.16
Moving on to the second topic of this  section –  the knowledge theories of 
the Stoa and the New  Academy –  what we know of them mainly stems from 
two sources, Cicero’s Academica dating from 45 bc and the second- century 
works of Sextus Empiricus. Both sources deal with Stoic epistemology in 
the light of the criticism that Arcesilaos (New Academy, third century bc) 
levelled against the views of Zeno, the founder of the Stoa, and of the objec-
tions Carneades (second century bc) raised against the views of Chrysippus. 
The debate between the Stoa and the New Academy on the question of the 
certainty of knowledge belongs to the history of Greek philosophy. Since 
14 Voci 1963: 823–5.
15 Idem: 885–989.
16 In this context, Voci 1963: 887 and 894 refers to Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.123 twice, namely when 
introducing the real intention and when introducing the implicit intention. In this section, 
Cicero states that an advocate who pleads contra scriptum will sometimes show that the writer 
always had the same end in view and sometimes that the writer’s purpose has to be modified 
to fit the occasion as a result of some act or event. He does not refer to the writer’s real or 
implicit intention.
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our interest is in the history of Roman law, we will only address this debate 
insofar as it is relevant to our argument.
For our purpose, two issues or questions in this debate are relevant: ‘what 
can we know?’ and ‘how do we know the world?’.17 Both issues belong to 
the sphere of philosophy that was called Physics, the study of the physical 
world. Regarding the first question, the Stoa held that the kosmos is not the 
result of chance; it is a living organism. All things in the kosmos consist of 
an active, divine principle (pneuma, breath) and a passive principle (hule, 
matter), and the tension between these two principles (tonos) varies. The 
soul, for instance, has a very refined form of pneuma, being at the same time 
rational and corporal. Only these things exist, that is, they can act and be 
acted upon. Other things are incorporeal, such as time, place and emptiness.
The second question (‘how do we know the world?’) was the central issue 
in the debate between the Stoa and the New Academy. In the Stoic theory 
of knowledge, the main concept is impression (phantasia).18 According to 
the Stoics, our senses receive constant impressions that pass from objects 
through the senses to the mind. The mind can judge whether an impression 
gives a true representation of reality or a false one. Some impressions contain 
such a strong guarantee of reality that they force our mind to ‘assent’; they 
then become a kataleptic, that is, recognisable, presentation of reality. The 
crux of the controversy between the two schools was this concept of katalep-
sis, recognition.
The question was whether perception by means of katalepsis was true. 
In his Academica, Cicero summarises the discussion as follows. According 
to the Stoics, he says, dialectica was invented to serve as a ‘distinguisher’ 
or judge between truth and falsehood (2.91). Cicero, however, echoing 
Carneades’ criticism, brings two arguments to refute this statement. First, he 
states that dialectica as such is unable to provide certainty. As an example, 
he describes the so- called sorites: when from a heap of corn the grains are 
taken away one at a  time –  at what point does the heap cease to be a heap? 
(2.92). The second argument against the use of dialectica for judging what is 
true or false is the weakness of the principle that every proposition is either 
true or false. Cicero demonstrates this with the famous liar paradox: if you 
say that you are lying and you say it truly, are you lying? If such a disjunctive 
proposition (consisting of two contrary statements) can be false, neither is 
true (2.95–7).
According to Cicero, Stoic dialectica will not help settle the question of 
the certainty of knowledge. It is better to hold, with Carneades, that some 
presentations can be qualified as probable and others as not probable. 
Probability comes in degrees. In order to qualify a particular presentation as 
probable it is essential that it be unhindered by anything. Thus the wise man 
17 See Sandbach 1989: 85–94.
18 See Rist 1969: 133–51.
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will make use of whatever probable presentation he encounters, if nothing 
presents itself that is contrary to that probability (2.99).
When comparing Voci’s theory of the voluntas testatoris with the theo-
ries of knowledge developed in Hellenistic philosophy, we cannot help but 
notice a certain similarity between Voci’s ideas and Stoic epistemology: 
where the Stoics regarded all things that exist as consisting of breath and 
matter, Voci considered the will as consisting of the document and the inten-
tion. Whatever one may think of this equation, it does inspire the question 
whether the way in which Romanists interpret the voluntas testatoris has a 
parallel in Stoic epistemology. Asking the question is easy: answering it, 
alas, may not be as straightforward, but in the following two sections, on the 
causa Curiana and four responsa from Justinian’s Digest respectively, we will 
attempt to do just that.
4. THE CAUSA CURIANA
In Roman oratory as well as in Romanist literature, the textbook example 
of the interpretation of unclear wills is the causa Curiana. Details of this 
lawsuit, which was tried in about 92 bc, have come down to us in the works 
of Cicero. Certain passages in Cicero’s De Oratore and Brutus give the fol-
lowing specifics.19 A man called M. Coponius drew up a will in which he 
instituted any son(s) that might be born to him as his heir(s). Coponius added 
a substitutio pupillaris stipulating that a certain M. Curius was to inherit the 
estate if his, that is, Coponius’, son(s) should die before reaching adulthood. 
Coponius died without issue and when his will had been opened and read, 
the inheritance passed to Curius, because it was assumed that the condition 
relating to the substitution had been fulfilled. However, the heir by intes-
tacy, who was also called Coponius, denied it had and claimed the inherit-
ance. In the trial that followed, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, speaking for this 
Coponius, argued in favour of a literal interpretation of the will, whereas 
Marcus Licinius Crassus, speaking for Curius, defended an interpretation 
that relied on the testator’s intention. Crassus won.
In antiquity, the causa Curiana was a cause célèbre for reasons of rhetoric. 
It is also famous today, but for a different reason: it is regarded as having 
introduced an important innovation into the Roman law of succession, that 
is, the idea of the testator’s ‘presumed intention’. It is for that reason that 
19 De or. 1.180, 238, 242–5; 2.24,140 and 220–2; Brut. 143–5, 194–8, and 256. Also references in 
Top. 44 and Caecin. 53, 67 and 69. In Inv. rhet. 2.122, Cicero describes a similar case but does 
not add any names. These sources do not give a completely uniform description of the case, 
for instance, only in De Inventione is the testator said to have had a spouse, in Topica is the 
son said to be born within ten months, and in Caecin. 53 is the son called a postumus. Since 
these additions are irrelevant to the legal problem, we prefer to omit them in our description 
of the case.
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Romanists tend to direct their gaze towards the voluntas testatoris and, by 
extension, Crassus’ plea. A good example of this orientation is Voci’s analy-
sis of this case.
Voci regards the discussion in the causa Curiana as an important moment 
‘per la ricerca induttiva della volontà’.20 He summarises Scaevola’s argument 
on behalf of the heir by intestacy as follows: the will is invalid because of the 
inefficacy of the pupillary substitution and the non- existence of the vulgar 
substitution. The latter is the institution of a second or further heir in case 
the institution of the heir is or becomes invalid.21 Rebutting Scaevola’s argu-
ment, Crassus is said to have stated that the testator must be understood 
to have implied the vulgar substitution, because he who presupposes to 
appoint any son of his own as his heir and appoints a substitute for him, 
does all the more want a substitute for himself. In his plea, Crassus contrasts 
 strictness with aequitas, written words with voluntas, verba with res. Voci 
explains the word res as the objective situation that by itself imposes the solu-
tion on the reasonable man: the testator can be supposed to be a reasonable 
man. In this connection, res is one and the same thing as voluntas. According 
to Voci, the practical value of Crassus’ defence was that it led to the recogni-
tion of the implicit intention and more in general of the presumed intention; 
theoretically, it sired the twin ideas of the presumed intention as the testa-
tor’s intention and of the testator as a prudent person.
Many scholars have adopted Voci’s interpretation, although they do not 
always mention the implicit vulgar substitution.22 The most recent example 
is the explanation of the causa Curiana offered by Schilling.23 He suggests 
 that –  according to  Crassus –  the ‘testator had erroneously assumed that he 
would have a descendant. He had not anticipated that he could die without 
issue. Had he considered this possibility, he would probably have appointed 
Curius as heir’.
How do these theories relate to Stoic epistemology? Although neither 
Voci nor Schilling (nor any other scholar for that matter) refers to any phil-
osophical school, their way of reasoning strongly recalls Stoic epistemol-
ogy. Let us first examine Voci’s comment on Crassus’ plea and particularly 
the implicit vulgar substitution. Voci tries to reconstruct the presumed 
intention of testator Coponius by means of logical reasoning. The major 
premise is that Coponius was a reasonable man who wanted his will to 
be valid. The minor premise is that Coponius could prevent his will from 
failing by adding a vulgar substitution to the pupillary one. Voci’s conclu-
sion is that Coponius must have intended to include a vulgar substitution 
20 Voci 1963: 912–14.
21 For an example, see Gai. Inst. 2.174.
22 For an overview, see Tellegen and Tellegen- Couperus 2000: 174–81. Now also Liebs 2012: 
46–9.
23 Schilling 2014: 316.
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even though he did not literally do so. What is clear from Voci’s argumen-
tation is that he used Stoic philosophy in two ways: one, by assuming that 
the intention of the testator was a res that exists and that can be known for 
certain by means of katalepsis, and two, by constructing a line of reasoning 
based on logic.
Schilling’s reasoning also comes close to Stoic epistemology. He distin-
guishes two possible situations:
1. The testator had considered the possibility that he could die without 
issue.
2. The testator had not considered the possibility that he could die without 
issue.
It is impossible for both possibilities to be true at the same time, Schilling 
argues, so either (1) or (2) is true. According to Schilling, possibility (1) 
can be ruled out because, if the testator had considered this possibility, he 
would probably have appointed Curius as his heir. So possibility (2) must 
be true. Schilling then constructs Coponius’ intention as follows: he wanted 
the substitute Curius to be his heir. His reasoning brings to mind one of 
the principles of Stoic dialectica referred to, that of the excluded third (any 
proposition is either true or false).
This summary of the modern views on the voluntas testatoris in the causa 
Curiana and their comparison to Stoic epistemology prompt the question 
whether these views are borne out by the sources. We think they are not, 
for two reasons. First, Voci’s assumption that a vulgar substitution formed 
part of the discussion in the causa Curiana is not supported by any of the 
sources describing this case. Nor did Scaevola qualify Coponius’ will as 
invalid because of the non- existence of a vulgar substitution, and nor did 
Crassus argue that Coponius had implicitly included such a substitution. 
Second, Voci’s premise that a substitutio vulgaris would have saved the will 
is not true. Both types of substitution presuppose the existence of a primary 
heir. Coponius, however, had added a condition to the institutio heredis (‘if a 
son is born, he must be heir’). Scaevola’s argument (‘in order to die, one first 
has to be born’) would therefore also hold against a substitutio vulgaris. Even 
if a substitutio vulgaris had been added, the testator’s intention would have 
been equally unclear.
Schilling’s interpretation is not based on the sources either. He reasons 
that there were two situations Coponius could have taken into account, 
that is, that he would have children and that he would not have children. 
However, the wording of the will leaves open various possibilities. The 
conditional wording of the heredis institutio as quoted by Cicero (si mihi filius 
genitur unus pluresve, is mihi heres esto) indicates that he did not know whether 
he would have one or more children or none at all. The fact that he did not 
explicitly provide for the situation that he would have no children does not 
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mean that he did not consider this possibility. Maybe he assumed that the 
substitutio pupillaris would apply in that case as well, because as Crassus’ 
reference to common practice suggests that had happened before.24 In short, 
the wording of the will is such that the possibilities (1) and (2) mentioned by 
Schilling can in fact both be true and that it is unfeasible to reliably recon-
struct the voluntas testatoris by means of dialectical logic.
In fact, if Crassus had used any reasoning suggested by modern Romanists, 
not he but Scaevola may well have won the trial. Our point is that logic of 
any kind would not have been helpful in this case. Carneades’ criticism 
would still hold: there is no criterion for establishing the truth and dialectics 
do not help. It is virtually impossible to ascertain either the testator’s real or 
his presumed intention.
What is more, the dispute between Scaevola and Crassus was not about 
the voluntas testatoris but about the interpretation of the words in Coponius’ 
will.25 The pleas of both advocates make this clear. Scaevola referred to the 
words of the will, and particularly to the wording of the substitutio pupillaris: 
in combination with the conditional institution of the heir, it was invalid. 
Crassus did not deny that the wording of the pupillary substitution was 
inadequate, but he referred to common practice showing that for want of a 
better one this wording had been long accepted. He then added that this was 
what the testator wanted.
Crassus’ plea is a perfect example of the strategy used by the speaker who 
is attacking the letter of the will, as described by Cicero in his De Inventione, 
2.138: he will first of all argue the equity of his case. After that, he will use 
other arguments, such as stating that the author having risen from the dead 
would approve of this act or interpretation. Crassus did not found his plea 
on the testator’s intention in the sense of his ‘real’ or ‘presumed’ intention; 
he only used the voluntas in the sense of probable, presumable intention and 
he did so to support his main argument of equity. In other words, if any 
Hellenistic school of philosophy were relevant here, it would be that of the 
New Academy.
5. VOLUNTAS TESTATORIS IN JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST
In Justinian’s Digest, hundreds of texts concern the law of succession but 
only sixty mention the voluntas testatoris.26 Most of them date from the 
second century. In modern literature it is assumed that in the early Empire 
some jurists began to use the concept of the testator’s presumed intention 
that had first been recognised in the causa Curiana. According to Schilling, 
24 According to Cicero, Brut. 197 in fine, Crassus argued that ‘most people wrote their wills in 
this way and that it was valid procedure and always had been’.
25 In the same vein, Wieacker 1967: 178.
26 According to the Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae V (1939), s.v. testator.
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these jurists were not interested in subdividing the testator’s real and pre-
sumed intention in the abstract so as to develop proper technical terms. 
Only Papinian used the term coniectura voluntatis –  and he did so  twice –  to 
describe the construction based on the testator’s presumed intention.27 In 
addition to the cases in which the voluntas testatoris is actually mentioned, a 
large number of other responsa in the Digest are today explained in terms of 
the testator’s intention, even if they do not mention it.
Do the latter responsa support the commonly held view that when inter-
preting an unclear will the Roman jurists aimed at ascertaining the testator’s 
real or presumed intention? And did Papinian really develop a theory of the 
testator’s presumed intention? Of course, a discussion of all of these responsa 
falls well beyond the scope of this chapter. We selected four to begin answer-
ing these questions. The first two are responsa that Romanists link to volun-
tas even though the word is not used in them. The other two texts are the 
responsa in which Papinian used the words coniectura voluntatis.
5.1 D. 32.62
The first responsum we will discuss is D. 32.62. It stems from the second- 
century jurist Salvius Iulianus (Julian).
Iulianus, liber singularis de ambiguitatibus. Qui duos mulos habebat ita legavit: 
‘mulos duos, qui mei erunt cum moriar, heres dato’: idem nullos mulos, sed duas 
mulas reliquerat. Respondit Servius deberi legatum, quia mulorum appellatione 
etiam mulae continentur, quemadmodum appellatione servorum etiam servae 
plerumque continentur. Id autem eo veniet, quod semper sexus masculinus etiam 
femininum sexum continet.
Julian, Ambiguities, sole book: A man who had two mules left a legacy as follows: 
‘Let my heir give two muli which shall be mine when I die.’ He left no muli but two 
mulae. Servius replied that the legacy was due, for mulae are included under the 
term muli, just as servae are generally included under the term servi. This may be 
caused by the fact that the male sex always also includes the female.28
In this responsum, Julian quotes Servius Sulpicius Rufus (Servius), a contem-
porary and friend of Cicero’s, and the most prominent jurist of his day. It 
is important to note that this responsum was selected by the compilers from 
Julian’s liber singularis de ambiguitatibus; it is included in book D. 32 entitled 
De legatis et fideicommissis. D. 32.62 deals with a legatum per damnationem in 
which the testator bequeathed two mules with the additional remark qui mei 
27 Schilling 2014: 317–20 lists opinions of Labeo (D. 33.2.41), Celsus pater (D. 31.29 pr.), Celsus 
filius (possibly as advisor of Emperor Hadrian, in Paul. D. 5.2.28), Africanus (D. 32.64), and 
Q. Cerv. Scaevola (D. 31.89.1). However, in none of these texts can the testator’s intention 
be regarded as a presumed intention.
28 The translations of this and the following Digest texts are based on those in Watson 1985.
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erunt cum moriar, ‘which shall be mine when I die’. When he wrote his will, 
he owned two he- mules. When he died, he owned two she- mules. The ques-
tion arose whether the bequest of the mules was owed. Servius said it was, 
because she- mules are regarded as having been included under he- mules. 
He underpins his opinion by comparing this case with female slaves, who 
are usually understood to be included in the word slaves. Julian agrees with 
Servius and rephrases his responsum in a general sense: ‘This may be caused 
by the fact that the male sex always also includes the female.’
The last sentence of this responsum has evoked a considerable amount 
of comment in modern Romanist literature.29 We will look at the observa-
tions of two scholars who interpreted it referring to the testator’s intention: 
Wieling and Harke. In his book on the interpretation of wills in Roman law, 
Wieling analyses this responsum in the context of interpretation by means 
of definitions and grammar.30 He states that definitions were often used by 
Roman jurists to ascertain the meaning of concepts. In all these cases, the 
point in question is whether a particular word is defined in a strict sense or 
whether the intention of the testator may have influenced the meaning of the 
concept. A number of such definitions suggest that they have an absolute 
meaning, as in the last sentence of D. 32.62, where Julian states that the male 
sex always includes the female. Wieling, however, argues that there cannot 
have been such a general view: it is easy to think of examples in which this 
view would lead to preposterous outcomes and in which Julian would cer-
tainly decide otherwise. Even so, Wieling thinks it is clear that Julian did not 
allow the testator’s intention to influence the meaning of the word muli and 
that Julian conceivably abided by this decision as long as it did not clearly 
lead to results that are ‘unsachgemäss’ (wrong).
Harke, on the other hand, thinks that Julian did allow the testator’s inten-
tion to influence the interpretation of the word muli.31 In his view, Julian 
assumed that the testator’s experience in life would determine what could be 
expected to be the testator’s intention regarding the mules. This view forms 
part of Harke’s theory that verba and voluntas were supplementary, not com-
petitive, criteria.
We disagree with Wieling’s comment on D. 32.62, because, in our view, 
the legal problem in this case does not turn on definition. Cicero describes 
definition as a phrase that explains what the thing defined is (quid sit).32 In this 
case, however, neither Servius nor Julian explains what a mule is; they merely 
explain that the word mulus is used in various ways. The legal problem, then, 
is caused by the vague, imprecise use of this word in the will in question. In 
29 See Fiuris (Archivio elettronico per l’interpretazione delle fonti giuridiche romane: CD- ROM by 
Pierangelo Catalano and Francesco Sitzia) ad loc.
30 Wieling 1972: 120–1.
31 Harke 2012: 64.
32 Cicero, Top. 26.
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other words, the legal problem turns on ambiguity, which may well be pre-
cisely why Julian included this case in his book De ambiguitatibus. He solved 
the problem by referring to the general usage of the word.33 Julian did not in 
any way consider the testator’s intention, presumed or otherwise.
Harke’s comment does not seem very convincing either; Julian does not 
refer to the testator’s experience in life, let alone to his intention, and we 
therefore cannot accept that this responsum supports Harke’s theory about 
the use of verba and voluntas in Roman law.
We think Julian’s opinion can best be explained by means of Cicero’s 
description of the rhetorical status ambiguitas in his De Inventione. In 2.116, 
he begins to describe the controversies that turn upon written documents, 
that is, when some doubt arises from the nature of the writing. Such doubt 
comes from ambiguity, from the letter and intent, from conflict of laws, 
from reasoning by analogy and from definition. A controversy arises from 
ambiguity when there is doubt as to what the writer meant because the 
written statement has two or more meanings. After giving an example of 
such a controversy, Cicero offers various arguments that can be useful:
Primum, si fieri poterit, demonstrandum est non esse ambigue scriptum, prop-
terea quod omnes in consuetudine sermonis sic uti solent eo verbo uno pluri-
busve in eam sententiam in quam is qui dicet accipiendum esse demonstrabit.
In the first place it should be shown, if possible, that there is no ambiguity in the 
statement, because in ordinary conversation everyone is accustomed to use this 
single word or phrase in the sense in which the speaker will prove that it should 
be taken.34
When we compare Julian’s approach of the mulae problem with this instruc-
tion, it is clear that Julian did exactly what rhetorical theory as described 
by Cicero suggested. No reference is made to the testator’s intention; the 
problem turns on the ambiguous wording of the will and is solved with a 
reference to customary language.
5.2 D. 34.5.28
The second text that lacks the word voluntas but that Romanists regard as 
referring to the testator’s presumed intention stems from Javolenus: D. 
34.5.28:
Iavolenus libro tertio ex posterioribus Labeonis. Qui habebat Flaccum fullonem 
et Philonicum pistorem, uxori Flaccum pistorem legaverat: qui eorum et num 
uterque deberetur? Placuit primo eum legatum esse, quem testator legare sensis-
33 In the same vein, Voci 1963: 832 fn. 30 and Torrent 1971: 666–7. Winkler 2013: 216 states 
that the Stoics would have called this case an example of simple homonymy.
34 Translation of this and the two following sections by Hubbell 1976.
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set. quod si non appareret, primum inspiciendum esse, an nomina servorum 
dominus nota habuisset: quod si habuisset, eum deberi, qui nominatus esset, 
tametsi in artificio erratum esset. Sin autem ignota nomina servorum essent, pis-
torem legatum videri perinde ac si nomen ei adiectum non esset.
Javolenus, From the Posthumous Works of Labeo, Book 3: A man who owned a 
fuller called Flaccus and a baker called Philonicus legated: ‘Flaccus the baker’ to 
his wife. Is only one of them to be delivered and, if so, which one? Or are both to 
be delivered? It was decided that in the first instance that slave was legated whom 
the testator thought he was legating, but that if this was not clear, the first thing 
to consider was whether the owner knew the names of his slaves. If he did, then it 
is the slave who is named that should be delivered, the error being supposed to lie 
in the description of his trade. But if he did not, then it is the baker who should be 
deemed to have been legated just as if no name had been given to him.
Javolenus’ third book on Labeo’s posthumous work deals with legacies.35 
The responsum has come down to us in D. 34.5 De rebus dubiis. The case is 
fairly straightforward, but is complicated by what looks like an unfortunate 
mix- up. Someone had two slaves: Flaccus who was a fuller and Philonicus 
who was a baker. In his will, the testator left the baker Flaccus to his wife. 
Almost inevitably, the question arose which of the two slaves was owed, or 
perhaps whether both were.
To date, this text has been explained in terms of the testator’s intention.36 
By way of example, we will look at Voci’s comment. He deals with D. 
34.5.28 in the context of falsa demonstratio, the problem that arises when the 
testator has added a wrong description to a person or thing mentioned in his 
will, for instance in a legacy.37 Does such a falsa demonstratio invalidate the 
legacy? According to Voci, it does when the description is essential, and it 
does not when the description is only accessory; it is the testator’s intention 
that determines whether the description is essential or accessory. Voci refers 
to D. 34.5.28 to make his point. Does it support his conclusion?
According to Voci, the question to be decided in this case is which of 
the two slaves has been validly bequeathed. He begins his analysis by stating 
that the responsum contains a distinction that links up with a general rule of 
interpretation: first, one has to ascertain the testator’s real intention, and if 
that is not possible one can try to assess what the testator can most likely 
have wanted. Voci recognises this distinction in D. 34.5.28. As to the first 
part of the responsum (‘eum legatum esse, quem testator legare sensisset’), 
he discusses several situations in which it is clear what the testator meant. 
Here, the testator’s real intention determines whether the falsa demonstratio 
35 Lenel 1889: I 307 (no. 192).
36 See for instance, Gandolfi 1966: 92–3 with older literature; Wieling 1972: 53; Backhaus 1981: 
122–5.
37 Voci 1963: 850–3.
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is essential or accessory. In the second part of the text, dealing with the situa-
tion in which it is not clear which slave was meant, Javolenus offers a double 
criterion based on the common practice that an owner did not always know 
his own slaves: whatever he  knew –  the name or the  profession –  should be 
essential. Here, the testator’s presumed intention determines whether the 
falsa demonstratio is essential or accessory.
In our view, Javolenus referred neither to the testator’s real nor to his 
presumed intention. Not a single word in the responsum supports this conclu-
sion. It is even questionable whether the rule ‘falsa demonstratio non nocet’ 
is applicable here: the question to be decided in this case is whether only one 
slave is owed, and if so which one, or both. The validity of the legacy itself 
was not at stake. This being so, Javolenus’ responsum cannot be relied on to 
support Voci’s conclusion.
The problem in this case is not what the testator thought, but what he 
wrote down. In other words, this responsum does not turn on the voluntas 
testatoris but on the ambiguous wording of the legacy. That Javolenus and/
or Labeo very likely thought so too becomes clear if we again compare this 
responsum with Cicero’s discussion of ambiguitas in his De Inventione. After 
the introduction (2.116), which was mentioned in connection with the mulae 
text, Cicero continues as follows (2.117):
Deinde, qua in sententia scriptor fuerit ex ceteris eius scriptis et ex factis, dictis, 
animo atque vita eius sumi oportebit, et eam ipsam scripturam, in qua inerit illud 
ambiguum de quo quaeretur totam omnibus ex partibus pertemptare, si quid aut 
ad id appositum sit quod nos interpretemur, aut ei quod adversarius intellegat, 
adversetur. Nam facile, quid veri simile sit eum voluisse qui scripsit ex omni 
scriptura et ex persona scriptoris atque eis rebus quae personis attributae sunt 
considerabitur.
In the next place, one ought to estimate what the writer meant from his other 
writings, acts, words, disposition and in fact his whole life, and to examine the 
whole document which contains the ambiguity in question in all its parts, to see 
if anything is apposite to our interpretation or opposed to the sense in which our 
opponent understands it. For it is easy to estimate what it is likely that the writer 
intended from the complete context and from the character of the writer, and 
from the qualities which are associated with certain characters.
In this entry, the writer’s intention is mentioned twice. When we apply 
Cicero’s discussion to linguistic ambiguity in legal cases, do his comments 
imply that the testator’s real intention should be discovered? We think they 
do not; the words sententia and voluisse only refer to the crux of the problem. 
As Cicero says in 2.116, a controversy arises from ambiguity when there is 
doubt as to what the writer meant because the written statement has two 
or more meanings. When that happens, the advocate can try to solve the 
problem by examining the writer’s other writings, acts, and so on. In line 
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with these instructions, Javolenus/Labeo examines the testator’s habits with 
regard to his slaves. He does not pretend to discover the testator’s real or 
presumed intention, but to assess what the testator probably meant and so 
solve the problem of the ambiguous wording of the legacy. The compilers 
most likely also thought he did, for they included this responsum in title 34.5 
De rebus dubiis, on ambiguous cases.
5.3 D. 31.78.1
The other two texts we will discuss are the responsa in which Papinian used 
the words coniectura voluntatis. The first one is D. 31.78.1:
Papinianus libro nono responsorum. Cum post mortem emptoris venditionem 
rei publicae praediorum Optimus Maximusque Princeps noster Severus Augustus 
rescindi heredibus pretio restituto iussisset, de pecunia legatario, cui praedium 
emptor ex ea possessione legaverat, coniectura voluntatis pro modo aestimationis 
partem solvendam esse respondi.
Papinian, Responsa, Book 9. When after the death of the buyer our best and great-
est Emperor Severus Augustus ordered that a sale of public property should be 
rescinded and the price restored to his heirs, I replied in the matter of this money 
that following the conjectured intention of the testator the appropriate part of the 
value should be paid to the legatee to whom the buyer had made a legacy of part 
of the public land possessed in this way.
Book 9 of Papinian’s Responsa addresses fideicommissa.38 The compilers 
included the responsum in D. 31 de legatis et fideicommissis. The case is rather 
complicated. Around the year 170, someone bought public land. Later, he 
drew up a will in which he left part of this land to a legatee. When in due 
course he died, his heirs accepted the inheritance and the legatee became 
owner of the land. Sometime later, the Emperor Septimius Severus 
decided to rescind the sale of the land and to pay back the purchase price. 
The land became public property again and the heirs as successors to the 
buyer received the purchase price. The legatee who had lost his legacy 
claimed part of the price from the heirs. Papinian was asked for advice and 
his reply was that the testator would probably want the heirs to pay the 
legatee an equivalent of the value of the land that had been bequeathed to 
him.
This responsum has attracted very little attention from modern Romanists.39 
Recently, Schilling referred to it in his paper on coniectura voluntatis. He 
states that:
38 Lenel 1889: I 923 (no. 614).
39 Fiuris reports six references, all in footnotes only.
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the testator could not have foreseen what had happened at the time of the succes-
sion and so Papinian asked what he would have wanted. He explicitly construed 
the will according to the presumed intention of the testator (coniectura voluntatis) 
and contrary to the clear wording of the will.40
In his comment, Schilling does not address the legal problem involved and 
that is why we wonder if this responsum can really demonstrate that Papinian 
‘established a theoretical understanding and technical formulation of our 
subject- matter’.41 What was the legal position of the legatee and how did 
Papinian safeguard his interests? Only when we know the answers to these 
questions can we assess the meaning of the words coniectura voluntatis.
Since the legacy concerned the ownership of land, we suppose that it was 
formulated as a legatum per vindicationem. The legatee had acquired owner-
ship upon the heirs’ acceptance of their inheritance, only to lose it when the 
emperor nullified the sale.42 Apparently (as seems likely), the legatee heard of 
the purchase price having been returned to the heirs and he wanted to claim 
part of it to make up for his loss. But how could he set about that? He could 
not use the legatum per vindicationem, because, unlike the legatum per damna-
tionem, this type of legacy could be used only to claim one’s own property 
and the land now belonged to the state. Two ways for Papinian to solve the 
problem spring to mind: to convert the legacy into a legatum per damnationem 
or to convert it into a fideicommissum.
At the initiative of the Emperor Nero, a senatorial decree had been issued 
that made it possible for an invalid legatum per vindicationem to be converted 
into a valid legatum per damnationem.43 The paying over of such a legacy could 
be claimed from the heirs with an actio ex testamento. If the bequeathed object 
was a certum, as in the case in question, then the formula would contain the 
clause ‘quanti ea res est’: if the judge were to decide that the claim was justi-
fied, he would condemn the heirs to pay the value of the res to the legatee. 
In the case of the rescinded sale, however, a conversion like this would not 
help. It was meant for cases in which the legatee had been unable to acquire 
his legacy from the outset. Here, the legatee had acquired the land but had 
lost it later, so the heirs could successfully deny his claim. For this reason it 
is unlikely that Papinian would have used this strategy.
But the invalid legatum per vindicationem could also be converted into a valid 
fideicommissum. This was a request made by a testator to one or more persons 
who would benefit from his inheritance to do something for or give something 
to a third party.44 It was originally used in cases where the ius civile would not 
40 Schilling 2014: 320.
41 Idem: 319.
42 The land will have been delivered by means of traditio, cf. Kaser 1971: 415. When the causa 
of the traditio lapsed, the delivery became invalid.
43 Gai. Inst. 2.197; see also Voci 1963: 225–8.
44 Gai. Inst. 2.246–89; see also Voci 1963: 231–4.
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allow a legacy, for example, to benefit someone who was not a Roman citizen. 
There were no formal requirements for a fideicommissum; it could be made in 
any way, even by means of a nod. The fideicommissum had been in use since 
Republican times, but at that time the beneficiary would not have had recourse 
to legal remedies to enforce performance. The emperor Augustus introduced 
a special praetor fideicommissarius who was authorised to judge claims based on 
fideicommissa, and in the second century, legacies that for some formal reason 
were null and void could be qualified as a valid fideicommissum.
Although the responsum as we know it does not say so, there are two 
reasons to assume that Papinian opted for converting the invalid legatum per 
vindicationem into a valid fideicommissum. The first is quite uncomplicated: 
Papinian included this responsum in a book on fideicommissa. The second 
is more elaborate: Papinian used the words coniectura voluntatis to support 
his view that the heirs should indemnify the legatee. For a fideicommissum to 
be valid it sufficed that the testator’s intention had been clearly expressed. 
In this case, the testator had clearly expressed his intention to leave part of 
the public land he had bought and possessed to the legatee. Unfortunately, 
the legacy had become invalid. Following the testator’s conjectured inten-
tion, Papinian regarded this invalid legacy as a valid fideicommissum. While 
the fideicommissum is not mentioned, the coniectura voluntatis is.
Papinian did not construe the will in accordance with the testator’s pre-
sumed intention (coniectura voluntatis) and contrary to the clear wording of 
the will, as Schilling suggested. Rather, Papinian used the clear wording of 
the will, particularly that of the legatum per vindicationem, to convert the 
invalid legacy into a valid fideicommissum. In other words, there is no reason 
to conclude from this responsum that Papinian ‘established a theoretical 
understanding and technical formulation’ of coniectura voluntatis. All he did, 
and all he had to do, was avail himself of the options Roman law placed at 
his disposal.
5.4 D. 31.77.8
The second responsum in which Papinian used the words coniectura voluntatis 
is D. 31.77.8. The text runs as follows:
Papinianus libro octavo responsorum. Evictis praediis, quae pater, qui se 
dominum esse crediderit, verbis fideicommissi filio reliquit, nulla cum fratribus 
et coheredibus actio erit: si tamen inter filios divisionem fecit, arbiter coniectura 
voluntatis non patietur eum partes coheredibus praelegatas restituere, nisi parati 
fuerint et ipsi patris iudicium fratri conservari.
Papinian, Responsa, Book 8. When a son is evicted from lands which his father, 
believing himself to be the owner, had left to him by the terms of a fideicommissum, 
there will be no action against the brothers and co- heirs. If, however, he made 
a division among the sons, the arbitrator  will –  upon conjecture of the father’s 
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 intention –  not allow this son to re- establish the parts that have been bequeathed 
to the co- heirs to be taken in advance, unless they too are prepared to hold up 
their father’s decision in favor of their brother.45
Like Book 9, the eighth book of Papinian’s Responsa deals with fideicommissa 
and like the former responsum, this one was included by the compilers in 
Book 31, De legatis et fideicommissis.46 The words coniectura voluntatis belong 
to the second part of the responsum. What do they mean in this context? We 
again quote Schilling’s comment:
In the second case, a testator had left particular pieces of land, of which he thought 
he was the owner, to one of his sons and gave the rest of his lands to his other 
sons. It transpired that the particular pieces of land did not belong to the testator, 
such that the disposition was void and the son would receive nothing. This was an 
outcome the father obviously would not have wanted. Papinian held that accord-
ing to the testator’s presumed intention (coniectura voluntatis), the other sons 
should purchase the particular pieces of land for their brother or alternatively 
they should pay him an equivalent.47
Schilling’s description seems to be based on Wieling’s.48
In our view, Schilling (and, for that matter, Wieling) explains the words 
coniectura voluntatis in a way that is not backed by the text. These words do 
not refer to what the testator would want his heirs to do for their evicted 
brother, but to what he would want the arbiter to do for his heirs. The case 
may be more complicated than Wieling and Schilling suppose. For a proper 
understanding of the text and particularly of the words coniectura voluntatis 
it is necessary to reconstruct the case, to assess the legal problem, and to 
analyse Papinian’s reaction.
The case: a father had left some pieces of land to one of his sons by means 
of a fideicommissum. He also divided his estate among his sons by means of 
praelegata, that is, legacies left to heirs in addition to their portion. Since leg-
acies and prelegacies had to be included in a will, the father must have drawn 
up a will and he must have instituted his sons as heirs. The father died and 
the son who had received the fideicommissum took possession of the lands. 
However, he was evicted, because somebody else turned out to be the real 
owner. The evicted brother wanted his brothers to compensate him for his 
loss but he could not make them do so. Probably, it was then that an arbitra-
tor was asked to divide the inheritance. The evicted son made a request to 
the arbitrator but, unfortunately, it is not clear what he asked.
His question is hidden in Papinian’s opinion on what the arbiter should 
45 This translation is based on that in Watson 1985, but the latter part differs considerably.
46 Lenel 1889: I 917 (no. 599).
47 Schilling 2014: 320. On the divisio inter liberos, see Voci 1963: 476–8.
48 Wieling 1972: 181–2. However, Schilling does not refer to Wieling.
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do. The relevant sentence is ‘arbiter . . . non patietur eum partes coheredi-
bus praelegatas restituere’. It has been translated in various ways, none of 
which is satisfactory.49 The main problem is the verb restituere, which usually 
means ‘to restore’, or ‘to return’. However, it cannot have that meaning here 
because the subject of restituere is eum, that is, the son, and he cannot return 
what had been bequeathed to his co- heirs. Moreover, it is not clear to whom 
he should return it. Restituere can also be translated as ‘to re- establish’, that 
is, the parts that had been assigned as prelegacies to his co- heirs.50 In our 
view, this is the only translation that makes sense. The evicted son asked 
the arbitrator for permission to bring the fideicommissum into the undivided 
inheritance in order to secure the value of the land he had lost.
The legal problem in D. 31.77.8 is caused by the fact that the land from 
which one of the sons had been evicted had been left to him by means of a 
fideicommissum. If it had been left by means of a legatum per damnationem, 
things might have been different. When a testator had made a legatum per 
damnationem of someone else’s property, the heirs charged with paying over 
the legacy were obliged to buy the land or, if that was not possible, to pay 
the value of the land to the legatee. About fideicommissa of someone else’s 
property, however, jurists held different opinions: according to Gaius, some 
held that such a fideicommissum should be dealt with as if it were a legatum 
per damnationem; others thought that if the owner did not want to sell, the 
 fideicommissum became invalid.51
In this case, the son had had possession of the land on the basis of the 
fideicommissum, but he had been evicted. His situation was comparable 
with that of someone to whom something had been bequeathed by means 
of a  fideicommissum which had from the outset belonged to someone else. 
Therefore, the main question in this case was whether the heirs should 
regard the fideicommissum as a legatum per damnationem and pay to their 
brother the value of the land (it is not likely that the successful evictor would 
want to sell the land), or whether they could regard it as invalid. A second, 
related question was whether the evicted son could make the arbiter include 
the fideicommissum in the division made by the father.
Papinian divided his responsum into two parts. First, he dealt with the 
validity of the fideicommissum: he did not agree with those who wanted to 
regard a fideicommissum of someone else’s property in the same way as a 
legatum per damnationem, but instead regarded it as invalid. Second, Papinian 
49 Watson 1985: ‘the arbitrator . . . will not allow him to restore to the co- heir (but: coheredi-
bus) the part (but: partes) bequeathed to be taken in advance’; Otto et al. 1831: ‘so wird der 
Schiedsrichter . . . nicht zugeben dass jener Sohn die den Miterben zum Voraus vermachten 
Antheile sollte herausgeben müssen’; Spruit 1997: ‘zal de scheidsman . . . niet toelaten dat 
die zoon aan de mede- erfgenamen de hun bij prelegaat vermaakte porties afgeeft.’
50 Oxford Classical Dictionary 1980: fasc. VII, ad loc. sub 4.
51 Gai. Inst. 2.262. According to Voci 1963: 254 fn.17, only D. 32.30.6 and D. 32.14.2 respec-
tively by Labeo and Gaius testify to the view first mentioned by Gaius.
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dealt with the division that the father had made in his will. There is no reason 
to  assume –  like Wieling and Schilling  do –  that the evicted son had been 
excluded from this division. The fideicommissum may have been an extra 
bonus. Because Papinian regarded it as invalid, he gave as his opinion that 
the arbiter should not consider it when dividing the inheritance. By dealing 
separately with the validity of the fideicommissum, Papinian prevented a situ-
ation in which the testator’s intention in the fideicommissum could be used 
against his intention in the division.
Let us now return to the main question: what do the words coniectura 
voluntatis mean in this responsum? Papinian used them as an argument for the 
arbiter not to consider the fideicommissum when dividing the inheritance; the 
father had made a division by means of praelegata indicating how he wanted 
his property to be divided among his sons. For one son, he had also included 
a fideicommissum. He probably would not want his division to be upset by the 
fact that this fideicommissum turned out to be invalid. The words coniectura 
voluntatis were not meant to compensate the evicted son, but to protect the 
portions assigned to the other sons. It seems rather far- fetched to qualify this 
view as a ‘theoretical understanding and a technical formulation’ of the testa-
tor’s presumed intention.
5.5 Hellenistic epistemology revisited
How do these responsa and their modern- day interpretations compare to 
Hellenistic epistemology? Romanists interpret these responsa in terms of the 
testator’s real or presumed intention, whether or not it is mentioned by the 
jurist in question, and from this interpretation they deduce the solution to 
the legal question they believe to be correct. The assumption that it is pos-
sible to know the testator’s intention meshes remarkably well with the ideas 
of Stoic epistemology. Yet, while the Roman jurists, following suggestions 
in rhetorical handbooks, do sometimes refer to the testator’s intention, they 
only appear to do so in the sense of probable intention and as an argument to 
support a desirable resolution of the legal issue. There is not even a hint of a 
suggestion that it is the testator’s real or presumed intention they are after. If 
the influence of any epistemology can be traced in the jurists’ argumentation, 
it is that of the New Academy.
6. CONCLUSION
We have attempted to show that there is a discrepancy between the 
Romanists’ interpretation of voluntas testatoris and the way the Roman jurists 
used these words. The former interpret them so that they fit their theory 
on the testator’s intention: by regarding him as a reasonable person who is 
supposed to have made a reasonable will, they can reconstruct his real or 
presumed intention. In the causa Curiana, this reconstruction generated the 
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hypothesis that the testator would have included a vulgar substitution in 
his will, and in the four responsa it led to rather complicated exegeses of two 
simple cases (D. 32.62 and D. 34.5.28) and to rather simplified exegeses of 
two complicated cases (D.31.78.7 and D. 31.77.8).
We on the other hand believe that, like Cicero, the Roman jurists used 
the words voluntas testatoris in the sense of probable intention, sometimes in 
the context of the status verba-voluntas, sometimes in another context, but 
always as an argument to support an opinion. In the fourth responsum (D. 
31.77.8) both parties would have used the testator’s intention to support 
their claim: the son by referring to the fideicommissum and his brothers by 
referring to the division made by their father. Clearly, in such a case, it is 
impossible to know the testator’s real or presumed intention. There is no 
single correct solution based on logical reasoning. The same holds for the 
other three responsa and for the causa Curiana.
In the introduction we raised the question of which philosophical 
school was most relevant to the development of Roman law, the Middle 
Stoa or the New Academy. We think they can both claim predominance, 
but in two different periods. The New Academy was most relevant to le 
droit romain romain, while the Stoa is most relevant to das heutige römische 
Recht. The Roman jurists referred to the voluntas testatoris in the sense of 
the testator’s probable intention, assuming that it is impossible to know 
something for certain. The Romanists, however, tend to interpret responsa 
about unclear wills on the basis of the testator’s real or presumed inten-
tion, assuming that it is possible to read a dead man’s mind. As Schilling 
has pointed out, this theory is closely related to modern German law and 
it is therefore tempting to qualify this theory not only as Pandectism,  but 
–  since Romanists try to design a modern theory on the interpretation of 
wills in the Roman  sources –  as ‘retro- Pandectism’. Of course, the philo-
sophical basis of modern legal science belongs to our time, but it seems to 
share some fundamental elements with the Middle Stoa. In Roman antiq-
uity, on the other hand, jurists facing the challenge of interpreting texts 
may more readily and successfully have turned for support to the New 
Academy. Cicero showed the way.
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Cicero’s reputation as a legal philosopher seems to be somehow discredited 
by his role as a politician and advocate. Despite admiration of his intellectual 
capacity, there is a prejudice that politics as well as legal practice require a 
day- to-day pragmatism incompatible with the aim of searching for a reliable, 
timeless truth. The move towards reading Cicero’s writings in context did 
not change the particular reluctance to believe in what Cicero says  or –  more 
 importantly –  to believe that Cicero himself believed in what he said. Given 
his different faces, one is prone to read his writings against the background 
of a multi- layered set of rhetorical, political or tactical functions forming his 
words and making them understandable in the eyes of a modern reader. As 
far as substance follows function in this sense, there is no place for a pure, 
abstract theory of law.
However, during the years of his political retreat after the Luca Conference, 
Cicero did develop a comprehensive and coherent theory of law and its 
nature. This theory, mainly found in his Laws and the Republic, is  not –  as 
often  assumed –  a theory contrasting man- made laws and natural law. It is a 
theory of law in the widest sense of the word, dealing with natura iuris, that 
is, the nature of law in general. This theory finds its origins in Stoic writings, 
especially in the oikeiosis doctrine; but Cicero amalgamates nomos and physis 
towards a new holistic understanding of law, which is not grounded in any 
dichotomy of leges and a higher- ranking ideal of natural law. For Cicero, 
law is  nature –  and what is not nature, is not law. Given this background, 
Cicero’s understanding of law goes beyond the idea of law as a specific tool 
among others to regulate society. Law has no function in this sense; it rather 
is the very essence of practical wisdom in a society of rational human beings. 
This practical wisdom is described as the highest form of human insight; it 
results from the very moment when gods and men join up to constitute a 
societas communis.
There is no evidence that Cicero’s legal philosophy strongly influenced 
legal practice in the long term; but I will try to show that (1) Cicero made 
use of truly philosophical arguments in legal practice and (2) the structure of 
legal practice was open enough to implement these reflections as specifically 
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legal arguments. The understanding of law as a closed doctrinal normativity 
fails to grasp the infinite and situational character of legal decision- making in 
the late Republic. There are a number of arguments, in particular in Cicero’s 
forensic speeches, which can clearly be understood against the background 
of his specific theory of the nature of law. Many of these arguments can 
 be –  and often have been – read simply as invectives or rhetorical tools. But 
a pure functional reading underrates their substantial plausibility, which 
grounds on their philosophical substance rather than on mere tactical aims.1
2. CICERO ON THE NATURE OF LAW
It is commonly assumed that Cicero’s idea of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ law is 
based on a juxtaposition of a divine category of natural law and a man- made 
category of positive law.2 This reading strongly reflects a modern distinc-
tion that dates back –  inter alia –  to the natural law doctrines of the early 
Enlightenment,3 but one can also find traces of this ‘dichotomist’ approach 
in philosophical thought before and within Cicero’s time. The antithesis of 
nomos and physis had broadly been discussed by the Sophists, in particular 
by Antiphon in his treatise peri aletheia;4 and also the Stoics, even though 
they tried to reunite nomos and physis in an all- embracing cosmic principle,5 
did not aim at closing the theoretical rift between man- made laws and the 
principle of nature.6 However, there is no evidence about similar discourses 
on the relation of positive law and any higher- ranking laws in Roman law. 
An early example of a dichotomist understanding of natural and positive law 
can be seen in Cato’s speech for the Rhodians;7 but as with the distinction 
between ius naturale, ius civile and ius gentium, Roman law did not read any 
consequences into a conflict between these different kinds of law. Thus, a 
dichotomist reading of Cicero’s legal philosophy is not anachronistic with 
respect to its distinction between natural law and positive law; but it contra-
dicts Roman law as far as it tries to establish a hierarchy among these laws.
 1 In what follows, I will present aspects I have partly published earlier; cf. B. Forschner 2014: 
21f. and B. Forschner 2015: esp. 52f., 60f., 71f.
 2 Kenter 1972: 170; Nörr 1974: 25; Colish 1990: 98; Lintott 2002: 225f. Powell 2001: 17f., 
admits that Cicero ‘had in mind no systematic dichotomy between natural law and positive 
law’, but he still adheres to a dichotomic reading; cf. Powell, ibem, 37: ‘true law (. . .) is (. . .) 
law (. . .) consonant with natural justice’; 38: ‘definition of law (. . .) from which a set of 
general laws is supposed to be derived.’
 3 See Hochstrasser 2004.
 4 Heinimann 1965. See also Ostwald 2009: 158f.; Scholten 2003: 206; Kerferd 1981: 111; 
Gagarin 2002: 65; Honsell 1993: 179f.
 5 Cf. recently M. Forschner 2014: 73–84.
 6 Chrysipp, SVF 3.308; Diog. Laert. 7.128.
 7 Cf. Gell. NA 6.3.45f.: ‘Ac primum ea non incallide conquisivit, quae non iure naturae aut 
iure gentium fieri prohibentur, sed iure legum rei alicuius medendae aut temporis causa 
iussarum[.]’
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However, as will be demonstrated, Cicero’s position was even more 
unique than a superficial reading might suggest. At the very beginning of his 
Laws, Cicero lays out the purpose behind his treatise. Here it becomes clear 
that he is not searching for a definition of different sorts of  law –  for example 
natural law or positive  law –  or a hierarchic structure putting these laws in 
any relation to each other. Rather, Cicero is trying to develop an understand-
ing of the nature of law –  natura enim iuris explicanda nobis est.8 Thus the 
Laws should not be regarded as an attempt to challenge or renew the Roman 
perception of natural law. As we will see, the Roman sources dating from 
Cicero’s time do not provide any consistent natural law theory at all, and the 
term ius naturale does not appear in the Laws even once.9 Cicero’s approach 
turns out to be radical in the true sense of the word.10 He aims to investigate 
the source from which all law originates (tota causa universi iuris ac legum); a 
source that is not to be found in the praetorian edict or the Twelve Tables, 
but is to be derived from the intima philosophia.11
Philosophy, as understood by Cicero, deals with the conditions and 
traits of a community as it exists among humans by nature. In this context, 
‘law’ is described as the  ideal –  that is,  natural –  way of organising a human 
community.12 Therefore, understanding the true nature of law requires an 
understanding of the nature of men: Natura enim nobis explicanda est, eaque 
ab hominis repetenda natura.13 Albeit Cicero’s approach seems to be collective 
at first glance, his starting point is not the community, but the human being 
as part of this community. However,  law –  as Cicero sees  it –  is not a means 
to organise a community of men against their nature. It is not an external 
command forcing the man to set aside his natural desires, and its primary 
goal is not to discipline unregulated human interests by way of coercive 
power. Law rather emerges within the man as the very essence of his reason.14
Cicero’s idea of human rationality is broadly based on Stoicism, in 
particular on specific aspects of the doctrine of oikeiosis. I will briefly shed 
some light on this philosophical background, even though the impact of 
Stoicism on Cicero’s concept of virtue is not surprising and  is –  by and 
 large –  common sense. What is more important is to consider how Cicero 
slightly changes the Stoic legacy and draws conclusions from his concept that 
a purely Stoic tradition would never have accepted.
For Cicero, human beings are the only living creatures among all others 
that are capable of sharing reason. However, reason is not primarily a human 
 8 Cic. Leg. 1.17. For a different approach, see recently Atkins 2013: 169f.
 9 Girardet 1983: 35f., 54f.
10 From radix = root.
11 Cic. Leg. 1.17.
12 Idem: 1.17.
13 Idem: 1.17.
14 Idem: 1.18: ‘Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et perfecta, lex est.’
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trait. Nature in its entirety is ruled by the immortal gods;15 and the gods let 
men participate in reason as the highest among divine capacities.16 Reason 
serves as a hinge connecting human and divine thinking; it is the feature 
separating men from other living creatures by way of establishing a specific 
kinship and thus a cosmic community between men and gods.17
It is important to see that Cicero, while claiming that all men are equal due 
to their reason, does not have in mind equality comparable to a Christian or 
a modern liberal understanding.18 For Cicero, the equality of all men is not 
grounded in their status as ‘persons’, who own an untouchable value simply 
qua being humans; and he does not even believe that all men succeed in 
gaining reason. He merely states that all men are equal with respect to their 
capacity to gain reason.19 Through this capacity, however, all men are distin-
guished from animals merely in a  formal –  that is, a  potential –  sense.20 It is 
men’s duty to make use of this capacity by developing reason and bringing 
it to perfection. As nobody owns the skills to teach himself to cultivate and 
use reason, for the open- minded man divine nature serves as tutor: by seri-
ously taking into account what he sees above him in the sky and around him 
on the hills and meadows, and by being responsive to  natural –  that is,  divine 
–  occurrences, man starts to communicate with the immortal gods.21 This 
communication will sharpen his understanding of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and 
will lead him to act in accordance with nature. On the highest level of ratio, 
human nature gains perfection; here, human and divine reasoning converge.22 
According to Cicero, this sort of ratio –  which he calls recta ratio –  is the law.23
Thus, human ratio is of an evolving nature. There exists a broad range 
between those who gain ratio perfecta (who are rather few) and those who 
gain a lower form of ratio; and a few do not even possess any traces of 
rational insight– as we will see later, those are ranked on the level of animals 
or below. This idea of an evolving human rationality is rooted in the Stoic 
doctrine of oikeiosis.24 Men and animals alike share a common instinct to 
preserve their own natural constitution and their community,25 and as a very 




18 Spaemann 1987: 295.
19 Ex neg. Cic. Leg. 1.18, 1.22, 2.11.
20 On this aspect, see B. Forschner 2014: 36.
21 Cic. Leg. 1.26: ‘Artes vero innumerabiles repertae sunt, docente natura, quam imitata ratio 
res ad vitam necessarias sollerter consecuta est.’
22 Idem: 1.23.
23 Cic. Rep. 3.33; Leg. 1.18.
24 Cicero’s affiliation with Stoic philosophy is strongly disputed in detail. For diverse 
approaches see Görler 2004: 240f.; Hirzel 1883: 488; Glucker 1988: 34f.
25 On the social aspect of these instincts see Cic. Fin. 3.65; Stob. ecl. 2.7.109.10 = SVF III, 686.
26 Diog. Laert. 7.85.
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case of human beings, a logos emerges in the course of their lives and over-
lies these instincts. Even though a newborn child is free of experience and 
behaves merely by instinct, it already has an unspecific capacity that enables 
it to develop human rationality later on.27 This capacity is understood by 
the Stoics as a prior grasp (prolepsis) of specific concepts, such as ‘useful’, 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. The Stoic prolepsis can be compared to a very first sketch28 
or a blank writing tablet.29 It does not provide the child with the capacity 
to understand a specific issue in detail and to reflect on it; but it enables it 
to collect impressions in a still undifferentiated way. Through experience, 
methodological study and habit the grown man will be able to structure his 
perceptions and to develop concepts to reflect his environment. On this 
developed level, man turns out to be a moral character. He leaves his animal 
starting- point of pure self- reference and opens his mind towards the world.30
In Stoic writings, one finds different strands of arguments explaining how 
the capacity to gain reason became part of the human mind.31 Insofar as the 
Stoics take up a theological position, they consider the whole cosmos as a 
common home of gods and men imbued with divine reason. Based on their 
shared reason, gods and men constitute a well- ordered and just society.32 
Here, the gods are seen as the source of human rationality. The Stoics also 
developed a more empirical approach, which is primarily grounded on the 
visible developments of newborn children and animals; and this approach 
seems not to be shaped by any divine metaphysics.33 But in the Laws (and, 
for instance, in contrast to De Finibus), Cicero associates himself with the 
theological strand of the Stoic heritage. This might also be for pragmatic 
reasons.34 Writing the Laws, Cicero pursued practical political aims. He 
did not intend to contribute to a purely academic debate, but he tried to 
save exactly this sort of res publica, quam optumam esse docuit in illis sex libris 
Scipio.35 Cicero’s ambitions as a politician were still (and again) high at this 
time, but in the aftermath of the Luca Conference he was forced by Pompey 
to adhere to the rules and end his fight against the reunited triumvirs. 
However, whereas the ‘official’ Cicero of this time is often regarded as a 
politically flexible or even slick academic thinker, he remained a strong and 
27 Cf. Pohlenz 1959: 56.
28 Pohlenz 1959: 56.
29 M. Forschner 1995: 155.
30 M. Forschner 2008: 169–91, 174. For a purely sociobiological understanding of the oikeiosis 
doctrine, which denies that the Stoics made a categorical difference between men and animal, 
see Bees 2004: 200f. For a critical discussion of Bees’ position see B. Forschner 2015: 61f.
31 Schofield 1995: 191f. See already B. Forschner 2014: 30f.
32 Cf. Schofield 1991; Vogt 2008. For a balanced account of Stoic theology see Algra 2003: 
153–78.
33 Schofield 1995: 191f.
34 On this aspect see B. Forschner 2014: 31.
35 Cic. Leg. 1.20.
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dedicated republican. Believing that the Republic was suffering mainly from 
moral decay,36 he  tried –  for the first time in Roman  history –  to set out the 
intellectual preconditions on which a republican society depends. Cicero’s 
theological approach was perfectly compatible with religious belief in the 
late Republic, and it surely helped him to get noticed by his contemporaries.
As demonstrated, Cicero’s concept of the nature of law is based on Stoic 
references. According to Cicero as well as to (some) Stoics, gods and men 
constitute a community grounded on their commonly shared reason; both 
Cicero and the Stoics understand law as the highest reason (recta ratio/ὀρθὸς 
λόγος), which emerges when human reasoning meets with divine reasoning; 
and both believe that men own the capacity to gain reason, but still have to 
develop reason over time. But despite these apparent similarities, Cicero’s 
understanding of law differs from the Stoic doctrine in a significant way. 
The Stoics, even though they believe in an all- embracing cosmic principle, 
never question the dichotomy of man- made laws (theseis) and the principle 
of nature (physis).37 Cicero, however, does not define lex in relation  to –  and 
thus as a potential counterpart of –  ius, but as source of all ius: In Leg. 1.19, 
lex appears as exordium iuris and, more specifically, as a yardstick to distin-
guish ius and iniuria.38
Unlike the dichotomist Stoic approach, Cicero’s concept, as it appears in 
the Laws, turns out to be holistic. Man- made laws are not measured against 
a higher- ranking natural law; they exist as law only if they are concordant 
with nature. Otherwise, they are not just seen as invalid law, but they do 
not count as law at all. This is a problem of the status of law, but it is also 
of terminological importance: identifying invalid law as law causes an error 
sermonis, which easily makes one forget the true character of law.39 Cicero’s 
theory, as developed in the Laws, does not only amalgamate lex, ius and 
natura; it also neutralises the terminological dichotomy of theseis and physis. 
Legal statutes inconsistent with nature must not be called law; they have to 
be removed from the legal discourse.
3. THE TYRANT: A MONSTER IN HUMAN DISGUISE
Cicero’s concept of the nature of law is closely connected to his theory of 
human nature. Being the substance of summa ratio, law is a product of the 
rational human mind. However, as not all men succeed equally in  developing 
36 Cic. Rep. 1.69.
37 On this dichotomy in Stoic writings see Long 1996: 218. But see Lehoux 2012: 57f.
38 Cic. Leg. 1.19: ‘Quod si ita recte dicitur, ut mihi quidem plerumque videri solet, a lege ducen-
dum est iuris exordium. Ea est enim naturae vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque 
iniuriae regula.’
39 Idem: 2.8: ‘Videamus igitur rursus, priusquam adgrediamur ad leges singulas, vim natu-
ramque legis, ne quom referenda sint ad eam nobis omnia, labamur interdum errore ser-
monis, ignoremusque vim nominis eius quo iura nobis definienda sint.’
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rationality, the law inevitably stands on fragile ground. The legal conse-
quences Cicero derives from the ‘evolving character’ of the human mind are 
illustrated by analysing his theory of tyranny.40
Cicero’s theory of tyranny is distinctively Roman, and it specifically 
reflects the problems that dominate the late Republic during the years of 
its crisis from 133 bc onwards. For the Greek world, the idea of tyranny is 
inextricably linked with the idea of absolute power. The Greek tyrant does 
not merely aim at ruling, but also owns the power to rule. This is the picture 
drawn by Plato and Aristotle,41 and it found its representation in tyrants like 
Cypselos, Peisistratos or Hippias. In contrast, the Ciceronian tyrant is less 
characterised through his real power, but rather through his intention to 
rule: For Cicero, tyrants are those, qui etiam iam liberata iam civitate domina-
tiones adpetiverunt.42 Thus, Cicero’s concept marks a shift from the objective 
(that is, the real power) to the subjective (that is, the desire to rule): tyranny 
becomes detached from the institutions of the state; instead, it is primarily 
identified with aberrations of the human mind.43
There is strong indication that this concept has to be understood as an 
answer to the challenges the late Republic had to face during Cicero’s days. 
Verres, Catilina nor  Clodius –  all labelled by Cicero as tyrants44 –  ever 
reached a position of absolute power, but as far as Cicero believes, their con-
spiracies could have successfully subverted the foundations of the concordia 
omnium bonorum. And indeed: the Republic did not finally fail due to the 
revolt of a single powerful man, but because of the weakening of its structure 
through a remarkable number of widespread conspiracies and assaults. As 
Lintott rightly pointed out, the Republic was especially vulnerable in this 
regard because of its lack of a central police power.45 In addition, its exten-
sive expansions and brutal internal  conflicts –  in particular in the course of 
the bellum civile and Sulla’s  reign –  lowered the loyalty of the members of the 
ruling class to the republican institutions.
To understand Cicero’s ‘subjective’ approach, this  last –  moral –  aspect 
is of specific importance. As not all men succeed in developing reason, not 
all men are capable of taking part in legal discourse. Therefore, a community 
of men lacking developed reason will fail to exist as a community based on 
40 On the following aspects, see B. Forschner 2014: 22f.
41 Cic. Rep. 2.51: ‘Quare prima sit haec forma et species et origo tyranni inventa nobis in ea re 
publica quam auspicato Romulus condiderit, non in illa quam ut perscripsit Plato sibi ipse 
Socrates tripertito illo in sermone depinxerit, ut, quem ad modum Tarquinius non novam 
potestatem nactus, sed qua, habebat usus iniuste, totum genus hoc regiae civitatis everterit.’ 
See also Arist. Pol. 1308b20.
42 Cic. Rep. 2.48.
43 See Büchner 1962: 116–47, 121.
44 Verres: Cic. Verr. 2.1.82, 2.3.71 and 77, 2.5.103; Catilina: Cic. Cat. 2.14; Clodius: Cic. Sest. 
125, 127; Cic. Mil. 18 (usurpator), 35, 80, 89.
45 Lintott 2004.
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law.46 Even though these men might adhere to specific laws in a given case, 
their decision to act lawfully is not driven by the normative power of law, 
but by its coercive power. They fear the consequences of violating the law, 
but they are not  motivated –  as Kant would have put it –  ‘by duty’. Their 
ignorance of the intrinsic value of law makes them prone to subvert the 
stability of the legal order: whenever political institutions break apart or fail 
to enforce the law, they will take advantage of this situation and ignore the 
legal provisions for their personal  benefit –  they only fear, as Cicero puts it, 
the presence of a witness and a judge, but in the dark they will follow their 
destructive interests: Nam quid faciat is homo in tenebris qui nihil timet nisi 
testem et iudicem?47 Law is the substance of human rationality, but human 
rationality is also a precondition to save the stability of an existing legal 
order. Thus, a true legal community is not constituted through laws enacted 
and executed by a political authority, but is based exclusively on the minds 
of its members.
Given this background, it becomes clear why Cicero’s definition of tyranny 
rather concentrates on the tyrant’s animus than on his real power. On several 
occasions, Cicero describes the tyrant as a belua, that is, as a wild animal,48 
 or –  as we will discuss  later –  as a furiosus.49 One might interpret this use of 
terminology purely from a rhetorical perspective.50 However, in Roman law, 
furiosus also appears as a synonym for a mentally disabled person.51
It is interesting to observe that Cicero does not only make reference to an 
established legal terminology here, but that this terminology also reflects the 
anthropological dimension of his own concept of human nature (and thus of 
the nature of law). As a result of the evolving character of the human mind, 
people failing to train their mind and develop rationality differ from animals 
not by their mental capacity, but only by their human appearance. However, 
some of them even lack those instincts, which all living creatures equally 
share, like parental love or the instinct to preserve oneself and one’s com-
munity.52 They are ranked below animals; and being monsters in a human 
disguise, they are excluded from the natural world.53
Killing a tyrant differs from killing a man. Just as law contradicting nature 
must not be called law, men lacking reason and instincts do not count as 
46 Cic. Leg. 1.42: ‘Ita fit ut nulla sit omnino iustitia, si neque natura est[.]’
47 Idem: 1.42. See also 1.40.
48 Cf. below fn.53.
49 Cic. Mil. 78.
50 Cf. Dunkle 1967: 151–71. See also May 1988: 129: ‘The speech is transmitted to us in an 
extraordinary rhetorical composition, often relying upon presentation of character for its 
effectiveness.’
51 Cf. D. 27.10.16 pr. (Tryph. 13 disp.). For a comprehensive account cf. Robinson 1996: 8f.
52 Cic. Rosc. Am. 63.
53 Cf., inter alia, Cic. Rep. 2.48: ‘qui quamquam figura est hominis, morum tamen inmanitate 
vastissimas vincit beluas’; Pis. fr. 5: ‘Quae te beluam ex utero, non hominem fudit.’
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human beings.54 Given that law is the highest form of reason, it can exist 
only among rational human beings. Therefore, the exclusion of the  tyrant – 
 be it through death or  exile –  is a necessary precondition for the existence of 
human community; otherwise, this community will not be able to survive as 
a legal order.
4. TYRANNICIDE AND LAW IN CICERO’S FORENSIC 
SPEECHES
In what follows, it is demonstrated how Cicero applies these abstract theo-
ries in specific forensic speeches, in particular in the speech he delivered to 
defend Milo in early 51 bc against the charge of having murdered Clodius, 
the tribune of 59/58 bc and arch- enemy of Cicero himself. In contrast to a 
predominantly rhetorical reading of these speeches, it is shown that espe-
cially as an advocate,  Cicero –  at least in his later days – relied strongly on 
philosophical foundations. The following short remarks are not aimed at 
denying Cicero’s masterly use of rhetorical tools. But they intend to shift 
attention to an aspect of Cicero’s forensic speeches that often seems to be 
ignored.55
When Cicero, in his speech in defence of Milo, paints his famous picture 
of Clodius as a tyrant, he has no mighty monarch in mind.56 Clodius is not 
a tyrant due to his absolute power, but due to his striving for dominatio: his 
conspiracies never succeed, but he does not stop planning them;57 he never 
manages to govern, but he is still starving for power.58 Thus no success-
ful usurpationes make him a tyrant, only his intentions. In Mil. 19, Cicero 
clearly points out that the reason for punishing a tyrant is not grounded in 
his success, but in his malevolent purpose: ‘minus dolendum fuit re non 
perfecta, sed puniendum certe nihilo minus.’
The anthropological dimension of Cicero’s theory of tyranny becomes 
visible when Cicero calls Clodius not merely a tyrant, but also a furiosus.59 
Here, Cicero points at the defective structure of Clodius’ mind. Lacking 
both ratio and social instincts, the tyrant is classed below animals; he is a 
mentally disabled person, detached from the overall community of natural 
beings. We can find similar patterns in an earlier portrait of Clodius devel-
oped by Cicero in his speech for Sestius: Clodius appears as a homo furibun-
54 Cic. Leg. 2.16: ‘hunc hominem omnino numerari qui decet?’; Rep. 2.48: ‘quis enim hunc 
hominem rite dixerit[.]’
55 The philosophically influenced readings of Cicero’s speech for Milo by Clark/Ruebel and 
Dyck are exceptions; cf. Clark and Ruebel 1985: 57–72; Dyck 1998: 228–9.
56 On the following, see B. Forschner 2015.
57 Cic. Mil. 37.
58 Idem: 88.
59 Idem: 78.
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dus ac perditus,60 and finally as a taetra immanisque belua.61 Being a belua, he 
is the opposite of a reasonable man; his character is bad by nature (natura 
improbus) and furiosus.62 Similarly, in his very first forensic speech in a 
criminal trial delivered in defence of Sextus Roscius in 80 bc, Cicero uses the 
distinction between those tied together by vis humanitatis and those whose 
bestiality outweighs even that of wild animals: through birth, breeding and 
the law of nature, wild animals still form some sort of community based on 
 kinship –  and thus, one might add, own the community spirit that the bad 
man lacks. Therefore, the bad man is not truly a man, but only looks like a 
man due to his human physical appearance.63 And, as Cicero claims in Pro 
Cluentio, by accusing her own son of having poisoned his father, Cluentius’ 
mother violated omnia iura hominum. She proved to be so brainless that she 
could not be called a human being; so brutal that she could not be called a 
woman; and so cruel that she could not be called a mother. Apart from her 
shape, she has totally lost her resemblance to a human creature.64
Although the anthropological dimension of tyranny is present in Cicero’s 
speeches even at the beginning of his career, what is still missing is the link 
between this anthropological aspect and Cicero’s concept of the nature of 
law. It does not seem an accident that this connection finally appears in the 
Miloniana, which was written at the time Cicero started working on the Laws 
and had probably already finished parts of the Republic. As outlined in Leg. 
1.40–2, the wicked man takes law for an external command, and led by self- 
interest, his decision to obey the law results from a personal cost–benefit 
analysis. The good man, in contrast, obeys law simply as it is law, that is, 
he recognises law as an internal command deriving from his own ratio. The 
same argument appears in Mil. 43 and 32: Here, Cicero takes the bad man’s 
hope of escaping punishment as the key to his criminal behaviour, with the 
consequence that, in certain cases, even trivial inducements might make him 
commit crimes. A virtuous man, by contrast, follows law for its own sake 
(non tam praemia sequi solera recte factorum, quam ipsa recte facta), and thus can 
overcome any temptation to act illegally, however great the external induce-
ments might be. Clodius’ disrespect of the law ([Clodius], cui iam nulla lex 
60 Cic. Sest. 15.
61 Idem: 16.
62 Idem: 97.
63 Cic. Rosc. Am. 63: ‘Magna est enim vis humanitatis; multum valet communio sanguinis; rec-
lamitat istius modi suspicionibus ipsa natura; portentum atque monstrum certissimum est 
esse aliquem humana specie et figura qui tantum immanitate bestias vicerit ut, propter quos 
hanc suavissimam lucem aspexerit, eos indignissime luce privarit, cum etiam feras inter sese 
partus atque educatio et natura ipsa conciliet.’
64 Cic. Clu. 199: ‘at quae mater! [. . .] cuius ea stultitia est ut eam nemo hominem, ea vis ut 
nemo feminam, ea crudelitas ut nemo matrem appellare possit. atque etiam nomina necessi-
tudinum, non solum naturae nomen et iura mutavit, uxor generi, noverca fili, filiae paelex; eo 
iam denique adducta est uti sibi praeter formam nihil ad similitudinem hominis reservarit.’
60 On Law
erat, nullum civile ius [. . .])65 made it impossible for the legal system to deal 
with him: eius furores, quos nullis iam legibus, nullis iudiciis frenare poteramus 
[. . .].66 His assassination turns out to be the only way to save the  legal –  and 
thus  natural –  character of the Republic; it is a virtuous act.
As shown above, Cicero, standing in a Stoic tradition, believes that ratio 
is not a pure human trait, but connects human and divine reasoning at its 
highest level. This theological aspect is the key to understand the subtext 
underlying Cicero’s final remarks in Mil. 83–8. Here, Cicero claims that 
the immortal gods were involved in the assassination of Clodius, who had 
incurred their hatred many years before, when he attended the festivity of 
Bona Dea in January 61 bc dressed up as a woman. When the gods noticed 
Clodius approaching Milo and his entourage on the Via Appia in front of the 
shrine of Bona Dea, they decided to take advantage of this symbolic situation 
and put in Clodius’ mind the idea to ambush Milo. Clodius, lacking the intel-
lectual capacity to understand the gods’ real intentions, attacked Milo and 
was killed when Milo’s slaves defended their dominus. Despite its rhetorical 
implications, this passage also entails the core elements of Cicero’s concept 
of tyrannicide. Being a tyrant, Clodius does not participate in the rational 
discourse of gods and men. The idea of attacking Milo does not appear as a 
product of his own reasoning, but was placed in his mind by the gods.
Cicero’s much- quoted dictum silent leges inter arma (Mil. 11) does not 
neglect the specific legal nature of the problem of tyrannicide. In contrast 
to its prevalent reading, it does not imply that in a state of emergency legal 
provisions forfeit their legitimacy and are substituted simply by power 
and politics. Rather, silere is to be understood as deafening silence, as an 
incorporated part of the law. If Cicero’s argument is read within its broader 
systematic context, the legal implication of silere clearly comes to  light –  the 
law grants tacitly the potestas defendendi: Silent enim leges inter arma [. . .]. Etsi 
persapienter et quodam modo tacite dat ipsa lex potestatem defendendi.67 Given 
that Clodius’ assassination is an act of summa ratio  and –  as Cicero states in 
Mil. 30 –  ratio praescripsit legem, at least from Cicero’s own perspective his 
arguments to justify Milo must be seen as a legal argument: ‘if there was no 
defence in law for what he did, then I have no defence to offer’.68
In Mil. 88–9, Cicero highlights the responsibility of the homo privatus to 
defend the res publica by himself as long as the republic turns out to be inca-
pable of repelling the tyrant ‘by its own laws’.69 Arguing from a positivistic 
standpoint and therefore identifying ‘law’ with law as enacted by authorised 
state institutions, one might assume that  Cicero –  paradoxically –  is putting 
65 Cic. Mil. 74.
66 Idem: 77.
67 Idem: 11.
68 Idem: 30: ‘Si id iure fieri non potuit, nihil habeo quod defendam’ (translation by Berry).
69 Idem: 89: ‘numquam illum res publica suo iure esset ulta.’
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forward the idea of violating the law in order to save it. But for Cicero, law is 
not an official product of the state, but an individual product of the rational 
human mind. He rather seems to assert that in cases where state institutions 
fail to effectively use their legal power, the stability of the legal order depends 
on the commitment of ordinary citizens, who are willing to take advantage 
of their rights and duties. This reading is backed by the next section, where 
Cicero deals with the  practical –  rather than  legal –  limitations of the power 
of state institutions: the most crucial problem of keeping Clodius in check is 
caused not by legal restrictions, but by the consul’s lack of courage.70
5. PHILOSOPHY AND LEGAL PRACTICE: A FEW 
SPECULATIVE REMARKS
So far, three questions have been discussed. First: can we find signs of a 
coherent theory of ‘law’ in Cicero’s writings? Does Cicero’s thinking merely 
reflect a discussion on the relation of different Rechtsschichten, like ius natu-
rale and ius civile, as they are significant in Roman legal thought;71 or can we 
observe a more comprehensive approach, dealing with the general question: 
‘what is law’? Second: given that Cicero developed a theory about the nature 
of  law –  how is this theory tied to his understanding of the nature of man? To 
ask more specifically: does Cicero’s concept of law imply any consequences 
for the subjective character of those constituting a human community based 
on law? Third: do we have to distinguish sharply between the speeches 
Cicero delivered as a legal practitioner and his theoretical approach on law 
developed in writings like the Laws and the Republic? Or can we find patterns 
appearing in both practical as well as theoretical contexts alike, suggesting 
that Cicero made use of his abstract concepts while arguing as an advocate?
The answer to this third question was that Cicero indeed applied argu-
ments in legal practice, which can be understood against the background 
of his theoretical concept of the nature of law. Focusing on how Cicero 
deals with the category of the ‘tyrant’ respectively ‘tyranny’ in his forensic 
speeches, one can observe that he makes those references from the very 
beginning of his legal career onwards. However, the most coherent example 
of the use of philosophical arguments in legal practice is the speech for Milo, 
delivered by Cicero as he was gaining political and intellectual consolidation.
It is one thing that Cicero, according to his own concepts, takes his 
philosophical arguments as essential to his concept of law; it is another thing 
whether legal practice followed the same path. The general reluctance to 
70 Idem: 88–9: ‘Senatus credo praetorem eum circumscripsisset. Ne cum solebat quidem id 
facere, in privato eodem hoc aliquid profecerat. An consules in praetor coercendo fortes 
fuissent?’
71 On the role of Rechtsschichten as a main trait of Roman law see most recently Babusiaux 2015: 
37f. See also Kaser 1986: 90f.
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recognise Cicero as a serious lawyer is surely influenced by an understand-
ing of Roman law as an abstract area of elitist discourse, which is seen as 
detached from religious and philosophical influences.72 Nowadays, this 
exclusive reading of Roman law is losing support, however strong it may 
have been in the past.73 Starting with Crook’s eminent studies in the late 
1960s, the social and philosophical rootedness of Roman law has become an 
increasingly popular field of study. This does not only apply to the world of 
common law, where the burden of a practically relevant ‘doctrinal’ tradition 
of Roman law weighed less than in mainland Europe.
It surely goes too far to believe that from the late Republic onwards, 
Roman jurists can be categorised in accordance with specific philosophical 
schools. Even Behrends, whose controversial writings promoted this idea in 
the past, is currently claiming a rather indirect philosophical influence on 
Roman legal thought.74 But what is true, however, is that Roman jurists had 
recourse to terms and argumentative patterns that are equally known from 
the discourse of ancient philosophers. They do not make deep philosophical 
contributions, and their direct philosophical references seem to be short and 
sometimes superficial in comparison with writings like those of Cicero. Nor 
do they provide us with coherent theories on the nature of law or the rela-
tion between law and human rationality. But it is precisely the partly inho-
mogeneous character of their writings that demonstrates that legal discourse 
was open enough to integrate different strands of philosophical argument.
We will illustrate this assumption by shortly pointing at the use of natura 
resp. ius naturale in early and later classical texts of Roman jurists.75 Looking 
at definitions of the ius naturale in texts from the Digest and Gaius’ Institutes, 
we find the idea of a natural community between men and other animals;76 
but we also find sources identifying ius naturale with ius gentium.77 The ius 
gentium, again, is (partly) seen as a law common only to all men by nature, 
and thus not shared by men and animals alike.78
The definition of ius gentium as a law quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes 
homines constituit79 seems to be similar to Cicero’s understanding of law as the 
very essence of human reason. However, the text lacks any deeper explana-
tion of the character of this ratio; in particular, it does not clarify how the 
72 Cf. Harke 2008: 3: ‘für die Gesamtsituation der römischen Reichsbevölkerung ebenso blind 
wie für religiöse oder philosophische Vorstellungen unanfällig[.]’
73 For a short summary of current approaches on Roman law see recently Schermaier 2014: 
107–32, 108–10.
74 Even though he still adheres to his understanding of Roman legal discourse as a discourse of 
separate, conflicting schools of thought; cf. Behrends 2013: 432f.; Schermaier 2014: 110.
75 On the following, see B. Forschner 2015: 61f.
76 Iust. Inst. 1.2 pr.; D. 1.1.1.3–4.
77 D. 1.1.9 (Gai. 1 inst.).
78 Gai. Inst 1.1.
79 D. 1.1.9 (Gai. 1 inst.); D. 41.1.1 pr. (Gai. 2 rer. cot.).
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ratio became part of the human mind. The naturalis ratio might indeed be 
understood as a Stoic/Ciceronian nata lex ad quam facti sumus. But it can also 
be understood as a reference to the basic ideas of the sceptic Academy, or to 
no specific philosophical school at all.
Ulpian, by contrast, takes natura for a genuine source of law.80 According 
to him, understanding the law does not require instinct, but peritia, that 
is, experience; and this experience is not only common to men, but to all 
animals.81 However, Ulpian does not draw any consequences from this posi-
tion: In D. 9.1.1.3 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.), he claims that animals lack sensus and thus 
cannot do any wrong.82 Here, he seems to distinguish between instinct, expe-
rience and reason, and understanding of the  law –  that is, of the difference 
between ius and iniura –  is not caused by experience, but by reason.
The inhomogeneous and sometimes superficial use of natura in the texts 
of the Roman jurists becomes particularly relevant when looking at their 
arguments supporting the right of self- defence. Like Justinian and Cicero, 
Gaius highlights that this right is grounded on the ratio naturalis.83 However, 
whereas Cicero develops a broad theory of the anthropological character of 
this ratio, Gaius’ texts provide no further hints clarifying his own concept: 
the ratio naturalis is simply taken for granted. Florentinus argues that a man 
is not allowed to threaten the life or physical integrity of another man, as 
there exists a natural kinship among all human beings; this, in turn, is the 
reason why every man has the right to defend himself against those trying 
to kill or violate him.84 The idea that natura inter nos cognationem quandam 
constituit reminds one of the wording of Gaius’ definition of the ius gentium 
([ius], quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit),85 but it does 
not necessarily say the same: whereas the latter takes the ratio naturalis as a 
source of law (which conforms to Gaius’ view expressed in D. 9.2.4 pr. that 
the right of self- defence derives from the ratio naturalis), the former does not 
explicitly discuss the nature of law, but merely points at a specific tie unify-
ing all men. If Florentinus had in mind a concept of the relation of human 
and legal nature, it did not survive in his text. Ulpian, finally, does not refer 
80 D. 1.1.1.3 (Ulp. 1 inst.): ‘Ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam ius istud 
non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium, quae in terra, quae in mari nascun-
tur, avium quoque commune est.’
81 D. 1.1.1.3 (Ulp. 1 inst.): ‘Hinc descendit maris atque feminae coniunctio, quam nos matrimo-
nium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio: videmus etenim cetera quoque 
animalia, feras etiam istius iuris peritia censeri.’
82 D. 9.1.1.3 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.): ‘Pauperies est damnum sine iniuria facientis datum: nec enim 
potest animal iniuria fecisse, quod sensu caret.’
83 D. 9.2.4 pr. (Gai. 7 ad ed. prov.): ‘nam adversus periculum naturalis ratio permittit se 
defendere.’
84 D. 1.1.3 (Florent. 1 inst.): ‘Ut vim atque iniuriam propulsemus: nam iure hoc evenit, ut quod 
quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, iure fecisse existimetur, et cum inter nos cognatio-
nem quandam natura constituit, consequens est hominem homini insidiari nefas esse.’
85 Cf. D. 1.1.9 (Gai. 1 inst.).
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to any philosophical background, but merely states that natura grants the ius 
defendendi.86
Looking at this selection of legal writings, a negative and a positive 
assumption can be made. Roman jurists do not, as Cicero did, reflect on the 
nature of law in a coherent way. Their use of natura seems to be much more 
pragmatic and occasional, and even in writings of one and the same author 
one finds  different –  and  contradicting –  assumptions. They also neither 
follow Cicero’s idea that only law conforming with nature counts as law, nor 
do they develop a hierarchic understanding of natural law as a law outrank-
ing other laws. But what can be said positively is that Roman legal discourse 
did include philosophical elements; that Roman lawyers seem to believe in 
the justness of what they perceive as the ‘natural quality’ of human beings 
(and animals, to some extent); and that they were concerned with the legal 
effect of this natural quality. Moreover, they are using a terminology that is 
also to be found in Cicero’s philosophical texts, like natura, naturalis ratio 
and cognatio.87
6. CONCLUSION
Does Cicero’s use of philosophical arguments in forensic speeches contra-
dict the legal discourse of his time? The question can only be answered with 
caution, as republican sources are rare. But with some certainty we can say 
that Cicero’s legal arguments derive from a philosophical background that is 
more complex and comprehensive than the philosophical splinters found in 
the texts of classical jurists. This, however, does not necessarily imply that 
his positions were incompatible with the way in which the Roman jurists 
argued. Cicero’s arguments might have been more grounded, but they were 
not foreign to Roman law. Like Cicero, the Roman jurists referred to a ratio 
that is inherent in the human mind, and they put forward the idea of a cog-
natio that binds all men (respectively all living creatures) together. And most 
importantly, they took these philosophical aspects to be legally relevant: 
natura was an established topic in the legal discourse, and it did count as a 
source of law.
Claiming that Cicero was not a jurist seems to be right and wrong at once. 
It seems to be right as he does not appear as a typical jurist: he shows less 
interest in the details of the ius civile, although he occasionally demonstrates 
a good knowledge of it; and unlike the jurists, he is strongly concerned 
with general reflections on the nature of law, the relation between law and 
society and the human preconditions of a lawful society. However, as the 
86 D. 43.16.1.27 (Ulp. 69 ad ed.): ‘Vim vi repellere licere Cassius scribit, idque ius natura 
comparatur.’
87 For the use of cognatio in Ciceronian texts see Leg. 1.25, 1.26; for the use of naturalis ratio see 
idem: 1.35.
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above analysis of short passages from his forensic speeches demonstrates, 
Cicero also tries to bridge the gap between his philosophical ideas (that is, 
his understanding of the nature of law and its relation to human nature) and 
the rules and structures of legal practice. His theoretical approach does not 
lack practical relevance, but serves as breeding ground for legal arguments. 
These arguments accord with arguments found in the jurists’ writings, even 
though they frequently exceed them with regard to their philosophical 
substance.
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Cicero and the Small World of Roman Jurists
Yasmina Benferhat
1. INTRODUCTION
What does it take to be number one? What did it take in Rome in the late 
Republic to be the best among the politicians and senators? How did one 
go about achieving the most brilliant career? These were questions that the 
young Cicero had in mind, without any doubt,1 as he started his cursus 
studying law, rhetoric and philosophy. Similarly, these are questions we 
need to keep in mind when attempting to understand his judgement of the 
Roman jurists of his time: Q. Mucius Scaevola, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, 
Gaius Trebatius Testa. It explains why his testimony, though valuable as can 
be considering that we do not have that many clues about them, must be con-
sidered cautiously: he is not objective, not because of his well- known pride, 
but because he sees law through the prism of his ambition and determination 
to achieve immortal glory.
For him it was clear that law was not enough and jurists could not expect 
to have a brillant career merely because of their knowledge. Cicero was an 
advocate, the greatest advocate Rome had in the late Republic from 70 bc 
onwards. He had studied law with the best, but law alone, in his view, was not 
sufficient to reach the top. Thus modern scholars must apply this filter when 
attempting to reconstruct the lives of those jurists he knew and assessing their 
importance in Roman society of the late Republic. The same caveat applies 
to his views on generals. Cicero considered it useful for the state to have 
great officers who won battles and wars, but he was convinced that it was not 
enough to pretend to be the best, and we can assume it was not only because 
he knew he could never compete with a Pompey or a Caesar. It was also 
because he believed that a leader had to be more than a victorious general, just 
as he believed that a jurist could not be a leader with a knowledge only of law.
Once we bear this in mind, we can study the main jurists who lived in or 
around Cicero’s time. Mucius Scaevola was his master in the study of law, 
until he died; then Cicero had to study with another member of this family. 
Servius Sulpicius was a colleague, one of the few consulares who, alongside 
 1 Cf. Cic. QFr. 3.5.4.
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Cicero, were still alive after Caesar’s death. The two men grew closer after 
Caesar’s death, shortly before Sulpicius also died. The last one survived 
Cicero: the young Trebatius was one of his pupils before becoming a friend 
of Caesar and later of Augustus.
This chapter will not focus on their careers, since much is already well 
known, thanks to W. Kunkel2 and Richard Bauman’s3 works. Instead, 
we will demonstrate how Cicero considered them, and what it tells us 
about the evolution of the social position of jurists in Rome in the late 
Republic. We are interested in subjectivity, not in an objective presenta-
tion of Mucius Scaevola, Sulpicius Rufus and Trebatius’ careers, even if 
sometimes these themes overlap. The order will be chronological because 
it reflects the evolution: first Scaevola, then Sulpicius, and last but not least 
Trebatius.
2. QUINTUS MUCIUS SCAEVOLA AUGUR
The earliest examples of jurists in Cicero’s circle were Q. Mucius Scaevola 
Augur4 and his cousin the Pontifex,5 his masters in the study of civil law.6 
The Augur was consul in 117 bc, and died in 88 or 87 bc; his cousin, who 
was much younger, was consul in 95 bc before going to Asia as proconsul. 
Cicero had studied around two or three years with the Augur, before briefly 
studying with the Pontifex, who was killed in 82 bc.
One would expect a positive description of these two figures in Cicero’s 
works harking back to a golden age of the Roman jurists, but the reality 
is more complex. Indeed Scaevola is praised in De Republica: he is a doctus 
adulescens,7 which likely refers to his studying civil law, even if Cicero, 
through Laelius, who was Mucius’ father- in-law, had already pointed out 
that law was not enough8 to solve political crises. His name is the first to 
appear in the treatise De Amicitia where he is praised:
And so it came to pass that, in my desire to gain greater profit from his legal skill, 
I made it a practice to commit to memory many of his learned opinions and many, 
too, of his brief and pointed sayings[.]9
 2 See Kunkel 1967.
 3 See Bauman 1983.
 4 RE 21: see Bauman 1983: 312–40; Harries 2006: 41–7; Rawson 1985: 203–11. Bretone 1978: 
48–52 believes he was born in 165 bc.
 5 See Harries 2006: 104ff.
 6 Cf. Amic. 1. On the teaching of law see Kodrebski 1976 and Liebs 1976.
 7 Cf. Rep. 1.18.
 8 Idem: 33.
 9 Amic. 1: ‘itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode dicta 
memoriae mandabam fierique studebam eius prudentia doctior.’ All English translations 
are based on those readily available online at sites such as Lexundria, LacusCurtius, and the 
Perseus Digital Library.
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There is also an allusion to Mucius Scaevola at the beginning of the De 
Legibus,10 and of course he is one of the main characters of the De Oratore, 
as if he were a kind of totem. Mentioning Scaevola the Augur allowed Cicero 
to place himself in glorious continuity starting with his political ideal Scipio 
Aemilianus Africanus, but does it prove he really had a good opinion of his 
masters?
The answer might seem positive when we read Cicero’s judgement of the 
Augur in the Brutus: ‘iuris civilis intellegentia atque omni prudentiae genere 
praestitit’.11 The Pontifex too is praised as ingenio et iustitia praestantissimus.12 
An even better indication may be found in the correspondence when Cicero 
is sent to Cilicia in 51 bc, since he constantly refers to Mucius’ example, and 
not only because he writes to Atticus, who had been one of his students too. 
Mucius had been propraetor in Asia, in 115 bc, and could be used as a model 
to govern a province. Cicero emphasises that he was in charge for only nine 
months,13 enough to play the game of the traditional cursus but without any 
excess . . . The proconsul of Cilicia used Mucius’ edict14 in his province:
I, however, have a proviso in my own edict of equivalent force, but less openly 
expressed (derived from the Asiatic edict of Q. Mucius, son of Publius) – 
 ‘provided that the agreement made is not such as cannot hold good ex fide bona’, I 
have followed Scaevola in many points, among others in  this –  which the Greeks 
regard as a charta of  liberty –  that Greeks are to decide controversies between each 
other according to their own laws.15
The problem here was the difficult coexistence between the administration 
and the merchants in a Roman province. Cicero tried to protect himself, 
wishing to avoid excesses, but he also wanted to minimise any possible 
future complaints from the publicani. He had not forgotten the problems 
faced by Mucius Scaevola when he returned from Asia, and he had them in 
his mind:
For my part, I shall not cease to defend your decrees: but you know the ways 
of that class of men; you are aware how bitterly hostile they were to the famous 
Q. Scaevola himself.16
10 Leg. 1.13.
11 Brut. 102. See Sumner 1973: 55–6 with the family tree.
12 Amic. 1.
13 Cf. Att. 5.17.6.
14 See Badian 1956: 104–23; Rawson 1985: 209 and Rigsby 1988.
15 Att. 6.1.15: ‘ego tamen habeo ἰσοδυναμοῦσαν sed tectiorem ex Q. Muci P. f. edicto Asiatico, 
EXTRA QVAM SI ITA NEGOTIVM GESTVM EST VT EO STARI NON OPORTEAT 
EX FIDE BONA, multaque sum secutus Scaevolae, in iis illud in quo sibi libertatem censent 
Graeci datam, ut Graeci inter se disceptent suis legibus.’
16 Fam. 1.9.26: ‘Equidem non desinam tua decreta defendere, sed nosti consuetudinem 
hominum: scis, quam graviter inimici ipsi illi Q. Scaevolae fuerint.’
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This then is the first serious criticism: being a jurist, and a great one, did 
not prevent you from having problems in your official career. Scaevola had 
to defend himself in a trial against Albucius, which he did brilliantly. One 
could add that the other Scaevola was murdered during the civil war between 
Marius’ partisans and Sulla. This was another example or counter- example 
that Cicero constantly had in his mind:
If, on the other hand, I keep my ground and find some footing on this side, I shall 
have done what L. Philippus did during the tyranny of Cinna, as well as L. Flaccus 
and Q. Mucius. Though it turned out unhappily in the case of the latter, he used, 
nevertheless, to say that he foresaw the result (a result which did actually happen), 
but preferred it to approaching the walls of his native city in arms.17
A slight reproach is also visible here, even if Cicero considers Mucius’ point 
of view as certa quaedam illa Muci ratio atque sententia: being a specialist in 
civil law was not enough for political life in Rome. But there were other criti-
cisms too: first, good knowledge of law alone was not enough to win a trial. 
This does not apply to the Augur who successfully defended himself against 
Albucius,18 but to his cousin. Cicero explains that Scaevola eagerly took all 
the clients who came to him,19 even if he was not the best person to defend 
them, and he reminds us of two times where Scaevola was not good enough, 
though the circumstances would have required it: first when pleading for his 
close friend Rutilius:
Q. Mucius too said much in his defence, with his usual accuracy and elegance; but 
not with that force, and extension, which the mode of trial, and the importance of 
the cause demanded.20
Mucius was not able to save his friend from an unjust exile, because he was 
not brilliant enough. Cicero is, in effect, indirectly praising his own genius 
for eloquence, and then his ability to be a great statesman thanks to his elo-
quence. In another case, the causa Curiana,21 Mucius lost the trial pleading 
against Crassus, though this kind of case was his speciality:
For he urged a great variety of arguments in the defence of right and equity, against 
the literal interpretation of the law; and supported them by such a numerous 
17 Att. 8.3.6: ‘at si restitero et fuerit nobis in hac parte locus, idem fecero quod in Cinnae 
dominatione (L.) Philippus, quod L. Flaccus, quod Q. Mucius, quoquo modo ea res huic 
quidem cecidit; qui tamen ita dicere solebat se id fore videre quod factum est sed malle quam 
armatum ad patriae moenia accedere.’
18 Cf. Brut. 102.
19 Cf. idem: 155.
20 Idem: 115: ‘et Q. Mucius enucleate ille quidem et polite, ut solebat, nequaquam autem ea vi 
atque copia, quam genus illud iudici et magnitudo causae postulabat.’ On this trial see Gruen 
1966: 53ff.
21 See Harries 2006: 100ff and Harries 2013:  109 –  it was a trial in the 90s about a contested will 
and it involved M. Curius.
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series of precedents, that he overpowered Q. Scaevola (a man of uncommon pen-
etration, and the ablest jurist of his time) though the case before them was only a 
matter of legal right.22
It is one thing to know the civil law very well, but another to use it efficiently. 
Cicero considered Servius a better jurist than Mucius because he not only 
knew law, he also knew how to use dialectics and was a brillant orator as 
well.23 The difference probably lay in the fact that law was a family matter 
for the Scaevolae: they began acting as lawyers when the civil law was a kind 
of heirloom reserved for a few families. Cicero never says it clearly but the 
way he describes another Scaevola, adopted by the Crassi, is quite clear:
For he had contracted an affinity with that accomplished speaker Servius Galba 
above- mentioned, by giving his daughter in marriage to Galba’s son; and being 
likewise himself the son of Mucius, and the brother of P. Scaevola, he had a fine 
opportunity at home (which he made the best use of) to gain a thorough knowl-
edge of the civil law.24
In fact, when Cicero criticises Scaevola by praising Servius, one must appre-
ciate that he in effect praising his own model: this is particularly obvious in 
the De Oratore when Crassus affirms that the best jurist will be defeated by 
the orator who has learned just enough law to seem keen on it. But one must 
study the way in which Cicero really considered Servius Sulpicius Rufus to 
prove this.
3. SERVIUS SULPICIUS RUFUS
Servius Sulpicius Rufus25 comes second in our study, and there is a con-
siderable gap between him and Scaevola. First, they are separated by two 
generations with all that this implies: Mucius was born around 160 bc, 
Servius around 105 bc. In second place, Servius’ career was far less brillant 
that that of Scaevola. But why should this be so? The Pro Murena, famously 
delivered in 63 bc, provides valuable explanation. It became tradition in the 
late Republic to start a trial against another candidate to the consulate who 
had been elected while you had been defeated. The competition had become 
all the fiercer after Sulla had increased the numbers of all magistracies, apart 
from the consulship (though their numbers were eventually increased first 
22 Brut. 145: ‘Ita enim multa tum contra scriptum pro aequo et bono dixit, ut hominem acutis-
simum Q. Scaevolam et in iure, in quo illa causa vertebatur, paratissimum obrueret argu-
mentorum exemplorumque copia.’
23 Idem: 151–4.
24 Idem: 98: ‘nam et cum summo illo oratore Ser. Galba, cuius Gaio filio filiam suam conlocav-
erat, adfinitate sese devinxerat et cum esset P. Muci filius fratremque haberet P. Scaevolam, 
domi ius civile cognoverat.’
25 See Harries 2006: 116–26, who sees him as a man of transition.
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by Caesar and then through the use of consules suffecti). Servius, furious at 
having been beaten, accused his victorious competitor, Murena, of bribery.
The Pro Murena is the speech that Cicero delivered to defend Murena, his 
main reason being the stability of the state at a risky time with the threat of 
Catilina never far off. As already known, Cicero never hesitated to caricature 
his adversaries in a trial: the dancer, the puer delicatus, the meretrix, the awful 
mother- in-law, all the stereotypes were good and used if necessary. So, it 
comes as no surprise when he presents Cato, who then assisted Servius, as 
a psychorigid Stoic, or Servius as a narrow- minded jurist. But, beyond the 
exaggerations, Cicero really meant them.
The Pro Murena is also a valuable source for us for knowledge of Servius 
and of Cicero’s real view of the jurists. At the outset it should be noted that 
Servius was never lucky in his career, even if this statement requires greater 
nuance. In 74 bc he was quaestor in Ostia, which could not have helped him 
to get many clients.26 Then as a praetor in 65 he was in charge of the trials de 
peculatu, which was politically pretty embarrassing:
What department was it that your lot gave you? A disagreeable and odious one. 
That of inquiry into peculation, pregnant on the one side with the tears and 
mourning apparel of the accused, full on the other side of imprisonment and 
informers. In that department of justice judges are forced to act against their will, 
are retained by force contrary to their inclination. The clerk is hated, the whole 
body is unpopular. The gratifications given by Sulla are found fault with. Many 
brave men, –  indeed, a considerable portion of the city is offended; damages are 
assigned with severity. The man who is pleased with the decision soon forgets it; 
he who loses his cause is sure to remember it.27
Was this a matter of chance? We could agree to some extent, even if it is 
well known that there were special ways to help chance along when balloting 
for a magistrature or a province. Servius indeed suffered from the politi-
cal context: he was sacrificed in 63 bc on the altar of the raison d’état and it 
took more than ten years for him finally to be elected consul, because of 
the Triumvirate. Caesar might have thought of him in 59 bc for a tandem 
with the Pompeian Gabinius,28 but he finally chose Calpurnius Piso, which 
is quite interesting.29 Piso and Servius had nearly the same  profile –  they 
belonged to the Roman aristocracy, even if Servius was a patrician while the 
26 Cf. Mur. 18.
27 Idem: 42: ‘Quid tua sors? Tristis, atrox, quaestio peculatus ex altera parte lacrimarum et 
squaloris, ex altera plena accusatorum atque indicum; cogendi iudices inviti, retinendi contra 
voluntatem; scriba damnatus, ordo totus alienus; Sullana gratificatio reprehensa, multi viri 
fortes et prope pars civitatis offensa est; lites severe aestimatae; cui placet obliviscitur, cui 
dolet memini.’
28 Cf. Cic. Att. 2.5.2.
29 We could also surmise that Servius’ connection with Caesar had started much earlier than 
stated.
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Calpurnii Pisones were a plebeian family reaching the consulate for the first 
time only in 212 bc, and both men were  moderate –  but Piso was considered 
a better option politically speaking, and not only because of his daughter.
Nevertheless, as Cicero emphasises, it was not only chance: it was law. 
Servius chose to be a specialist of civil law30 and Cicero hints in the Brutus31 
he did so after he realised that he could never compete with Cicero himself. 
We can surmise that he had also understood that he would never be able to 
compete with a Pompey for military glory, and he refused to be governor of 
a province after his praetorship. The Pro Murena is a speech about the three 
main ways32 to reach the top in Rome: Cicero had to glorify the militia, for 
the sake of his client, even if he could not help praising his own choice of 
eloquence,33 and the law was the loser of the three.
What were the arguments? Law is hard work with many sources of trouble 
and not much benefit: so said Cicero. It was not possible to acquire a good 
network of clientes who would vote for you later, by being a legal expert. A 
second important point would be the recent diffusion of civil law, which 
allowed everybody to learn it through books, and of course Cicero pre-
tended it was so easy to learn that anyone could quickly become a specialist:
Nor has any one any right to be considered skillful in law, because there cannot 
be any difference between men in a branch of knowledge with which they are all 
acquainted. And a matter is not thought the more difficult for being contained in 
a very small number of very intelligible documents. Therefore, if you excite my 
anger, though I am excessively busy, in three days I will profess myself a lawyer.34
More seriously, Cicero contested the utility of a science that was limited to 
the Roman sphere and even caused trouble there: jurists were an obstacle 
to the good use of law, according to him, because of a mix of tricky ways 
of changing old laws and the abuse of archaisms. This was indeed a good 
way to make people laugh at  jurists –  a long tradition from Aristophanes to 
Racine’s Les Plaideurs, not to mention other authors. But we can consider 
Cicero meant it, as a broader reflection on Rome’s history and development.
30 On law and Servius in the Pro Murena, see Michel 1975: 95.
31 Cf. Brut. 151. See Sumner 1973: 97 and 155– 6 –  he speculates that Servius was born in 105 
bc.
32 Cf. Ov. Her. 3–6. See Wiseman 1971: 119 on the three ways and 120 on Servius: though a 
patrician, Servius came from a family that had not given any consul to Rome for probably 
two generations, since Servius’ father remained an eques, and his grandfather was nulla illustri 
laude illustratus, cf. Cicero, Mur. 16. One might nevertheless surmise that his grandfather had 
done the cursus honorum and been an honourable though an unremarkable magistrate.
33 Cf. Mur. 24 and 29.
34 Idem: 28: ‘Peritus ideo haberi nemo potest quod in eo quod sciunt omnes nullo modo 
possunt inter se discrepare. Difficilis autem res ideo non putatur quod et perpaucis et 
minime obscuris litteris continetur. Itaque si mihi, homini vehementer occupato, stoma-
chum moveritis, triduo me iuris consultum esse profitebor.’
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To sum it up, the small world of jurists was narrow: their intellectual 
pursuit was narrow, their activities were narrow, and their lives could only 
be narrow. And if by chance you were not narrow- minded when you chose 
to be a specialist of civil law, then law was going to make of you a narrow- 
minded person: that is what can be inferred from the excellent analysis of 
Sulpicius’ electoral campaign for the consulate. Instead of thinking posi-
tively and trying to make people vote for him, as a jurist he reacted by bring-
ing a trial against Murena when he understood he was going to be beaten:
I often told you, Servius, that you did not know how to stand for the consulship; 
and, in respect to those very matters which I saw you conducting and advocating 
in a brave and magnanimous spirit, I often said to you that you appeared to me to 
be a brave senator rather than a wise candidate. For, in the first place, the terrors 
and threats of accusations, which you were in the habit of employing every day, 
are rather the part of a fearless man; but they have an unfavourable effect on the 
opinion of the people as regards a man’s hopes of getting anything from them, and 
they even disarm the zeal of his friends.35
The correspondence is another source for Cicero’s view of Servius. Although 
the judgement is sometimes positive, especially in the months preceding 
Servius’ death, globally the portrait corresponds to what the Pro Murena 
had shown. A first notable phase is around 51–49 bc: eventually Servius 
was consul in 51 bc, perhaps thanks to Caesar, if we admit that there was a 
political share not only in the repartition of the censorship that  year –  Piso 
was a Caesarian while Appius Claudius was close to  Pompey –  but also in 
the choice of the consuls. Then it would suggest that Marcellus was the 
candidate of Caesar’s opponents, while Servius was officially neutral36 but 
actually a Caesarian.
Caelius does not hesitate to criticise Servius, even if gently, by calling him 
a cunctator,37 which, as Fabius’ example showed, would not be seen posi-
tively in Rome. He probably knew Cicero would agree. In fact, Servius had 
attempted to preach for peace by delivering an important speech on the past 
civil wars in Rome, as Cicero recognises much later,38 without much success.
At the beginning of the civil war, Servius chose to remain in Rome, offi-
cially still neutral although his son Servius junior was serving in Caesar’s 
35 Idem: 43: ‘Petere consulatum nescire te, Servi, persaepe tibi dixi; et in eis rebus ipsis quas 
te magno et forti animo et agere et dicere videbam tibi solitus sum dicere magis te fortem 
accusatorem mihi videri quam sapientem candidatum. Primum accusandi terrores et minae 
quibus tu cotidie uti solebas sunt fortis viri, sed et populi opinionem a spe adipiscendi aver-
tunt et amicorum studia debilitant.’
36 Cf. Att. 7.3.3.
37 Cf. Fam. 8.10.3: ‘Nosti Marcellum, quam tardus et parum efficax sit, itemque Servius quam 
cunctator.’
38 Cf. idem: 4.3.1 (September 46 bc).
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armies against Pompey.39 And he agreed to come to the senate once 
Caesar had entered Rome, which Cicero could not help criticising, even if 
indirectly:
And, in fact, I should myself have written to you before to warn you that your 
going to the  senate –  or rather to the convention of  senators –  would have no 
result, had I not been afraid of annoying the man who was urging me to imitate 
you. Him indeed I gave clearly to understand, when he asked me to attend the 
senate, that I should say precisely what you said about peace, and about the 
Spains.40
Cicero’s portrayal of Servius is filled with  irony –  his colleague prefers his 
little bed in Rome41 –  and pretty full of contempt. Cicero first considers him 
to be a coward,42 then criticised him for being an eternal jurist, evaluating the 
positive and the negative:
I never saw anybody so completely beside himself with fear; and yet, by Hercules, 
he feared nothing that was not a legitimate object of fear: ‘Pompey was angry with 
him, Caesar no friend to him: the victory of either one or the other was alarming, 
both because of the cruel nature of the one, the unscrupulousness of the other, 
and also because of the financial embarrassment of both, which could be relieved 
from no source except that of the property of private persons.’ And these remarks 
were accompanied with such floods of tears, that I wondered they had not run dry 
from such protracted misery.43
Though choosing to go their separate ways, since Cicero found a boat to 
go to Greece and Servius joined Caesar’s side in Italy, the two men kept in 
touch. When Servius took the charge in Achaia that Caesar had given him, 
Cicero agreed44 and never hesitated to send him letters of recommendation. 
In an interesting letter of September 46 bc, when Servius was in Greece, 
39 He joined Caesar’s camp in South Italy, cf. Att. 10.14.3 (‘fili militia Brundisina’).
40 Fam. 4.1.1. (21–2 April): ‘Atque ipse antea ad te scripsissem te frustra in senatum sive potius 
in conventum senatorum esse venturum, ni veritus essem, ne eius animum offenderem, qui 
a me, ut te imitarer, petebat: cui quidem ego, cum me rogaret, ut adessem in senatu, eadem 
omnia, quae a te de pace et de Hispaniis dicta sunt, ostendi me esse dicturum.’
41 Cf. Att. 10.14.3.
42 Cf. idem: ‘Si vir esse volet . . .’ The same negative point of view a bit later beginning of May 
49 bc cf. idem: 10.12.4. Cicero wished to convince Servius to sail away with him and join 
Pompey, which Servius refused to do.
43 Idem: 10.14.1: ‘numquam vidi hominem perturbatiorem metu; neque hercule quicquam 
timebat quod non esset timendum; illum sibi iratum, hunc non amicum; horribilem utri-
usque victoriam cum propter alterius crudelitatem, alterius audaciam, tum propter utri-
usque difficultatem pecuniariam; quae erui nusquam nisi ex privatorum bonis posset. atque 
haec ita multis cum lacrimis loquebatur ut ego mirarer eas tam diuturna miseria non exarui-
sse.’ Cf. Idem: 10.15.2: ‘Servi consilio nihil expeditur. omnes captiones in omni sententia 
occurrunt.’ 
44 Cf. Fam. 4.4.2.
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Cicero wrote that their two  specialisms –  eloquence and civil  law –  were 
suffering:45
For your professional  knowledge –  eminent and unrivalled as it  is –  no sphere much 
better has been left than for mine. Wherefore, though I do not presume to advise 
you, I have persuaded myself that you also were engaged in pursuits which, even if 
they were not exactly profitable, yet served to withdraw the mind from anxiety.46
The truth was that Cicero and Servius were among the few surviving 
consulares at that time, and it probably helped Cicero to appreciate Servius’ 
qualities, which he then praised when writing to Torquatus,47 even if 
Caesar’s death and the necessity to make choices again could reactivate old 
reproaches. Cicero again criticised Servius’ cowardice just after the Ides of 
March,48 describing him once more as the eternal jurist:
Servius, however, the peacemaker, and his young secretary seem to have under-
taken a mission and to be on their guard against all possible quibbles of the law. 
However, what they ought to have been afraid of was not ‘the joining hands in 
legal claim’, but what follows[.]49
Notice the use of the pejorative diminutives –  librariolus and captiunculae – 
 and also the ironic mention of a legal formula: Cicero is being very sarcastic 
here. This did not last: the two men both acted against Antony’s abuses, first 
when Servius obtained from the senate an agreement that Caesar’s writings 
(true or false) should not be used after his death to legitimate Antony’s meas-
ures. Cicero, missing the absence of Servius in September 44 as he began 
his battle against Antony in earnest, described him as summa auctoritate et 
optime sentiens.50 Once back in Rome, Servius helped Cicero in his efforts to 
promote Octavian51 against Antony. But a big difference remained between 
Cicero and Servius, who tried again to play the go- between for peace52 
45 He writes the same in Brutus, also written in 46 bc: cf. Brut. 22.
46 Fam. 4.3.4: ‘Tuae scientiae excellenti ac singulari non multo plus quam nostrae relictum est 
loci; qua non equidem te moneo, sed mihi ita persuasi, te quoque in iisdem versari rebus, 
quae, etiamsi minus prodessent, animum tamen a sollicitudine abducerent.’
47 Cf. idem: 6.1.6 and 6.4.5. But Cicero never forgets to underline the difference in political 
choices: cf. idem: 4.6.3 (Caesar is no enemy of Cicero but a friend of Servius).
48 Cf. Att. 14.19. 4: ‘Servi orationem cognosco; in qua plus timoris video quam consili.’ 
Compare with idem: 14.18: ‘desperatio’.
49 Idem: 15.7 (end of May 44 bc): ‘Servius vero pacificator cum librariolo suo videtur obisse 
legationem et omnis captiunculas pertimescere. debuerat autem non “ex iure manum conser-
tum” sed quae sequuntur.’
50 Fam. 12.2.3 (letter to Cassius).
51 Cf. ad. Brut. 1.15.7.
52 Cf. Phil. 9.7: Servius Sulpicius Rufus had played a key part in the senate to ensure that an 
embassy should be sent to Antony, who was besieging Decimus Brutus in Modena in order 
to negotiate a peace agreement, instead of proclaiming Antony hostis, which Cicero would 
have preferred.
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although Cicero did not agree with that policy at all.53 The ninth Philippic 
contains praise for Servius, who died at the beginning of 43 bc returning 
from Modena where he had tried to play the go- between between Antony 
and the senate54, in order that a statue be obtained for him. This laudatio 
funebris could not of course contain anything negative and so Servius is 
praised as one of the greatests jurists of Rome:
The praise of all mortals will forever celebrate his wisdom, his firmness, his 
loyalty, his admirable vigilance and prudence in upholding the interests of the 
public. Nor will that admirable, and incredible, and almost godlike skill of his in 
interpreting the laws and explaining the principles of equity be buried in silence. 
If all the men of all ages, who have ever had any acquaintance with the law in this 
city, were got together into one place, they would not deserve to be compared to 
Servius Sulpicius.55
The Brutus already had offered the same praise of Servius as the greatest spe-
cialist of civil law. But maybe one of Cicero’s last remarks was nearer to what 
he really thought: Servius was a man whose life had been spent sanctissime 
honestissimeque, and he had been often useful to the state as well as a simple 
citizen than as a magistrate.56 ‘Often’ did not mean always, and could remind 
us of all the times Cicero criticised Servius . . .
4. GAIUS TREBATIUS TESTA
Our third case is Gaius Trebatius Testa57 who we meet mostly in Cicero’s 
letters, first in 54–3 bc when the young jurist was sent to Gaul to Caesar’s 
headquarters, then during the civil war. It is a difficult case because Cicero’s 
presentation is far from being complete: a short time in a long life, first, since 
Trebatius was born around 75 bc if not around 80 bc, and died after ad 4 
under Augustus, whom he assisted. A second problem is connected with 
politics: Trebatius was a Caesarian, which we know thanks to other authors, 
but Cicero does not seem to be willing to see or to appreciate it.
53 Cf. idem: 8. 20–1. The whole sixth and seventh Philippics are a criticism of the embassy.
54 Cf. idem: 9. 5–9, 13. 20 and 29, 14.4.
55 Idem: 9.10: ‘Semper illius gravitatem, constantiam, fidem, praestantem in re publica tuenda 
curam atque prudentiam omnium mortalium fama celebrabit. Nec vero silebitur admirabilis 
quaedam et incredibilis ac paene divina eius in legibus interpretandis, aequitate explicanda 
scientia. Omnes ex omni aetate, qui in hac civitate intellegentiam iuris habuerunt, si unum in 
locum conferantur, cum Ser. Sulpicio non sint comparandi.’
56 Idem: 15.
57 Trebatius has not been studied extensively: we have first Sonnet, who wrote the entry for the 
Pauly–Wissowa (RE 7), around 1930. See Kunkel 1967: 28 fn.44 and Bauman 1983: vol. 2, 
125ff; and D’Orta has published several studies (1984–5, 1987, 1990, 1991). Recently Harries 
2006 has studied Trebatius among other Roman jurists. See also Benferhat 2005: 274–81. 
Sources for Trebatius’ legal works are to be found in Bremer 1896: 376–424.
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But at the same time it is a very interesting case because Trebatius was 
a young thing and Cicero at his peak when he wrote: so he did not have to 
hide what he really thought about lawyers, and thus we have a frank point of 
view without the respect due to a  master –  Scaevola –  or the politeness due 
to a colleague, Sulpicius. When Cicero recommends him to Caesar, in April 
54, Trebatius has already studied law with his master Cornelius Maximus:58 
familiam ducit in iure civili singulari memoria, summa scientia.59 These qualities 
are listed second after personal virtues: honesty, a sense of duty. This might 
be the first evidence of Cicero’s view about a good knowledge of law: it was 
not enough to win the favour of Caesar, who was in need of men he could 
trust. At the same time we can assume that this presentation was also tactical, 
since Cicero knew that Trebatius’ big advantage was his legal education.60
The initial reactions of Trebatius, as Cicero criticised the jurists –  ineptias 
istas et desideria urbis et urbanitatis61 –  are interesting because they are a sign of 
an evolution: the young jurist does not want to leave Rome and the city life, 
where he knows he is at his best. It is very amusing to see Cicero trying to 
give Trebatius the traditional cursus62 with a mission in a general’s staff, just 
like he had done in his youth in Pompeius Strabo’s castra,63 though we know 
Cicero himself did not like this at all. But Trebatius decided to refuse to play 
the game: Cicero hints at this with the expressive verb extrudere64 to remind 
the young man of his own efforts to convince him.
Trebatius kept on refusing to play the game by declining first the offer 
to be a tribunus militaris, though Caesar had made it comfortable (this post 
usually allowed an individual to have their first experience of commanding 
men in the army and being a member of the consilium where the decisions 
were taken65):
and at the same time I wondered why you despised the profits of a military trib-
uneship, especially as you are exempted from the labour of military duty.66
Then he refused to go to Britain with Caesar.67 What could seem bold and 
was indeed interpreted this way by Cicero might have been mere realism: 
58 RE 264. See Kunkel 1967: 24 n°39.
59 Cic. Fam. 7.5.3.
60 Cf. Cic. QFr. 2.13.3: Cicero mentions Caesar’s remark on the lack of good lawyers in his 
staff. The same in Fam. 7.16.3: ‘constat enim inter omnis neminem te uno Samarobrivae iuris 
peritiorem esse’.
61 Cic. Fam. 7.6.1. Same reproach some months later in October 54, cf. idem: 7.17.1: ‘levis in 
urbis urbanitatisque desiderio’.
62 Cf. idem: 7.17.2.
63 See Benferhat 2014: 183–97.
64 Cic. Fam. 7.6.1.
65 See Le Bohec 2001: 92–4.
66 Cic. Fam. 7.8.1: ‘et simul sum admiratus cur tribunatus commoda, dempto praesertim labore 
militiae, contempseris.’
67 Cf. idem: 7.17.3; 7.16.1; 7.10.1–2.
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Trebatius was aware that his best way to serve Caesar was his competence 
in civil law. But the problem was spring and summer were commonly used 
for military expeditions: so it took many months (too many according to 
Trebatius who seems to have been a bit impatient at the beginning) and the 
coming of winter usually devoted to civil affairs before the mission began to 
look attractive.
We can observe then a serious misunderstanding between Cicero and his 
‘protégé’. Cicero, faithful to tradition, thought it was better for Trebatius to 
leave Rome and Italy, in order first to get some money,68 and second to be 
on good terms with Caesar, probably not only for his own sake: in the usual 
game of beneficia, or the exchange of mutual favours/services, Trebatius could 
play the part of go- between between Caesar and Cicero, who could also get 
some news this way about the situation in Gaul. But sending Trebatius to 
Caesar had another consequence: the perfect match between the general and 
a good jurist, which prefigures the monarchic system under the Empire.
Cicero didn’t realise it: when he describes Trebatius under the charm 
of Caesar,69 he was not surprised since Caesar was intellectually a most 
seductive man. The brothers Cicero could have attested it.70 He was even a 
bit jealous, pretending Trebatius seemed all the more good at law since he 
had no real competition in Gaul.71 Actually the young man was sent to the 
Tresviri72 with Labienus, at the end of the winter 54–3 bc to solve legal prob-
lems, which Cicero hints at in his famous letter about Trebatius’ conversion 
to Epicureanism:73 his main activities were a mix of law and war.
This letter is also interesting because of the mention of Pansa. Later we 
see Matius mentioned as a new close friend of Trebatius,74 but we must not 
forget the most important event: after fourteen months in Gaul, Trebatius 
was close to Caesar himself.75 To sum it up, as a friend of Pansa, Matius and 
Balbus,76 too, Trebatius was at the very core of the Caesarian system.
This should be on our mind when we read letters written during the 
civil war: Trebatius appears always as a go- between, alone or with another 
Caesarian, between Cicero and Caesar. It starts in February 49 bc, as we can 
68 The hints are pretty numerous: cf. idem: 7.7.1; 7.9.2; 7.16.3; 7.11.2–3; 7.13.2.
69 Cf. idem: 7.16.1: inlectus. The change was obvious since Trebatius started to make jokes, 
being in a much better mood. cf. idem: 7.11.2.
70 Cf. Cic. QFr. 3.1 for example.
71 Cf. Cic. Fam. 7.10.1.
72 Cf. idem: 7.13.2.
73 See D’Orta 1991 and Benferhat 2005: 274–7.
74 Cf. Cic. Fam. 7.15.2: ‘in C. matii, suavissimi doctissimique hominis familiaritatem venisti.’
75 Ibidem: ‘te esse Caesari familiarem.’
76 He might have noticed the young man already in Rome since he was there when Cicero chose 
to send Trebatius to Caesar proposing to take one of his friends onto his staff, cf. Cic. Fam. 
7.5.2, and he kept an eye on him for the whole year (54 bc).
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see in a letter to Atticus:77 Caesar used Trebatius to try to convince Cicero 
to stay in Rome when Pompey was leaving with almost all the senators. 
For Cicero Trebatius was no Caesarian: he described him twice as a good 
citizen,78 bonus vir et civis, which means a Republican. It seems it was an 
illusion: Trebatius was one of Caesar’s go- betweens and it is not surprising 
to find him in Rome with Sulpicius Rufus79 with whom he shared an inter-
est in law but he was also a consularis that Caesar needed badly in the city. 
Trebatius as a jurist could be useful to convince Sulpicius as well as Cicero 
to stay in Italy and maybe even help Caesar.
He was probably also useful in coming up with solutions to the economic 
situation in Italy with the debt problem,80 and he also played the part of 
political advisor as well, as Suetonius tells us when relating how Caesar did 
not get up for senators as they were arriving:
Some think that when he attempted to get up, he was held back by Cornelius 
Balbus; others, that he made no such move at all, but on the contrary frowned 
angrily on Gaius Trebatius when he suggested that he should rise.81
But we do not see it in Cicero’s letters: nevertheless his testimony is impor-
tant because it shows us a Trebatius who was then an important piece of 
Caesar’s strategic team: the men who played their part in the shadows, with 
technical competences and a real ability to serve as intermediaries. They 
actually often worked in tandem: Oppius with Balbus, Hirtius with Pansa, 
Trebatius with Matius.
After Caesar’s murder, Trebatius appears again in Cicero’s letters from 
the year 44 bc. It seems he had a house in Rome on the Lupercal, but also 
some properties in Velia thanks to his father.82 Cicero keeps on juxtaposing 
his own  model –  eloquence over  all –  with that of Trebatius’ specialisation in 
civil law: he offers him the Topica,83 written at the beginning of the summer, 
trying to convert him to rhetoric. Law appears to be something hard to learn:
I send you this book from Rhegium written in as clear a style as the subject admit-
ted. But if certain parts appear to you to be somewhat obscure, you must reflect 
that no art can be learnt out of books without some one to explain it and without 
77 Cf. Cic. Att. 7.17.3.
78 Cf. idem: 10.1.3 and 10.11.4: ‘vir plane et civis bonus.’ Nevertheless Atticus has a curious 
expression (cf. 9.9.4): ‘nihil bene sperat’. That could mean Trebatius had no good hope about 
the situation, at a time when Pompey was leaving Italy for Greece, or if we consider the 
adverb bene as a political code refering to the boni, it could mean Trebatius was a Caesarian 
from Atticus’ point of view.
79 Cf. Cic. Fam. 4.1.1.
80 Cf. Cic. Att. 13.23.3.(?)
81 Cf. Suet. Caes. 78.
82 Cf. Cic. Fam. 7.20.1.
83 See Harries 2006: 126–32. There are two main studies on the Topica: see Riposati 1947 and 
Reinhardt 2003.
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some practical exercise in it. You will not have to go far for an instance. Can the 
art of you jurisconsults be learnt out of books? Though there are a great number 
of them, they yet require a teacher and actual practice.84
But in fact Trebatius was already far too advanced on his own path: as a 
close friend of Matius, he was probably helping the young Octavian. He 
plays once more the role of an intermediary between Matius and Cicero in 
October 44 bc, that is not only between two men but also between two politi-
cal camps: Cicero supports the Republicans around Brutus and Cassius, 
while Matius remains faithful to Caesar and has started to support his legal 
heir Octavian85 with the organisation of the Ludi Victoriae. He was then 
already a first- class jurist, as Cicero admits, in a joke about a discussion over 
dinner:
Accordingly, though I returned home full of wine and late in the evening, I 
marked the section in which that question is treated and caused it to be copied 
out and sent to you. I wanted to convince you that the doctrine which you said 
was held by no one was maintained by Sextus Aelius, Manius Manilius, Marcus 
Brutus. Nevertheless, I concur with Scaevola and Testa.86
To be put at the same level as Quintus Mucius Scaevola Augur was indeed 
an accomplishment.
5. CONCLUSION
What did it take to be number one in Rome? That was our primary ques-
tion and the answer is this: from Caesar to at least Theodosius it took a 
general assisted by jurists. There were three ways in the Pro Murena: the 
militia kept playing the most important part, since armies were used not only 
against external enemies to obtain power, but also against citizens. Whatever 
Servius and Cicero might have hoped, and they were like twins (as said in the 
Brutus)87 united in the thought that the time of civil lawyers had finally come, 
the generals never lost their power and influence.
Cicero’s eloquence and Servius’ civil law both needed peace to flourish: 
nevertheless, eloquence died the day peace was ensured by the victory of one 
man and the advent of the Principate. Tacitus88 in his Dialogue clearly states 
this after a century of monarchy in Rome. Meanwhile, the jurists, by adapt-
ing their careers to the new deal, maintained real importance in the exercise 
of political power. What Cicero had said to defend Murena about the civil 
law being of no use except in Rome proved wrong with the advent of the 
84 Fam. 7.19.1. 
85 Cf. idem: 11.28.6.




Roman Empire. Roman civil law became the civil law of an Empire and then 
the matrix of European laws much later.
What emerges here is a time in the late Republic when there were various 
experiments to try to answer to the need for changes that the Romans could 
feel: some tried to get power using civil law as a speciality, some tried to be 
number one by intellectual genius and eloquence, some solved the problem 
with their armies. Cicero unwittingly helped the real revolution, that is to 
say the coming of the Principate and the end of the Republic: he did not see 
Trebatius and Caesar as precursors of a new way to exercise power. And so 
came the result towards the end of 43 bc first with his own execution, then in 
the following centuries: game over . . .
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Chapter 6
‘Jurists in the Shadows’: The Everyday Business of the 
Jurists of Cicero’s Time
Christine Lehne-Gstreinthaler
1. INTRODUCTION: WHO WAS A JURIST?
It is a matter of dispute whether the Roman jurists of the Republic can be 
aptly described as such. There was no formalised training for the legal profes-
sion nor is it clear how much time the Roman jurists devoted to their profes-
sion. Indeed, the jurists of Cicero’s time were amateurs compared to modern 
jurists. The Roman jurists active during that time could be described most 
accurately as ‘gentlemen’, men from higher classes who engaged in giving 
legal advice and representing parties in court due to favours owed to their 
clients, acquaintances and family members. Legal services were not paid 
for but nor were they free of charge. Rewards were often made in the form 
of gifts, bequests or other services. Monetary reward, even the prospect of 
financial gain, was, although undoubtedly present, looked down upon by the 
Roman aristocracy. For them, giving legal advice, making accusations, litigat-
ing on behalf of others and arbitrating was part of the duties of a vir bonus. 
Moreover, it was considered necessary to legally assist friends and acquaint-
ances to spread favours before and for elections.1
2. SOCIETY AND THE LAW
In earlier works2 I used to define as jurists men (1) who identified as such, 
(2) who were called jurists, (3) to whom considerable legal knowledge was 
attributed and (4) who had left responsa. For the purpose of this chapter I 
would like to supplement a fifth category: men of whom legal knowledge can 
be presumed on the basis of their legal work.
I want to define as jurists in the shadows men from a lower social back-
ground, who devoted themselves to less illustrious legal work and were 
therefore, when consulted, seldom mentioned by name. Their activities 
can be attributed to the following categories: legal representatives, the staff 
 1 Cf. Cicero’s remarks on Hirrus in Fam. 8.6 after he lost an important election: ‘Moreover, 
he, who never appeared in the forum and hardly had anything to do with litigation, is repre-
senting generously, though seldom past noon.’
 2 Lehne (unpublished, 2011): 5. See also Lehne 2014: 232 fn.66.
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and other advisors of the magistrates, businessmen, and conveyancers. It 
should be stressed, however, that these categories are neither exhaustive nor 
exclusive. For example several negotiatores served as procuratores,3 Atticus, a 
respected businessman, drafted at least two last wills4 and private secretaries 
had official duties when their patron became a magistrate.
2.1 Legal representatives: procuratores and cognitores, advocates and 
sycophants
Procuratores/cognitores and advocates are generally seen as separate entities. 
This may be partly due to the fact that according to the prevailing view, 
lawyers stemmed mostly from Rome’s leading classes, while procuratores 
and cognitores are assumed to have belonged to the lower classes. Another 
assumption is that neither procuratores/cognitores nor advocates needed legal 
knowledge, because legal questions were already accounted for in iure.
Both assumptions are untrue: procuratores especially, who represented 
others in lawsuits, had to have sufficient legal knowledge.5 Sext. Alfenus, 
procurator of P. Quinctius, who, incidentally, had a higher social status than 
both Quinctius and Naevius,6 showed his knowledge of legal proceedings 
when he defended P. Quinctius. The negotiator Herennius, a procurator to 
C. Matrinius, defended Matrinius’ vilici and pastores when they were accused 
by Verres.7 Last but not least, Cicero himself was asked to manage the assets 
of Sittius tamquam procurator.8 Often, though, the terms procurator and cog-
nitor were used as invectives by Cicero against his enemies.9 This leads me 
to believe that, while not all procuratores and cognitores had low social status 
or a bad reputation, the image of the profession prevented men from the 
senatorial or equestrian order from declaring themselves as procuratores, even 
though they fulfilled this duty. A case in point is T. Pomponius Atticus, who 
managed Cicero’s  assets –  however, in the Letters to Atticus the term procura-
tor is never mentioned in his regard.
Cognitores, too, possessed considerable legal knowledge. In Satire II.5 
Horace advises his reader to act as a defensor and cognitor while advertising 
legal knowledge.10 Similarly, Cicero addresses Aebutius as cognitor viduarum, 
who is learned in law but is considered a jurist only among women.11 If we 
 3 Treggiari 1969: 104.
 4 The wills of Terentia and Cicero.
 5 Frier 1985: 67.
 6 Schaefer 1998: 90.
 7 Cic. Verr. 2.5.15, 2.5.155. Schulz 1997: 264.
 8 Cic. Fam. 8.11.4.
 9 Cic. Caecin. 14; Cic. Rosc. Am. 23; Verr. 2.3.78, 178; Phil. 12.18.
10 Hor. Sat. 2.5.30–8.
11 Cic. Caecin. 14.
90 On Lawyers
put Cicero’s invective against the social climber Aebutius aside,12 we can 
clearly deduce from this passage that Aebutius had decent knowledge of law. 
He interfered in litigation on behalf of others and was actually quite suc-
cessful, a fact Cicero himself grudgingly concedes.13 Cicero had an equally 
low opinion of C. Claudius Palatina, the cognitor appointed by Verres for 
Sthenius.14 However, the list of occupations listed for Claudius –  sequester, 
interpres, confector negotiorum, prope conlega Timarchidi15 –  implies forensic 
experience and probably also legal knowledge.
Cicero’s views on the social background of his adversaries also influenced 
Roman linguistic usage regarding lawyers. While men from the senatorial 
order were addressed with the reverential term patronus, advocatus or causidi-
cus was often used for lawyers who had legal knowledge16 or who stemmed 
from a lower social background.17 Advocati who were freedmen were not 
uncommon,18 as is illustrated by the examples of L. Aelius, a freedman who 
accused T. Quinctius Mutto (Scaur. 23), an enemy of his patronus,19 and 
Voltacilius Plotus, a libertus who defended his patronus and taught oratory.20 
Another freedman who acted as advocate did not concern Cicero: ‘Selius 
may be eloquent enough to prove himself freeborn, I do not worry’.21 Last 
but not least, the freedman Trimalchio mentions advocacy or acting as a 
praeco as a possible career for his son.22
Similarly, sycophants (quadruplatores, calumniatores), men who accused 
others on a professional basis, were not worthy to be called jurists, although 
serial accusers like Naevius Turpio23 or Aelius Ligus, whom Cicero coined 
a venalis adscriptor,24 often had legal knowledge. Indeed, Cicero himself 
acknowledges the legal knowledge of the unknown accuser in his defence of 
L. Cornelius Balbus.25
2.2 The staff of the magistrates and the magistrate’s helpers
The staff who helped Roman officials has often been overlooked. The 
duties of these men (scribae, accensi, praecones, lictores, accensi, interpretes) 
12 He was probably an eques anyway, see Frier 1985: 35.
13 Cic. Caecin. 14.
14 Cic. Verr. 2.6.106
15 Idem: 2.6.108.
16 Cic. Off. 1.32
17 Cic. Verr. 2.3.184; Rosc. 28; Att. 1.16.2; De or. 2.283; Brut. 289; De or. 1.202; Orat. 30.
18 Freedmen who acted as advocati had been mentioned in Plautus’ Poenulus.
19 Cic. Scaur. 23.
20 Treggiari 1969: 118.
21 Cic. Fam. 7.32.3.
22 Petron. Sat. 46.
23 Verr. 2.3.90; 2.5.108. See also Schulz 1997: 137.
24 Cic. Dom. 49. He is also mentioned in Sest. 69 and Har. resp. 5, although not by name.
25 Cic. Balb. 20, 27.
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included helping in drafting edicts, laws and senatus consulta; drafting con-
tracts for the publicans and providing assistance in comprehending and 
following the numerous laws regulating the duties of the Roman officials. 
Indeed, Cicero points out, the apparitores often knew best where you could 
find the laws26 and that most of the magistrates only knew as much as the 
apparitores allowed them to know.27 Cicero was not alone in his opinion: 
the younger Cato, according to Plutarch, tried to curb their influence28 and 
Philo of Alexandria mentions that Aulus Flaccus Avillius was so knowl-
edgeable as prefect of Egypt that his scribes became redundant.29 Schulz 
has correctly pointed out that the personnel had a great deal of routine 
and assisted their magistrate, even more so in the provinces where news 
and help from Rome needed considerable time.30 Among the apparitores, 
the accensi, the scribes and the praecones were most closely involved with 
legal affairs.
The accensi, stewards to the higher magistrates, were personally appointed 
for the magistrate’s term of office and could gain considerable influence on 
the decision- making processes.31 More often than not they controlled who 
had access to the governor. 32 These men usually had a lower social status. 
Many of them were freedmen (sometimes even slaves acted as apparitores) 
and it was not unusual for a magistrate to bring his own freedman with 
him.33 An extraordinary example for such a freedman is Q. Tullius Statius, 
the accensus of Cicero’s brother Quintus:34 Cicero, who apparently disliked 
Statius,35 complains that due to Statius’ influence Quintus was less accessible 
and felt that Statius had more responsibility than he was due. Cicero illus-
trates this impression with an example, namely, when Statius handled his 
patronus’ official correspondence.36 Similarly, Verres’ accensus, Timarchides, 
was infamous for acquiring money for Verres, be it by collecting tax money37 
or buying art for a low price.38 Additionally, Timarchides was also involved 
in trials.39 To stress the influence of the apparitores, Cicero cites a letter in 
26 See for example Leg. agr. 2.13: The public scribes brought Cicero a copy of Rullus’ draft.
27 Cic. Leg. 3.46, 48. See also Treggiari 1969: 158.
28 Plut. Cat. Min. 16.2–5.
29 Philo. In Flaccum 3.
30 Schulz 1997: 128.
31 Kunkel and Wittmann 1995: 126f, Treggiari 1969: 154–6.
32 Schulz 1997: 105, 143–5.
33 See also Treggiari 1969: 153.
34 Treggiari 1969: 158 thinks that Statius was a private secretary, not an accensus, but one who 
performed public duties.
35 Cf. Att. 2.18.4, 2.19.1.
36 QFr. 1.2.1–3, 8. See also Treggiari 1969: 149, 158, 181 and Schulz 1997: 151–3.
37 Cic. Verr. 2.3.171, 175.
38 Idem: 2.4.35. See also Classen 1998: 127f and Schulz 1997: 243.
39 Cic. Verr. 2.2.74, 2.3.69.
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which Timarchides advises Apronius to acquire influence with the new 
scribes and apparitores to gain the praetor’s respect.40
In contrast to the accensi, scribes were often freeborn, especially those 
who had more reputable positions like the scribae quaestorii. In Verr. 2.3.184 
Cicero portrays the scribes as honourable but socially low- standing people, 
although some of them used this ordo as a means of social climbing (this is 
also alluded to by Horace).41 Their miscellaneous duties included writing 
protocols,42 managing the public funds43 (which also gave them the oppor-
tunity to appropriate them),44 maintaining the tabulae publicae45 and par-
ticipating in trials and lawsuits.46 Especially for the latter, legal knowledge 
proved to be useful (one only has to keep in mind the scriba Cn. Flavius who 
published the fasti) and some scribes bragged about their legal skills in their 
funerary inscriptions.47
Among those with extensive legal expertise was the scribe Sext. Clodius 
(sometimes referred to as Sext. Cloelius). He assisted Clodius in drafting 
contracts and laws, for example the contracts with exiles from Byzantium48 
and the lex Clodia de exilio Ciceronis.49 Others are mentioned by Cicero but 
it is not clear which proposals and laws he meant.50 Generally, drafting laws 
was considered a task for the nobility,51 which is why Cicero vehemently 
attacked Clodius for breaking this noble tradition.52 M. Aemilius Scaurus 
and L. Licinius Crassus, who descended from established families, helped 
Drusus in drafting his laws.53 P. Sestius and Visellius both prepared a draft 
of the law that should have restored Cicero’s rights:54 Cicero himself much 
preferred the draft that Visellius made for T. Fadius to the draft of Sestius, 
whom he considered incapable.55 Politicians regularly used jurists to draft 
40 Idem: 2.3.154–7.
41 Hor. Sat. 2.5.56–7. It is important to note that Horace was also a scriba quaestorius (Suet. 
Hor.).
42 Verr. 2.5.54. See Schulz 1997: 105.
43 Cic. Dom. 74.
44 Cic. Pis. 61.
45 Cic. Verr. 2.3.184; Cic. Dom. 74.
46 See Kunkel and Wittmann 1995: 111 fn.28 and Purcell 1983: 130.
47 CIL VI 1853; CIL VI 1819. See Damon 1992: 236 fn.22 and Purcell 1983: 130 fn.22.
48 Cic Dom. 83.
49 Idem: 47f, 83; Sest. 133.
50 Cic. Dom. 129; Cic. Har. resp. 11; Cic. Mil. 33. See also Damon 1992.
51 Cic. Dom. 48.
52 Apart from Sext. Clodius, Clodius (Cicero’s adversary) used a certain Decimus for drafting 
laws (Cic. Dom. 50).
53 Cic. Dom. 50.
54 Cic. Att. 3.30.3; 3.23.4.
55 Cic. Att. 7.17.2.
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laws.56 P. Sestius helped Pompey in drafting laws,57 while Balbus helped 
Caesar in drafting the lex Iulia municipalis.58 Those who drafted their own 
laws, like Vatinius, emphasised their achievements.59 Other drafters of the 
laws were known to Cicero’s audience but are unknown to modern readers 
such as the unnamed iure consultus called out in the Philippicae60 or the auc-
tores responsible for the draft of P. Servilius Rullus.61
Verres’ scribes, M. Papirius Potamo and Maevius,62 also exerted their 
influence on Sicily. While M. Papirius Potamo, an eques Romanus, who had 
previously served Caecilius, participated in Verres’ consilium,63 Maevius had 
a far more important role in Verres’ dealings. He assisted Verres in bringing 
in tax money and the delivery of grain64 and was rewarded for his services 
with a gold ring, which made him an eques.65 Last but not least there was 
Cicero’s own scribe, M. Tullius, who handled his official correspondence 
and assisted him in preparing his accounts before he left his province.66
Other helpers of Verres who had legal responsibility and (presumably) 
legal knowledge were his praeco Valerius, who was among the judges who 
decided the lawsuit of Nympho,67 C. Claudius, an interpres who was already 
mentioned above,68 A. Valentius, another interpres, who also acted as publi-
canus69 and M. Petilius, a personal advisor of Verres, who functioned as a 
iudex and participated in another judge’s consilium.70
Generally, because of their involvement in public and private auctions,71 
praecones were not held in high esteem by Roman society.72 However, their 
influence was substantial, and the function of a praeco represented a chance 
for social advancement.73 Sext. Naevius, a praeco and Cicero’s adversary 
56 The scriptor’s intentions were a major point in interpreting the law, too (Cic. Part. or. 134, 
136; Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.137, 139), which probably explains why the auctor of a law is quite often 
named.
57 Cic. Att. 7.17.2.
58 Cic. Fam 6.18. See also Simshäuser 1973: 137–9.
59 Cic. Vat. 27.
60 Cic. Phil. 2.96.
61 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.98.
62 Verr. 2.3.168.
63 Div. Caecin. 29; Verr. 2.3.137.
64 Cic. Verr. 2.3.171, 175. He also kept some money for himself (Verr. 2.2.170, 2.3.181–7).
65 Idem: 2.3.185. See also Bleicken 1995: 51.
66 Cic. Fam. 5.20.1. On Tullius see Treggiari 1969: 258.
67 Cic. Verr. 2.3.54.
68 See 90.
69 Cic. Verr. 2.3.84; 2.4.58.
70 Idem: 2.2.71, 73.
71 See Thielmann 1961: 42, 53f.
72 Kunkel and Wittmann 1995: 126. cf. Catull. 106.
73 The father of L. Aelius Stilo Praeconinus was a praeco (Plin. NH 33.29). Horace, too men-
tions being a praeco as a possible career for himself (Sat. I.6.86). On praecones see also 
Treggiari 1969: 99–101.
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in Pro Quinctio, is painted in a harsh light by Cicero.74 At the same time, 
Bannon has pointed out that Naevius, who had learned to use the legal 
system to his advantage over the course of his career, is also a good example 
of a praeco.75
At this point, it is interesting to note that Cicero used terms applicable 
to the support staff of a magistrate and other less reputable professions to 
ridicule jurists: praeco actionum,76 interpres iuris,77 interpres legum,78 cantor 
formularum,79 auceps syllabarum,80 ministrator.81 However, different factors 
might be at work. On the one hand, praecones and interpretes dealt, among 
other things, with legal affairs. On the other hand, jurisprudence was in 
Cicero’s view all but an ancillary discipline to oratory,82 a necessary evil an 
orator had to resort to, if he wanted to win a lawsuit.83
A magistrate did not depend solely on his staff. To a certain  degree –  and 
this was especially true of  governors –  he also needed to rely on his subor-
dinates (tribuni militum, praefecti fabrum, legati) and advisors (the so- called 
cohors amicorum).
The praefecti fabrum in particular gathered considerable influence.84 A 
representative of this group was L. Cornelius Balbus, who served as a prae-
fectus fabrum to Caesar in Hispania and Gallia. After Caesar’s governorship 
he remained his chief advisor, advising him on political and financial matters 
and helping him to draft laws.85 More importantly, during the civil war, he 
and C. Oppius remained in the city and acted as intermediaries between 
him and his allies. Their power was so great that Cicero bitterly called them 
‘kings of Rome’.86 After Caesar’s death, both transferred their loyalties to 
Octavian.
Another group of men who had considerable impact on legal and politi-
74 See also Damon 1997: 197. However, not all praecones were held in such low esteem by 
Cicero. Q. Granius, a praeco, who was famed for his wit, was held in high regard by him (see 
for example Cic. Planc. 33).
75 Bannon 2000: 75, 82.
76 Cic. De orat. 1.236.
77 Cic. Top. 4.
78 Cic. Tusc. 5.105.
79 Cic. De orat. 1.236
80 Idem: 1.236
81 Idem: 2.305
82 Cic. Orat. 141; De orat. 2.142–4.
83 Of course this is only a simplified version of Cicero’s view, albeit one he promoted in most 
of his orations and theoretical writings. Taking into account his letters to Trebatius, Cicero 
portrays himself as a man with solid legal knowledge who seems to covet their shared interest 
in jurisprudence. However, Cicero was a self- conscious man who yearned for the acceptance 
of the boni viri and therefore never declared himself as a jurist (although he could be consid-
ered to be one).
84 Schulz 1997: 160f.
85 Tac. Ann. 12.60.
86 Cic. Att. 12.12.1; Fam. 9.19.
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cal matters were the legati. Often they were recruited from family, friends 
or business associates.87 One of their duties involved the exercise of judicial 
functions, either exercising jurisdiction themselves88 or participating in the 
consilium of the magistrate.89 Men like Trebatius and C. Matius, a friend 
of both Cicero and Trebatius,90 acted as legal advisors to Caesar. Another 
friend of Cicero, the jurist Valerius, was employed by both P. Cornelius 
Lentulus Spinther91 and Appius Claudius Pulcher.92 At other times the legati 
assisted in drafting enactments and decrees, for example Gaius Longus and 
Publius who helped L. Sempronius Asellio in drafting his edict.93
Influence on the edict was not limited to legati. Verres’ familiaris 
Q. Apronius, a publicanus, initiated the edict on pactiones94 and it is probable 
that he influenced other portions of the edict95 as well as the jurisdiction,96 
and Cicero often mentions the power Apronius exerted on Verres and the 
province as a whole.97
2.3 Negotiatores and publicani
Another group of men whose legal knowledge is rarely recognised were 
the negotiatores, merchants who belonged to the equites and who engaged in 
banking, auctions and (the slave) trade. Most of Rome’s leading class was 
involved in making money98 but since the senatorial class was forbidden to 
engage in certain activities, they depended on the equites for most of their 
financial affairs.99 The negotiatores differed from the publicani whose associa-
tion Cicero sought and emphasised,100 insofar as Cicero called negotiatores 
those who could or would not accept the lease of taxes.101 Since the equites 
and the tribuni aerarii were often called upon as judges in trials and took part 
in the conventus civium,102 they acquired quite a bit of forensic experience and 
Cicero could single out men like Q. Considius, and M. Iuventius Pedo for 
 87 Schulz 1997: 173f.
 88 Behrends 1970: 31.
 89 Brennan 2000: 443, 480, 539.
 90 Cic. Att. 9.1.12, 14.1, 14.2; Fam. 7.15.
 91 Cic. Fam. 1.10.
 92 Idem: 3.1.
 93 Diod. Sic. 37.8.
 94 Cic. Verr. 2.3.36. See also Schulz 1997: 224.
 95 Cic. Verr. 2.3.25, 28, 70.
 96 Idem: 2.3.23.
 97 For example, idem: 2.3.22, 32, 40, 60–2, 106, 178, 228.
 98 See Cic. Att. 9.13.
 99 Cf. the praise for Rabirius Postumus because he strove to enlarge his friends’ assets (Rab. 
Post. 4).
100 On this topic see Bleicken 1995 and Treggiari 1969: 103.
101 Bleicken 1995: 30.
102 See also Idem: 1995: 32–43.
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their experience, their legal knowledge and their fairness in judging.103 A less 
than stellar example of this ordo was the promagister L. Carpinatius, who 
assisted Verres in making and selling judgements.104
A man whose legal qualifications are often overlooked is T. Pomponius 
Atticus, Cicero’s most trusted friend, who not only advised him in personal 
matters but whose duties also included the management of Cicero’s funds. 
Additionally, he managed the funds of Q. Tullius Cicero, M. Porcius Cato, 
Q. Hortensius, Aulus Manlius Torquatus and many more.105
An area of law he was very often involved in was auctions, since he admin-
istered the auctions of Cicero’s various inheritances. He advised Cicero on 
whether to accept or deny an inheritance, and handled the actual auction.106 
However, he did not take part in public auctions107 and while he had good 
contact with the publicans and acted as an intermediary, he never acted as 
a praes or manceps.108 Further legal duties of Atticus included collecting and 
accepting Cicero’s debts,109 paying and enforcing the repayment of Tullia’s 
dowries,110 and repaying the dowries of Terentia and Publilia.111 Several 
letters of Cicero to Atticus are dedicated to the acquisition of some gardens 
where Cicero wanted to build a monument for his daughter Tullia.112
Financial law was but one area in which Atticus’ expertise was visible, 
however, he had knowledge of inheritance law as well. Cicero asked 
Camillus and Atticus to assist Terentia in drafting her last will113 and it is 
obvious from Att. 12.18a.2 that he also had a hand in formulating Cicero’s 
will. Interestingly enough, he also handled property law: Cicero instructed 
Atticus to waive a servitude regarding one of his neighbours.114 Although 
Nepos mentions that Atticus never filed a suit on his own account, this does 
not mean that he never litigated. While he was neither an accusator nor a 
subscriptor, he was involved in several lawsuits and assisted Antonius’ wife 
Fulvia in her lawsuits.115
Another jurist whose expertise Cicero often sought was C. Furius Camillus, 
who specialised in the ius praediatorium.116 Cicero consulted him among other 
jurists in reference to the debts of Valerius, which he wanted to transfer to his 
103 Cic. Clu. 107.
104 Cic. Verr. 2.2.169–73.
105 Nep. Att. 15.3.
106 See e.g. Cic. Att. 11.13, 11.14, 11.15, 11.16, 12.1, 12.21; 12.23; Cic. Fam. 14.5.
107 Nep. Att. 6.3.
108 Idem: 6.3.
109 Cic. Att. 12.1, 12.6.
110 Idem: 11.2, 11.3, 11.4a, 11.25.
111 Idem: 14.13, 16.2; Plut. Cic. 41.3.
112 Cic. Att. 12.24, 12.25, 12.27, 12.28, 12.29, 12.30, 12.31, 12.33.
113 Idem: 11.16.5.
114 Idem: 15.26.4.
115 Nep. Att. 9.4.
116 Cic. Balb. 45.
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legatus Q. Volusius.117 Camillus was involved in the sale of Milo’s assets.118 
Together with Atticus he helped Terentia when she drafted her last will.119 
Similarly, he helped Cicero in drafting his own will.120 Like Atticus, he was 
involved in auctions and accepted payments on Cicero’s behalf.
Bankers, too, had extensive legal knowledge. Horace mentions three fae-
neratores, Nerius, Parellius and Cicuta, in Sat. 2.3,121 and makes reference to 
the ‘knotty contracts’ (nodosae tabulae) of Cicuta, from which few can escape. 
Taking into account that Porphyrio calls Parellius and Cicuta jurists,122 we 
can reasonably assume that they were not the only bankers who had legal 
knowledge and used it to the detriment of their clients.
2.4 Legal advisors and conveyancers
Legal advisors and conveyancers were jurists who specialised in giving legal 
advice or drafting contracts autonomously, but who for some reason or 
other were not viewed as jurists. One relevant factor was the area of law 
with which these men occupied themselves. If a man was involved in a less 
distinguished area of law, it soiled his reputation. This is especially true of 
ius praediatorium, because it dealt with the assets of debtors who could not 
repay their debts. In fact, auctions for indebted persons were so frequent 
that although they did not deal exclusively with such cases, they were identi-
fied with indebtedness.123 This also might account for the lack of sources on 
auctions in the Digest.124
Apart from the men mentioned above there were also those who assisted 
private men in drafting contracts (for example for dowries, sales or contracts 
for work); often these men were secretaries and their legal work was just one 
aspect of their occupation. Others were small town officials and priests.125 
Many of them were experts in less distinguished areas of the law: Cascellius 
(father of the famous jurist A. Cascellius) and Furius, who specialised in the 
ius praediatorium,126 could not expect much respect from their fellow citizens. 
This did not mean, however, that they had no work. Similarly, areas of law 
that were deemed too exotic or too useless did not command respect.127 
117 Cic. Fam 5.20.3
118 Cic. Att. 5.8, 6.1.19, 6.5.2.
119 Idem: 11.17, 11.21, 11.22, 11.24, 11.26, 11.27, 12.16.
120 Idem: 12.16.
121 Hor. Sat. 2.3.69, 75.
122 Porph. In idem: 2.69, 75.
123 Thielmann 1961: 47f.
124 Cf. idem: 81.
125 For examples see Schulz 1997: 136.
126 Cic. Balb. 45.
127 A similar problem seems to exist in German scholarship on Roman jurists who devoted 
themselves to public law.
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Things were different with inheritance law. Although ‘normal’ jurists were 
often asked for responsa in inheritance law, drafting the actual testament was 
often (not always) the task of freedmen: Polybius and Hilarion, Augustus’ 
freedmen, are mentioned as helping him write his will.128 Later this task fell 
to the tabelliones.
Another aspect that almost certainly played a role was the social status. 
Freedmen who gave legal advice (like the title- giving parasite Phormio in 
Terence’s comedy) or drafted contracts were not considered jurists due to 
their low social status. Most of these were former scribes, or librarii, who 
continued to do the same work they had performed as slaves. 129
3. CONCLUSION
Who was considered a jurist did not necessarily depend on the legal knowl-
edge of those concerned: Quite contrary to modern perceptions, many 
factors played a role: The bad reputation of some professions (for example 
procuratores and cognitores) obscured the forensic experience of those fulfill-
ing these duties. Other men (for example Cicero) may have baulked from 
declaring themselves as jurists, since for them jurisprudence was always 
second to oratory. Some were impeded by their origins from being per-
ceived as jurists, others were hindered by their chosen area of law. In sum, 
the jurists of the late Roman Republic were a very heterogeneous group on 
which future research is much needed.
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Chapter 7
Cicero’s Reception in the Juristic Tradition  
of the Early Empire
Matthijs Wibier
1. INTRODUCTION
Anyone interested in Cicero as a legal thinker and his importance in the 
development of Roman law will find herself facing a somewhat paradoxi-
cal situation. On the one hand, Cicero is often counted among the greatest 
ancient thinkers on law, while on the other his name and writings are largely 
absent from ancient Roman legal scholarship. A quick glance reveals that the 
Institutes of Gaius, a text from the second century ad, do not cite Cicero by 
name. Likewise, the fifty books of Justinian’s Digest, our most important 
source for juristic writings, mention Cicero only a handful of times.1 Even 
when it comes to the reception of ideas, Cicero’s presence seems limited; it 
is at least sufficiently elusive as to create ample scholarly disagreement.2 Yet 
Cicero undeniably had an extensive interest in legal matters, ranging from 
the wording of wills to questions about natural justice, and there is every 
indication that much of his œuvre has circulated widely since his lifetime. 
For these reasons, it is worth considering how Cicero and his works were 
received by the jurists and how we should understand his relatively marginal 
presence in Roman legal thought.
The relation between Cicero and the Roman jurists has undergone 
thorough scholarly scrutiny, albeit mostly from a Ciceronian perspective.3 
Designated by Latin words such as iure consultus or iuris peritus or simply 
prudens,4 a jurist functioned as a legal advisor to individuals with questions 
about the ‘proper’ interpretation of the law, which could involve written 
as well as unwritten law.5 A jurist’s answer, specific to the case at hand and 
known as a responsum, could be cited in court in support of one’s case. The 
 1 For a discussion of some of the complications involved in using the Digest as a source, see 
the next section.
 2 See for example Nörr 1978; Atkins 2013; MacCormack 2014, for widely different analyses 
and appraisals.
 3 Seminal studies are Frier 1985 and Harries 2006.
 4 Although generally accompanied by iuris or iure, all three adjectives do occur alone to refer 
to jurists (see OLD s.vv).
 5 Interpretatio is in fact used by jurists as a technical term to describe their activities. See Pomp. 
D. 1.2.2.6 (cf. Cic. Off. 2.65).
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authority of responsa was a function of the authority of their authors, who 
needed to be experts on customary practices in order to find a solution that 
could be considered ‘right’ –  that is, a solution in line with traditional inter-
pretations of statutes, or customary law, or, in lack thereof, Roman tradi-
tions. We should note at the outset that Cicero is generally not considered a 
jurist, either by the ancients or by modern scholars. The main reason is that 
Cicero, when pleading a case in the courtroom, is out primarily to win the 
suit for his client and as such acts as an advocate, not a jurist.6 This image 
is strengthened by Cicero’s own writings: he regularly portrays jurists as a 
group to which he himself does not belong.7 As recent studies have pointed 
out, however, it is crucial to keep in mind that Cicero is often trying to 
construct an authoritative persona at the expense of the jurists.8 The late 
Republic was a world that lacked a single ultimate legal authority and as such 
ownership of the law was diffused.9 The result was that many individuals 
staked claims to legal expertise. Since it was his business to persuade others 
of his views, it served Cicero the Advocate to marginalise rival lawyers by rel-
egating them to the ranks of the jurists, who he tends to construct as a class 
of inferior and somewhat pedantic students of the law. Hammering home 
the idea that he himself outclassed the jurists proved to be one of Cicero’s 
favourite rhetorical ploys in a context in which the boundaries between dif-
ferent types of lawyers (including jurists and forensic orators) were not as 
clear as Cicero claimed them to be.10
In this chapter, I explore Cicero’s relation to the jurists from the opposite 
perspective by studying how jurists viewed and read Cicero. Since only very 
little juristic material survives that dates to Cicero’s lifetime, I will be focus-
ing chiefly on jurists from the early Empire. On the one hand, this allows 
us to get as close as possible to the views of Cicero’s contemporaries. On 
the other hand, and more importantly so, we should realise that intellectual 
legacies take shape over several generations and may display a multiplicity 
of appraisals. This is certainly the picture we get from several recent studies 
on Cicero’s early reception outside the juristic sphere. Thus we should note 
that Cicero’s actions as a politician received a mixed press. While executing 
some of Catiline’s fellow conspirators provoked intensely hostile reactions 
for centuries after his death, Cicero’s verbal attacks on Antony earned him 
superlative and universal praise. Yet in contrast to his equivocal reception as 
 6 See Crook 1995 for an excellent discussion of legal advocacy in the Roman world.
 7 For example at Brut. 150–7; Mur. 19–30.
 8 Harries 2006.
 9 See Harries 2002.
10 Even though by the second century ad jurisprudence had grown into a more specialist 
discipline, gentlemen scholars such as Gellius were reading legal works and discussing legal 
problems. This suggests that law was far from being isolated from mainstream culture, as 
was held by scholars of previous generations. For an excellent discussion of Gellius and the 
jurists, see Howley 2013.
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a politician, Cicero’s reputation as a speaker and stylist was never seriously 
criticised; his eloquence (in writing) formed the gold standard for every 
orator who came after him.11 These observations indicate that the reception 
of the author- as-person may be different from the reception of his writings. 
This distinction will prove relevant for the jurists as well, since some of their 
most polemical passages involve the name of Cicero rather than an engage-
ment with his contributions to law. It should be clear that my reception- 
based approach has a major advantage over the traditional Quellenforschung 
approach. Where an earlier survey tried to establish the mechanics of quota-
tion and misquotation,12 this chapter takes as a starting point that quotation, 
and especially paraphrase and adaptation, presuppose a selection process on 
the part of the receiving author, which raises acute questions about under-
lying agendas. Similarly the reception perspective opens our eyes to how 
jurists construct the figure of Cicero in (sometimes, very) particular ways.
In mapping Cicero’s legacy, I will proceed in three steps, which cor-
respond roughly to his reception in juristic, rhetorical and philosophical 
terms. The next section discusses a number of quotations from Cicero’s 
works in the Digest that are cited and used in the way jurists engage with 
the works of other jurists. This suggests that Cicero must occasionally have 
acted like a jurist, and that jurists mined his works to some extent for useful 
materials. The subsequent section studies juristic attitudes towards Cicero’s 
place in legal history by focusing on the famous history of jurisprudence by 
Pomponius. Against the background of the polemical use of Cicero in the 
rhetorical tradition, we can see how Pomponius’ narrative uses the figure of 
Cicero and rewrites some of his most hostile passages in order to push back 
on his attacks on the jurists. The final section addresses Cicero’s importance 
as a legal philosopher. Arguing first that Cicero’s philosophical reception in 
the juristic tradition cannot be proven, I show that the jurists avoid crediting 
the figure Cicero for any philosophical contributions at all. In his stead, they 
project and construct the jurist Labeo (Augustan Age) as the all- eclipsing 
legal philosopher of  Rome –  and it seems that polemical considerations once 
more play a role here.
2. THE JURISTIC TRADITION AND THE DEFINITIONS OF 
MARCUS TULLIUS
This section surveys the quotations that the Digest ascribes to Cicero. I 
argue that they are well at place in, and should hence be understood within, 
11 A recent survey is Gowing 2014; older surveys are Kennedy 2002 and Winterbottom 
1982. See MacCormack 2014 for late antiquity, Bishop 2015 for Cicero’s pairing with 
Demosthenes and Plato, Kaster 1998 on Cicero in the rhetorical schools (cf. La Bua 2006), 
and Dressler 2015 on the figure of Cicero.
12 Nörr 1978 (a slightly expanded version of Nörr 1977).
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a book culture that is characterised by jurists who excerpt other jurists and 
compile collections of legal opinions. Before turning to Cicero, then, I will 
first discuss briefly the juristic tradition and point out some of the peculiari-
ties involved in working with excerpts.
The introduction above has mentioned that legal opinions were typically 
given in response to specific queries. From scattered remarks in Cicero’s 
œuvre, it appears that for the middle and late Republic the standard scenario 
involved individuals approaching a fellow citizen with a certain authority 
in legal affairs.13 But it is important to stress that questions could come up 
and might need addressing in many situations: while court cases obviously 
often revolved around legal technicalities, issues could also arise with offi-
cials in exercising their office as well as during discussions in an educational 
setting.14 Legal opinions given in response to such problems were treated 
as interpretations of the law with a certain authority, although this varied 
somewhat depending on the status of the issuing jurist. Since they clarified 
problematic aspects of the law, responsa along with case descriptions (occa-
sionally including case decisions) were preserved for future reference, which 
in addition to legal disputes included legal education. According to Cicero, 
in educating the next generation some prominent jurists allowed students 
merely to observe their giving of responsa, while others invited students to 
their houses for question- and-answer sessions that went over old cases and 
sometimes developed hypothetical problems as well. For the specific legal 
cases we hear about in the sources, it is often impossible to establish in what 
form their dossiers reached the jurist–teacher who discussed them with 
his students; but generally speaking it must have involved a mixture of the 
senior jurist’s personal recollection, of documents preserved in the family 
archive, and increasingly also of material found in opinion collections in 
book form. Cicero’s œuvre once more makes it clear that by his time opinion 
collections circulated that contained the views of more than one older gen-
eration of jurists. For example, we learn from one of Cicero’s letters that the 
work De iure civili of Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex (consul 95 bc) 
listed the opinions of different jurists organised by topic.15
The same letter from Cicero indicates that Mucius’ work made it easy 
to look up what others had said about a certain topic. From the excerpts 
of juristic works preserved by Justinian, we can see that as time evolves 
jurists increasingly cite and refer to other jurists. While commentaries 
and polemical works were being produced and survive in small fragments, 
13 The following short overview intends to present the standard narrative; for an overview with 
ample source references, see for example Wibier 2014: 361–3.
14 See for example Gell. NA 13.13 (a quaestio concerning jurisdiction) and Alfenus Varus, D. 
38.1.26.1 (for a question of a student to his teacher).
15 Cic. Fam. 7.22 (= SB 331). The letter does not explicitly say that Mucius’ work was con-
sulted, but scholars generally assume so (e.g. Shackleton Bailey 2001).
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much effort was devoted to producing selections from previous literature, 
so- called digests, in order to keep track of legal opinions and arguments 
that had been circulated, and to keep consultation of a variety of views 
manageable.16 In effect, Mucius’ work constitutes the earliest such digest of 
which we know. Alfenus Varus (cos. suf. 39 bc) was the first to use the title 
Digesta for his work, which was probably a collection of both his own opin-
ions and those of his teacher Servius Sulpicius Rufus. The second- century 
ad jurist Pomponius tells us that a certain Aufidius Namusa, a student of 
the same Servius Sulpicius, ‘digested’ the works of his fellow students in a 
massive work spanning 140 books (digesti sunt, D. 1.2.2.44). Even introduc-
tory legal textbooks could take the form of digests: Gaius’ Institutes, one of 
the few legal texts from the early Empire that survive independently from 
Justinian’s project, is a handbook that credits points of legal doctrine to 
individual jurists. Standing at the end of a long tradition of legal digests, the 
fifty books of Justinian’s Digest (brought into circulation in ad 533) present 
the opinions mainly of jurists dating to the first through third centuries ad, 
although the views of older jurists are regularly quoted directly or indirectly. 
For example, while Q. Mucius Scaevola himself features occasionally in the 
Digest, in practically all cases his opinions occur as quoted or paraphrased 
by other jurists.17
Once we realise that excerpting and paraphrasing are central technolo-
gies of the Digest and its forerunners, questions arise in terms of textual 
and source criticism: what does it mean for the text, and the ideas presented 
therein, that we are dealing with an excerpt or even a paraphrase? How accu-
rate are the texts? How much have the excerpted texts been edited? These 
questions in combination with worries about poor syntax gave rise to a 
hunt for ‘interpolations’ in the Digest among earlier generations of schol-
ars. While the problem is real, recent studies of passages in the Digest that 
are also attested via independent channels have shown that syntactical and 
stylistic considerations are often misleading and highly subjective, and that 
the interventions of excerptors appear to be primarily stylistic rather than 
substantive.18 As such, most scholars now work on the hypothesis that the 
Digest gives a fair rendering of the words of the authors it is quoting, while 
remaining open to the possibility that new evidence might prove otherwise 
for the particular excerpt under scrutiny.
The following passage gives a flavour of juristic excerpt collections and 
brings us back to the issue of quotations from Cicero in the Digest:
16 To be sure, I am using the term ‘digest’ here fairly widely to refer to a type of text that brings 
together and organises legal opinions on certain topics. My usage here is not limited to works 
entitled Digesta.
17 See Lenel Paling. 2.757–62.
18 See Nelson 1981 for a collation of quoted passages from Gaius’ Institutes in the Digest 
against the MS of Gaius. See in general Honoré 2010.
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CELSUS libro vicensimo quinto digestorum. litus est, quousque maximus fluctus 
a mari pervenit: idque Marcum Tullium aiunt, cum arbiter esset, primum consti-
tuisse. [1.] praedia dicimus aliquorum esse non utique communiter habentium ea, 
sed vel alio aliud habente. (D. 50.16.96 pr. –  1.)
CELSUS, in the twenty-fifth book of the Digesta: the ‘shore’ is as far as the highest 
tide reaches from the sea: and they say that Marcus Tullius first established this, 
when he was deciding a case. Of ‘estates’ we surely do not say that they belong to 
those holding them in common, but rather when everyone has their own.
The passage gives us two definitions, suggesting that it was excised from a 
longer list of legal definitions. Note further that this excerpt is a digest at 
several levels: being part of Justinian’s Digest, it quotes Book 25 of a work 
rather aptly entitled Digesta by the jurist Celsus, who was active in the reigns 
of Trajan and Hadrian. Celsus himself excerpts and summarises further, 
mentioning unnamed others who quote or paraphrase Cicero. The term 
aiunt is conventional language among the jurists, which generally indicates 
that they found something in a written source.19 Furthermore, the fact that 
Celsus mentions Cicero’s capacity as an arbiter suggests that Cicero (suppos-
edly) formulated this view during a legal proceeding when a question about 
the exact boundaries of the shore came up. Expressed in a practical situation 
in response to a specific query, the opinion was apparently appreciated, and 
it entered the juristic tradition for that reason. Celsus’ aiunt indicates that by 
his time the definition was generally accepted and could be found in many 
legal works, which is confirmed by Quintilian’s report that ‘jurists’ (iuris 
consulti), as a group it seems, define the shore as ‘as far as the tide rolls’ (qua 
fluctus eludit, 5.14.34–5).
While Celsus and Quintilian both point out that the definition circulated 
widely, the difference in wording between them opens up the source ques-
tion. It has long been pointed out that both authors take up a passage from 
Cicero’s Topica:20
solebat igitur Aquilius collega et familiaris meus cum de litoribus ageretur, quae 
omnia publica esse voltis, quaerentibus iis quos ad id pertinebat quid esse litus, 
ita definire: qua fluctus eluderet.
For, when there was a case about shores, which you [jurists] want to be all com-
munal, my colleague and friend Aquilius used to give the following definition 
when those whom this concerned asked what a shore was: ‘as far as the tide rolls’.
It should be clear from this passage that Quintilian stays closest to the 
Ciceronian text. Celsus, on the other hand, not only reformulates the 
19 For example in Pomponius, who introduces a paraphrase of Cicero’s Brutus with the words 
Cicero ait (D. 1.2.2.40). See below.
20 Top. 32. See Nörr 1978: 126.
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 definition, he also ascribes the definition to Cicero himself rather than to 
Aquilius Gallus. Regarding the reformulation, we should note that it cannot 
really be considered a corruption of Cicero: while the Ciceronian–Aquilian 
concept of ‘shore’ is preserved, the tweaking of the phrasing makes the 
expression even clearer, which should be no problem in a legal context. We 
may thus take Celsus to be paraphrasing a definition found in the Ciceronian 
corpus. Furthermore, the attribution to Cicero instead of Aquilius suggests 
that Celsus (or his source) quoted from memory, and then put the definition 
down in much the same words as before and tagged it with Cicero’s name.21 
Yet even if this seems a straightforward account of the divergence between 
Celsus and the text of the Topica, the present state of evidence does not allow 
us to rule out at least two further interpretations. On the one hand, it is not 
impossible that Cicero actually used Aquilius’ definition in a case in which 
he was an arbiter, and that the version found in the case dossier somehow 
entered the juristic tradition. On the other hand, we will see in more detail in 
the next section that the jurists of the early Empire operated in an intellectual 
setting that was rife with polemic against them. These attacks were themselves 
a self- conscious form of Ciceronian reception, projecting Cicero, and with 
him oratory, as superior to jurisprudence. Within this context, we may read 
Celsus’ elision of Cicero and Aquilius as a deliberate attempt to co- opt Cicero 
for the juristic tradition and to show that he at times wore a jurist’s hat, thus 
erasing to some extent the boundaries between types of lawyers as found in 
the Ciceronian corpus.22 No matter which of these views we prefer, the key 
point to note is that Cicero is presented as an authority of legal definition 
and is treated as a fellow jurist by Celsus (and perhaps already his source), 
and later by Justinian’s compilers, without hesitation or justification. All this 
indicates that Cicero and his writings could be taken seriously as contributing 
to juristic debates in the first centuries after his death.
A similar argument about Cicero’s potential value to juristic discussions 
can be made on the basis of a definition of latitare ascribed to him by the 
third- century ad jurist Ulpian. The following quotation is a passage taken 
from Ulpian’s commentary on the praetor’s edict:
quid sit autem latitare, videamus. latitare est non, ut Cicero definit, turpis occulta-
tio sui: potest enim quis latitare non turpi de causa, veluti qui tyranni crudelitatem 
timet aut vim hostium aut domesticas seditiones. [5.] sed is, qui fraudationis causa 
latitet, non tamen propter creditores, etsi haec latitatio creditores fraudet . . . (D. 
42.4.7.4–5)
21 Cf. also the reformulation of cum . . . ageretur as cum arbiter esset. This is along the lines of the 
explanation given by Nörr 1978: 126–31, although I do not think that Celsus’ reformulation 
necessarily means that the text of the Topica was only transmitted orally, which Nörr contends.
22 See below. We will see that jurists generally try to exclude Cicero from their ranks, but 
there is no need to assume that all jurists had the same ideas about how to handle Cicero and 
Ciceronian polemics.
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But let us see what constitutes ‘hiding’. ‘Hiding’ is not, as Cicero defines it, a 
shameful concealment of oneself: for someone can hide due to a cause that is not 
shameful, such as when someone fears the cruelty of a tyrant or the strength of the 
enemy or uprisings at home. However the person who hides in order to deceive, 
yet not because of his creditors, although this hiding deceives the creditors . . .
This discussion about the meaning of ‘hiding’ comes up in the context of a 
praetorian provision known as missio in possessionem (‘seizure of property’), 
which could be used, for example, against someone who was in debt. Ulpian 
informs us that the praetor will grant an action against a person hiding out 
of fraudulence (praetor ait: qui fraudationis causa latitabit . . . 42.4.7.1). After 
a few introductory points, the question about the technical legal meaning of 
latitare is raised. Several definitions are reviewed. The first of these, which is 
rejected, is explicitly attributed to Cicero. This definition was long consid-
ered a fragment from a lost work of Cicero until Jane Crawford demonstrated 
that it forms a paraphrase of De domo sua 83.23 Furthermore, Crawford has 
suggested that Ulpian’s subsequent discussion of the technical juristic defini-
tion may evoke Cicero’s Pro Quinctio, which features the phrase qui frauda-
tionis causa and a form of latitare at two points (60, 74). Even though both 
Ulpian’s text and the Pro Quinctio indicate that this clause occurred in the 
praetor’s edict and must as such have been fairly widespread,24 the activation 
of the Ciceronian connection in the preceding sentence invites us to consider 
Cicero’s more technical discussion of latitare in the Pro Quinctio, which is 
in line with technical juristic conception of the term. On this reading of the 
passage quoted above, Ulpian’s text engages with the Ciceronian corpus in a 
complex way. First and foremost, it signals the value for a jurist of compar-
ing and contrasting different speeches of Cicero, and the legal knowledge 
that can be harvested from this process if done in the right way. In addition, 
by showing off knowledge of Cicero’s works, the text casts Ulpian as a jurist 
exemplary for his learnedness and the acumen required for properly assess-
ing the writings of others.25
The final explicit reference to Cicero’s writings in a discussion of legal 
doctrine can be found in a passage by the jurist Tryphoninus (active around/
23 Crawford 1994: 311–12, ‘turpis occultatio sui ~ latitat omnino, sed, si requiri iusseris, inven-
ient hominem apud sororem tuam occultantem se capite demisso.’
24 This is indicated by Ulpian’s praetor ait and Cicero’s recita edictum (Quinct. 60). See Lenel 
1927: 405 (= 38.205). The fact that Probus included FCL (= fraudationis causa latitat) in a list 
of legal abbreviations indicates that the phrase was ubiquitous (Not. iur. 6.66.1). However, it 
appears hardly attested outside juristic texts except in Cicero’s Pro Quinctio.
25 Even if we do not accept that the passage may call to mind the Pro Quinctio, it still suggests 
that jurists may profit from reading Cicero. A favourite rhetorical strategy among jurists is 
to take someone’s legal definition in order to sharpen one’s own. As Gai. Inst. 3.183 shows, 
this does not necessarily imply a generally negative attitude towards the criticised author 
in question, as Nörr proposed for Ulpian in relation to Cicero on a tenuous parallel (1978: 
134–6).
108 On Lawyers
after 200 ad). The Digest features the following excerpt discussing the delib-
erate abortion of pregnancies:
Cicero in oratione pro Cluentio habito scripsit Milesiam quandam mulierem, 
cum esset in Asia, quod ab heredibus secundis accepta pecunia partum sibi 
medicamentis ipsa abegisset, rei capitalis esse damnatam. sed et si qua visceribus 
suis post divortium, quod praegnas fuit, vim intulerit, ne iam inimico marito 
filium procrearet, ut temporali exilio coerceatur, ab optimis imperatoribus nostris 
rescriptum est.26
Cicero in the speech Pro Cluentio wrote that, when he was in Asia, some woman 
from Miletus had been condemned on a capital charge because she herself had 
driven off her own foetus by means of drugs after having taken money from 
the substituted heirs. But also if a woman after a divorce applies violence to her 
womb because she is pregnant, in order not to produce a child for her now hateful 
husband, it has been ordered in an imperial rescript by our very best emperors 
that she be punished with temporary exile.
The second half of this passage tells us that the emperors of Tryphoninus’ 
day, probably Septimius Severus and Caracalla,27 affirmed that a woman 
who aborted her pregnancy after a divorce would be liable to penalty. That 
they did so in a rescript, which is an official communication in response to 
a petition, suggests that Roman law did not punish the abortion, or at least 
that the legal situation needed clarification. This impression is substantiated 
by Dieter Nörr’s discussion of the passage, which argues that, while Roman 
attitudes towards abortion were generally hostile, it only became punishable 
in the Severan Age.28 The near- quotation from the Pro Cluentio in the first 
sentence seems to point in a similar direction: not only did Tryphoninus 
apparently find no juristic authorities who had formulated a view in line 
with the rescript before, he referred to a peregrine (not Roman) case found 
in a by- then centuries- old courtroom speech. That is to say, the reference 
to Cicero must have served to create some sort of precedent or parallel for 
the opinion expressed in the rescript, and we should note that Tryphoninus 
apparently considered Cicero sufficiently authoritative as to make the 
rescript more palatable to a wider juristic audience.29
All in all, then, we have seen that Cicero’s writings were read by jurists 
and were referenced in the juristic tradition, even though his occurrence is 
26 D. 48.19.39 pr.
27 See the jurist Marcian at D. 47.11.4.
28 Nörr 1978: 122–5, with Ulpian (D. 48.8.8) and Marcian (D. 47.11.4).
29 See also Nörr 1978: 124–6, who entertains the idea that Tryphoninus may have circulated 
his rendering of the Pro Cluentio already before the rescript was issued and may as such have 
influenced policy change. This must remain speculative. I also see no reason to suppose that 
the second sentence in the block quote above is a later addition.
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relatively marginal.30 Furthermore, it should be noted that whenever Cicero 
is cited, he is cited for a detailed piece of legal doctrine, which is used by 
later jurists to support or sharpen their own views. Crucially, then, while the 
jurists quote Cicero only sparsely, they do quote him as if he is a jurist. Nörr 
emphasised that these quotations do not support the claim that the jurists 
considered Cicero a professional colleague, but this is once more to per-
petuate Cicero’s own rhetorical and somewhat disingenuous dichotomy.31 
Rather, the passages discussed suggest that Cicero’s work was not off- limits 
in principle, and that the boundaries between Cicero and the jurists were 
more porous than Cicero claimed in his own works.32
3. ADVOCATES, JURISTS AND THE MYTH OF CICERO
A juristic text that brings up Cicero several times is the history of Roman 
jurisprudence written by Pomponius during the reign of Hadrian (D. 1.2.2). 
Rather than presenting a compilation of views on legal doctrine, the text 
constitutes a historiographical narrative of legal scholarship from the Regal 
period onwards. Recent studies have demonstrated extensively that Roman 
historiographical writings tend to push their rhetorical agendas onto their 
readership.33 In line with these observations, this section analyses the 
agenda of Pomponius’ account in its engagement with Cicero.34 We will 
see that Pomponius is primarily interested in the figure of Cicero and in 
constructing him as of marginal importance to the field of jurisprudence. 
We will also see that Pomponius does so in reaction to polemical attacks by 
advocates, who take up hostile passages from Cicero’s œuvre so as to assert 
their superiority over jurists.
Regarding the question why the claims of these orators are so important to 
Pomponius, it should be kept in mind that by his time rhetorical training had 
been a staple of elite culture for many generations. Authors such as Seneca 
the Elder, Quintilian and Suetonius give the impression that a tremendous 
number of people had been through the rhetorical schools that started to 
30 Ulpian’s discussion of the term deicere at D. 43.16.3.8 may be a further case. Although it does 
not mention Cicero by name, the definition squares with Cicero’s definition at Pro Caecina 
66. Tellegen- Couperus 1991: 46 has argued plausibly that the standard juristic interpretation 
originates with Cicero.
31 Nörr 1978: 145–7.
32 Papinian at D. 48.4.8 cites Iulia’s (= Fulvia’s) testimony against the Catilinarian Conspirators 
in support of the claim that women can be heard in cases of maiestas. While Papinian men-
tions that Cicero was consul that year, this is hardly a case of Ciceronian reception as Cicero 
never mentions Fulvia by  name –  in contrast to Sallust and Florus. See on this extensively 
Nörr 1978: 115–21.
33 See Kraus and Woodman 1997: 1–10 for a discussion.
34 On the agenda of Pomponius’ work more generally, see Nörr 1976 for an extensive 
discussion.
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arise since the Augustan Age. It seems fairly clear that this type of educa-
tion provided an entry ticket to a political and literary career, as well as to a 
career in forensic oratory.35 It is therefore plausible to assume that men who 
made their name as  jurists –  men such as  Pomponius –  had spent time in the 
rhetorical schools as well,36 and hence that they were familiar not only with 
the schools’ literary curricula but also with how the discourse of advocacy 
constructed legal history and Cicero’s role therein.37 In order to contextual-
ise Pomponius’ engagement with Cicero fully, then, it is necessary to place 
it against the predominant narrative that we find in the rhetorical tradition.
A quick glance suffices to note that Cicero is a towering figure in the 
rhetorical tradition of the early Empire. From Seneca the Elder’s work on 
the rise and development of declamatory culture at Rome, we learn that 
Cicero’s works, especially his orations, were studied intensively, something 
we also gather from the work of Quintilian and from Tacitus’ Dialogus. 
While Seneca’s preface rhetorically claims that declamatory culture is a mere 
footnote to the heights of eloquence reached in Cicero’s works, it is perhaps 
more telling about the esteem in which Cicero was held that, by the time of 
Seneca, the figure of Cicero had grown into a larger- than-life icon of Roman 
political oratory. Robert Kaster has pointed out how exceptional it is that 
Cicero features in the exercise scenarios of Suasoria 6 and 7.38 The seventh 
exercise, for example, asks students to produce a speech advising Cicero 
whether or not to burn all his writings in the hypothetical situation that 
Antony offers mercy on this condition. Many of the speeches excerpted by 
Seneca advise against taking the offer on some variant of the argument that 
Cicero’s eloquence transcends the mortal condition.
When it comes to Cicero’s importance more specifically in forensic 
oratory, it is Quintilian who is most explicit about Cicero’s all- eclipsing 
accomplishments. As part of his discussion that the perfect orator must be 
thoroughly educated across the disciplines, Quintilian argues that Cicero 
was the one by far closest to reaching this ideal (12.1.15–21). We should note 
that in developing these points Quintilian references Antonius’ speech on 
the ideal orator in Cicero’s De Oratore and that he himself defends a similar 
theory (De or. 1.94, 3.189). While the perfect orator of the Ciceronian text 
remains nameless, Quintilian’s reception of it is premised on a reading that 
equates the figure of Cicero with the ideal of De Oratore. The same reading 
underlies Quintilian’s discussion of the relation between rhetoric and juris-
35 Seneca’s description of Ovid’s days as a student is famous (2.2.8–12). In general, see Bonner 
1969, 45 for (still) the best account of this.
36 Crook 1955 shows that many jurists made a career and achieved top positions under the 
emperors.
37 This is arguably far less the case for the legal–juristic tradition, since specialist juristic educa-
tion was pursued by only a fraction of the elite young men who went through the rhetorical 
schools.
38 Kaster 1998.
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prudence somewhat later on. When Quintilian argues extensively at 12.3 
that the perfect orator should have extensive knowledge of the law, we find 
the following:
verum et M. Cato cum in dicendo praestantissimus, tum iuris idem fuit peritis-
simus, et Scaevolae Servioque Sulpicio concessa est etiam facundiae virtus, et 
M. Tullius non modo inter agendum numquam est destitutus scientia iuris, sed 
etiam componere aliqua de eo coeperat, ut appareat posse oratorem non discendo 
tantum iuri vacare sed etiam docendo. (12.3.9–10)
But indeed Marcus Cato was both the most outstanding in speaking and, likewise, 
the greatest expert in law; and excellence in speaking has also been granted to 
Scaevola and Servius Sulpicius, and Marcus Tullius was not only never devoid of 
knowledge of the law when pleading, but he even began to write something about 
that, so that it appears that an orator might devote himself not merely to learning 
the law but also to teaching it.
This passage uses several rhetorical ploys to project Cicero as the pinnacle 
of legal oratory. First, by placing Cicero at the end of this brief history and 
by elaborating so much on his qualities, the narrative suggests that Cicero is 
the culmination of legal history, both of forensic oratory and of legal schol-
arship. Cicero’s capabilities come out even more strongly once we take into 
account the ancient commonplace that complete intellectual mastery comes 
with the ability to teach the subject in question.39 He thus seems to surpass 
even Cato; for while Cato is praised to a superlative degree, standing out 
among his peers until at least the generations of Mucius Scaevola and Servius 
Sulpicius, nothing is said as to whether he ever taught law. Furthermore, we 
should note that the passage once again evokes the debate on the ideal orator 
in De Oratore by reformulating the speech of Crassus in which he urges pas-
sionately that the orator be thoroughly versed in the law (1.166–204).40 Here 
we see once more that Quintilian engages closely with Cicero’s ideas about 
the perfect orator, while pushing forth the idea that the figure of Cicero 
embodies the ideal.41
If the text in the block quotation above already suggests that jurispru-
dence is somehow subordinated to oratory, Quintilian makes this point 
crystal- clear in the immediately following paragraphs. This time Quintilian 
takes up a rather polemical passage from De Oratore to stress how difficult 
a task becoming a perfect orator is: many students will not achieve it. We 
hear that failed students regularly decide to become jurists, designated here 
by the pejorative term leguleius (‘pettifogger’, 12.3.11 ~ Cic. De or. 1.236). 
39 See for example Quint. 1 pr.23.
40 For specific references, see Russell’s notes ad loc. in the Loeb edition (Russell 2001).
41 This is admittedly a reading encouraged by the Ciceronian corpus itself. The second half of 
the Brutus comes probably closest to saying this flat out.
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The problem with these jurists is that they are intellectually less competent 
or simply lazy individuals (desidia, pigritia), who despite all this have the 
nerve to assert the greater usefulness of their type of law (utiliora). In all, 
then, Quintilian not only presents Cicero as the perfect orator according to 
Quintilian’s  own –  Ciceronian –  theory, but his reception of the Ciceronian 
corpus also involves turning Cicero into the icon of advocacy’s abusive claim 
of superiority over jurisprudence.
The letters of Pliny the Younger suggest that the polemical attacks on 
jurists as found in Cicero’s works enjoyed a fairly wide reception among 
high- profile orators. Three letters, linked by the occurrence of the term vol-
untas defuncti, discuss wills that have been formulated in such a way that the 
testators’ wishes cannot legally be carried out (2.16, 4.10, 5.7). Since the wish 
of the deceased is perfectly clear in each case, Pliny claims, the solution to 
the legal tangle should be straightforward. But he also expresses his concern 
that his view will be rejected by the iuris consulti (5.7.2; cf. 4.10.2). By claim-
ing that the jurists are too harsh and suggesting that they are somewhat infe-
rior to himself (for example convenit inter omnes [sc. iuris peritos] . . . sed mihi 
manifestus error videtur, 4.10.2), his letters invoke a rivalry between orators 
and jurists similar to the one we saw in the case of Quintilian. Yet since Pliny 
needs to be careful not to enrage those he needs to persuade, his strategy is 
to push gently for a seemingly self- evident point, namely that the intention 
of the deceased take precedence over the debates of lawyers. For the same 
reason, his engagement with Cicero is rather surreptitious. On the one hand, 
Pliny’s claim that the deceased’s wish is antiquior iure (5.7.2) may be referring, 
as Whitton has suggested, to views to this effect associated with Cicero, as 
found in for example De Legibus 1.42.42 On the other hand, the dilemmas 
in the three letters seem to evoke the causa Curiana, a Republican case that 
pitted the jurist Scaevola and his literal interpretation of a will against the 
orator Crassus, who successfully emphasised that the intention of the testa-
tor was all that mattered.43 The case was made famous by Cicero’s repeated 
discussions, which show enduring interest in Crassus’ vitriolic disparaging of 
the jurists.44 As Quintilian informs us that the case became the exemplar of 
disputes revolving around letter and intention (7.6.9),45 Pliny, in construct-
ing his Ciceronian persona, evokes a subtext that extols the advocate at the 
42 See Whitton 2013 ad Plin. Ep. 2.16.
43 Pliny’s text does not seem to make any intertextual connections, probably because he needs 
to be careful not to give too much offence. There is perhaps one exception: ‘quid sit iuris ~ 
quod Scaevola defendebat non esse iuris’ (Caecin. 69).
44 See for example Cic. Caecin. 69; De or. 1.180, 2.140–2; Brut. 194–8.
45 La Bua 2006 may be pushing the point too far when he claims that the causa Curiana mark-
edly shaped the controversia scenarios revolving around the opposition of letter vs spirit of 
the law. Rather, the status was already developed by the rhetor Hermagoras, whose work was 
used widely by Republican orators (e.g. Bonner 1969: 46–7; Winterbottom 1974: xvii). See 
below.
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expense of the jurist. Thus, even though Pliny is less openly hostile than 
Quintilian, both authors engage the same polemical trope.46
Since rhetorical education was widespread in the early Empire, the dis-
course about Cicero and the law in the rhetorical tradition provides the intel-
lectual context of Pomponius and his readers.47 As mentioned above, the 
long fragment of Pomponius at D. 1.2.2 presents a history of jurisprudence 
from the Regal period until the reign of the emperor Hadrian.48 The narra-
tive informs us about generations of jurists with brief notes on their accom-
plishments, thus resembling other histories of learning such as Cicero’s 
Brutus and Suetonius’ On Grammarians and Rhetors. Pomponius seems to stay 
closest to the model of the Brutus: in addition to engaging explicitly with the 
Brutus at several points, he takes care to list the extant works of most of the 
jurists featured, and he often inserts a comparative assessment (synkrisis) of 
coeval jurists that brings out the strengths of all involved.49 A passage from 
D. 1.2.2.45 about jurists who were active into the Augustan Age illustrates 
what is at issue here:
ex his Trebatius peritior Cascellio, Cascellius Trebatio eloquentior fuisse dicitur, 
Ofilius utroque doctior. Cascellii scripta non exstant nisi unus liber bene dicto-
rum, Trebatii complures, sed minus frequentantur.
of these Trebatius is said to have been more expert (in the law) than Cascellius, 
Cascellius more eloquent than Trebatius, Ofilius more learned than either one. 
Cascellius’ writings are not extant except for one book of well- formulated legal 
maxims, of Trebatius quite some [are extant], but they are less frequently resorted 
to.
While the passage has raised ample debate about the personal histories of 
these jurists, for present purposes I will focus on the rhetoric of the synkrisis. 
We should note that the criteria on which Pomponius compares Trebatius 
and Cascellius, legal scholarship and eloquence, are founded on the same 
46 This is not to say that Pliny was hostile to jurists in general, nor that a polemical approach is 
the only approach found in the rhetorical tradition of the early Empire (cf. e.g. Sen. Controv.; 
Tac. Dial. 39).
47 This is one of my main disagreements with Nörr 1978: he simply assumes that Pomponius is 
responding to Cicero’s attacks on the jurists, whereas I believe that the intervening rhetorical 
tradition is of great significance.
48 The following textual note is in order: the Digest credits the passage to a one- book version 
of Pomponius’ Enchiridion, whereas at other places it quotes from a two- book version, of 
which the one- book version may be an abridgement. In any case, I will be assuming that the 
text can be read as a product of Pomponius’ days, and can be meaningfully contextualised in 
the intellectual culture of the late first and early second centuries.
49 It is difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether Pomponius’ direct model is indeed 
Cicero’s Brutus, or whether he works from a tradition of texts of which the Brutus is one 
exponent. References in Quintilian, Tacitus, Gellius and Fronto suggest that Pomponius in 
all likelihood knew the Brutus (see Nörr 1978: 139).
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distinction between orators and jurists that we have witnessed in Cicero and 
the rhetorical tradition of the early Empire. The quotation above is part of a 
larger passage that activates this rivalry and also stages the figure of Cicero, 
whom, as we saw, the rhetorical tradition constructed as the alpha male (D. 
1.2.2.40–6). In doing so, Pomponius invokes the same topos to demonstrate 
the value of jurists while denying Cicero any importance to legal learning. 
How does Pomponius do this?
In the first place, while his name is mentioned three times, Cicero is never 
acknowledged as having contributed anything to the area of law. When 
Pomponius discusses Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex, we hear about 
his seminal contribution to the organisation of the ius civile as well as about 
the many students he educated. Yet while Cicero in his own works empha-
sises time and again that he studied under Mucius, Pomponius does not even 
list Cicero among Mucius’ pupils. Nor does Cicero’s friendship with Servius 
Sulpicius Rufus receive any attention, even though Cicero himself dwells 
extensively on it, especially in the Brutus. Instead, Pomponius cites Cicero 
simply as a source of some specific pieces of information in his narrative. At 
one point, he praises Cicero as an orator by claiming that the Pro Ligario is 
a ‘most beautiful speech’ (oratio satis pulcherrima, 1.2.2.46). But even in this 
last case, Cicero’s presence is marginalised, because Pomponius’ elaboration 
on the case is in all likelihood drawn from the speech of Cicero’s adversary 
Tubero, not from Cicero’s own speech.50 Pomponius thus suppresses the 
voice of Cicero, the forensic orator, even when bringing up oratory.
Furthermore, Pomponius also resists Cicero’s attacks by citing several 
polemical passages from the Brutus while rewriting their narrative to let 
the jurists emerge as intellectual powerhouses. This strategy can be seen 
at work at least three times in the passage under discussion here. The first 
case occurs in Pomponius’ mentioning of Lucius Crassus, ‘the brother of 
Publius Mucius, who is called Mucianus: Cicero says that he is the most 
well- spoken of the jurists’ (frater Publii Mucii, qui Mucianus dictus est: hunc 
Cicero ait iurisconsultorum disertissimus, 1.2.2.40).51 This specific Crassus must 
be the consul of 131 bc, who was the brother of Publius Mucius Scaevola 
(father of Quintus) and the father of Licinius Crassus (cos. 92). Several verbal 
echoes suggest that the praise Pomponius puts in Cicero’s mouth is adapted 
from Brutus 145, a discussion of the causa Curiana in which the younger 
Crassus and Quintus Mucius Scaevola served as lawyers. In styling Crassus 
50 That is, several facts in Pomponius do not match the account in the Pro Ligario. Nörr thinks 
that Pomponius misremembered the speech, assuming that Cicero’s speech was transmitted 
orally (1978: 137). Yet it is much more plausible to assume that Pomponius is summarising 
Tubero’s (now- lost) speech, which was known to Quintilian. The drama of the story can 
easily be seen as in line with Tubero’s side, rather than that of Ligarius. Pomponius is thus 
taking the side of Tubero, the jurist in the story.
51 The transmitted text is Munianus; I follow Mommsen in taking this as a corruption.
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as the prototypical orator and Quintus Mucius as the prototypical jurist, 
Cicero extols Crassus as ‘the most learned in law of those who are eloquent’ 
(eloquentium iuris peritissimus), while Quintus Mucius is called ‘the most 
eloquent of those who are learned in law’ (iuris peritorum eloquentissimus, 
Cic. Brut. 145; cf. De or. 1.180). As we have already seen, Cicero is primarily 
interested in setting up this distinction because it serves his larger agenda to 
claim that orators are the superior class of lawyers. Pomponius, on the other 
hand, takes up the praise for Quintus Mucius Scaevola and projects it back 
onto the uncle, thus conflating the famous jurist and the father of the famous 
orator. By foregrounding juristic accomplishments and emphasising family 
connections, Pomponius underlines that the Crassi are part of a larger juris-
tic  clan –  perhaps implying that the younger Crassus’ success as an orator 
was made possible by the family’s legal expertise.
The biographical section on Servius Sulpicius is the second point at which 
Pomponius recasts a hostile passage from Cicero’s Brutus. At Brutus 150–7, 
Cicero argues extensively (1) that his friend Servius Sulpicius Rufus is a 
superior jurist compared to Quintus Mucius Scaevola, and (2) that Cicero 
himself outranks Servius by virtue of being an orator rather than a jurist. In 
making his point, Cicero works with his favoured contrast between orators 
and jurists. We hear that, in the course of studying rhetoric together, Servius 
decided to turn to jurisprudence in order to be ‘first in the second art’ (in 
secunda arte primus, 151), rather than having to stand in Cicero’s shadow and 
be ‘second in the first art’ (in prima secundus). Note that Cicero insists that 
Servius consciously chose to turn to jurisprudence. Furthermore, Cicero 
argues passionately that Servius’ scholarship is in a different league from 
Quintus Mucius’ because Servius was the first to bring ‘dialectic’ to jurispru-
dence (153).52 On the other hand, it is immediately obvious that Pomponius’ 
narrative about Servius is rather different. While Pomponius stays close to 
the Brutus when he reports that Servius was the best orator ‘certainly after 
Cicero’ (pro certo post Marcum Tullium, 1.2.2.43), we then read a rather dra-
matic story about Servius’ conversion to jurisprudence in which Quintus 
Mucius Scaevola plays a key part. Servius allegedly consulted Mucius on a 
point of law, only to realise later that he had misunderstood Mucius’ words. 
The same thing happened a second time. On Servius’ third visit Mucius 
reprimanded him by saying that it was a shame (turpe) for a patrician to be 
ignorant about the law (ius) on which the case he was pleading depended. 
The story ends by saying that Servius, driven by the ‘harsh words’ (velut con-
tumelia), decided to devote himself to law. Several differences with Cicero’s 
account stand out. First, Quintus Mucius is portrayed as the godfather of 
Roman law that most sources make him to be. At the same time, nothing is 
52 Cicero is probably inflating Servius’  importance –  and the explicit surprise of the Brutus’ 
interlocutors suggests that the claim was expected to be controversial. The juristic tradition 
passes over this claim in complete silence (see below).
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said about Servius’ qualities as a jurist. Second, while Pomponius mentions 
that Cicero is the best orator, there is no trace of any suggestion that this 
makes him superior. Rather, it seems that jurisprudence is a separate and 
challenging world of learning, to which only exceptional individuals turn.
The image that jurisprudence is particularly demanding is further substan-
tiated by a parallel conversion story in Pomponius’ treatment of Tubero. 
We have already seen that Tubero found himself in court against Cicero, 
who acted as Ligarius’ advocate. Before telling us about the trial, however, 
Pomponius reports that Tubero was ‘a patrician and went over from plead-
ing cases to jurisprudence’ (patricius et transiit a causis agendis ad ius civile, 
1.2.2.46), after the trial against Ligarius. The motif of the conversion thus 
provides an intriguing alternative view on the rivalry between orators and 
lawyers. In contrast to what we see in Cicero and Quintilian, Pomponius’ 
narrative gives the impression that select individuals turned to jurisprudence 
after they had started careers as orators; in Servius’ case this even took the 
colossal efforts of an exceptional, erudite mentor. Only the most capable men 
specialised further in jurisprudence. Note in this connection that nothing 
negative is said of Servius and Tubero: Servius was one of the best pleaders, 
and while we hear that Tubero lost his case against Cicero, Pomponius does 
not disqualify his oratory in any way. We also read that both were extremely 
successful as jurists: Servius had a tremendous following, and Tubero is 
called ‘most learned’ (doctissimus). This last statement illustrates once more 
how Pomponius turns Cicero’s hostile narrative in the Brutus into a version 
that is favourable to the jurists. Taking up Brutus 117, Pomponius reformu-
lates Cicero’s claim that Tubero was ‘most learned in detailed argumentation’ 
(doctissimus in disputando) into the more scholarly attribute of being ‘learned 
in public and private law’ (doctissimus . . . iuris publici et privati). Furthermore, 
while Cicero claims that Tubero’s style was ‘harsh, rough, uncouth’ (durus 
horridus incultus), Pomponius tells us that Tubero wrote ‘in an archaic style’ 
(sermone . . . antiquo) with the result that his works are not read very often. 
In Pomponius’ hands, the disparaging Ciceronian narratives about jurists are 
rewritten as more balanced, if not positive, stories.
To sum up, if we juxtapose how the rhetorical tradition of the early 
Empire and Pomponius’ account deal with Cicero in relation to the law, 
Cicero and his writings emerge as the centrepiece of a fierce polemical 
debate. On the one hand, the reception of Cicero’s theories on the ideal 
orator by authors such as Quintilian entails casting the figure of Cicero in 
that role. For Quintilian, a crucial ploy is to assert aggressively the superior-
ity of Cicero- the-perfect- orator over the jurists. On the other hand, while 
invoking the same Ciceronian intertexts, Pomponius not only constructs 
Cicero as a mostly irrelevant figure, but he also presents jurisprudence as 
an exacting and therefore exclusive field of study. In pushing their points, 
orators and jurists both work with a clearly marked dichotomy between 
legal oratory and legal scholarship, indicating their reception of Cicero’s 
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rhetorical strategy. That orators and jurists felt the need to engage in such 
polemics, however, suggests that they were talking to each other to some 
extent, and that the boundaries between the two fields may have been fuzzier 
than their rhetoric claims them to be.53 We should take into account here 
that Cicero was not only the source of the polemical tropes but that he 
apparently also contributed enough to juristic  debates –  something we saw 
in the preceding  section –  as to be considered a borderline case. While this 
facilitated his portrayal as an interdisciplinary genius in the hands of the 
orators, it might also help to explain why, for Pomponius, Cicero warranted 
explicit exclusion.
4. LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS OF ROME: THE CASES OF CICERO 
AND LABEO
The question as to Cicero’s importance as a philosopher to Roman legal 
thought is a problematic and highly contested one. The preceding sections 
of this chapter surveyed all explicit references to Cicero and his writings in 
the Digest, revealing that Cicero is never mentioned by jurists in relation to 
any philosophical conceptual elaborations. If this encourages us to study 
Cicero’s reception at the level of ideas, it is crucial that, before turning to 
the sources, we first address a set of conceptual and methodological ques-
tions that have surprisingly often been ignored: what do we mean when we 
talk about importance, influence, or reception? And how do we establish 
whether possible connections between texts and ideas found in the output of 
jurists and in Cicero are meaningful?
As already indicated above, the scholarship so far has usually taken an 
approach informed by Quellenforschung. For example, Dieter Nörr’s impor-
tant work on quotations from Cicero in the jurists studies the manifest and 
latent influence of  Cicero –  the latter signifying ideas about which jurists were 
unaware that they have an origin in Cicero’s works.54 While the search for 
latent influence may sometimes yield returns,55 the problem is that such con-
nections are generally hard to trace and to establish beyond reasonable doubt. 
Illustrative here is the often- held assumption that technical terms found 
both in the philosophical and in the juristic traditions reached the jurists 
via Cicero, frequently with the further assumption that the jurists in ques-
tion must have subscribed to Ciceronian conceptions of the terms, though 
53 To the same effect, though from a different perspective, Mantovani 2007 and Bettinazzi 2014 
argue that the declamations ascribed to Quintilian at many points reveal in- depth knowledge 
of technical juristic argumentations. 
54 Nörr 1978 (e.g. ‘über latente Einflüsse zu spekulieren’, at 142).
55 For example Tellegen- Couperus 1991 on Cic. Caecin. (see above); the case is not mentioned 
by Nörr.
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without crediting him.56 Prime examples are the notions of natural law and of 
aequitas. Yet several considerations show how problematic this view is.
First and foremost, the concepts are hardly conceptualised explicitly by 
jurists outside the few excerpts in Digest 1.1, which still seem fairly generic: 
while the famous passages of Gaius and Ulpian distinguish different types 
of universal law and hence seem to clash, many scholars have pointed out 
that it is well nigh impossible to discern philosophical differences between 
these authors’ jurisprudence.57 Even though Gaius brings up a naturalis ratio 
repeatedly, it never becomes quite clear what this naturalis ratio is in concep-
tual terms. Rather (and perhaps somewhat provocatively), the term func-
tions rhetorically for Gaius to posit an  axiom –  a starting point that he does 
not want to elaborate further on in the context of the argument he is making. 
Because the notion is conceptually unarticulated, the source question also 
becomes problematic. While Gaius probably found it in earlier juristic 
works, it is on the present evidence impossible to say whether it entered the 
juristic tradition through Cicero’s works.58 The spread of the idea of natural 
law in the philosophical and rhetorical traditions signals that there are many 
ways, also beyond Cicero, in which it may have reached the jurists.59
Much the same case can be made for the concept of aequitas. We find 
the most articulate juristic elaboration in a passage of Marcus Antistius 
Labeo, a much- admired scholar of the Augustan Age, where he distinguishes 
between aequitas naturalis and aequitas civilis –  both still vaguely defined (D. 
47.4.1.1). Once more, the Ciceronian connection cannot be pressed, because 
the opposition between written law and equity had already been a common-
place in the rhetorical tradition long before Cicero.60 Thus the so- called stasis 
theory of the second- century bc rhetorician Hermagoras standardised an 
argumentative pattern that opposed the letter of the law and more universal 
considerations of justice.61 It is essential to note that, rather than embodying 
a substantive and philosophically developed idea, aequitas functions here as 
a concept that can be fleshed out according to the immediate needs of the 
forensic orator in the case he is arguing. In short, then, the Ciceronian signa-
ture of many of the jurists’ theoretical notions cannot be taken for granted,62 
at least not without further evidence.
56 For example Ando 2008: 79–92; MacCormack 2014: 254–5.
57 See Atkins 2013: 224–6 for a recent discussion with further literature.
58 Idem: 224–5 suggests that Ulpian’s distinction between ius civile, ius gentium, and ius naturale 
may be taken from Cicero, but that in working with these notions Ulpian is hardly a follower 
of Cicero.
59 For example in Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.67 and Rhet. Her. 2.19, which both digest older rhetorical 
doctrine (cf. Arist. Rh. 1.13, 1373b4–9). Stoics and Epicureans (among other philosophers) 
discuss their conceptions of natural law.
60 For example Cato the Elder (fr. 168.1 = Gell. NA 6.3.38).
61 Bonner 1969: 46–7 (see above).
62 Gaius’ famous distinction between res corporales and res incorporales may eventually go 
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In contrast to a focus on source criticism, which leads us to scholarly 
aporia at best and negative conclusions at worst, a perspective based on 
reception studies encourages us to ask how jurists appreciate Cicero as a phi-
losopher of law. While we have already seen that the jurists do not connect 
Cicero with philosophy in the Digest, this does not imply that they do not 
discuss the role of philosophy in law. Quite to the contrary, several observa-
tions indicate that jurists construct the aforementioned Labeo as a founda-
tional figure who appears to displace Cicero by virtue of his expertise in law 
and philosophy. In the first place, a study of patterns of citation in the Digest 
yields that Labeo, a relatively early jurist, is cited much more frequently than 
jurists before him and those for several decades after his death. We should 
note that Labeo’s views are often transmitted through quotations in Ulpian, 
whose work formed the basis of the Digest by supplying around 40 per cent 
of the excerpts.63 Ulpian’s interest in Labeo indicates that he must have 
found Labeo important to the development of legal doctrine.
In line with his profile in the Digest, several texts indicate that the signifi-
cance of Labeo goes hand in hand with his reputation as a polymath in the 
early Empire. Thus Pomponius reports that ‘Labeo, who had also put work 
in other fields of learning, set out to make very many innovations on account 
of the quality of his genius and the faith in his own learning’ (Labeo ingenii 
qualitate et fiducia doctrinae, qui et ceteris operis sapientiae operam dederat, 
plurima innovare instituit, 1.2.2.47). While Pomponius does not single out 
philosophy as one of Labeo’s occupations, his designation of Labeo’s learn-
ing with the term sapientia carries strong philosophical connotations. The 
picture of Labeo as having philosophical credentials is further substantiated 
in the work of Aulus Gellius, an author of the second century ad. Gellius’ 
testimony is of particular importance, because, while not a jurist himself, he 
was a close and interested observer of jurists. His Noctes Atticae thus provide 
a window onto second- century juristic culture independently of the juristic 
tradition, including its excerptors. While Gellius expresses his admiration 
for Labeo at many points, his most extravagant eulogy can be found in Book 
13:
Labeo Antistius iuris quidem civilis disciplinam principali studio exercuit et con-
sulentibus de iure publice responsitavit; <set> ceterarum quoque bonarum artium 
non expers fuit et in grammaticam sese atque dialecticam litterasque antiquiores 
altioresque penetraverat Latinarumque vocum origines rationesque percalluerat 
eaque praecipue scientia ad enodandos plerosque iuris laqueos utebatur.64
back to Cicero’s Topica 26–7, but the point of both passages is conceptually distinct (see 
Reinhardt 2003, 259, 263). Yet even if we consider this a case of Ciceronian influence, it 
remains an open question whether the substance or merely the expository scheme of Roman 
law have been ‘influenced’.
63 Honoré 2010: 5–6.
64 Gell. NA 13.10.1.
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Labeo Antistius devoted himself with the foremost zeal to the study of the 
ius civile and he formulated opinions ‘publicly’65 about the law to those who 
consulted him; but he was also not destitute of the other good arts and he had 
immersed himself in the study of grammar and in dialectic and the lofty litera-
ture of the olden days and he was steeped in the origins and explanation of Latin 
words, and he used that knowledge in particular to untie many knots in the law.
The passage underscores Labeo’s importance to the ius civile. What makes 
him so erudite and productive is that he was educated across the intellectual 
board. Even though we hear that antiquarian studies and grammar were the 
greatest assets to the legal scholar, his mastery of philosophy in the form of 
dialectic is also highlighted. All this reinforces the account of Pomponius. 
Yet we should also note that we hear nothing about what we would call legal 
philosophy: Labeo’s valued accomplishments lie in bringing logic to the field 
of law.66
Finally, while so far I have discussed Labeo as someone who is presented 
as the prime philosopher in the legal sphere, there is some evidence to 
suggest that, being aware of Cicero’s foundational status in legal oratory, 
some jurists consciously constructed Labeo as the Cicero of Roman juris-
prudence. An excerpt of the jurist Paul (early third century ad) brings up a 
hypothetical case with a fictional subject (D. 34.3.28.4). This subject is called 
Antistius Cicero. Paul’s choice to combine the names of Labeo and Cicero 
signals that he considered the two historical characters to some extent on a 
par. It is tempting to take this as a nod at Labeo’s and Cicero’s status as intel-
lectual patriarchs in jurisprudence and forensic oratory respectively.
5. CONCLUSION
Cicero’s reception among the jurists is a complex phenomenon. When 
it comes to Cicero’s writings, especially his speeches, jurists occasionally 
quote Cicero as a jurist. Above we have encountered several definitions and 
analogies from Cicero’s hand that are credited explicitly to him. In this con-
nection, the watertight separation between orators and jurists that Cicero 
himself posited collapses to some extent. On the other hand, when it comes 
to the figure of Cicero and his place in legal history, he turns out to be a 
controversial character: while Pomponius mentions Cicero but marginalises 
him, Cicero’s role as a philosopher is passed over in complete silence. In his 
place, Labeo receives full credit. Thus, paradoxically enough, the quotations 
and the controversy around his person together cement Cicero’s place in 
65 The meaning of publice in this passage is highly contested. To be sure, its possible connection 
with Pomponius’ publice respondendi ius (1.2.2.49) is irrelevant to my argument here.
66 Note that the jurists ignore completely Cicero’s similar praise of Servius Sulpicius Rufus at 
Brut. 153 (see above).
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Roman law. In the eyes of the jurists discussed above, Cicero was undeniably 
important to Roman law. This is most evident at points where Cicero is not 
mentioned but lurks under the surface.
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Chapter 8
Servius, Cicero and the Res Publica of Justinian
Jill Harries
1. INTRODUCTION
In 45 bc, Servius Sulpicius Rufus and Cicero exchanged letters containing 
reflections on the recent death of Cicero’s daughter Tullia. This tragic event 
was assimilated by both to what they saw as the ‘death’ of the res publica, 
defined loosely by both as the constitutional order that had underpinned 
their own success and prestige, and that now, thanks to the victory of Caesar, 
was no more. However, both also resorted to survival strategies: a continued 
involvement, somehow, in the affairs of the res publica; and the fulfilment of 
obligations to the interests of clients and friends.1
Although the emotions that prompted the exchange were heart- felt (at 
least on Cicero’s side), the pair of letters was also a jointly created literary 
artefact. Both writers were masters of rhetoric (despite Cicero’s allegations 
to the contrary with regard to Servius in the Pro Murena) and their argu-
ments add up to a joint exercise in self- representation as the chief mourners 
for a defunct res publica. As an analysis of what was meant by res publica, the 
letters leave much to be desired in that they may reflect Servius’ more limited 
political and philosophical outlook; Cicero, even when profoundly afflicted 
by grief, could do better, as is evidenced in the Tusculan Disputations, also 
a response to Tullia’s death.2 In other words, Cicero, as so often, adapted 
himself to his correspondent.
Cicero’s and Servius’ concern with helping friends would provide a means 
to enable the elite under the Empire to survive and prosper as manipulators 
of networks of power. Among them, Servius’ intellectual successors, the 
Roman jurists, also prospered; his career, and the subsequent perspectives 
on it, illustrated here through brief analyses of the presence of Servius in 
Celsus and Pomponius, illustrate how easily the iuris periti could adapt to 
a new constitutional order, by representing it as a continuation of the old. 
The ‘procuratorial’ attitude to the role of the populus in the res publica in 
 1 For Cicero’s overall definition of res publica, see Schofield 1995.
 2 Tusc. 4.1.1 for laws as directors of res publica; for death of Tullia; Att. 12.28.2; full discussion 
and other references at Hammer 2014: 79–87. On the Tusculan Disputations as a response to 
Caesar’s victory, with an emphasis on history and education, see Gildenhard 2007.
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their exchange is more problematic. The ‘fall of the Republic’ can be read 
in many ways; certainly, the ability of the populus Romanus to act as an effec-
tive element in constitutional governance was an early casualty of Augustus’ 
new system. Cicero and Servius, it will be argued, justify cultural attitudes 
towards the populus that distanced the elite from the populus as ‘partners’ in 
the res publica, thus also subverting Cicero’s own philosophical stance on res 
publica as societas.3 This downgrading of the significance of popular participa-
tion and consent paved the way for the Augustan regime; parallels between 
Ciceronian and modern Russian attitudes to ‘the people’ suggest that these 
attitudes had (and have) constitutional, as well as social, implications.
2. SERVIUS AND CICERO 45 bc
In their exchange of letters in 45, Cicero and Servius allow the meaning of 
res publica to shift in line with their argument. Servius’ letter of condolence 
mourns the passing of the res publica (which Tullia, fortunately for herself, 
did not live to see), comparing that catastrophe to the obliteration of once 
great Greek cities.4 However, Servius then shifts his ground and the res 
publica is resurrected. While the res publica as ‘constitutional’ government 
was no more, the res publica, defined as the Roman civic community, still 
needed Cicero. Servius thus urged his friend not to seem indifferent to the 
current situation (tempora rei publicae) –  or to give the impression of resenting 
the triumph of the opposing faction. Instead Cicero must continue to supply 
wise advice to the patria (fatherland) and life must go on.
For his part, Cicero, while appreciative of his friend’s concern, had more 
still to say of the res publica, now redefined as a source of the activities and 
status that made life worth living for a leading politician and senator. Famous 
exemplary men in Roman history who had lost children, Cicero wrote, 
nonetheless could derive consolation from their possession of the dignitas, 
honourable status, which they could enjoy under a functional res publica: the 
benefits included help for friends, the care (procuratio) of the res publica, and 
activities in the law courts and the senate.
Under stress, Cicero reveals a concept of res publica, which emphasises 
the duties of friendship and services to clients over service to ‘the people’. 
While his use of procuratio is consistent with his concept of the res publica as 
property owned by the populus5 Cicero, as procurator, sees himself as the legal 
agent for a populus, which, by implication, cannot be  trusted –  and indeed is 
 3 Atkins 1990; Asmis 2004; Harries 2006: 23–5, 214–15.
 4 Fam. 4.4. Cicero’s reply is idem:. 4.5.
 5 Rep. 1.25.39: ‘est igitur . . . res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum 
coetus quoque modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis com-
munione sociatus.’ Note the lack of independent agency implied by the passive sociatus.
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not even legally  competent –  to look after its own affairs.6 Moreover, his list 
of activities proper for a man of dignitas was headed, not by his obligation to 
act as procurator, but by his duty to supply ‘help for friends’, which would 
have included acting as their advocate (patronus) in law courts. Cicero’s atti-
tude to the populus was not shaped by any sense of obligation to constituents 
or electors. Nor did he see himself as a ‘servant’ of the populus, with any 
obligation to take account of the superior wisdom of the Roman people. 
In this discourse of power, amicitia and the exchange of favours between 
equals took precedence over the rights of the populus as a political, or even 
legal, independent agent. The populus, therefore (when not the audience to 
Cicero’s comparatively rare speeches ad populum) are treated as passive, 
because incapable of operating as independent agents, and thus in need of the 
‘care’ of his superior wisdom.
Cicero’s vision of the populus is paradoxical and perhaps self- contradictory, 
in ways that cannot be explained as deriving from the contexts or genres in 
which they were expressed. I shall suggest below that modern constitutional 
theory, when applied to Cicero’s analysis of Rome’s early constitutional 
history in Rep. 2, accords the populus a crucial, albeit limited, role in early 
Roman state formation, which accords with the functions ascribed to a 
‘constituent power’. This did indeed die with the Republic, both institution-
ally and conceptually. But this concession was undermined by the negative 
attitude implied by the emphasis on procuratio. It will also be argued, using a 
modern parallel, that such cultural attitudes on the part of an elite towards a 
populus were, and are, incompatible with modern, Western ideals of democ-
racy. Despite the well- attested liveliness of the Roman people in public con-
texts and the importance attached by Cicero and others to the appearance 
of public support, the late Republican elite, Cicero included, did not view 
the populus as a responsible agent; it was unable to handle freedom (libertas) 
responsibly and required enlightened procuratorship on the part of the elite 
to perform its functions effectively.
3. LEGUM AUCTORITAS AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW
Both res publica and the rule of law survived the end of Republican govern-
ment. Emperors would pay lip service to the res publica down to the time of 
Justinian. Justinian’s sponsorship of the Corpus Iuris Civilis project between 
529 and 534 made a direct connection between the res publica and the law and 
was a positive statement on the part of the autocrat that the rule of law was 
important. Nothing, he claimed, was more deserving of close attention (studio-
sum) than the ‘authority of the laws’ (legum auctoritas), supported by centuries 
 6 See also Scipio’s comment at idem: 1.22.35, that the procuratio and administratio of the res 
publica are duties inherited by himself (and by implication other eminent public men), and 
not dependent on popular consent.
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of tradition going back to the foundation of the Roman state by Romulus. 
Nor was this an isolated nod in the direction of ancient history. Elsewhere 
Justinian justified his reinvention of the praetor in Republican terms; the 
praetor, he reminded his Byzantine Roman readers, was among the senior 
magistrates sent out to the provinces, to handle both arms and the laws.7 
Justinian’s contemporaries also used the Republic as a reference point for the 
rise (and fall) of the Roman Empire, and not always favourably. As Marion 
Kruse put it, apropos Justinian’s discontinuation of the consulship after 541, 
‘Jordanes (the historian) heightens the tension inherent in the term respublica 
because the consulship was, for any late antique authors, including Justinian, 
the defining office of the Republic and its most important survival’.8
Jordanes would have agreed with modern late Roman historians, who 
have assumed that, by the time of the promulgation of Justinian’s Digest in 
533 ad, the term res publica was no more than an empty signifier. The turning 
point, moderns argue, came in the third century ad, as emperors scrapped 
the use of Republican magistracies and titles on inscriptions, and the senate 
was increasingly ignored both as a source of provincial administrators and 
as a body that had hitherto conveyed both advice, authority and legitimacy.9 
By the early fourth century, this notional Republic had finally given way to 
a divinely sponsored and unaccountable autocracy. On this view, Justinian’s 
focus on the authority and continuity of law (which echoes the language of a 
novella of Anthemius more than half a century earlier) and the importance of 
Rome’s rise under the Republic is mere antiquarian rhetoric.
The same could also apply to assertions on the part of emperors that they 
were subject to the rule of law. Claudian, the panegyricist of the emperor 
Honorius early in the fifth century, provides a representative sample, which 
could have been guaranteed some impact as it was delivered in public:10
if you ordain or decree any measure to be enacted for the common good, be the 
first to submit yourself to your own orders; for thus the people are more obser-
vant of justice nor do they refuse submission when they see the lawmaker himself 
obedient to his own law.
Obedience to law, Claudian insisted, was reinforced by respect for the 
Roman senate, ancient custom and enlightened legal reform. While the 
rhetoric would have targeted a Roman audience, which could claim more 
continuity than most with the Republican past, this was a sustained use of 
loaded terms –  ‘the people’, justice, the obedience of the lawmaker to the 
laws, respect for the senate and custom, appropriate  change –  which Cicero 
himself would have been proud to own.
 7 Novella 24 pr. For an alternative view, see Kaldellis 2005. 
 8 Kruse 2015: 243.
 9 Weisweiler 2015: 19–26.
10 Claud. IV cons Hon. 296–9, 504–7.
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Such rhetoric, however conditioned by official conventions, had a 
prominence in imperial pronouncements and ceremonial that could not be 
lightly discounted. Sustaining a visible connection between the late antique 
present and the Republican past was part of a complex strategy of assert-
ing imperial legitimacy by accepting constitutional constraints, which were 
themselves validated by reference to tradition and history. This process, 
however, originated not with Constantine but with Augustus, whose adop-
tion of the tribunicia potestas in 23 bc gave him permanent curatorship of the 
interests of the populus, relieving them of all constitutional responsibility 
for their affairs. Under the Principate, all emperors were content to appear 
‘Republican’, through their continued use of Republican magisterial titles 
and powers, because such symbols provided a convenient mask for an 
evolving autocracy and a reassuring connection with a remote and idealised 
past; the rhetoric of continuity was designed both to reassure and to mask 
change.
The treatment of Servius by later, second- century lawyers demonstrates 
how continuity between ‘Republic’ and ‘Empire’, specifically in the legal 
tradition, was constructed and maintained through the simple device of 
failing to acknowledge that there had been a break at all. Successions of 
jurists through families or descent from teacher to pupil provided the 
illusion of continuity. So too did patronage. Like many jurists under the 
Empire, Servius did better with help from his friends; his adherence first 
to Pompey, who was probably responsible for Servius’ consulship in 51, 
and later Caesar, who appointed Servius to the governorship of Achaea in 
46, foreshadowed the elevation of other jurists to high office by emperors. 
This was not a matter of chance. Servius’ lack of clout under the Republican 
system made him a prime target for the military dynasts in search of useful 
clients, to provide expert assistance in the creation of what was, already, a set 
of alternative administrative regimes. By contrast with his belated political 
success, Servius was a relative failure in his cultivation of eminent people as 
future jurists (perhaps Cicero’s pejorative view of the profession was shared 
by others); his pupils, as listed by Pomponius, lacked independent distinc-
tion or power bases of their own.11
4. SERVIUS AND CELSUS
Servius, of course, cannot be held responsible for the absolutism of sixth- 
century Byzantium, but he would have fitted in well there. As a iuris peritus, 
Servius asked questions of law that required answers, regardless of who was 
in charge of the government. The adherence of successive emperors in the 
first and second centuries to what they claimed to be the traditional values 
11 D. 1.2.2.44, C. Alfenus Varus (cos. suf. 39), Aulus Ofilius, T. Caesius, Aufidius Tucca, 
Aufidius Namusa, Pacuvius Labeo, the father of Antistius Labeo.
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of government, which included the rule of law, gave to jurisprudence signifi-
cant protection from the vagaries of autocratic rule; emperors could hardly 
jettison traditions of which law was an integral part. But the increased asser-
tion of imperial control over the lawmaking process by both Hadrian, in the 
codification of the Praetorian Edict (c. 130 ad), and Justinian, through the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis (529–34 ad), were important stages in the consolidation of 
power in the person of the emperor. Had Servius lived in the sixth century, 
he could have been, perhaps, another Tribonian.
The legal tradition itself drew strength from continuity. Servius’ work 
could easily be connected to the thinking of those second- century ad 
politicians who prospered under Trajan and Hadrian. The Servius of the 
senatorial aristocrat and jurist, P. Iuventius Celsus (consul II, 129) was useful 
because he was someone who could advise on what was meant by the word, 
‘furniture’ (supellectilis), when used by a testator in a will.12 For a discussion 
of his options, he turned to three authorities, all more than a century old, 
Antistius Labeo, praetor under Augustus, who had supplied an etymologi-
cal definition of supellectilis, Servius and Aelius Tubero. Eminent though he 
was, Celsus went out of his way to show his respect for his predecessors: 
Tubero’s auctoritas (authority, prestige, standing) and ratio (legal reasoning) 
were to be honoured, although Celsus nonetheless declared his preference 
for Servius’ view.
Cicero’s exchange with Servius had mourned the deaths of both Tullia 
and the res publica; theirs was a rhetoric of discontinuity and the collapse 
of the old political and legal order. In the narrative of the imperial jurists, 
there is no mention of, still less concern about, the death of Republican 
libertas (a ‘freedom’ that could be read as applying more to the senate than 
the population at large). Celsus’ deference to Servius, along with Tubero 
and other lawyers contemporary with Cicero, such as Aulus Cascellius,13 
asserts continuity with a legal tradition that was first shaped by the lawyers 
who rose to prominence under Cicero’s res publica. The intellectual pedigree, 
constructed by jurists’ citations of each other, bridged the gap (as we see it) 
between Republic and Empire, by  simply –  and from their standpoint  rightly 
–  failing to acknowledge it in the first place.
But the world had changed, in some respects. Celsus, like all senators, 
owed his status and his high offices to the patronage of the emperor. As a 
member of the emperor’s consilium, Celsus would collude in strengthening 
the emperor’s control of law, when he supervised the young lawyer from 
Africa, Salvius Julianus, in his redacting of the Praetorian Edict into a fixed 
form. Moreover, on at least one occasion, Celsus the lawyer strayed into 
the world of patronage and amicitia that Cicero’s exchange with Servius 
12 Celsus, Digest XIX at D. 33.10.7 = Lenel vol. 1 Celsus, 168, col. 153.
13 Celsus, Digest XXV at D. 50.16.158 = Lenel vol 1, Celsus, 215, col. 160; Cascellius is other-
wise cited only by Labeo and Iavolenus Priscus, with two indirect references in Ulpian.
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had placed, for their own purposes, at the heart of what the res publica 
meant to them. With reference to Pompey’s Eastern settlement in 63 bc, 
Celsus described the lex Pompeia, the constitution for Bithynia- Pontus, as 
a  beneficium.14 The terms of the discussion suggest that Celsus’ copy was 
incomplete, and that the lawyer, who was also the emperor’s man, had no 
scruples in categorising Pompey’s charter as primarily an act of patronage 
rather than of law.
This  provision –  which is not typical of the contents of the Digest as a 
 whole –  elided the all- important distinction between the making of law as 
an activity based on rules and legal principles, and the discretionary (and 
potentially corrupt) culture of doing things for others as acts of (selective) 
kindness (beneficium). As is well known, patronage, amicitia and the various 
forms of assistance afforded by the elite to clients and friends were funda-
mental to how Roman society worked. Yet the omnipresence of amicitia, as 
an honourable and useful relationship between members of the elite, was 
also constantly subversive of the rule of law and the ‘constitutionality’ that 
both Cicero and Servius claimed to champion, not only because of the dis-
cretionary element but also because focus on obligations to individual clients 
obscured the need to serve the requirements of the populus as a whole.
Cicero will be presented below as a champion of the role of the populus in 
the res publica, which was essential, but restricted. First however, we should 
look at Servius’ story as Pomponius narrated it, a story in which questions of 
documentary composition and survival, personal relationships (sometimes 
dysfunctional) and teacher–pupil succession for the most part trumped those 
of public service and the status rei publicae.
5. SERVIUS AND POMPONIUS
Justinian was far from being the first to ignore the distinction between 
Republic and Empire. Pomponius’ Enchiridion, extracts from two versions 
of which were included in the Digest, is an attempt to preserve and promote 
a canon of juristic authorities. This is embedded in an account designed to 
establish the central importance of jurists from the very foundation of Rome 
(when the leges regiae were allegedly codified by C. Papirius) –  and to create a 
narrative without an obvious break. To this end Pomponius, where he could, 
tried to establish family trees of teachers and auditors, pupils who went on to 
be famous jurists themselves. But he knew that, with the Republic, he faced 
problems of transmission and survival, not on constitutional grounds but 
because his heroes had lived a long time ago. Servius, on his first appearance, 
provided valuable evidence for predecessors:15
14 D. 50.1.1.2, cited by Ulpian, Ad Edictum 2, referring to the lex Pompeia of 63 bc.
15 D. 1.2.2.42.
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Mucii auditores, fuerunt complures, sed praecipuae auctoritatis Aquilius Gallus, 
Balbus Lucilius, Sextus Papirius, Gaius Iuventius: ex quibus Gallum maximae 
auctoritatis apud populum fuisse Servius dicit.
The auditors of Mucius (Q. Mucius Scaevola Pontifex) were numerous, but of 
outstanding auctoritas were Aquilius Gallus, Balbus Lucilius, Sextus Papirius and 
Gaius Iuventius; of these Servius declared that Gallus had the greatest auctoritas 
among the people.
Here is Servius, not yet in his own right but as a source of an earlier stage in 
the evolution of a juristic dynasty constructed through teachers with author-
ity and their pupils. What was awkward for Pomponius was that he was 
obliged to rely on Servius as the gatekeeper who preserved through his own 
writings some record of the learning of his predecessors:
Omnes tamen hi a Servio Sulpicio nominantur: alioquin per se eorum scripta non 
talia exstant, ut ea omnes appetant: denique nec versantur omnino scripta eorum 
inter manus hominum, sed Servius libros suos complevit, pro cuius scriptura 
ipsorum quoque memoria habetur.
All these, however, are listed by name by Servius. For their writings do not 
survive in such a condition on their own account that everyone can have access 
to them. And so their writings do not circulate at all through people’s hands but 
Servius has incorporated them in his own books and, on account of his writings 
the memory of these men is also preserved.
This, then, was Servius’ first claim to fame, that he had placed on record 
material from earlier jurists that would otherwise be either completely lost 
or restricted in circulation to a very few. Underlying this is a concern that 
is apparent elsewhere in Pomponius with the survival of texts and the acces-
sibility of rare books, which extends also to their readability: Aelius Tubero, 
for example, affected an archaic style, which made his ‘many books’ on 
public and private law unattractive to the reader.16 This Servius is an author 
who wrote books for other people who liked books, a type Aulus Gellius 
would also have appreciated.17
In Pomponius’ account, Servius the orator, known to and appreciated by 
Cicero, was subverted and then destroyed by an encounter with Q. Mucius 
Scaevola Pontifex. Servius begins his public career as a forensic orator 
second only to Cicero himself (an anachronism, as Cicero’s rise to fame 
postdates Mucius’ death in 82 bc). Having enquired about a legal point on 
behalf of a friend, Servius is twice told the answer and fails to understand it. 
Q. Mucius loses his temper and declares that ‘it was shameful for one who 
was a patrician and a nobleman and one who pleaded cases to be ignorant 
16 D. 1.2.2.46, ‘parum libri eius grati habentur.’
17 See Howley 2013.
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of the law he was subjecting to discussion’.18 Pomponius thus obliterates the 
narrative of Servius’ consulship, while personalising his disagreements with 
the opinions of Q. Mucius. Servius’ choice of a legal career is prompted by 
his feelings of  shame –  at the contempt shown by  Mucius –  and affront to his 
honour, which can only be dealt with by a change of direction.
This refashioning of Servius is anomalous. Resentment about an insult is 
an unusual launch pad for a legal career. Moreover, having begun with Servius 
as the guardian of the memory of earlier jurists, Pomponius offers a Servius 
who, far from being the dutiful successor to a great man, as was usually the 
case, in fact breaks with him. Brought up in a Rome divided between two 
principal dynasties (or schools) of lawyers, whose intellectual pedigree he 
traced back to Ateius Capito and Antistius Labeo, Pomponius venerated the 
role of praeceptores and their auditors as providing continuity through the 
generations. This should have been the case with Servius as well. One pupil 
of Mucius, Balbus Lucilius, taught Servius the basics of law, before Servius 
moved to advanced study with another Mucian auditor, C. Aquilius Gallus, 
already in the 80s an established iudex and arbiter. An explanation of this legal–
dynastic malfunction was therefore required. Pomponius knew that Servius 
had disagreed with Q. Mucius on a wide range of matters, including in works 
provocatively entitled the Reprehensa Scaevolae Capita,19 and the De Sacris 
Detestandis (The Swearing Away of the Sacra).20 However, he did not appear 
to know why and made no direct reference to the offending texts (although 
their citation by Gellius shows that they were still available to Romans in the 
second century). Thus the anecdote did not merely substitute for admitting 
the intellectual divergence between the two; it also served as a cover- up.
Upon Servius’ death ‘on embassy’ (in legatione), Pomponius returns him 
to the world of  Cicero –  or nearly. In Philippic 9, Cicero had commemorated 
Servius’ service to the res publica and his death on embassy to Antonius 
encamped in northern Italy in February 43, an embassy Cicero had in fact 
opposed. Pomponius, however, had nothing to say on the involvement of 
Cicero, the objective of the embassy, or its fraught political context. What 
mattered was the statue voted on by the populus (not the senate, who had 
voted on Cicero’s motion to that effect). It had been placed before the 
Rostra, ‘and today it survives still before the Rostra of Augustus’.21 The 
shifts in emphasis may be accidental but they are significant. Servius receives 
his statue from ‘the people’, not the senate, Cicero is not mentioned at all, 
and the location is defined in relation to an imperial monument.
18 D. 1.2.2.43, ‘namque eum dixisse turpe esse patricio et nobii et causas oranti ius in quo ver-
saretur ignorare.’
19 D. 17.2.30; 33.9.3.6; 50.16.25.1; Gaius, Inst. 3.149; Gell. NA 4.1.17–20.
20 Gell. NA 7.12.1.
21 D. 1.2.2.43, ‘hic cum in legatione perisset, statuam ei populus Romanus pro rostris posuit, 
et hodieque exstat pro rostris Augusti.’
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Pomponius’ narrative about Servius concludes with an account of the 180 
books ascribed to him. However, he makes one more appearance in a context 
that illustrates Pomponius’ deliberate downgrading of political, in favour of 
juristic, family identity and status.22 C. Cassius Longinus, namesake and 
relative to Caesar’s assassin, was consul suffectus in 30, and the patron of 
Masurius Sabinus; for Pliny, he was the mainstay of the Cassian school, 
which was based in his Roman residence, where, as Tacitus observed, the 
funeral masks of Brutus and Cassius the tyrannicide were also to be found.23 
None of this family history mattered to the historian of jurisprudence:
Huic (Sabino) successit Gaius Cassius Longinus natus ex filia Tuberonis, quae fuit 
neptis Servii Sulpicii: et ideo proavum Servium Sulpicium appellat.
To him succeeded C. Cassius Longinus, the son of Tubero’s daughter, who was 
also the granddaughter of Servius Sulpicius; and so he called Servius Sulpicius his 
great- grandfather.
Not only, then, was this Cassius a member of a juristic dynasty, relating him 
to Servius and Tubero, with no connection to the assassin  Cassius –  he was 
also prepared to boast about it.
Pomponius’ Servius is a product of the second century ad. Servius’ 
intellectual pedigree, the information he provides on earlier jurists and spe-
cifically his contradictions of Q. Mucius, are laid out, and Servius’ alleged 
change of direction, from orator to jurist is accounted for by his contretemps 
with Mucius, the teacher of his teachers. In due course, he becomes the 
author of numerous books, the teacher of several famous jurists, the diligent 
state servant, who dies on embassy, and the recipient of a statue. His more 
obviously ‘Republican’ aspects are airbrushed from the portrait, including 
his offices; his relationships with Caesar, Pompey and, crucially, Cicero; 
and the context of the legatio, the senate’s abortive negotiation with Antony. 
Even the location of the statue is defined by its relationship to the Rostra 
of Augustus, making it in effect an adjunct to the new imperial order. The 
exclusion of material reminiscent of the old Republic is not fortuitous. For 
Pomponius, there was no ‘old’  Republic –  only lawyers and their pedigrees, 
familial or educational, who transcended both the centuries and the vagaries 
of constitutional change.
6. RES PUBLICA AND MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
While we cannot know if Pomponius’ reworking of history is his own or 
that of his now lost sources, the effect of his account was to construct a legal 
continuum that existed independently of political, social or constitutional 
22 D. 1.2.2.51.
23 Tac. Ann. 16.7–9.
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context. This allowed the authority of law, as defined by juristic interpretatio, 
to be asserted as an entity that could not be influenced or affected by external 
factors, such as changes in systems of government from monarchy to collec-
tive rule and back again to the imperial autocracy. This fed, in due course, 
into Justinian’s affirmation of law’s continuity over the 1,400 years of the 
Roman res publica down to his own day, and into the repeated insistence by 
panegyrical and other sources on the importance of the rule of law, and the 
emperor’s subjection to it.
Although the ius civile as codified by Justinian cannot be described as a 
constitution in any modern sense, the legitimation both of law and of power 
rested on related foundations. Rome, of course, had no written constitution, 
and in that respect differed from the societies usually studied by modern 
constitutionalists, where ‘modern constitutions invariably come into exist-
ence as the consequence of some founding act’.24 However, the issue of how 
a constitutional order is created and subsequently sustained bears directly on 
both the Roman res publica and later states.
The ‘paradox’ of constitutionalism has been defined by Loughlin and 
Walker as a tension between two imperatives: one that governmental power 
must ultimately be generated by the consent of ‘the people’, and a second, 
that ‘such power must be divided, constrained and exercised through distinc-
tive institutional forms’. The paradox is that ‘people’ and ‘constitution’ can 
be constructed and shaped by each other, thus rendering the relationship 
unstable:
The formal constitution that establishes unconditional authority, therefore, must 
always remain conditional. The legal norm remains subject to the political excep-
tion, which is the expression of the constituent power of the people to make, and 
therefore also to break, the constituent power of a state.
For moderns, the ‘constituent power’ must be ‘the people’ for a constitu-
tion to be legitimate, although some flexibility is accorded to what ‘the 
people’ might consist of in any given situation. Moreover, although (on the 
American model) it is possible to identify the moment when a constitution 
comes into being, the creation of a constitutional order can also be a process 
of unspecified duration. When these theories are applied to Cicero’s think-
ing on the res publica, for which he claimed the status of procurator, it appears 
that he did indeed construct ‘the people’ as the constituent power, albeit 
with limits as to its role, and that he had a clear idea of who, in philosophi-
cal terms, ‘the people’ were. Moreover, he saw the formation of the Roman 
constitution as a process, extending over centuries.
The res publica, Cicero’s Scipio Africanus argued, was owned by the 
populus, and the populus was defined, not as a haphazard collection of 
24 Loughlin and Walker 2007: 3.
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 individuals but as an assemblage of a large population (coetus multitudinis) 
‘brought together in a partnership’ (sociatus) by legal consent and mutual 
self- interest (iuris consensu et utilitatis communione). Although Cicero appears 
to ascribe agency to ‘the people’, for whom it is part of the law of nature that 
they wish to live in communities, the use of the passive sociatus is ambigu-
ous; there is no space to acknowledge that those who constitute the coetus 
must choose to make the partnership contract with each other as individuals. 
Instead a partnership is created for the coetus as a collective ‘brought together’ 
by two further abstracts, legal consent and common interest. This use of lan-
guage may not be fortuitous; reducing ‘the people’ to a philosophical abstract 
endowed with a collective identity, constructed by a legal concept, societas, 
downgrades the importance of individual agency in state formation.
Next, Scipio’s coetus constructs its dwellings on a fortified site, calls it a 
town or city and builds shrines and meeting places. Only then does a ‘con-
stitution’ take shape:25
Omnis ergo populus, qui est talis coetus multitudinis, qualem exposui, omnis 
civitas, quae est constitutio populi, omnis res publica, quae, ut dixi, populi res est, 
consilio quodam regenda est, ut diuturna sit. Id autem consilium primum semper 
ad eam causam referendum est quae causa genuit civitatem.
Every people, therefore, which is the assemblage of a large population, as I have 
described, every citizen community, which is the constituted state of the people, 
and every res publica, which, as I said, is the entity owned by the people must be 
governed by some kind of guiding power, so that it may endure. And this guiding 
power must always first be attributed to the same root cause that generated the 
citizen community.
Although Cicero uses no single word for ‘constitution’, the formation 
of the consilium, involving the coetus, the civitas and the populus marks the 
moment at which a constitution, notionally, comes into being. At this point, 
the choice is made (we are not told how) between the three primary types of 
government: monarchy, aristocracy or democracy. Any of these, Scipio says, 
is viable, provided that the ties (vinculum), which first bound men together in 
the partnership of the res publica, hold firm.26 All three forms of government, 
therefore, still depend on the continuation of the partnership formed for 
(but not so clearly by) ‘the people’; this, in its turn, is based on legal consent 
and the common good.
As ‘owners’, on the strength of the partnership established among them-
selves, Cicero’s populus was the prime source of legitimacy for all forms 
of government and constitutions. However, the power to act, in practice 
25 Rep. 1.26.41.
26 Idem: 1.26.42, ‘si teneat illud vinculum, quod primum homines inter se rei publicae societate 
devinxit.’
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ascribed to the populus, is left undefined. The result is a paradox. In line 
with modern constitutional theory, Cicero concedes to the populus its status 
as the constituent power with an ongoing watching brief on its governance 
(including, in theory, the option of majoritarian democracy). At the same 
time, Cicero is either vague or restrictive on how in practice that power was 
or should be exercised.
His narrative of the founding of a real constitution, that of the Roman res 
publica, also ascribed to Scipio, further clarifies the rights of the populus as 
beneficial ‘owner’ of the res publica. It also suggests that what we now see as 
‘constituent power’ may be ascribed to more than one authority, requiring 
a differentiation between the role of ‘constituent power’ or ‘powers’ in the 
creation and legitimisation of the constitution, and the ability of the ‘constitu-
ent power’ to break the power of the state as ‘constituted’, by withdrawing 
consent or by disrupting or changing the institutions it has initially authorised.
In his preliminary remarks, Scipio invokes the authority of Cato the Elder 
in explicitly rejecting the creation of the Roman constitution as the work of 
a moment or of one individual.27 Unlike Greek lawgivers, he said, such as 
Minos in Crete, Lykourgos in Sparta and, in Athens, Theseus, Draco, Solon 
and Cleisthenes, the Roman res publica was not the creation of one mind but 
of many. The res publica had a founder, Romulus, responsible for the choice 
of site (much space is devoted to the advisability of not being by the sea), the 
union with the Sabines, and the creation of the advisory senate. He also insti-
tuted the taking of the auspices, a practice conducive to the security (salus) of 
the res publica, and the founding of the College of the Augurs, ‘which was the 
foundation (principium) of our res publica’.28
Because so much of Rome’s early history was the stuff of legend, Cicero 
had some leeway in handling the tradition. The choice, therefore, to fore-
ground, as he did, the importance of popular consent and ratification, is 
significant. From the death of Romulus onwards, the populus asked and were 
granted by the senate a decisive voice, both in the continuation of the mon-
archy and the appointment of successive kings.29 In response to the people’s 
insistence on a new king, the senate appointed an interrex, and, after a search, 
‘the people’, on the advice of the senate, chose Numa Pompilius, credited 
with the establishment of Rome’s religious institutions.30 On Numa’s death, 
the Comitia Curiata, presided over by the interrex, chose Tullus Hostilius, 
whose prompt response was a request to the Comitia directly for ratification 
of his position:31




30 Idem: 2.13.25, ‘patribus auctoribus sibi ipse populus adscivit.’
31 Idem: 2.17.32.
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Et ut advertatis animum, quam sapienter iam reges hoc nostri viderint, tribuenda 
quaedam esse populo . . . ne insignibus quidem regiis Tullus nisi iussu populi est 
ausus uti.
His successor, Ancus Martius, maternal grandson of Numa, was chosen by 
‘the people’, and the choice was confirmed by a curiate law.32 When he too 
died, the fifth king, Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, was elected unanimously and 
he too passed a law de suo imperio.33 Thus the pattern was established of a 
double popular vote, first making the choice and then, once the nominee had 
consented, confirming it with a lex de imperio.
Despite Cicero’s insistence on popular consent, however, his treatment 
of the populus falls short of crediting them with creating the institutions of 
the res publica. The populus therefore were the ‘constituent power’, in the 
sense that they chose, and by their choice gave delegated authority to, those 
who would proceed to create over time the institutions of the res publica 
using their own judgement. The architects of the reforms that ‘constituted’ 
the res publica were the kings, and the populus, having chosen the king, had 
no further direct say. Instead, Romulus was responsible for the city, the 
senate and the auspices; Numa, the various priesthoods, including the Salii 
and Vestal Virgins and the necessary rituals, making them onerous but not 
expensive; and Tullus Hostilius the meeting places for senate and people, 
and the ius fetiale, the binding rules, governing the declaration of war. Ancus 
Martius made no reforms but expanded the city and Tarquinius Priscus 
expanded the senate, and reformed the cavalry.
Could the populus be credited with the ability to act as the constituent 
power, given their largely passive role? With the accession of the sixth king, 
Servius Tullius, the tension between the populus as the ‘owner’ of the res 
publica and thus of the ruler, and the role of the ruler himself as the author 
of constitutional reform, became more apparent. ‘Laelius’ observed that 
Servius Tullius ‘had the best insight of all into what the public interest 
required’.34 Yet his legitimacy was open to challenge. As Scipio confirmed, 
Tullius was traditionally believed to be the first to have reigned ‘without the 
order from the people’ (iniussu populi). Indeed, as the monarchy entered its 
phase of degeneration Tullius engaged in a cover- up, by taking over follow-
ing Tarquinius’ murder and ruling in his name, concealing his predecessor’s 
death until his own position was secure. He did not consult the senate either, 
but, after Tarquinius’ funeral, took his request for power to the people 
and, after receiving their endorsement, authorised the usual curiate law. 
His main reform, so admired by ‘Laelius’, would have gone down less well 
with the majority of the populus; the creation ascribed to him of the Comitia 
32 Idem: 2.18.33, ‘a populo est Ancus Martius constitutus.’
33 Idem: 2.20.35, ‘cunctis populi suffragiis rex est creatus L. Tarquinius.’
34 Idem: 2.21.37, ‘qui mihi videtur in re publica vidisse plurimum.’
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Centuriata concentrated voting power in the hands of the elite. The pretext 
of universal suffrage was maintained, while ‘the greatest voting power lay 
with those in whose interest it most was that the welfare of the civitas was 
maintained’.35
Cicero’s view of the role of the populus was conditioned by the Roman 
understanding of the nature of different kinds of power. Potestas, also used 
of the power of fathers over households, lay with the magistrates; auctoritas 
lay with the senate; and libertas with the populus;36 and unless they were prop-
erly distributed, the status rei publicae would be destabilised. But although 
they had the ‘freedom’ to own, their role in the state in Cicero’s day was 
limited to that of responding to prompts from the elite concerning legisla-
tion, voting in elections; in those held by the Comitia Centuriata, the upper 
classes were privileged, a state of affairs justified by ‘Scipio’, on the grounds 
that a principle in constitutional governance (in re publica), which should 
always be upheld was that ‘the greatest number should never hold the great-
est power’.37 This passive or reactive role is echoed in Cicero’s terminology 
with reference to the behaviour of the populus in the early centuries of the 
Republic, when, although the people were ‘free’, the government lay with the 
auctoritas of the senate;38 reforms were brought about by the senate, while 
the people acquiesced, populo cedente or populo patiente atque parente.39
Thus far, this line of thought, which favoured aristocratic governance 
but gave a protected, albeit passive constitutional role to the populus, along 
with such legal rights as that of provocatio (appeal), is what we would expect 
of Cicero, even as mediated through the figure of Scipio Aemilianus. But in 
consigning the populus to a passive constitutional role, both in the evolution 
and the preservation of the res publica, while also, in the letter to Servius, 
assigning to himself and to fellow members of the elite the powers of acting 
as procurator, on behalf of the populus as owner of the res publica, Cicero 
effectively nullified the ability of the populus to take action on its own initia-
tive to protect its interests.
7. CULTURES OF POWER: MODERN RUSSIA
Cicero’s representation of ‘the people’ as being occasionally active and asser-
tive, not always in their own best interests, but otherwise passive recipients 
35 Idem: 2. 22.40, ‘et is valebat in suffragio plurimum, cuius plurimum intererat esse in optimo 
statu civitatem.’
36 Idem: 2.33.58, ‘ut et potestatis satis in magistratibus, et auctoritatis in principum consilio, et 
libertatis in populo sit’; on libertas, as, among other things the freedom to ‘own’ in Cicero’s 
public sense of ‘owning’the res publica, see Hammer 2014: 52–8.
37 Rep. 2.22.39, ‘ne plurimum valeant plurimi.’
38 Idem: 2.32.56; cf. 2.31.55, ‘modica libertate populo data’, so that the auctoritas of the princi-
pes could be strengthened.
39 See Idem: 2.32.56; 35.60; 36.61.
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of enlightened leadership by the elite was a cultural, as much as a constitu-
tional, phenomenon. As Michael Urban’s study of elite political discourse in 
post- communist Russia maintains, ‘Cultures of power express themselves as 
discursive strategies, rooted in group habitus, by means of which actors on 
the field of politics stake out positions yielding access to desired things’.40 
Cicero (and Servius) would doubtless have been appalled to be accused of 
framing arguments about clientelae, public service or constitutional theory 
with a view to enhancing their own status. Nonetheless, Cicero’s (and 
Scipio’s) philosophical position both explains and validates Cicero’s politi-
cal preference for the exercise of auctoritas by an enlightened elite. Nor was 
this a deliberate or conscious tailoring of theory to practice. As Urban puts 
it, ‘Rather than a collection of beliefs and values held by individuals, that are 
thought to cause some effect in behaviour, culture appears here as meaning 
integral to, or coextensive with, that behaviour itself’.41
While the parallels with modern Russia should not be pushed too far, 
the overlaps with Ciceronian attitudes towards ‘the people’ are striking. 
The power of the Russian elite, though different in composition from that 
of Rome, was based, as it was in Rome, on networks of power and personal 
relationships, designated favourably as ‘teams’ or, unfavourably, as ‘clans’, 
a linguistic distinction reminiscent of the Romans’ designation of oppos-
ing groups as ‘factions’. Urban’s interviews with a selection of men and 
women involved in government from the late 1980s to the present identified 
four distinctive perceptions of the Russian people; ‘as inert; as in need; as 
degraded; and as easily manipulated’.42 The first perception, partly grounded 
in tradition, was of the people as either ‘vegetables’ or ‘god- bearers’ or 
both, who were liable to act on the basis of irrational impulses. The second 
was expressed, as a minority view, positively in terms of ability to provide 
practical help to constituents; more often respondents expressed an abstract 
dedication to popular welfare, which did not, at least in the speakers’ view, 
entail helping individuals, reminiscent of Cicero’s often generalised rhetoric 
on public service, as contrasted with his active efforts on behalf of clients. 
The third element, degradation, blamed the ‘vegetable’ state of the people 
on wider corrupt practices on the part of the elite, not least the introduction 
of mass capitalism; Roman moralists, such as Sallust, might have spotted 
parallels with the corrosive effect of the riches of empire on social mores. 
The fourth, which criticised the people as too easily fooled by populist 
rhetoric, resulting in their preferring the ‘bad’ leader Yeltsin to the ‘good’ 
leader Gorbachev, has a long classical pedigree in the denigration of orators 
as deceivers (and Cicero’s own boasts, as over his defence of Cluentius in 66, 
of how he pulled the wool over the eyes of credulous judges).
40 Urban 2001: 4–5.
41 At 5.
42 Idem: 78–87.
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Of these, the first two are the most significant to Cicero’s cultural perspec-
tive. As we have seen, Cicero’s ‘people’, having asserted itself positively with 
its choice of the first five kings, gradually slipped into more passive mode. 
While retaining the constitutional power to ‘concede’ or ‘allow’, the People 
of the early Republic wisely submitted itself for the most part to the auctoritas 
of the senate. However, as Hammer pointed out, the partnership (societas) 
that constituted the res publica was also a matter for negotiation, and if the 
balance of powers was uneven, or the people acquired a taste for too much 
‘freedom’, such negotiations could undermine the stability of the entire res 
publica:
grant a measure of freedom to the People, as did Lycurgus and Romulus, you will 
not grant them a sufficiency of liberty but will whet their appetites for more, when 
you give them no more than a mere taste of it.43
Indeed, ‘Scipio’ argued, as history had shown, a people with too much 
freedom had no idea how to use it, indulged in all kinds of excesses and 
ended up under the rule of a tyrant.
Cicero’s ‘people’, therefore, although entitled to be ‘granted’ legal 
rights and freedom, was best off, when it acquiesced in the auctoritas of the 
enlightened elite. But obligations were reciprocal. On Urban’s second cat-
egory, the people as in need, Cicero agreed that, as individuals, they were 
entitled to protection and the elite were expected to provide it: under the 
early Republic, before inequalities of wealth had taken hold, ‘the virtuous 
conduct of each in public life was the more welcome, because in their private 
dealings, they made every effort to assist individual citizens with practical 
assistance, advice and material support’.44 However, as a constitutional 
entity, a member of the populus as a voter in elections or on legislation was 
not susceptible to ‘assistance’. However, he could be, and was, manipulated 
(Urban category 4) by (alleged) bribery, rhetoric in the contio,45 and as a 
member of a jury in public trials. Cicero praised ‘the people’ to their faces, 
as in his speech for Pompey’s command in 66, or his rejection of the agrarian 
bill in 63, by posing as a true popularis; it was a tribute to his skill as a speaker 
that he could also, as he did Rullus in 63, persuade them to vote against 
their own interests. Here, unlike in the Russian example, which ascribed the 
deceit to others, it was the manipulator himself who boasted of his power to 
hoodwink the unwary.
43 Rep. 2.28, 50.
44 Idem: 2.34.59.
45 Mouritsen 2001: 38–62.
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8. CONCLUSION
The formulation, study and interpretation of Roman law was an elite pre-
rogative; its practitioners required the leisure that came with wealth, and 
access to power networks, which could both use and disseminate their 
work. Lawyers, therefore, had employment and status, whatever Rome’s 
system of government, provided the preserves and privileges of their sector 
of the elite were safeguarded. It followed that, along with the jurists, the 
continued survival of a res publica, which originated with iuris consensus, was 
also guaranteed, not as a specific constitutional entity, but as a civic com-
munity governed by law. Pomponius’ and Celsus’ assertion of continuity, 
therefore, may not have been as tendentious as appears at first sight. They 
asserted the continuity of law (and Servius’ place within that continuum), 
because that was genuinely the case. Justinian, several centuries later, would 
do the same.
Nor was jurisprudence the only elite occupation to be relatively unaf-
fected by constitutional change. Cicero’s focus in his letter to Servius on 
helping his friends as a bereavement strategy would also be continued by 
the elites under the Empire; patronage, friendship, the cultivation of clients 
were the bedrock of aristocratic power down to the Fall of Rome in the 
fifth century. All this rendered the populus dispensable. Cicero’s notion (as 
expressed by ‘Scipio’) of the enlightened aristocrat, empowered to act as a 
procurator for a populus bound into the contractual partnership of the res 
publica, denied to the populus the right or indeed the legal capacity to act 
for itself. Whatever may be thought of Roman ‘democracy’, the cultural 
assumptions of Cicero, the self- proclaimed procurator of the people, show 
that he was no democrat; for him the populus must always be legally depend-
ent on those who knew better.
Cicero’s historical construction of the role of the populus in the evolution 
of the Roman constitution therefore contained a paradox. On the one hand, 
the people had ultimate authority, especially under the early kings, as the 
‘constituent power’ that chose the kings, who then, under power effectively 
delegated by the people, established the institutions of the res publica. On the 
other, as their role became more passive, the populus was ‘granted’ freedom 
and rights, or ceded reforms, through a process of largely passive consent. 
This version of history was not intended as the tendentious self- justification 
of elite values, but reflected the interaction, or confluence, of Cicero’s elite 
culture with the actions and behaviour that had characterised his entire 
political career.
Such attitudes had constitutional consequences in that it rendered more 
acceptable a res publica without the populus. Perceptions on the part of 
members of the modern Russian political elite of their populus as inert and 
irresponsible, requiring assistance but vulnerable to manipulation, provide 
an instructive echo of Cicero’s perspectives. Without seeking to make judge-
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ments on the present state of Russian ‘democracy’, an elite, be it Roman or 
any other, which, as a collective, has access to power and wealth, without the 
requirement to seek endorsement from the wider population,46 and which 
also expresses cultural attitudes that are dismissive or contemptuous of the 
ability of the populus to make rational decisions for itself, is unlikely to go 
out of its way to safeguard the people’s constitutional prerogatives. In 45 
Cicero and Servius condemned Caesar’s autocracy, yet both, in their differ-
ent ways, would contribute to its perpetuation.
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Cicero and the Italians:  
Expansion of Empire, Creation of Law
Saskia T. Roselaar
1. INTRODUCTION
As the Roman state expanded its territory, the peoples of Italy were gradually 
incorporated into the Roman framework, either as full or partial citizens or 
as nominally independent allies. In the third century bc a bewildering variety 
of legal statuses existed in close proximity within the Italian peninsula, which 
meant that people of different statuses were obliged to interact regularly. The 
Roman state endeavoured to accommodate these needs by creating new legal 
instruments, for example commercium and conubium –  which, however, were 
only available to Latins, not to all Italians. The office of praetor peregrinus was 
created in 241 bc to deal with legal conflicts between Romans and Italians. 
Nevertheless, not all conflicts that involved people who held a different legal 
status could easily be resolved; new legal instruments were created through-
out the Republic.
Most Italians still suffered from legal disadvantages in their dealings with 
Romans, for example because they did not hold commercium, which made it 
difficult to do business with Romans and to join in commercial partnership 
with them, or because they could not inherit from or bequeath to Romans 
because of their lack of conubium. Moreover, their possessions, especially 
land, were constantly under threat of confiscation by the Romans, as became 
clear during the Gracchan land reforms. Recourse to the praetor peregrinus 
availed the Italians very little in these situations. These legal handicaps may 
have been among the main reasons for the outbreak of the Social War in 
91 bc: the Italians demanded, among other things, legal equality with their 
Roman business partners.
In the early first century bc, after the Social War, all Italians were granted 
Roman citizenship. However, it took a while before the Roman state was 
willing to grant them the full benefits of this status; it attempted to limit the 
voting rights of Italians by entering them in a small number of voting tribus, 
and are most unlikely to have assigned all Italians a tribus until the census of 
70 bc.
This chapter will investigate the legal status of Italians in the second and 
first century bc. In theory, at least after 70 bc, Italians were equal to the 
old Roman citizens, in that they could avail themselves of the same legal 
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 instruments provided by the Roman state. Nevertheless, there are indica-
tions in Cicero’s work that not all Italians were considered equal by the 
Romans who sat in judgement on their cases. Sometimes Cicero seems to 
fight against prejudice held about Italians, making it necessary for him to 
point out that Italians are perfectly capable of acting as witnesses, or arguing 
that they possess the same moral qualities as Romans and should therefore 
be treated equally under the law.
Furthermore, Cicero and other sources also indicate that not all Italian 
communities shared exactly the same laws; communities could ‘ratify’ 
Rome’s laws to make them valid locally (the so- called fundus fieri), which 
suggests that in administrative matters Italian communities retained their 
own laws and customs. This chapter will investigate the integration of 
Italy in Roman legal procedure, as well as the practical and legal prejudice 
that Italians seem to have suffered in their legal affairs through the eyes of 
 Cicero –  not only the most famous Roman lawyer in history, but also an 
Italian.
2. THE LEGAL STATUS OF ITALIANS BEFORE THE 
SOCIAL WAR
During their conquest of Italy the Romans devised various legal instru-
ments to regulate their relations with people who did not possess Roman 
citizenship. One of the issues that needed regulation was trade: laws had to 
be formulated to enable trade between people from different political enti-
ties. It is often assumed that the main instrument devised by the Romans to 
regulate trade with peregrini –  a term that included all non- citizens, including 
Latin and Italian  allies –  was the ius commercii. It is usually assumed that com-
mercium was a right that could be granted to non- citizens, permitting them 
the use of certain legal instruments related to trade that were otherwise only 
available to citizens.
I have explored elsewhere the legal status of Italians in the third and 
second century bc, and especially the importance of ius commercii and ius 
conubii.1 In short, in contrast to what is believed by many scholars, I believe 
that only the inhabitants of Latin colonies enjoyed these two privileges, 
while other allies did not. These were aimed at maintaining the strength of 
the Latin colonies, thus serving a military  purpose –  the most important role 
that any ally served in the eyes of Rome. Conubium, commercium and the ius 
migrationis formed clearly defined instruments of Roman hegemony, with 
which it kept a close watch on the strength of its Latin colonies. The Roman 
state was not eager to grant these rights to anyone else, including Italian 
allies; the three  rights –  separately or  together –  could be granted as rewards 
 1 Roselaar 2013a; 2013b.
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for loyalty to the Romans, either to individuals or to towns or peoples, but 
the recorded number of such grants is rather limited.2
Many scholars argue that trade between Romans and non- citizens was 
severely limited or even completely impossible when peregrini did not enjoy 
commercium with Romans. However, the only possible limitation on trade 
between Romans and peregrini concerned res mancipi, to which people 
without ius commercii were not admitted. Trade in res nec mancipi could 
always take place, and could be protected by the praetor; and even trade in 
res mancipi could be protected by the praetor if he so chose. Allies were not 
allowed to use the Roman legis actiones, but this does not mean that they 
could not pursue a lawsuit. If there was no available legis actio, the matter 
could be resolved by an informal oral statement of the plaintiff and defend-
ant, to be judged by the praetor. The praetor could use an actio in factum 
(‘action considering the facts’) or actio utilis (‘useful action’, which could be 
added if the law did not quite match the facts). Where Roman law could not 
be applied, the praetor could protect the interests of a peregrinus by means 
of an actio ficticia; this ordered the judge to proceed as if something was the 
case, which in fact was not true.3 Thus the praetor could treat the plaintiff as 
a Roman citizen when in fact he was not, through the fiction si civis romanus 
esset.4
Peregrini were also protected against disruption of their possessions by the 
possessory interdicts. The interdictum uti possidetis protected the person who 
was in actual possession, provided he had not obtained the item ‘by violence, 
stealth, or on sufferance’ (vi, clam, or precario) from the other party. Through 
an interdictum utrubi, the possession of a movable thing was declared to 
belong to the party who had held it the greatest part of the past year. The 
interdictum unde vi protected someone who had been driven by force from his 
possession. These interdicts had probably existed since the late third or early 
second century bc and could be granted to peregrini by the praetor.5
Legal transactions were based on bona fides: this was the basis of social 
life. If someone did not perform a task entrusted to him, he damaged the 
community as a whole, because he undermined the social values on which 
it was based.6 Transactions depended on adherence to moral standards, ‘as 
ought to be good conduct between good men’ (societas omnium bonorum).7 
 2 Coşkun 2009.
 3 Sotty 1977.
 4 Gai. Inst. 4.37. See Coşkun 2009: 49–50.
 5 Festus 260–2 L mentions Aelius Gallus (fl. 170–150 bc) as the oldest authority. In Ter. Eun. 
319–20, written c. 161, refers to the interdictum uti possidetis; while Plaut. Stich. 696: Age dice 
uter utrubi accumbamus and 750: Utrubi accumbo? –  Utrubi tu vis, seems to refer to the inter-
dictum utrubi. The interdictum unde vi is mentioned in the lex agraria of 111 bc, l. 18–9. See 
Crawford 1996: 164; Roselaar 2010:114–6.
 6 Cic. Rosc. Am. 111–13; Nat. D. 3.74. See Harries 2013: 118.
 7 D. 17.2.1.1.
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The  so- called bonae fidei iudicia protected the consensual contracts of emptio- 
venditio (buying and selling), locatio-conductio (leasing and hiring), societas 
(partnership), and mandatum (performance of services for free). These devel-
oped gradually: the contract of emptio-venditio was probably the earliest 
and had been fully formed by c. 200 bc, locatio-conductio in the mid- second 
century, and mandatum by 123 bc.8 These contracts were accessible to per-
egrini; they were simple agreements between two people and required no 
special status.
The praetors were the most important magistrates in the development of 
law: they could introduce new regulations to deal with issues that were not 
covered by the ius civile, or new instruments of law for those who could not 
use the ius civile. These new regulations were collectively called the ius hono-
rarium, the body of law created by the magistrates of the Roman Republic. 
We may conclude that the number of people enjoying commercium was 
much smaller than is assumed by many scholars, but also that it was much 
less important in trade than is often thought. However, in certain situations 
the lack of Roman citizenship caused limitations in the possibilities for 
economic gain that Italians enjoyed. When trading in res mancipi, the legal 
position of an Italian partner in trade was worse than that of the Roman 
party, despite the possibility that the praetor would protect an Italian party. 
Furthermore, it was impossible for Italians to inherit from or make bequests 
to Romans if they did not enjoy conubium. This meant that they were not 
fully free to decide on the best possible strategy for managing their property, 
which could have negative effects on their financial position. Furthermore, 
Italians suffered from various legal and economic disadvantages, which 
gradually led to more and more dissatisfaction with their position via-à-vis 
the Roman state, and eventually to the outbreak of the Social War in 91 bc.
3. THE SOCIAL WAR
Many explanations have been given for the outbreak of the Social War: a 
universal desire for Roman citizenship; the cultural Romanisation of Italy; 
Italian grievances over Roman abuse, and dissatisfaction with their politi-
cal, military and/or social position. Not all these explanations are equally 
likely; the cultural Romanisation of the Italians especially is now generally 
rejected.9 In my view, it is likely that economic grievances were the most 
important reason for the outbreak of the Social War.10 First, problems 
surrounding the distribution of ager publicus were among the economic 
 8 Mandatum appears in Rhet. Her. 2.13.19. See Watson 1961; 12–13, who argues that man-
datum became legally recognised between the time of Plautus and that of Cicero. See Fiori 
1998–9.
 9 Most forcefully argued by Mouritsen 1998.
10 I argue this in more detail in Roselaar forthcoming.
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concerns of Italians in the late second century.11 This land was in theory 
accessible only to Roman citizens, so that Italians had no legal right to use it. 
I have dealt extensively with ager publicus elsewhere,12 but for now it suffices 
to say that many Italians had continued to work this land after it had been 
confiscated. When the Gracchan land commission started its work in 133, 
the distribution of the land worked by Italians, although legal from a Roman 
point of view, caused much opposition among its Italian holders. It is in the 
context of the debate about ager publicus in the 120s bc that we hear for the 
first time about the idea of granting citizenship to Italians; clearly the two 
issues were closely connected. It was suggested that the Italians would be 
more willing to give up their land if they received citizenship in exchange.13 
This at first sight looks rather odd: why would Italians prefer Roman citizen-
ship, which did not have any direct economic benefits, to the possession 
of land, which clearly brought in large profits? However, in fact there were 
tangible material benefits to having citizenship.
Italians had used Roman ager publicus for a long time, never considering 
that it could be taken away from them. Suddenly these possessions became 
insecure; very importantly, the Italians suffered from the fact that measure-
ments made by the land commission were done very quickly, and not always 
very accurately.14 It seems that Italians suffered more than Roman citizens 
from incorrect measurements and that in some cases their private land 
was taken by the Roman state for distribution. Gaining citizenship would 
give the Italians some measure of protection against all this. Citizens were 
protected against random confiscations of their private land during land dis-
tribution schemes; rather than having to approach a Roman senator to gain 
redress, which in this case proved ineffective, they would have access to the 
Roman courts to protect their rights of ownership of privately owned land.
There were other direct economic advantages of having citizenship: for 
example, the Italians were still paying taxes for the upkeep and payment of 
the contingents they sent to the Roman army. The Romans had not paid any 
direct taxes since 167.15 Furthermore, a very profitable business only open 
to Romans was tax- farming in the provinces and bidding for public contracts 
let out by the state, for example for building projects. Italians could only 
become involved in tax- farming and other public contacts indirectly, by 
entering into a partnership with a Roman, but this was not as profitable as 
being a publicanus in their own right.16 Badian argues that very quickly after 
11 Nagle 1973; Kendall 2013: 142–66.
12 Roselaar 2010.
13 App. B Civ. 1.21: ‘The Italians were ready to accept this, because they preferred Roman 
citizenship to possession of the land.’ See Nagle 1973: 368; but he agrees that the supposed 
Italian willingness to accept citizenship in exchange for land was indeed strange.
14 App. B Civ. 1.18–9.
15 Brunt 1988: 120–1.
16 Badian 1972: 57–8, 97; Kendall 2013: 121–2.
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gaining citizenship Italians started to bid for public contracts.17 This is dif-
ficult to corroborate, since the  sources –  mostly  Cicero –  do not record the 
backgrounds of the publicani.18 Cicero does, however, emphasise the close 
bond between the equites, the publicani and the upper classes of Italian towns. 
When defending Plancius from Atina, he emphasised his Italian origins on 
the one hand, and on the other his position as a publicanus: ‘The flower of the 
Roman knighthood, the ornament of our society and the backbone of our 
political life, is to be found among the body of tax- farmers’.19
Finally, cultural developments in second- century Italy were important. 
Many areas of Italy show great cultural sophistication, influenced by the 
Greek world, for example in building stone theatres and monumental temple 
complexes. Italy was often ahead of Rome in these developments, erect-
ing sophisticated buildings and artworks that had not yet been introduced 
in Rome. Italian elites were rightly proud of these achievements, but the 
Romans could easily depict the Italians as backward, boorish, and uncivi-
lised (see below). This depiction clearly did not match the image that Italians 
held about themselves, of sophisticated and civilised people engaged in a 
Mediterranean- wide cultural exchange. As Roman citizens the Italians would 
have greater social prestige in the eyes of existing Roman citizens. They 
would also be protected against random abuse from Roman magistrates, as 
occurred regularly in the late second century bc.20 Velleius indicates that 
the Italians indeed felt that they were seen as ‘foreigners and aliens’ by the 
Romans, although they felt closely related.21 However, even if prestige was 
an important consideration, the tangible benefits of having citizenship were 
likely to be more important.
Of course the Romans could see that their allies were unhappy; they in fact 
recognised the validity of the Italians’ grievances. One way of showing this 
was to take action against magistrates who abused their powers. In 123 the lex 
Acilia repetundarum was passed on the instigation of Gaius Gracchus, which 
allowed for a set procedure for the prosecution of extortionate officials. This 
was probably available to both Italians and provincial allies. An ally who suc-
cessfully prosecuted a Roman magistrate was to be granted (Roman) citizen-
ship, or, if he preferred to keep his own citizenship, to receive provocatio and 
freedom from military service and public services (munera) in his hometown. 
Thus, the law recognised that not all allies might want to become citizens and 
offered provocatio as an alternative reward.
The lex Acilia was unfortunately not very effective. Most governors 
17 Badian 1972: 96–7. Mouritsen 1998: 92–3 does not believe many Italians wanted to become 
publicani.
18 Brunt 1988: 126–7.
19 Cic. Planc. 24.
20 E.g. Gell. NA 10.3. See Dart 2014: 56–9; Roselaar forthcoming.
21 Vell. Pat. 2.15.2, see App. B Civ. 1.35.
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who were prosecuted were acquitted; only a few successful prosecutions 
are known. The only recorded cases of people receiving citizenship after a 
prosecution are those of L. Cossinius from Tibur, who prosecuted a Roman 
between 106 and 90, and another Tiburtine, T. Coponius.22 This indicates 
that the law was passed, at least in part, because of the Italians’ dissatisfaction 
with the way they were treated. However, the fact that so few people gained 
citizenship through a prosecution shows that the possibility of becoming a 
citizen by prosecuting a magistrate was quite  limited –  or that Italians who 
were successful chose provocatio rather than citizenship.
Around the same time, Latin allies were given the opportunity to receive 
citizenship through the ius adipiscendi civitatem Romanum per magistratum, that 
is, the ‘right to receive Roman citizenship through holding a magistracy’.23 
Unfortunately much uncertainty exists about the contents of this right. It is 
assumed that this regulation allowed magistrates of Latin towns to become 
Roman citizens after the term of their magistracy. The lex Acilia repetunda-
rum awards successful prosecutors either Roman citizenship, or, if they do 
not wish to become citizens, provocatio and vacatio are awarded. This option 
is given to ‘[whoever of them . . .] shall not have been [?duumvir, consul, 
dicta]tor, praetor or aedile’. Apparently those who exercised these offices 
in their hometowns had been granted provocatio and vacatio because of their 
 service –  another important indication that allies did not necessarily want 
to become citizens, but that their grievances were recognised by the Roman 
state. Most scholars argue that the lex repetundarum introduced the civitas per 
magistratum, or at least that it was introduced around 125,24 although this 
date has been disputed.25
Further evidence for the existence of the civitas per magistratum, at least 
in the early first century bc, comes from Asconius: he states that Pompeius 
Strabo gave some towns in the Po Valley ‘Latin rights, so that they would 
have the same rights as the other Latin colonies, namely to receive citizen-
ship through exercising a local magistracy’.26 If Asconius means by ‘other 
Latin colonies, those that existed at the time, that is, before the Social War 
when the Latins were given citizenship, then this means that the people of 
these colonies had this right since before the Social War. It seems reasonable 
therefore that civitas per magistratum was introduced either by the lex Acilia 
or at some point between 122 and 87.27 This was another way in which the 
Roman state tried to assuage the grievances of its allies, at least of the Latin 
colonists among them.
22 Cic. Balb. 53–4.
23 Crawford 1996: 111; Mouritsen 1998: 99–108.
24 E.g. Brunt 1988: 97; Dart 2014: 60–1.
25 E.g. Sherwin- White 1973: 112; Galsterer 1976: 96.
26 Asc. 2–3C.
27 See in more detail Roselaar forthcoming.
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However, this does not necessarily mean that all Latins and allies wanted 
to become Roman citizens: all these problems could have been solved by 
other means, such as a more equal distribution of booty acquired in wars, 
opportunities to share in the exploitation of the provinces, and protection 
against random abuse and the expropriation of land by Romans. This had 
indeed been attempted by the lex Acilia, but had proven ineffective. Thus, 
for most Italians Roman citizenship was not a goal in itself, but a means to 
an end, namely the improvement of their economic situation. The Italians 
did not necessarily want citizenship for cultural reasons: in the late second 
century, many Italian towns were still proud, wealthy and important. There 
was no reason to assume that the Italians wanted to abandon their local 
citizenship and become Romans. However, eventually they saw no other 
choice, since they realised that other measures to protect their interest were 
ineffective. Legally, economically and socially their interests would best be 
served by becoming Roman citizens.
After the Social War the Romans still refused to share the advantages of 
citizenship with the Italians. Although the allies had now been given citizen-
ship, the Romans were still not happy with the idea. In fact, various tricks 
were devised to prevent them from exerting any actual influence.28 There 
is some debate about when and how the new citizens were finally included 
on the Roman census lists and assigned to a voting tribe. At first it was pro-
posed that new citizens would be placed in a small number of newly created 
voting tribes,29 but these were most probably never created. The census 
of 89 failed, meaning that new citizens were not enrolled into the tribus or 
the census classes, which would have allowed them to vote in the comitia 
centuriata. This was especially important for wealthier Italians, who would 
have joined the higher classes of the comitia centuriata and thus been able to 
make a real difference. A new census was held in 86, but the census figure 
for this year as reported is only 463,000, suggesting that the Italians were not 
registered in the tribes.30
This Roman reluctance to give the Italians what was theirs by right was 
clearly perceived as a new insult by the Italians. They showed their interest 
in the matter by supporting the various Roman politicians who claimed to be 
able to give them full citizenship rights: Marius, Sulpicius, Cinna and Sulla 
all tried to recruit the Italians.31 The next recorded census was not held until 
70 bc; this meant that the new citizens would not enjoy full voting rights 
until 70, or at least not in the comitia centuriata. They might have been able 
28 App. B Civ. 1.49, 53–5; Livy Per. 76–7; Plut. Sull. 8; Vell. 2.19.1, 2.20.2. See Sherwin- White 
1973, 156–7.
29 App. B Civ. 1.49; Vell. Pat. 2.20.2; Sisenna fr. 17 Peter (3.50 B).
30 Cic. Arch. 11; Cass. Dio 37.9.3; Livy Per. 63, 98.3; Jer. Chron. 85. See Dart 2014: 103–4; 
Roselaar forthcoming.
31 App. B Civ. 1.77–82, 93; Plut. Sull. 25; Strab. 5.4.11.
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to vote in the comitia tributa, if they had indeed been assigned to a tribus, but 
for voting rights in the comitia centuriata their property had to be recorded in 
the census. At this time indeed a much larger number of  citizens –  910, 000 
–  was recorded than in 86; finally all new citizens and their property were reg-
istered. Thus, after the census of 70 bc, all Italians were full Roman citizens 
and thus held the same legal status as the Romans.
As we can see, the Roman state in the late second century bc was very 
aware of the grievances of the Italians and the importance of keeping them 
happy. However, the measures introduced to solve these grievances were 
ineffective. This was often the result of conflicts within the Roman ruling 
class, especially in the debate about whether the Italians should be given 
citizenship. Nevertheless, legal instruments were gradually created that were 
available to Italian allies, such as the bonae fidei iudicia and the interdicts. 
Gradually, therefore, the Italians were integrated into Roman political and 
legal life. However, this process was not fully complete after the Social War, 
and in fact continued throughout the first century bc.
4. PREJUDICE AGAINST ITALIAN ALLIES AND THE 
IUS CIVILE
The Italians in the first century bc shared the same legal status as the old 
Roman citizens, even if they sometimes suffered from prejudice. The 
ambiguous reputation of Italian towns is clear from Cicero’s works: he does 
not hesitate to present them as the sources of all virtue, although he could 
also present them as backward if it suited his purposes. The most explicit 
example of Cicero extolling the virtues of an Italian town (his home town, 
Arpinum) occurs in the speech for Publius Sulla of 62 bc. He says to the 
defence lawyer:
‘This is what I mean’, says he, ‘that you come from a municipal town’, I confess 
that I do, and I add, that I come from that municipal town from which salvation 
to this city and empire has more than once proceeded. But I should like exceed-
ingly to know from you, how it is that those men who come from the municipal 
towns appear to you to be foreigners. For no one ever made that objection to that 
great man, Marcus Cato the Elder, though he had many enemies, or to Tiberius 
Coruncanius, or to Marcus Curius, or even to that great hero of our own times, 
Gaius Marius, though many men envied him. In truth, I am exceedingly delighted 
that I am a man of such a character that, when you were anxious to find fault with 
me, you could still find nothing to reproach me with which did not apply also 
to the greater part of the citizens. And if we seem to you to be foreigners, whose 
name and honours have now become familiar topics of conversation and pane-
gyric throughout the city and among all men, how greatly must those competitors 
of yours seem to be foreigners, who now, having been picked out of all Italy, are 
contending with you for honour and for every dignity! And yet take care that you 
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do not call one of these a foreigner, lest you should be overwhelmed by the votes 
of the foreigners.32
A number of interesting observations can be made from this passage: firstly, 
Cicero himself was accused by the prosecution lawyer, Torquatus, of being 
a foreigner (peregrinus). In legal texts a peregrinus was someone who did not 
possess Roman citizenship, and could therefore not partake in ius civile. 
Furthermore, such a person suffered from prejudice: he was not considered 
a true member of Roman society, even if he lived in Rome. Cicero, on the 
other hand, turns the argument on its head by saying that many of the most 
famous men in Roman history, including some of the kings, had arrived in 
Rome from elsewhere; this did not mean that they were excluded from per-
forming great deeds for the Roman state. In the eyes of city- born Romans, 
their Italian origins could be used to insult their character and, more impor-
tantly, as an indication of their unfitness for public office. In fact, Cicero 
counters, men from Arpinum have twice saved the Roman Republic: first 
Gaius Marius, who repelled the Cimbric invaders in 101 bc, then Cicero 
himself when he dealt with Catiline’s conspiracy.
Furthermore, Cicero refers to more new men entering the Roman state in 
recent times. Cicero thinks that, if a longstanding citizen town like Arpinum 
already seems foreign to Torquatus, then all these new citizens must seem 
even more exotic. Cicero suggests that there is a kind of hierarchy among 
the Italian towns, with those that had citizenship for longer being seen as less 
foreign than those just admitted. These new citizens also formed a tangible 
danger for the old city- born Romans, since all these people had the right to 
vote and to be elected as magistrates in Rome. Thus competition for public 
office had increased enormously, and the power of new Italian citizens to 
vote threatened to swamp the power of the old Roman citizens. Therefore, 
Cicero warns Torquatus, he must be careful about whom he calls a  foreigner 
–  before he knows it he may lose out on public office because the ‘foreigners’ 
vote against him.
On the other hand, Cicero does not hesitate to use prejudice against 
Italian towns if it suits his case. In De lege agraria he takes a stab at Capua, 
where a new colony was planned. He points out the arrogance that is tradi-
tional to Capuans, as well as the danger they present to Rome:
Though similar officers in the other colonies are called duumvirs, these men chose 
to call themselves praetors. But if their first year of office inspired them with such 
desires as that, do not you suppose that in a few years they would be likely to take 
32 Cic. Sull. 22–5. Although the speech was in defence of Publius Sulla, it was also Cicero 
himself who was under attack; some accomplices of Catiline had been arrested and put to 
death without a trial on the senate’s order, which was executed by Cicero; this had caused 
much resentment against him. For other instances of prejudice against Italians, see Clu. 197; 
Cael. 5; Mur. 15–7; Phil. 3.15–17. See Roselaar forthcoming.
 Cicero and the Italians 155
a fancy to the name of consuls? In the next place, they were preceded by lictors, 
not with staves, but with two fasces, just as lictors go before the praetors here . . . 
But after this, it was almost more than one could endure, to see the countenance 
of Considius. The man whom we had seen at Rome shrivelled and wasted away, in 
a contemptible and abject condition, when we saw him at Capua with Campanian 
haughtiness and royal pride, we seemed to be looking at the Magii, Blossii, and 
Vibellii.33
Cicero is talking here, in 63 bc, about the colony in Capua founded in 83 
bc, led by Considius and Saltius; this colony contained many Roman set-
tlers, so that the inhabitants of Capua were not in fact all native Capuans. 
However, Considius, as Cicero represents him, saw Capua as his own little 
kingdom and behaved with the arrogance of the previous Capuan leaders, 
the Blossii, Magii and Vibellii. If Capuan institutions reflected Rome’s, then 
the Capuans were not only arrogant in using the same terms for magistrates 
as Rome did, but could also form a real threat if at some  point –  under 
Considius’  leadership –  they desired to form an alternative state rivalling 
Rome, as had been done by the Italian rebels in the Social War.
What lies behind this kind of prejudice is the debate about who deserves 
to be a citizen. All citizens of the Roman state were subject to the ius civile. 
The ius civile is defined by Cicero as ‘a system of proportional fairness 
[aequitas] set up for those with a shared citizenship to claim what is rightfully 
theirs’.34 Throughout his works Cicero says much about what it means to be 
Roman citizen: it is determined by ‘ethical continuity’ (mos maiorum), which 
includes culture, descent and political identification with the res publica.35 
The res publica is defined as the res populi, but ‘a people is not a collection 
of all human beings joined in whatever way, but a coming together of a 
multitude of people in agreement with respect to law and a partnership with 
respect to the common good’.36 Cicero on many occasions emphasises the 
importance of the ius civile and the rule of law. The rule of law is the basis of 
any state; violence is fundamentally incompatible with it.37 The loss of law 
would cause ‘great detriment to the citizen community [civitas]’.38
33 Cic. Agr. 2.93. See also Cic. Fam. 7.1.3; Cic. Leg. 3.36, where he makes fun of unimportant 
small town events.
34 Cic. Top. 9: ‘Ius civile est aequitas constituta eis qui eiusdem civitatis sunt ad res suas 
obtinendas.’ He is aware that the ideal is not always achieved, however: Inv. rhet. 2.65; see 
Harries 2013: 111, 115.
35 Dench 2013: 122.
36 Cic. Rep. 1.39: ‘res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo 
modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.’
37 Cic. Caecin. 5: ‘those rights which concern all men, which were established by our ancestors, 
and have been preserved to this time; while, if they were taken away, not only would some 
part of our rights be diminished, but also that violence, which is the greatest enemy to law, 
would seem to be strengthened by that decision.’ See Frier 1985: 171–83.
38 Cic. Caecin. 75. See Harries 2006: 186.
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This means that by definition those who are not citizens do not fully 
participate in the ius civile. However, Cicero, as the defender of new citizens 
of Italian background and those who did not hold citizenship at all, has to 
look for a different community that included everyone whom he defended. 
Cicero therefore emphasises a community of humanity, of which in theory 
everyone could become a member. Membership of this community is not 
determined by legal status, but by political and moral values, so that Cicero 
must offer a clear definition of who is or can become a member of it.39 For 
this he turns to the ius gentium, the ‘natural’ laws that are common to all 
humanity. He sees Roman law as sharing elements of natural law, as long as 
it is created and maintained by men who possess ‘Roman’ virtues. Cicero 
argues that these virtues can be taught to both Roman citizens and aliens.40 
Therefore, citizenship, in his view, should not solely based on parentage or 
birthplace, but be opened to all those who share ‘Roman’ values or contrib-
ute positively to the Roman state.
What is most important, according to Cicero, is the shared history of a 
community; this is more important than shared emotional bonds between 
the inhabitants. Because the community is formed through historical events, 
fluidity is possible in its citizenship. Especially in early Rome, as Cicero (a 
Roman citizen) emphasises, citizenship was constantly renegotiated, often 
violently.41 He constructs a nostalgic version of Rome’s early history, in 
which the Romans were always respectful, never more violent than neces-
sary, and brought Roman law to those they conquered. Early Roman leaders 
aimed to protect their clients and the peoples who enjoyed friendship with 
the Roman people, and to bring them prosperity.42 The value of the mos 
maiorum, so important for Roman society, was fully exploited by Cicero: he 
constantly refers to examples from ancient history, as in the passage of the 
Pro Sulla cited above. In the Pro Balbo, Cicero also emphasises the impor-
tance of new citizens to Rome: the Sabines, Volsci, Hernici and Latins, and 
the people from Tusculum and Lanuvium. The fact that the Italians had been 
so important in the early Republic gives his argument extra weight.43
Cicero does not usually make distinctions between different Italian towns. 
He usually ascribes certain moral values to specific peoples, rather than to 
individual towns.44 This allows him to present the Italians as occupying the 
moral high ground, shocked at the behaviour of Roman politicians and 
39 Subacus 2015: 84.
40 Cic. Off. 3.27: ‘Those who say that regard must be had for citizens, but deny it to foreigners, 
these tear apart the common partnership of the human race.’ See Subacus 2015: 91.
41 Subacus 2015: 125–6.
42 Cic. Div. Caec. 66.
43 Cic. Balb. 31.
44 E.g. Leg. Agr. 2.95: ‘The Ligurians, being mountaineers, are a hardy and rustic tribe . . . The 
Campanians were always proud from the excellence of their soil, and the magnitude of their 
crops, and the healthiness, and position, and beauty of their city’. See Dench 1995: 85–94.
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magistrates, and as opponents of tyranny. Regularly he states that tota Italia 
is shocked at abuse from Roman magistrates; in the triumviral period, tota 
Italia wants libertas.45 Thus because the Italians represent traditional ‘Roman’ 
virtues, they are worthy of citizenship. A good example of a deserving citizen 
is Cluentius, from Larinum in southern Italy. He ‘guards that well- known 
nobility among his own people and status handed down by the ancestors in 
such a way that he achieves the weightiness, firmness, good name and gen-
erosity of the ancestors’.46 Cicero is deliberately vague on which ancestors 
he means: only Cluentius’ direct, local ancestors, or the Roman nobility of 
old, who were the quintessential examples of weightiness, firmness, good 
name and generosity. By implication, he suggests that Cluentius is one of the 
Italians who represents traditional Roman virtues.
Therefore, political loyalty was an important criterion for inclusion in 
the Roman state. Cicero famously stated that he, like all Romans who were 
born in an Italian town, had two patriae: ‘I think, that there are two father-
lands for him and all those from municipalities, one from nature, the other 
from citizenship’.47 There was a clear hierarchy between the ‘natural’ and the 
‘legal’ patria:
The one which takes its name from the state as a whole should have first place 
in our affections. That is the country for which we should be willing to die, to 
which we should devote ourselves heart and soul, and on whose altar we should 
dedicate and consecrate all that is ours. Yet the one which gave us birth is dear to 
us in a way not very different from that which took us in. And so I shall always 
insist that this is my country, even though the other is greater and includes this 
within it.48
In Pro Balbo, Cicero uses political loyalty to Rome to argue for citizenship 
based on emotional and political affiliation. One’s feelings and actions 
towards the Republic are what determine whether someone is worthy to be 
a citizen. The state is united by a shared sense of identity that comes from 
loyalty to the Republic: ‘I wish that those who everywhere are the defenders 
of this empire, could come into this state, and that all those fighting against 
the republic be put out of the state’.49 Thus, everyone who has something to 
contribute to the Roman state should be welcomed as a citizen.
Not only political values, but also culture created a community of 
45 Abuse: Cic. Verr. 1.54; Phil. 2.105–6; Cic. Cat. 2.25: ‘all Italy’ opposes Catilina; Red. Quir. 
16: ‘all Italy’ asks Pompey to speak for Cicero; libertas: Phil. 3.32, 10.19, 13.39. See Dench 
2013: 128.
46 Cic. Clu. 196: ‘Praeterea nobilitatem illam inter suos locumque a maioribus traditum sic 
tuetur ut maiorum gravitatem, constantiam, gratiam, liberalitatem adsequatur.’
47 Cic. Leg. 2.5: ‘Ego mehercule et illi et omnibus municipibus duas esse censeo patrias, unam 
naturae, alteram civitatis.’
48 Cic. Leg. 2.5.
49 Cic. Balb. 51. See Subacus 2015: 148–9.
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 humanity. Cicero emphasises this especially in the Pro Archia, since Archias 
was a poet whose works glorified the Roman state.50 He starts out by creating 
a bond between himself, the jury and Archias, who are all part of the same 
community.51 Cicero argues that learning and literature are typical values of 
the Roman elite, and that Archias shares this cultural kinship. Thus both his 
kinship with Roman culture and his tangible contribution to Rome’s power 
make him worthy of citizenship.
In the Verrines, Cicero combines the arguments of cultural similarity to 
Rome and political loyalty to the Roman state. He argues that the Sicilians 
possess typically Roman characteristics, while on the other hand Verres 
is not a true Roman at all because of his corruption. He establishes clear 
characteristics for what makes someone a virtuous Roman, and argues that 
anyone can claim these qualities. On the other hand, he also praises Sicily’s 
importance and past loyalty to Rome: ‘Sicily first of all foreign nations 
devoted herself to the friendship and loyalty of the Roman people. First of 
all to be called a province, that which is an ornament of empire’.52 Although 
the Sicilians were not in fact Roman citizens, they certainly deserved to be 
treated as if they were, Cicero argues.
All this prejudice against Italians could obviously be a problem if they 
became engaged in a lawsuit. Much of Cicero’s pleading is aimed at establish-
ing the Italian or provincial defendants as worthy characters who deserved to 
be protected by Roman law. In many cases he was successful, as his clients 
won their case. Most Italians of course never got into legal trouble, but this 
does not mean that they never suffered from prejudice legal and economic 
affairs. For example, in the Pro Fonteio Cicero argues that Naevius was ‘a 
worthy man, but one who had not been brought up in such a manner as 
to give him the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the rights of a 
partnership and the duties of a trustworthy manager’.53 As we saw above, 
the rules of bona fides underwrote all business and legal transactions. It was 
necessary to be acquainted with Roman law and the unwritten social rules of 
trade; an Italian who traded little with Romans would not be able to acquire 
this knowledge and therefore be at a disadvantage. Having citizenship would 
50 Cic. Arch. 14. Archias wrote in Greek, which ensured that Roman glory was spread through 
as large a part of the world as possible: ‘Moreover because Greek is read in nearly all races, 
Latin is contained in its own, narrow, limits. By which, if those things which we do are 
defined by the regions of the whole world, we ought to desire that where the weapons of our 
armies have come, our glory and fame reach to the same place’ (Arch. 23). Archias thus has 
duae patriae as well: ‘his Greekness is just as important as his constructed Romanness and in 
fact plays an active role in the continual affirmation of what it means to be Roman’ (Subacus 
2015: 144–5).
51 Cic. Arch. 3: ‘before this order of most literate men, your humanity . . . that you allow me to 
speak a little more freely concerning a zeal for humanity and letters.’
52 Cic. Verr. 2.1.2–3; see 2.2.2–11. See Lintott 2008: 95.
53 Cic. Font. 11–2.
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open up more opportunities to use the ius civile, leading to a closer knowl-
edge of Roman law among Italians.
5. FUNDUS FIERI: ROMAN LAW AND THE ITALIANS
It stands to reason that all Italians, after being made Roman citizens, had 
to adhere to Roman law. However, some debate has been caused by what 
Cicero says about the concept of fundus fieri in Pro Balbo:
What can possibly be said more ignorant than that it is requisite for the federate 
cities to ratify such a transaction? (quid enim potuit dici imperitius quam foederatos 
populos fieri fundos oportere?). For that is not a right peculiar to federate cities, but 
to all free nations . . . When the Roman people had ordered anything, if the allied 
peoples and the Latins had adopted and ratified it, and if the law which we had 
among ourselves was in this manner established among some people on a firm 
footing, then that people should be bound by the obligations of that law; not in 
such a manner as to detract in the least from our privileges, but that those nations 
might enjoy either that law which was established among us, or some other advan-
tage and benefit . . . The Latins have adopted whatever of them they have chosen; 
even the lex Iulia itself, by which the rights of citizenship were given to the allies 
and to the Latins, it was decreed that those people who did not ratify the law 
should not have the freedom of the city, which circumstance gave rise to a great 
contention among the people of Heraclea and of Neapolis, since a great part of the 
population in those states preferred the liberty which they enjoyed by virtue of 
their treaty with us to the rights of citizenship. Lastly, this is the meaning both of 
that law and of that expression, that the peoples who do ratify it enjoy its advan-
tages owing to our kindness, and not owing to any right of their own [ut fundi 
populi beneficio nostro, non suo iure fiant].54 When the Roman people has enacted 
anything, if it be a matter of that sort, that it appears it may be granted also to 
some other nations, whether joined to us by a treaty, or free to decide themselves 
which law they prefer using, not about our affairs, but about their own; then it 
seems necessary to inquire whether they have adopted and ratified our law, or 
not; but the Senate never intended that those peoples should have the power of 
ratifying or declining to ratify measures which concern our republic, our empire, 
our wars, our victory, and our safety [de nostra vero re publica, de nostro imperio, de 
nostris bellis, de victoria, de salute fundos populos fieri noluerunt].55
Cicero has to explain the concept of fundus fieri in order to support 
Balbus’ claim to citizenship. He argues that Balbus, from Gades in Hispania, 
54 Elmore 1916, 35–6 argues that beneficio nostro, non suo iure fiant means that fundus fieri was 
a privilege granted to foreign states by Rome, perhaps as a result of a petition by the com-
munity. But this cannot be deduced from Cicero’s words; he refers to the individual benefits 
that the allies received.
55 Cic. Balb. 20–2.
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had accepted citizenship from Pompey under the lex Gellia Cornelia of 72 bc. 
The prosecutor argued that Balbus was not a citizen because his hometown 
had not adopted this particular Roman law, that is, had not become fundus 
to it. Against this, Cicero argues that the formal adoption of a Roman law 
was necessary only where the internal affairs of a community were con-
cerned. Furthermore, Rome was free to grant its citizenship to individual 
foreigners as a reward for service. Thus, it is a fundamental Roman right to 
retain or renounce the citizenship: ‘for these are the firmest foundations of 
our freedom, that each man is his own master in retaining or giving up his 
citizenship’.56
Scholars have proposed different theories about whether Roman law 
applied to the Italians. Salmon mentions a number of other second- century 
bc laws that he thinks applied to the allies: the lex Voconia about female 
inheritances, as Cicero mentions in Pro Balbo, the lex Appuleia and lex Furia 
(both de sponsu), and the lex Fannia of 161 and lex Didia of 143, both sump-
tuary laws.57 Harris, on the other hand, convincingly argues that the leges 
Appuleia and Furia probably only applied to Roman citizens in Italy and the 
provinces. The most important argument for this is that both laws were still 
valid in Gaius’ time, so that Gaius’ text cannot be used as evidence to argue 
that it applied to Italian allies before the Social War. Moreover, the use of 
sponsio was restricted to citizens in any case, so that it was not relevant to 
Italian allies before they received citizenship.58 In 161 a sumptuary lex Fannia 
was passed; eighteen years later a lex Didia specified that this also applied to 
Italici.59 If this is true, it would be a very unusual innovation for this period, 
leading us to doubt that Macrobius really meant Italian allies when using 
the term Italici. It is possible that he meant ‘Roman citizens living outside 
of Rome’, since the lex Fannia was concerned with spending during the Ludi 
Romani and other festivals in Rome, so that Romans living outside the city 
could easily use the argument that it did not apply to them.60 Macrobius 
emphasises the difference between town and country, and it is very likely 
that he did not realise that Italians had not held Roman citizenship in the 
second century bc.61
Aulus Gellius states that even though the inhabitants of a community 
were Roman citizens, it was only bound by Roman laws if it became fundus 
56 Cic. Balb. 31: ‘Haec sunt enim fundamenta firmissima nostrae libertatis, sui quemque iuris et 
retinendi et dimittendi esse dominum.’
57 Gai. Inst. 3.121–2: ‘But, as the Lex Furia only applies to Italy, the result is that in the other 
provinces both sponsors and guarantors, like sureties, are perpetually liable; and each one of 
them is bound for the entire amount of the debt, unless they are, to a certain extent, relieved 
by the letter of the Divine Hadrian’, Salmon 1967: 324.
58 Harris 1972: 642.
59 Macr. Sat. 3.17.6.
60 Harris 1972: 644.
61 Idem: 644; Roselaar 2013a.
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of them.62 As Elmore argues, Gellius is wrong: those who had Roman 
citizenship should follow Roman law.63 This means that a community could 
not make itself fundus to the lex Iulia while retaining its own municipal 
laws. Only towns that are foederati or liberi could make themselves fundi, as 
Cicero in fact states.64 Elmore argues that all Latin colonies were fundus of all 
Roman laws, but that they could choose not to follow them in each case.65 
However, Harris argues that those communities that did adopt Roman law 
were mostly Latins, and that Italians did so only rarely.66 There in fact is very 
little evidence about how many Roman laws the Italians, or in fact the Latins, 
adopted. Sherwin- White assumes that the Tabula Bantina is an example of 
fundus fieri and that the community of Bantia had adopted a Roman law, in 
this case the lex Appuleia de maiestate.67 However, if indeed this was a lex de 
maiestate, it could easily be argued that it was part of the laws de nostra vero re 
publica et cetera, which Cicero mentions. Indeed treaties between Rome and 
other communities, whether aequus or iniquus, included a clause to maintain 
the maiestas of the Roman  people –  this was the ‘international’ version of 
fides.68 This law unfortunately therefore cannot be used as an example of 
fundus fieri. Criminal laws were not open to fundus fieri either: ‘crimes com-
mitted in Italy which require a public investigation, such as treason, conspir-
acy, poisoning, and assassination, are under the jurisdiction of the senate’.69
Quite strikingly, Cicero mentions that the Latins and Italians even had the 
right to adopt or reject the terms offered in the lex Iulia. Indeed, as Cicero 
states, if the Roman state wanted to make an allied state benefit from some 
Roman measure, it had to be checked whether it was fundus, because the 
allied state must always retain the possibility to use its own law.70 It is under-
standable that great debate surrounded the lex Iulia in some Italian com-
munities: although we have seen that Roman citizenship could offer many 
advantages, many people would not have been convinced that it was worth 
giving up their independence.
It must be emphasised that there is a difference between being citizens 
with access to the ius civile, and following the Roman system of administra-
tion. All Roman citizens were indeed subject to the ius civile, but not all 
62 Gell. NA 16.13.6: ‘Municipes ergo sunt cives Romani ex municipiis legibus suis et suo iure 
utentes, muneris tantum cum populo Romano honorari participes, a quo munere capes-
sendo appellati videntur, nullis aliis necessitatibus neque ulla populi Romani lege adstricti, 
nisi in quam populus eorum fundus factus est.’
63 Elmore 1916: 37.
64 Hardy 1917: 134.
65 Elmore 1916: 37.
66 Harris 1972: 645, contra Brunt 1965: 101.
67 Sherwin- White 1973: 130.
68 Polyb. 21.32.2; Liv. 38.11.2.
69 Polyb. 6.13.4. See Hardy 1917: 134; Harris 1972: 644–5.
70 Elmore 1916: 38–40.
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Italian communities had the same constitution. The Tabula Heracleensis, a 
municipal charter dated to c. 44 bc, states that:
whoever is or has been commissioned by a law or a plebiscite to give a charter for 
a municipium fundanum, or the citizens of that municipium, whatever supplements, 
amendments, or corrections are made to this charter in the year immediately after 
the people authorise this law shall be binding on the municipium fundanum, as 
they would have been if these had been incorporated by him when first he gave a 
charter on the authority of the law or the plebiscite.71
Some debate has focused on the term municipium fundanum. Municipia were 
usually communities of Roman citizens, which would mean that their inhab-
itants were subject to Roman law in any case.
However, the Tabula Heracleensis suggests that local constitutions dif-
fered from place to place, which is indeed shown by other sources as well. 
For example, the number and character of local magistracies varied in the 
first century: Arpinum had three aediles, for example.72 Bispham reason-
ably argues that the municipia fundana were those communities that had 
made themselves fundi to the lex Iulia, and thus become municipia; but, as 
he rightly points out, there was no immediate need for them to change their 
constitution, as long as they fulfilled their military and other duties towards 
the Roman state.73 It is therefore likely that much variation still existed in the 
laws of the Italian communities after the passage of the lex Iulia, despite the 
fact that all Italians now were Roman citizens, and that only in 44 bc was an 
attempt made to bring them into line. The Tabula Heracleensis also shows 
the autonomy that these communities still held over their own  constitution 
–  when more than a year had passed after their foundation, they would have 
to agree to any changes to their municipal laws.
71 Tab. Her. l. 159–63 (text Crawford 1996): ‘sei qui<d> is post h(anc) l(egem) r(ogatam) in eo 
anno proxumo, quo h(anc) l(egem) populus iuserit, ad eas leges <addiderit commutauerit 
conrexerit>, municipi{ei}s fundanos/ item teneto, utei oporteret, sei ea<e> res ab eo tum, 
quom primum leges eis municipibus lege pl(ebei)ue sc(ito) dedit,/ ad eas leges additae com-
mutatae conrectae essent, neue quis interced<i>to neue quid facito, quo minus/ ea rata sint 
quoue minus municipis fundanos tenea<n>t eisque optemperetur.’
72 Cic. Fam. 15.15.1.
73 Bispham 2007: 166. See Knapp 1980: 30; he argues that the list headed by Fundi, in Festus’ 
list of praefecturae, had led to the creation of the general name municipia fundana to indicate 
all towns that needed a new charter. This is very unlikely: first, there were more towns in 
need of changes in their charters than just the praefecturae listed by Festus; and secondly, 
since the term fundus fieri already existed, it would create confusion if it was now applied to a 
different type of town. Sherwin- White 1973: 167–8 argues that this regulation refers only to 
the municipium of Fundi, but this seems unlikely in a law of general relevance. See Galsterer 
1976: 98.
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6. CONCLUSION
It is clear that law and the expansion of the Roman state went hand in 
hand. As the Roman Republic expanded, it conquered first the whole of 
Italy and then large parts of the Mediterranean. The Romans could not 
simply order their Italian and provincial allies to obey them, but had to 
give them a share in the profits of empire. At first only the Latin colonies 
were given any legal advantages with regard to their political and economic 
position. During the second century bc, however, the Italians became dis-
satisfied with their position, especially because of economic disadvantages. 
The Roman state introduced various new laws in order to satisfy them, but 
without much success. In the end only a grant of Roman citizenship could 
placate their wishes.
Thus, at least after 70 bc, Italians were equal to old Roman citizens, in 
that they could avail themselves of the ius civile. Nevertheless, there are 
indications in Cicero’s work that not all Italians were considered equal by 
the Romans who sat in judgement on their cases. Cicero often had to fight 
against prejudice held about Italians and other allies, arguing that they pos-
sessed the same moral qualities as Romans and should therefore be treated 
equally under the law.
Even if all Italians shared access to the ius civile, this does not mean that all 
Italian communities had the same constitution. They could ‘ratify’ Rome’s 
laws to make them valid locally through the process of fundus fieri. Even 
after the municipal laws of Caesar in 44 bc created more unity in Italian local 
administration, Italian communities retained control over their own laws 
and customs.
As the Roman state continued to expand, the inhabitants of the provinces 
adopted the place that the Italian allies had taken in the hierarchy of peoples. 
As with the Italians earlier, the Roman state acknowledged that these people 
needed a means of protection against Roman abuse. Moreover, if Rome 
wanted to maintain its status as most powerful state in the Mediterranean, 
it had to act against abuse carried out by Roman  magistrates –  otherwise, 
the status of the res publica would be damaged.74 Still, the Romans were not 
ready to give the provincials citizenship. Instead, two important mechanisms 
for existed: treaties and the lex repetundarum; Cicero used both of these many 
times in his speeches for provincial clients. Eventually, these proved insuf-
ficient to really protect the allies, but citizenship for all provincials was long 
in coming.
74 Subacus 2015: 192–3.
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Chapter 10
Jurors, Jurists and Advocates: Law in the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium and De Inventione
Jennifer Hilder
1. INTRODUCTION
For Jill Harries, the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero’s early De 
Inventione, written in the 80s bc, read ‘at times like textbooks on law rather 
than rhetoric’.1 This is surely a reflection of the great emphasis both works 
place on the Judicial type of oratory, to which the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
devotes two books. Law and the legal context are manifest in the examples 
used in these two handbooks written in the 80s bc, giving an insight into the 
practice as well as the theory of legal oratory in this period.
In fact, the two handbooks are a rich source of information for several 
aspects of  trials –  from the jurists who advise on civil law cases to the advo-
cates who speak at trials and the jurors who judge them. In this chapter I 
will explore these three groups of people involved in trials (who may not, 
in reality, be separate individuals) to build a picture of the legal system in 
Cicero’s youth.
The Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero’s De Inventione are often studied 
together, to the detriment of one or other of the texts. As will become appar-
ent, the two texts are significantly different, although this is often not explic-
itly recognised. There is little to gain, therefore, from trying to reason away 
their disagreements. Instead, these points of difference make the picture of 
the Roman Republic richer, emphasising the choices that were available to 
the people involved in the legal world and giving a glimpse of the variety that 
is frequently lacking in the surviving sources.
Despite their differences, the texts are still worth studying together for 
two reasons: their date and their common source. Both texts were almost 
certainly written in the 80s bc before Cicero began his legal career and before 
his earliest surviving speech, Pro Quinctio (81 bc). The commonly agreed 
dating of the Rhetorica ad Herennium falls between 86 and 82 bc.2 The termi-
 1 Harries 2006: 93.
 2 See Caplan 1954 for a brief but valuable introduction to the issues surrounding the text, 
including its authorship and dating. Other major commentaries are Calboli 1969; Achard 
1989.
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nus post quem refers to the death of Marius in 86 bc,3 the latest datable event 
mentioned in the text, and the fact that there is no mention of Sulla’s dicta-
torship is used as evidence for it being written before 82 bc. Although the 
terminus ante quem is less certain, and some scholars have argued for a much 
later date,4 the concentration of examples relating to the late 90s and early 
80s strongly suggests that the work was written around this time.
The De Inventione is also undated but scholars have placed the work in the 
middle of the 80s bc.5 The work was once thought to have been written prior 
to the Social War, but Cicero’s very young age at this time makes it unlikely. 
His own reference to the work as being written when he was puer et adules-
centulus is probably intended to mislead.6 Instead, the work fits into the later 
period of Cicero’s rhetorical and legal education in Rome under figures such 
as Q. Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex and Apollonius Molon of Rhodes.7 Its 
unfinished state, treating only the first of five duties of an orator (inventio), 
may well reflect his growing interest in philosophy or the beginning of his 
legal career.8 Hence the strong likelihood that the two rhetorical handbooks 
were written around the same time and reflect a similar historical and legal 
context; although it cannot be determined which one came first.
The common source of the two works is another important issue in 
understanding the relationship between the Rhetorica ad Herennium and the 
De Inventione. The identical wording of the texts in some places must mean 
that they both used the same written source in Latin.9 It is not known who 
or what this common source might be, but it is clear that either one or both 
authors deviate from it as there are significant structural differences that 
underlie the superficial similarities.10
The deeper structural divergences are particularly important when con-
sidering the legal aspects of the texts as the two authors choose to instruct 
their readers quite differently on the use of legal evidence. For example, the 
anonymous Auctor of the Rhetorica ad Herennium restricts his methods of 
argumentation, the Issues or constitutiones, to three: coniecturalis, legitima, 
 3 Rhet. Her. 4.54.68.
 4 See Douglas 1960, who suggests that the date could be as late as the 50s bc. Henderson 1951: 
73 fn.18 takes 75 bc as the terminus ante quem, the date that a C. Herennius was killed in Spain 
in Sertorius’ army.
 5 See Achard 1994: 6–10.
 6 Cic. De or. 1.2.5.
 7 Cic. Brut. 304–16. On Cicero’s education see Corbeill 2002, 2007.
 8 Negri 2007: 190–1.
 9 See Herbolzheimer 1926 for a detailed comparison of such similarities, for example the iden-
tical definition of inventio at Cic. Inv. rhet.1.7.9 and Rhet. Her. 1.2.3. A common Latin source 
is supported by Marx 1894: 111–33; Herbolzheimer 1926; Adamietz 1960; Achard 1989: 48; 
Achard 1994: 20.
10 Calboli 1972 argues for a strong connection between the Rhet. Her. and the work of M. 
Antonius (cos. 99); see Cic. De or. 1.21.94, 1.47.206, 1.48.208. Others have suggested that 
there were many such rhetorical works being produced at this time; see Calboli 1969: 19–23.
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iuridicialis.11 Two of these are specifically about the law: in a iuridicialis 
constitutio the Auctor explains how to employ the different sources of law, 
and how to beg forgiveness despite breaking the law.12 By contrast, in using 
a legitima constitutio the advocate aims to resolve difficulties with the laws 
themselves, such as whether to follow the letter or the spirit of the law.13
In the De Inventione on the other hand, there are four constitutiones (coniec-
turalis, definitiva, generalis, translativa)14 and a separate section about written 
documents,15 which is parallel to the legitima constitutio of the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium. Cicero chooses to keep the section about legal difficulties iso-
lated from the main method of argumentation.16 One effect of this is that 
Cicero is able to focus more clearly and expansively on these legal aspects 
of a rhetorical argument. In general, the text of the De Inventione is much 
longer than the equivalent books of the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero’s 
tendency to add further details is particularly evident in these legal sections.
These specific discussions of law and legal culture take place in the 
context of the wider discussion of forensic oratory that predominates in the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium and the De Inventione. Both texts devote the major-
ity of the first two books to the Judicial style of speech and give only short 
explanations of inventio for Epideictic and Deliberative speech, which are less 
commonly used in court.17 Despite this focus on forensic oratory, neither 
text makes an explicit distinction between civil or criminal trials, either in 
terms of the rhetorical techniques required or the legal processes involved. 
In this chapter I will also treat both civil and criminal trials, although their 
discussion will largely fall into separate sections.
The two texts can by no means provide a complete picture of the Roman 
legal system in the early first century bc. Indeed, it would be surprising if this 
were the case, given that they are both principally guidebooks on rhetorical 
theory. But by carefully analysing the evidence they do contain, it is possible 
to think further about the people involved in the legal cases: jurists, advo-
cates and jurors. In the first section I will examine the influence that Cicero 
11 Rhet. Her. 1.11.18–5.25.
12 Idem: 2.13.19–7.26.
13 Idem: 2.9.13–2.18.
14 Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.8.10.
15 This section begins at idem: 2.40.116. Cicero explains it (2.39.115): ‘But I have said quite 
enough about the constitutiones, now it seems I must speak about the controversiae that relate 
to written documents’ (Ac de constitutionibus quidem satis dictum est: nunc de iis controversiis, 
quae in scripto versantur, dicendum videtur).
16 Without going into too much detail about the history of rhetorical theory here, Cicero’s 
system follows the division of the mid- second century rhetorician Hermagoras, while the 
Auctor says he is using the three constitutiones of his own teacher, noster doctor (Rhet. Her. 
1.11.18). For the theory of constitutiones see Heath 1994.
17 The Auctor explains this by saying that the Judicial is the most difficult of the three types 
of speech (2.1.1). For Epideictic and Deliberative: Rhet. Her. 3.2.2–8.15; Cic. Inv. rhet. 
2.52.157–9.178.
 Jurors, Jurists and Advocates 169
attributes to the jurists (while the Auctor does not mention them explicitly) 
and the way that this is reflected in the legal cases around inheritance that 
recur in both texts. I will then turn to the role of the advocates in each of the 
texts, and particularly the challenge that the ill- defined law about maiestas 
presented to contemporary figures. Finally, I will look at the way in which 
the jurors or iudices are addressed in examples from both texts, and what 
this reveals about expectations of their legal knowledge and what they would 
respond to.
2. JURISTS
Jurists were legal experts who advised primarily in the field of civil law in 
Rome.18 The juristic tradition can be traced back into the third century but 
Cicero saw a high point in the mid- second century with Sext. Aelius, M’. 
Manilius and P. Mucius Scaevola.19 The next generation included Q. Mucius 
Scaevola the Augur and Q. Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex, who were the 
leading figures immediately prior to and at the time that the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium and the De Inventione were being written. Until Q. Mucius 
Scaevola the Pontifex and his influential work De Iure Civili, the juristic pro-
fession had been closely tied to the pontifices and pontifical law. His work, 
which was also probably written in the 80s bc, is said to have helped to create 
a separate role for the jurists beyond the religious sphere.20 Their role was 
typically described by Cicero as respondere, agere, cavere,21 but it is the first 
of  these –  the giving of responsa –  for which they are perhaps best known. It 
is these responsa that comprise much of the later collected writings on law, 
such as Justinian’s Digest.
Jurists appear twice in Cicero’s De Inventione and both references attest 
to the importance and involvement of the jurists in the field of ius civile, 
civil law. The examples that Cicero uses alongside these references can help 
to further understand where and how jurists participate in the wider legal 
system. Although jurists are not mentioned by the Auctor in the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, a number of similar examples imply that jurists must also figure 
in his conception of the Roman courts, as I will discuss below. Elsewhere, 
although I will not discuss this in detail here, the Auctor’s assumptions about 
his audience’s legal knowledge imply that they would either have received a 
18 See Frier 1985 and Harries 2006 for the two major discussions of the jurists; see also Watson 
1974: 101–10. For an overview of Cicero’s attitude to jurists in his writings, see Harries 2013: 
107–12. For Cicero and the law generally, see Harries 2004; Gildenhard 2011: 168–95.
19 Cic. De or. 1.48.212.
20 Harries 2006: 13–14, 19.
21 Cic. De or. 1.48.212. For the different roles of jurists, see Frier 1985: esp. 139–96; Harries 
2006: esp. 27–50. Bauman’s discussion of Q. Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex is a good case 
study of the range of roles such a figure could play: 1983: 340–424. On where and how jurists 
were consulted, see Tuori 2010. Cicero refers to different juristic specialisms at Balb. 45.
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level of legal education from jurists or that jurists were widely available for 
consultation on legal matters.22
The references that Cicero makes to jurists in the De Inventione (iure 
consulti, iuris consulti) occur when he is discussing the negotialis (Legal) sub-
division of the constitutio generalis (Qualitative issue).23 As opposed to the 
constitutio coniecturalis, where the dispute is about what actually happened, in 
this Issue the advocates debate what kind of thing happened (qualis res) and 
whether it qualifies as being against the law.24 As recommended in the nego-
tialis subdivision, one way of doing this is to look at the law itself, or perhaps 
more specifically, what the law is according to the custom of the community 
(civilis mos) and equity (aequitas).25 As Cicero says explicitly, the type of law 
that is under consideration in this Issue is the ius civile.26
When introducing the negotialis subdivision in Book 1, Cicero states 
that the people who have command over the way in which mos and aequi-
tas are interpreted are the jurists themselves (cui diligentiae praeesse . . . iure 
consulti).27 As mentioned, the remit of the jurists is clearly specified as being 
ius civile and they are given the full responsibility for this, at least in Rome 
(apud nos). The task that Cicero is assigning to the jurists here, essentially 
that of deciding quid iuris, is no small one. Although the Auctor does not 
mention the jurists in the parallel section of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, he 
does give this Issue equal significance, saying that it should be used to argue 
‘whether a thing was done legally’ (iurene sit factum).28 When each text goes 
into further detail about this Issue in its second book, the list of the six parts 
of ius that follows demonstrates the incredible scope of topics that the jurists 
assisted with. The references to laws from the Twelve Tables in this section 
also provide a further connection to the jurists; I discuss these further below.
Cicero’s second reference to the jurists comes at the end of his extended 
discussion of the same negotialis subdivision in his second book.29 Here he 
says that it is a commonplace in arguing this kind of case to speak either for 
or against the authority of a jurist (ab auctoritate iuris consultorum et contra 
auctoritatem).30 This is particularly interesting, because Cicero precedes 
this by saying that it is impossible to suggest any other definite topics or 
common places (certi . . . loci) for this issue. The frequent presence of the 
22 For example, the Auctor’s discussion of translatio at Rhet. Her. 1.10.18.
23 This is part of the absoluta subdivision within the iuridicialis constitutio in the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium: 1.14.24, 2.13.19–20.
24 Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.8.10.
25 Idem: 1.11.14.
26 Idem:. 2.22.68. For the Roman distinction between ius civile and ius publicum, see for example 
Harries 2006: 59–66. Cic. Top. 28.
27 Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.11.14.
28 Rhet. Her. 2.13.19.
29 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.21.61–22.68.
30 Idem: 2.22.68.
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jurists is one of the only things his reader can be sure of. Cicero’s reluctance 
or inability to propose any specific commonplaces also gives the impression 
that this is somehow a different kind of case. It prompts Cicero to remind his 
reader to look out for other loci communes arising from the case itself (ipsa res 
. . . ostendat); it was necessary for the advocate to respond directly to a par-
ticular argument being made on the basis of the jurist’s advice, and the way 
for them to do this could not be predicted in general terms. The advocates’ 
interaction with the jurists when attending such a case is implicit.31
With this in mind, it is useful to examine the example that Cicero has 
chosen to explain the negotialis issue as a whole:32
Quidam pupillum heredem fecit; pupillus autem ante mortuus est, quam in suam 
tutelam venit. De hereditate ea quae pupillo venit, inter eos qui patris pupilli 
heredes secundi sunt et inter agnatos pupilli controversia est.
A certain man made a ward his heir; however the ward died before he came of age. 
A dispute arose about the inheritance the ward came into between those who were 
the reversionary heirs of the ward’s father and the agnates of the ward.
The example goes on to discuss the arguments on either side, which are 
based on whether or not the father’s will was also the ward’s will as long as 
he was a minor.33 The need for jurists in a case such as this is clear: as the 
writers of wills (as expressed by cavere), jurists would be well placed to advise 
on such topics and their auctoritas would be valuable.
Significantly, this example is very similar to an example of ‘letter versus 
spirit’ that Cicero gives in his later discussion of written documents, which 
describes the case known to modern scholars as the causa Curiana.34 This 
was another case involving inheritance and a dispute between the reversion-
ary heirs and the agnates that took place in 92 bc, just a few years before the 
two rhetorical handbooks were written:35
Paterfamilias cum liberorum haberet nihil, uxorem autem haberet, in testamento 
ita scripsit: si mihi filius genitur unus pluresve, is mihi heres esto. Deinde quae 
assolent. Postea: si filius ante moritur, quam in tutelam suam venerit, tum mihi, 
dicet, heres esto. Filius natus non est. Ambigunt adgnati cum eo, qui est heres, si 
filius ante, quam in tutelam veniat, mortuus sit.
31 Harries discusses the overlap and tension between advocates and jurists: 2006: 92–100, 114.
32 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.21.62.
33 This may or may not have originated in a real case; it is quite usual for Cicero to anonymise 
the examples he uses in the De Inventione, see Harries 2006:107.
34 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.42.122. Other references to the case appear in Cic. De or. 1.39.180, 1.57.242–
5, 2.6.24, 2.32.140–1, 2.54.220–3; Brut. 39.144–6, 52.194–53.199; Top. 10.44; Caecin. 18.52–
3, 67–70; Quint. Inst. 7.6.9–10. See Vaughn 1985 for a comprehensive overview and further 
references.
35 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.42.122.
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A head of a household, when he had no children, but he had a wife, wrote this in 
his will: if I have one or more sons, let him be my heir. Then the usual phrases. 
Afterwards: if the son dies before he comes of age, then let so- and-so be my heir. 
A son was not born. The next of kin disputed with the man who was heir if the 
son died before he came of age.
The structural resemblance between this and the previous example already 
suggests that there must have been a similar need for jurists in the case, but 
in fact the advocates involved make this even clearer. Cicero describes the 
two men, L. Licinius Crassus and Q. Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex, as the 
most learned in law of the eloquent men and the most eloquent of the men 
learned in law respectively.36 Crassus spoke in favour of Manius Curius, 
the reversionary heir, by arguing for the spirit of the law and Scaevola was 
the advocate for the next of kin, Coponius, arguing that the letter of the law 
should be prioritised.37 Although Crassus’ argument was more persuasive 
for the jury on this occasion, Scaevola’s contribution to the case confirms 
the active role that jurists could play in legal trials.
Cicero’s personal connection to the two advocates, who were both his 
mentor at one time, may explain why he chooses to use this example of the 
causa Curiana as well as the previous inheritance case despite their similar-
ity. But his use of this example may also reflect a broader tendency of both 
rhetorical handbooks to repeatedly use cases of inheritance.
One instance of this occurs in the lists of the six parts of ius that both 
authors give to illustrate the negotialis/absoluta Issues discussed above. In 
fact, Cicero and the Auctor use the same two examples of problematic inher-
itance cases, which may mean that the examples come from the common 
source that the texts share. The first example demonstrates a case of ambigu-
ity, when the will specifies that the heir should give his mother certain silver 
vessels ‘as they wish’ (quae volet), but doesn’t say who is to do the choosing.38 
The dispute arises between a son and a mother, each claiming the right to 
choose. The wording of the example in each of the two texts is very similar.
The second example is an example of reasoning by analogy.39 The authors 
list a series of relevant laws (leges) before describing an actual situation in 
further detail. In this case, a condemned man made a will and the question 
is whether the will is valid or not. The three laws that are cited by both 
36 Cic. Brut. 39.145. Although Cicero separates the two men here into different specialisms, it 
should be remembered that they were colleagues in magistracies for most of their careers, 
and indeed had been consuls together only a few years previously in 95 bc. On Scaevola’s 
career, see for example Balsdon 1937; Bauman 1983; Kallet- Marx 1989, 1990.
37 Cic. Brut. 193–9; see Vaughn 1985. As Vaughn argues, Scaevola followed the theoretical 
advice of the Rhetorica ad Herennium in structuring his argument: 1985: 215.
38 Rhet. Her. 1.12.20; Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.40.116.
39 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.50.149, cf. 2.41.120; Rhet. Her. 1.13.23.
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authors can be securely attributed to the fifth book of the Twelve Tables.40 
The Auctor gives the name of the individual involved, Malleolus, and both 
authors explain that he had been convicted of murdering his mother, made 
a will, and was thrown in a sack to be drowned in the river. Livy’s epitoma-
tor confirms that this was a real case from 101 bc.41 As mentioned above, 
the reference to the Twelve Tables connects this discussion to the jurists, 
including Scaevola, whose work De Iure Civili was a somewhat traditional 
commentary on the ancient statutes.42 Cicero’s decision not to include the 
name of Malleolus, just as he did not refer to any names in the causa Curiana, 
may show the additional influence of the juristic hypothetical case on his 
writing.43
Why are these examples significant? The prevalence of such examples, 
many of which I have not discussed here for reasons of space,44 must be 
a reflection of the frequency of such cases in the Roman civil law courts. 
Their use in the rhetorical handbooks also suggests that they place particular 
demands on the advocates taking part. From the context of the first unknown 
inheritance case that I discussed within Cicero’s work and its subject matter, 
it is clear that the responsa of jurists were involved. In the case of the causa 
Curiana, this involvement deepened to include the jurist Scaevola directly 
as an advocate. In the examples of the silver vessels and Malleolus’ will, 
the advice of jurists must also have played an important role in shaping the 
arguments of the advocates on either side. For this reason, these and the 
many other examples of inheritance in the two rhetorical handbooks serve 
as evidence for the supporting role played by jurists in many Roman trials.
The references that Cicero makes to the jurists acknowledge their promi-
nent and essential role in the field of civil law from an advocate’s point of 
view. It is no coincidence that Cicero uses the example of inheritance to 
illustrate the domain over which they have such mastery: the frequent inter-
vention of the jurists’ expert advice about these cases must be assumed. The 
recurrence of these examples touching on inheritance in both texts may in 
fact reflect a discussion sparked by the causa Curiana about its significance. 
Yet it may also simply be a sign of how frequently this issue arose in the 
40 Twelve Tables 5.7a (‘Si furiosus est, agnatum gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque eius potestas 
esto’); Twelve Tables 5.3 (‘Paterfamilias uti super familia pecuniaque sui legassit, ita ius 
esto’); Twelve Tables 5.4–5 (‘Si paterfamilias intestato moritur, familia pecuniaque eius 
agnatum gentiliumque esto’). The Auctor also gives one further law, which cannot be 
securely attributed to the Twelve Tables but may derive from there.
41 Livy Per. 68.
42 Harries 2006: 43: the commentary may have been ‘both traditionalist and revolutionary’. See 
Watson’s reconstruction: 1974: 143–4.
43 For Scaevola and the hypothetical case, see Frier 1985: 166–9; Harries 2006: 105–8.
44 Examples that mention inheritance but I do not discuss here are: Rhet. Her. 2.13.19, 2.21.33, 
3.20.33, 4.23.33, 4.29.40, 4.38.50, 4.40.52, 4.53.67; Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.45.84, 1.48.89, 2.21.62, 
2.40.118.
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Roman courts. In either case, the position of the jurists at this time seems to 
be assured.
3. ADVOCATES
Unsurprisingly, advocates are not as hard to locate in the two rhetorical 
handbooks as the jurists in the previous section; the orator of the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium and the De Inventione are both implicitly situated in the law 
courts for much of the time. They are also shown using the law explicitly 
in several locations. The anonymous Auctor of the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
comes back to the case of maiestas three times in the work, a reflection of the 
difficulties arising from new legislation. Yet the Auctor shows how a case 
involving maiestas can be argued from both sides, presenting an opportunity 
for the advocate to reframe the law.
The role of advocates in a Roman court is best introduced by the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium itself. In the fourth book of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, the 
Auctor gives an example addressed to the judge L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla, 
known for his strictness and severity:45
Accusatoris officium est inferre crimina; defensoris diluere et propulsare; testis 
dicere quae sciat aut audierit; quaesitoris est unum quemque horum in officio 
suo continere. Quare, L. Cassi, si testem praeterquam quod sciat aut audierit 
argumentari et coniectura prosequi patieris, ius accusatoris cum iure testimonii 
commiscebis, testis inprobi cupiditatem confirmabis, reo duplicem defensionem 
parabis.
It is the duty of the prosecutor to bring the charges; of the defence counsel to 
explain and oppose them; of the witness to say what they know or what they have 
heard; of the court official to keep each one of these to their duty. Therefore, 
Lucius Cassius, if you allow the witness to describe more than what they know 
or have heard using arguments and conjectures, then you will confuse the right 
to prosecute with the right to give evidence, you will encourage the ambition of a 
dishonest witness, and you will prepare a double defence for the defendant.
This is an example of distributio, assigning roles to people or things. The 
Auctor praises this rhetorical technique and the reference to Cassius 
Longinus gives it grounding in a recognisable (and datable) Roman context. 
It clearly describes the ideal role of the two advocates, the role of the court 
official (quaesitor), and the witnesses. The prosecutor (accusator) brings the 
charges, makes arguments and attacks the opposition with conjectures, while 
the defence (defensor) explains and rebuts them.
45 Rhet. Her. 4.37.47. See Cic. Rosc. Am. 84–5; Brut. 97; Asc. Mil. 34C for Longinus’ reputa-
tion. It may be Crassus speaking here or another defendant at the trials for corruption of the 
Vestal Virgins in 114/3.
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This example is intended to make the process sound simple, but the 
reality is more complicated. As seen in the section above, an advocate in a 
civil trial would have to take into account the arguments of the jurists, as well 
as the disposition of the judge. In a criminal trial too, as I discuss in the next 
section, the advocate would have to assess his audience of iudices to pitch his 
argument in the most persuasive terms.46
But while these factors were obviously important, an additional con-
sideration for advocates recurs throughout the texts, and that is the laws 
themselves.47 The Rhetorica ad Herennium and the De Inventione both point to 
a very contemporary issue with one particular, new law: the lex Appuleia de 
maiestate. In full, this law about maiestas (sometimes translated as ‘treason’ 
or lèse majesté) was intended to protect against maiestas populi Romani minuta, 
‘damage to the dignity of the Roman people’.48 The law was passed by 
L. Appuleius Saturninus, the tribune of 103/100.49
The issue of maiestas recurs throughout the two handbooks in much the 
same way that inheritance does, both as the central focus of examples and 
also incidentally as the background to examples. The main figure linked with 
maiestas in the Rhetorica ad Herennium is Q. Servilius Caepio; his alleged 
offence in obstructing Saturninus’ attempt to pass a grain law is described 
early in Book 1.50 The Auctor’s decision to use this particular occurrence 
of (potential) maiestas is significant because the offence involved Saturninus, 
who had passed the law de maiestate. By using this incident to illustrate 
maiestas the Auctor draws a direct line for future advocates between 
Saturninus’ legislation and the actions of Caepio, an exemplary justification 
for Saturninus’ maiestas law.
The key information for the reader comes afterwards: the Auctor explains 
that this example illustrates definitio because ‘the term itself is defined when 
it is examined what “damaging maiestas” is’.51 This highlights the scope that 
the advocate had to determine exactly what maiestas was in terms that were 
favourable to their client’s situation. Maiestas was a subjective term and 
Saturninus’ law clearly allowed for some manipulation.52 As this suggests, 
46 See also Alexander for the differences between the role of a prosecutor and defence counsel: 
2002: 1–54, esp. 8–15. See for example the specific advice given to the prosecutor or defence 
counsel for a narratio in Rhet. Her. (2.2.3) or the loci communes for the coniecturalis constitutio 
in Inv. Rhet. (2.16.51). Also found in Quint. Inst. 5.13.2–3; Cic. Rosc. Am. 56–7.
47 See Burnand’s comments on Cic. Clu. 146–7, 155: 2000: 116–21.
48 Fantham 2004: 34. See Bauman 1970 for a full overview of the history and significance of the 
charge.
49 Cic. De or. 2.25.107, 49.201.
50 Rhet. Her. 1.12.21. Saturninus is mentioned twice more in the Rhetorica ad Herennium: 
4.22.31, 4.54.67.
51 1.12.21: ‘vocabulum enim definitur ipsum cum quaeritur quid sit minuere maiestatem.’
52 Fantham 2004: 122 (see also 123–30). Seager 2001 uses D. 48.4.7.3, 48.4.4 pr. to argue that 
some specific examples of improper conduct may have been included in the law, although 
seditio would not have been. Harries discusses the acknowledged limitations of written law 
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the advocate’s own interpretation of ‘damaging maiestas’ could prove crucial 
in winning or losing the case.
In Book 2, the Auctor illustrates for the reader the way in which an advo-
cate could construct his interpretation or definition when faced with this 
type of cause. He gives two examples that define maiestas in different ways, 
using the same phrase of amplitudo civitatis but reappropriating the meaning 
to suit opposing perspectives.53 In this way, the Auctor illustrates for the 
future advocate how to speak on either side of such a case. The two examples 
represent fragments of the prosecution and defence in Caepio’s trial, with 
the defence example given in the first person.54
In the first definition, the prosecutor argues that maiestas is diminished 
when the things that make up the civitatis amplitudo, ‘greatness of the state’, 
are taken away. According to him, these are suffragia, magistratus: the right 
to vote and the magistracies. These two things are political and they relate 
to the people’s involvement in the state and their protection by it. In the 
contrasting definition, the defence claims to have guarded the treasury and 
opposed the desires of evil people in order to prevent the state’s decline.55 
Here the focus is on the economic stability and moral rectitude of the state. 
These definitions provide the crux of either argument, containing themes 
that could be expanded persuasively throughout the remainder of the speech 
to convince the audience that this interpretation was the most important 
one. The Auctor makes it clear that each phrase can be construed in various 
ways and hence demonstrates the options available for an advocate defend-
ing or prosecuting in a maiestas trial.
The similarity of the approach in De Inventione suggests that was a widely 
recognised approach, at least in the quaestio de maiestate. In Cicero’s text 
maiestas is used to illustrate the technique of definitio once again, although the 
example that Cicero chooses is one from much earlier in Republican  history 
–  the case of C. Flaminius being removed from the rostrum by his father when 
he was tribune of the plebs in 232 bc.56
more generally: 2004: 156–7. Sulla’s lex Cornelia de maiestate did not succeed in clarifying the 
law satisfactorily, according to Cicero: Part or. 105; cf. Lintott 1968: 118.
53 2.12.17: ‘Maiestatem is minuit, qui ea tollit, ex quibus rebus civitatis amplitudo constat. 
Quae sunt ea, Q. Caepio? Suffragia, magistratus. Nempe igitur tu et populum suffragio et 
magistratum consilio privasti, cum pontes disturbasti.’
54 Caepio’s defence advocate was L. Licinius Crassus and the prosecutor was T. Betutius 
Barrus. It is not known whether Caepio did speak in his own defence either at his trial or on 
another public occasion, or whether the example represents an imagined speech act. See Cic. 
Brut. 169; Alexander 1990: fn.88.
55 2.12.17: ‘Maiestatem is minuit, qui amplitudinem civitatis detrimento <adficit. Ego non 
adfeci, sed prohibui detrimento:> aerarium enim conservavi, libidini malorum restiti, 
maiestatem omnem interire non passus sum.’ The bracketed section is omitted by some 
manuscripts, but has been included by editors from Marx onwards. The sense of the frag-
ment in contrast with the former is nevertheless clear for the purposes of this discussion.
56 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.27.52.
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The term amplitudo appears again in Cicero’s opposing definitions for 
maiestas, but the emphasis has shifted towards the significance of the term 
potestas instead.57 This suggests that Saturninus’ maiestas law had left yet 
another avenue of debate open to be taken advantage of by advocates. 
Despite the different focus, Cicero’s two opposing definitions follow quite 
similar themes to those found in the Rhetorica ad Herennium. One fore-
grounds the potestas of the people and the elected magistrates, while the other 
gives priority to the unlawful potestas of those who have not been elected, 
perhaps equivalent to the libido malorum in the Rhetorica ad Herennium.
The concern with defining and using maiestas continues in several other 
examples from both texts that refer to the offence directly or indirectly.58 
For example, the Auctor and Cicero mention the defeat of L. Popilius by 
the Gauls in 107 and say explicitly that he was brought to trial for maiestas.59 
Cicero uses the Popilius example while discussing the Qualitative (generalis) 
issue, but he acknowledges that the action could also be prosecuted using 
one of two Conjectural (coniecturalis) arguments. This recognition, that there 
were several possible methods of argument for the same maiestas case, is a 
particularly interesting aspect of Cicero’s presentation. In a very pragmatic 
way, it is a further confirmation that the topic of maiestas was not straightfor-
ward but presented advocates with a choice.
The same debate about the right approach for advocates is also explored 
in Cicero’s much later work, De Oratore. Although written around 55 bc, 
the text is set in 91 bc and includes several key figures from maiestas trials in 
the 90s,60 including Crassus who spoke on behalf of Caepio, as mentioned 
above. Cicero also gives voice to the characters of M. Antonius and Ser. 
Sulpicius Rufus who were defence counsel and prosecutor respectively for a 
parallel maiestas case involving C. Norbanus.61
In this latter case, Cicero has Antonius explain that the whole case (tota 
illa causa) rested on the way that he and Sulpicius interpreted maiestas in 
the lex Appuleia.62 Although Antonius claims that neither of the advocates 
gave a strict definition of maiestas, which would be vulnerable to attack, he 
does later give the same sort of description that is found in the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium and the De Inventione.63
57 Idem: 2.27.53, 2.28.55.
58 The Auctor gives another definition of maiestas in Book 4 (4.26.35; alongside iniuria, fortitudo 
and diligentia) where he discusses definitio as a rhetorical technique. The Auctor’s example 
of the style at the beginning of Book 4 (4.9.13) is also thought to represent part of L. Varius’ 
speech in favour of his own lex Varia de maiestate during the Social War; see Caplan 1954: ad 
loc. See Gruen 1965; Seager 1967 for the lex Varia.
59 Rhet. Her. 1.15.25, 4.24.34; Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.24.72.
60 For the importance of trials in the 90s, see Gruen 1966, 1968.
61 Cic. De or. 2.25.107–9, 47.197–50.202. Cf. Badian 1957, 1983.
62 Cic. De or. 2.25.107. See Fantham 2004: 122.
63 Cic. De or. 2.39.164.
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Si maiestas est amplitudo ac dignitas civitatis, is eam minuit, qui exercitum hosti-
bus populi Romani tradidit, non qui eum, qui id fecisset, populi Romani potestati 
tradidit.
If maiestas is the greatness and the dignity of the state, then it is lessened by the 
man who hands over the army of the Roman people to the enemy and not by the 
man who brings the one that did it to the authority of the Roman people.
Antonius here sets up the contrast between the severity of what Caepio did 
and what Norbanus did. To do this, he again uses the key words amplitudo 
. . . civitatis and potestas, which were found in Cicero and the Auctor’s defi-
nitions.64 These seem to be the key terms that an advocate would have to 
think about and prepare his response to. The slight differences within each 
text show how each pair of advocates could redefine the terms for their own 
individual cases.
An advocate in the early first century bc would face many challenges, but 
the focus on maiestas that I have discussed in this section shows one par-
ticular aspect of an advocate’s role that both Cicero and the Auctor found 
important. The ability of the prosecutor to bring the charges and the defence 
counsel to rebut them were both significantly impaired by the ambiguity 
of the definition of maiestas, which could leave even the most convincing 
arguments vulnerable. However, both authors take the opportunity to 
quote both sides of the argument and thereby give their readers the skills 
necessary to take advantage of such a scenario. For a would- be advocate, this 
could be a chance to practise arguing on both sides of a case. For historians, 
this evidence shows how advocates in the Roman Republic were able to re- 
appropriate language like amplitudo and adapt definitions in order to succeed 
in court.
4. JURORS
On the receiving end of these definitions were the jurors, iudices. In a civil 
trial there would typically be a single judge (unus iudex) who was appointed 
by the urban praetor.65 The causa Curiana was a slightly different type of 
civil case that was heard by a group of iudices called the Centumviri.66 In a 
criminal trial, the board of iudices was drawn from a list that would be set 
annually by the praetor.67 The individuals involved in either type of case 
64 See Hellegouarc’h 1963: 314–20 for the political significance of maiestas and its connection 
with the term amplitudo.
65 Kelly 1976: 112–33.
66 Cic. Brut. 144. For more on legal procedure see Lintott 2004; Metzger 2010.
67 As stipulated in the lex repetundarum, 123/2 bc: Crawford 1996: fn.1 ll.15–26. See also Frier 
1985: 199–201 for the normal process of selecting iudices and the different procedure for 
selecting recuperatores; Harries 2006: 15. See Cicero’s discussion in Planc. 62.
 Jurors, Jurists and Advocates 179
were likely to have a similar background, in that they were all members of 
the Roman elite, highly educated and relatively wealthy. However there was 
an ongoing debate about whether equestrians or senators (or both) should 
staff the criminal courts, the quaestiones.68 The situation went back and forth 
in the thirty years between Gaius Gracchus’ controversial legislation and the 
writing of the two handbooks, but in 87 the lex Plautia was passed, resulting 
in mixed juries.69
Jurors, the iudices, are mentioned in sixteen examples from the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium and seven examples from the De Inventione.70 The iudices are 
addressed in the form of an apostrophe, usually towards the beginning of an 
example. If these examples do come from real speeches, then the plural form 
of iudex means that it is likely these jurors are addressed as part of a quaestio 
in criminal law.71 This is important because it provides a context in which the 
role of the iudices can be assessed. I will study the way they are addressed and 
the assumptions made about what is persuasive in that context. However, as 
I will show in this section, there are important differences in the realism and 
approach of the examples chosen by the Auctor and Cicero that employ this 
rhetorical device.
Neither author intends these disparate examples to be representative of 
the iudices; each of them is used to illustrate different techniques at different 
points of the text. In the Rhetorica ad Herennium all but one of the examples 
comes from the final book, where the Auctor gives positive recommenda-
tions about style. The single negative example in the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
is matched by two consecutive examples in the De Inventione that illustrate 
the faulty techniques of a commune or vulgare argument. But despite the 
rather accidental nature of these two groups, there are common themes 
running through the examples that reference the iudices in each work.
In the Rhetorica ad Herennium, the examples addressing the iudices tend to 
use pathos rather than legal argument (logos), arousing fear in the audience 
through a variety of techniques.72 By contrast, Cicero in De Inventione uses 
examples from non- Roman contexts, which mostly refer explicitly to the use 
of the law. Cicero also devotes a long passage to the applicability and utility 
of laws to the iudices themselves.73
A typical example in the Rhetorica ad Herennium addressing the iudices will 
68 For a brief treatment of the various changes, see Suárez Piñeiro 2000. See also Weinrib 1970; 
Griffin 1973.
69 Asc. Corn. 79C. Suárez Piñeiro 2000: 264–5.
70 Rhet. Her. 2.21.34, 4.8.12, 4.9.13, 4.21.29, 4.24.33, 4.31.42, 4.35.47, 4.36.48, 4.37.49, 4.38.50, 
4.39.51 (x3), 4.40.53–41.53, 4.49.63, 4.50.63–51.64; Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.33.56, 1.39.68, 1.39.70, 
1.48.90 (x2), 1.52.100, 2.43.104.
71 The term does not appear in Cic. Quinct., Q Rosc., Tull., Caecin.
72 See Wisse 1989: 77–104 for ethos and pathos in the rhetorical handbooks.
73 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.45.131–2.
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attempt to persuade the jurors by emphasising and exaggerating the negative 
consequences that would result from making the wrong decision:74
Quodsi istum, iudices, vestris sententiis liberaveritis, statim, sicut e cavea leo 
emissus aut aliqua taeterrima belua soluta ex catenis, volitabit et vagabitur in foro 
. . . Quare, iudices, eicite eum de civitate, liberate omnes formidine; vobis denique 
ipsis consulite.
But if, men of the jury, you set that man free with your verdicts he will swoop and 
skulk around the forum at once like a lion let out of its cage or another terrible 
wild beast released from its chains . . . Therefore, men of the jury, throw him out 
of the city, free everyone from fear, and finally, consider yourselves.
This example illustrates Vivid Description (descriptio) and, indeed, seems 
to do so very successfully. The advocate addresses the iudices directly to 
reinforce and awaken them to the connection between their votes and the 
potential threat of the defendant. He describes at length the terrible actions 
that the free man could undertake, and then encourages them to make their 
judgement on the basis of this knowledge for the sake of the state, all the citi-
zens and themselves. Two other examples for Vivid Description also address 
the iudices and use a similar combination of threats and encouragement to 
attempt to persuade them,75 while the Auctor’s examples of the Grand and 
Middle styles of speech also take place in this context.76
The personal threat that is hinted at the very end of the example is also 
taken up elsewhere. An example of licentia, Frankness of Speech, berates the 
iudices for failing to pass judgement on the defendant in the first hearing of 
the trial.77 The speaker says that the iudices have themselves suffered ‘very 
great misfortunes, both private and public’ (maximae publicae et privatae 
calamitationes) and that many more (maiores) threaten them. The misfortunes 
are not specified, and the speaker may have left the details purposefully 
vague for greater effect. Yet even if this is another exaggeration, it gives the 
responsibility implied in the above example a sense of reality, and shows 
how the job of a iudex could be an unpleasant and burdensome one.
It is not certain whether some, all or none of these examples originate in a 
real Roman quaestio. At the beginning of this fourth book, the Auctor makes 
a strong case for writing his own examples throughout the work, but this 
does not seem to always be the case.78 Commentators on the ad Herennium 
have previously identified influences on some of these examples addressed to 
74 Rhet. Her. 4.39.51.
75 Also at Rhet. Her. 4.39.51.
76 Idem: 4.8.11–9.13.
77 Idem: 4.36.48.
78 This has been discussed by many scholars, see Marx 1894: 114–18; Caplan 1954: 31–2; 
Barwick 1961: 300–14; Calboli 1969: 42–6; Ungern- Sternberg 1973: 149–52; Adamik 1998: 
271.
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iudices such as Demosthenes, Plautus and possibly also Varius, who passed 
the lex Varia during the Social War.79 It seems unlikely that the Auctor 
would have wholly invented a lengthy 438- word character description of a 
poor man said to have been involved in an elaborate pretence.80 There are 
other details too that locate these examples within a Roman context, such 
as mentions of the senate and the equestrian order, as well as references to 
the Roman people and the forum.81 Wherever these examples come from, 
then, they have at least been adapted to fit the context of a Roman quaestio. 
In order to be appropriate and useful teaching tools, they must be intended 
to resemble the kinds of speech that might be found there. Hence they are 
useful evidence of the kinds of addresses to the iudices that the Auctor con-
siders successful in the legal context of a quaestio.
Reading the Rhetorica ad Herennium, then, gives an impression of a quaestio 
environment that functions primarily through the use of emotional appeals 
and is staffed by a board of iudices who respond best to this approach. To 
some extent, this presentation of the quaestio system makes sense in the 
Roman context as it is understood by modern scholarship. Iudices are not 
chosen for their legal knowledge or expertise, although as members of the 
elite (either equestrians or senators) they would have had some legal educa-
tion. In the quaestiones, too, the jurists did not play a major role in advising 
or supporting legal interpretation. Hence emotional appeals and general 
themes may have been more understandable to this audience.82
And yet, the iudices addressed in Cicero’s examples in the De Inventione 
are quite different. One explanation for this might be that it is much less 
clear that the iudices Cicero refers to are meant to resemble iudices from a 
Roman quaestio, unlike those in the Rhetorica ad Herennium. The three most 
substantial passages come from Book 1 and describe an argument with five, 
four or three parts. While many of the points are of a general nature and 
discuss the res publica in a familiar way, the specifics relate to Thebes and the 
general Epaminondas.83 Cicero also glosses one of the examples, ending with 
‘For what more do you want, iudices, when this and this [hoc et hoc] have been 
made clear to you?’84 Cicero supplies only the information that is relevant to 
the example itself, which illustrates a method of summing up in the conclu-
sion. Although understandable, this is a contrast to the Auctor’s tendency to 
make his examples sound as authentic as possible.
Nevertheless, as in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, it ought to be true that 
79 See Caplan 1954: ad loc. 4.9.13 (Varius), 4.22.33 (Demosthenes), 4.50.63–51.64 (Plautus).
80 Rhet. Her. 4.50.63–51.64.
81 See e.g. 4.9.13 for populi Romani, 4.35.47 for senatus and locus equester, 4.39.51 for in foro.
82 As discussed by Harries 2004: 149. See also Riggsby 1997, 2004 for the relevance of non- legal 
arguments.
83 Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.33.56, 1.38.68, 1.39.70.
84 Idem: 1.52.100.
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Cicero’s examples are intended to serve as models for the reader, and the 
arguments contained within them are relevant for persuading Roman iudices 
too. Indeed, as proof of this, Cicero makes much the same arguments in 
Book 2 in his authorial voice.
The discussion relates to the argument between the letter and the spirit 
of the law. Two of the three Theban examples argue in favour of the letter 
of the law, that is, that the way that the law is written should be interpreted 
literally. The examples explicitly refer to the legal knowledge of the iudices 
and the relevance of the laws to the iudices personally. In the first example 
the speaker says:
Quod ergo ascribi ad legem nefas est, id sequi, quasi ascriptum sit, rectum vobis 
videatur? Novi vestram intellegentiam; non potest ita videri, iudices.85
Therefore, would it seem right to you that something was done as if it had been 
added to law, which it is illegal to add to the law? I know your intelligence; it 
cannot seem right to you, iudices.
The intellegentia of the iudices surrounding the laws is also relied upon in 
the third example. The speaker argues that the iudices must obey the laws, 
but in order to do so they must follow what has been written there. If they 
themselves are reliant on and bound by the written word of the law, then it 
is obvious that the defendant ought to be too.
Cicero picks up on this idea when he returns to explain the arguments 
based on letter and spirit in Book 2 (rather than how to piece together an 
argument, which is the focus of the examples above).86 Among other argu-
ments that can be made in favour of the letter of the law, including the 
reading out of exceptiones from other laws to prove that they can be written 
in if necessary, Cicero comes back to the iudices’ own reliance on the law. 
The iudices need laws to base their judgements on, and to justify their actions 
to others afterwards. The iudices are bound by many annoying details of the 
law (obstricti in tantis molestiis) and, therefore, why should others not be too?
The idea that the iudices should consider the law is made explicit in these 
sections of the De Inventione. Cicero’s use of this topic to illustrate how argu-
ments can be formed and adapted suggests that this was a clear- cut argument 
in itself, a relatively straightforward proposition that could be made (or had 
been made) in different ways. When Cicero goes into greater detail in Book 
2, he provides an argument that counters the points above by also appealing 
to the experience of the iudices: the writer of the law knew the kind of men 
who would be judging the case, not stupid or foreign ones, and not simple 
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Cicero’s glossed example, mentioned above, also places the iudices in the 
position of interpreting and understanding the law. In this case, the speaker 
asks the iudices ‘What if the laws could speak? Would they not ask you these 
things?’88 The iudices must listen to the laws, which the speaker connects 
directly to their argument and the outcome of the case as a whole.
In Cicero’s examples involving the iudices, they are presented as a group 
of people with real legal responsibility and an ability to interpret the laws in 
complex and meaningful ways. This is in contrast to the way that the iudices 
appear in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, where they are not connected to the 
law by any of the speakers chosen by the Auctor.
There is one example from the De Inventione that more closely resembles 
the examples from the Rhetorica ad Herennium.89 This example illustrates dep-
recatio, a plea for mercy, and addresses the iudices with persuasive language 
that is founded on their own character, the character of the accused and their 
emotional response. The speaker says that it would be worthy of their clem-
ency and the defendant’s virtue for them to forgive him this one error. This 
discussion of the defendant in the third person by an advocate suggests that 
this speech comes from a Roman context rather than a Greek one, where the 
defendant would speak for themselves. It is possible that this is a real Roman 
example, which might suggest that there were genuinely different expecta-
tions of legal knowledge when speaking to a Greek and a Roman audience.
There is not enough evidence here to conclude definitively what is rep-
resentative of the interaction between Roman advocates and iudices in the 
quaestiones, or of the legal knowledge of the iudices more generally. But in 
the context of the two rhetorical handbooks it is notable that the dominant 
approach to the iudices in the two works is very different, with the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium demonstrating the rhetorical success of emotional appeals and 
the De Inventione showing repeatedly that the law ought to be the deciding 
factor. Two models of speaking to the iudices are set up, which represent two 
of the different options for the advocates of the 80s bc.
5. CONCLUSION
This last section highlights an important question: to what extent can the 
guidelines provided by a rhetorical handbook be taken as historical evidence? 
Although there cannot be a definitive answer, both texts were intended to be 
relevant and useful to readers at the time hence their evidence ought to be 
taken seriously. Yet this argument applies more convincingly perhaps to the 
Auctor, who was experienced enough in Herennius’ eyes to be an authority 
de ratione dicendi, than to Cicero, who was still a young man without any 
personal experience of being an advocate. This may be reflected in the more 
88 Idem: 1.52.100.
89 Idem: 2.34.104.
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theoretical and idealised approach to rhetoric that is apparent throughout 
the De Inventione. On the other hand, Cicero’s years of education and train-
ing with highly experienced statesmen, as well as his demonstrable ability 
to discuss legal issues at length in the De Inventione, mean that the in- depth 
legal arguments presented in his Theban example should not be dismissed as 
irrelevant to the Roman context.
Instead, by examining the Rhetorica ad Herennium and De Inventione I 
hope to have shown that both works are rich sources of evidence for this 
period and can significantly add to our understanding of the legal context. 
By looking at these works it is possible to better appreciate the post- Social 
War legal system, the context of Cicero’s legal education, and the potential 
for the influence of jurists such as Scaevola to be widely felt. These two rhe-
torical handbooks show that the law courts in the early first century bc were 
complex and challenging places, but the Auctor and Cicero saw the need to 
present solutions and offer guidance in order to train the next generation 
of advocates. In spite of the disturbance of the Social War and the follow-
ing  years –  or perhaps because of  it –  the Roman law courts continued to 
function and these texts are important evidence of the people and processes 
involved.
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Chapter 11
Multiple Charges, Unitary Punishment and  




This chapter addresses an apparent contradiction in Roman criminal trials 
between multiple charges and unitary punishment. If the punishment for a 
defendant who was found guilty was the same whether he was found guilty of 
one charge or many charges, why were multiple charges common?
I will first attempt to establish that the causa coniuncta, the case involving 
several charges, was, in fact, common. In order to support this point, I will 
argue against the belief that many of what I consider to be actual charges 
were merely character defamation of the defendant, although character defa-
mation of the defendant was typically employed by prosecutors to make a 
conviction more likely. I will try to make my case not only on the evidence 
of Cicero’s forensic orations, but on the advice provided to orators in the 
extensive rhetorical literature of the late Republic and early Empire. This 
rhetorical literature helps us see Cicero as a typical orator, albeit the leading 
orator of Rome for much of his life, rather than as an anomalous ‘star player’ 
in the Roman courts.
I hope to show in this chapter that it can be more fruitful to view rhetoric 
as a means employed by ancient orators, such as Cicero, to implement a 
strategy that they developed to meet the specific legal environment of a trial, 
rather than as a way merely to obfuscate the legal issues that the trial needed 
to address. Rhetoric, I will argue, should not be viewed as an unfortunate but 
necessary way to confuse the jurors, but rather primarily as a highly devel-
oped tool that enabled orators to present the facts and the law to the jurors 
in a comprehensible and persuasive manner.
Legal history involves an inherent tension between formalism and legal 
realism. My approach pushes the needle somewhat towards the former and 
away from the latter, while, I hope, avoiding the pitfalls of an extreme for-
malist approach.
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2. MULTIPLE CHARGES
Prosecutors typically cast many aspersions against the defendant in Roman 
criminal trials, which we usually know about because the patronus, speaking 
for the defendant, attempts to refute these aspersions. (The main excep-
tion where we know about the prosecution directly from the prosecutor’s 
words is, of course, all the charges that Cicero made when he prosecuted 
Verres in 70 bc, which are contained in the orations that he delivered at 
that trial and from those of the Second Actio that he published, although he 
never actually delivered these speeches in court.) Quintilian describes the 
difference between a simple case (causa simplex) and a complex case (causa 
coniuncta):
Ceterum causa omnis, in qua pars altera agentis est, altera recusantis, aut unius 
rei controversia constat aut plurium: haec simplex dicitur, illa coniuncta. Una 
controversia est per se furti, per se adulterii. Plures aut eiusdem generis, ut in 
pecuniis repetundis, aut diversi, ut si quis sacrilegii et homicidii simul accusetur. 
Quod nunc in publicis iudiciis non accidit, quoniam praetor certa lege sortitur, 
principum autem et senatus cognitionibus frequens est et populi fuit.
Every Cause, in which one side is the plaintiff’s and the other the defendant’s, 
is based either on a Controversy involving a single matter or on one involving 
several. The first type is called ‘simple’, the second ‘compound’. A theft taken by 
itself or an adultery taken by itself form a single Controversy. Where there are 
several charges, these may be of the same kind (for example, in extortion cases) 
or of different kinds (for example, if a man is accused at the same time of sacri-
lege and homicide). This does not now happen in the public courts, because the 
praetor allots cases according to the relevant law, but it often happens in hearings 
before emperors or the senate, as it did once in trials by the people.1
Quintilian makes here a distinction between cases where there is only one 
question at issue and those where several questions are at issue, and then 
divides the latter between those in which the issues are all the same (that is, 
all the same kind of charge, for example, all extortion charges), and those in 
which different kinds of questions are involved. The final sentence quoted 
above refers to this second kind of complex case, which is likely to occur, in 
Quintilian’s time, before imperial and senatorial courts, and in Republican 
times in trials before the People (iudicia populi). In a later passage,2 Quintilian 
gives the example of a causa coniuncta in which there are charges that the 
defendant arranged for someone to be killed, for another person to be 
wounded, and for someone else to be killed, and an example of the several 
kinds of issues may be raised, if, for example, the defendant disputes one 
 1 Quint. Inst. 3.10.1, translation Russell 2001.
 2 Quint. Inst. 7.1.9.
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fact, justifies another, and argues that a third is not the business of the court. 
An example of a causa coniuncta from imperial times is the trial of Apuleius 
before the Roman proconsul in Sabrata in the province of Africa, on three 
charges of magic, towards the end of ad 158 or the beginning of the following 
year;3 since the only non- Ciceronian forensic speech (Apuleius’ self- defence) 
comes from this trial, it provides important confirmation that multiple 
charges were not a peculiarity of trials of the Ciceronian era, but a normal 
feature of Roman judicial practice.4
I am admittedly a ‘maximalist’ in terms of classifying aspersions against 
the defendant as actual charges rather than as character defamation, as can be 
seen in an appendix to my book that attempts to reconstruct the case for the 
prosecution on the basis of eleven speeches of Cicero for the defence. Here 







 Roscius of Ameria: 1
 Cluentius: 4
 P. Cornelius Sulla: 8
 Sestius: 2
 Caelius: 7
There are forty- two charges in ten trials, thus, on average, slightly more than 
four per trial.
This is the maximum number of charges, since I marked some of them 
with a question mark, and I have not included Rabirius Postumus, since he 
did not face an actual criminal charge, but rather had been called into court 
as the recipient of extorted funds.6 Thus, for example, Cluentius was charged 
not only with ‘judicial murder’, the matter to which Cicero devotes most of 
his speech, but also to three acts of poisoning.7 In his defence of P. Cornelius 
Sulla, although most of the case involves the Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63, 
Hortensius, Cicero’s co- counsel, also answers charges related to the so- called 
‘First Catilinarian Conspiracy’ of 66.8
 3 Hunink 1997: vol. 1, 12.
 4 See Pellecchi 2012: 261 and 273 fn.61.
 5 Alexander 2002, Appendix One (‘List of Crimina’): 251–3.
 6 Cic. Rab. Post. 8.
 7 Cic. Clu. 164–91.
 8 Gell. NA 1.5.2–3.
190 On Legal Practice
The conceptual basis for this maximalist approach was provided by an 
article of mine that starts with the Roman concept of double jeopardy, as we 
see it in the epigraphically preserved extortion law of the Gracchan era, and 
concludes that the law envisaged the prosecutor being authorised to bring up 
all offences against that statute committed by the defendant up to the time of 
the trial. This article then contemplates the possibility that this was a general 
principle of the Roman statutes that established standing criminal courts 
in the late Republic.9 Admittedly, such a principle rests on a very narrow 
evidentiary foundation, but it is consistent with what we see as Ciceronian 
practice.10
Corroboration for the proposition that multiple charges in criminal trials 
were a product of the specific legal environment of Roman criminal law is 
provided by a contrast with private law cases, which, though not as numer-
ous as criminal cases within the Ciceronian corpus of forensic speeches, 
nevertheless are numerous enough (four in number) to provide a test of the 
proposition. These are the cases in which Cicero delivered these speeches: 
the Pro Quinctio (81 bc), the Pro Tullio (71 bc), Pro Roscio Comoedo (late 70s 
or early 60s), and in the Pro Caecina (early 60s), In these four cases, the issue 
or issues that the court was going to decide had been established by the for-
mulary procedure or by some subsidiary procedures before speeches were 
delivered, and Cicero, as patronus, sticks fairly closely to speaking on behalf 
of his client in relation to those specific issues.
A minimalist approach with regard to the number of formal charges, on 
the other hand, can be based on two approaches. The first is that the actual 
charges mattered little because cases were actually decided primarily on 
political grounds:
Conviction or acquittal was more often an index of political power than a testi-
mony to the effectiveness of legal argument.11
Legal sophistries abounded on both sides; the slippery character of maiestas 
encouraged them. But it would be a mistake to dwell on legal arguments. Politics 
was the central issue in this case . . .12
The technical charge against C. Antonius, it seems, was res repetundae, in connec-
tion with alleged misbehaviour in Macedon. But the technical charge was a minor 
 9 Alexander 1982. I doubt that my thesis has found general acceptance, although Riggsby 
1999: 54 and Riggsby 2004: 172–3 express approval.
10 In fact, the actual charges made by the prosecution in extortion trials were probably nor-
mally limited to one province, because of the practical fact that the prosecutor had time to 
conduct an inquisitio (Asc. Scaur. 19C; Ps. Ascon. 205 Stangl) in only one province. Thus, in 
the interrogatio legibus, Cicero made the statement against Verres, ‘Aio te Siculos spoliasse’ 
(Ps. Ascon. 207 Stangl). Santalucia 2007: 4996.
11 Gruen 1968: 6.
12 Trial of Cornelius for maiestas in 65: Gruen 1974: 264–5.
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issue. The prosecutors, as in all Republican trials, had a free hand to raise any 
matter that might bring discredit upon the defendant.13
These quotations recall an era of English language scholarship on the history 
of the Roman Republic, starting in the 1950s and going into the 1980s, in 
which there was great interest in Roman criminal trials as indices of political 
coalitions and feuds, but almost no interest in Roman criminal law itself.14
This inclination to minimise the legal element in Roman trials may 
originate, in the case of scholars living in Common Law jurisdictions such 
as England and the United States, in the perception that the respects in 
which Roman trials differed from trials in the Anglo- Saxon world must 
have rendered them political rather than legal events. In the nineteenth 
century Heitland described some of these differences in order to describe 
‘the spirit of Roman trials’: the use of non- professional pleaders, praevari-
catio (collusion between the prosecutor and the accused), the importance 
of the personal influence of individual pleaders, emotional appeals to the 
jurors, including defendants dressed in rags, the bribery of jurors, and, 
perhaps most importantly from the viewpoint of someone with Common 
Law expectations about the training and function of the presiding 
magistrate,15
4. There was no professionally trained judge to sift the evidence in a summing- up. 
The praetors were changed from year to year, and merely acted as chairmen of 
the Courts. With such presidents, no wonder that irrelevant considerations often 
were the most powerful in determining a verdict.
While it is true that a Roman praetor exerted much less control over the 
actual trial than an English or American judge, in terms of ruling on what 
kinds of evidence could be introduced, and what questions could be asked 
of witnesses, one should not ignore the active role that a praetor or quaesitor 
played in the legal preliminaries leading up to the actual trial, as Santalucia 
has elucidated in a series of articles.16 Moreover, the dominance of rhetoric 
at the high level of Roman education that most presiding magistrates and 
patroni in Roman Republican trials would have received, and the important 
role that legal issues and argumentation played in that education, mitigated 
the amateur standing of these participants.
The other way to minimise the formal charges that formed the basis of 
a criminal trial is to emphasise the rhetorical tricks used by the speakers. 
Zetzel, in a review of Craig’s book on the use of dilemma, expresses this 
point of view very openly:
13 Trial of Antonius in 59: idem: 288.
14 On the prosopographical approach to Roman criminal trials, see Alexander 2007: 103.
15 Heitland 1878: 116–17. Appendix A.
16 Santalucia 1997, 1998, 2007, 2009.
192 On Legal Practice
truth itself, the guilt or innocence of Cicero’s client, was rarely very important 
. . . The blatant fraud of most dilemma- arguments establishes a collusive bond 
between advocate and jury: a recognition on both sides of the fraud, and a simul-
taneous recognition that it is both entertaining and unimportant.17
In other words, Zetzel claims that Cicero as the advocate for the defendant 
was not really addressing the charges, and the jurors did not expect him to 
do so, and therefore the trial was a form of  entertainment –  though, I would 
add, presumably not entertaining for the defendant, whose whole mode 
of life was at risk, even if his life itself was not. For those scholars whose 
primary skill is the exegesis of speeches, it is natural to focus on the speech, 
rather than the occasion that gave rise to it.
I find Zetzel’s critique of Craig misleading for two reasons. First, when it 
assumes that the fraud created by Cicero’s use of dilemma was evident to the 
jurors, it fails to take sufficient account of the difference between hearing a 
live oration as a juror, and reading a written text of an oration as a scholar, 
and in fact rereading it many times, as Craig must have done. As Powell and 
Paterson write, ‘it would be an acute juror indeed who could see the logical 
flaws in Cicero’s arguments on a first hearing’.18 And as May points out, 
digressions that seem unnecessary in a written document may have served 
to reinforce points that make the speech easier to follow as a listener rather 
than a reader.19
Second, Zetzel’s criticism confuses two different things: (1) a trial, and (2) 
one oration delivered within a trial. The oration is just part of the trial; there 
were, in fact, at least two orations, for the prosecution and for the defence, 
and often many orations, important legal preliminaries that led up to the 
receptio nominis by the presiding magistrate before the actual criminal trial 
took place, the testimony of witnesses and the interrogation of witnesses, 
and some kind of debate between the speakers on the two sides. A Roman 
trial provided many ways for factual information to be presented before the 
jurors to use in deciding their verdict. The importance of witnesses is empha-
sised by Powell, and in particular he argues that the rules of Roman proce-
dure, in putting the testimony after the speeches, restricted what the patronus 
could say about what witnesses were going to say, and therefore make the 
whole trial appear to be less focused on matters of fact than it actually was.20
Zetzel’s depiction of a Roman criminal trial as ‘a collusive bond between 
advocate and jury: a recognition on both sides of the fraud, and a simul-
taneous recognition that it is both entertaining and unimportant’ (quoted 
above) in my view underestimates the seriousness of a criminal trial. In 
17 Zetzel 1994.
18 Powell and Paterson 2004: 44.
19 May 2002: 54.
20 Powell 2010: 27.
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fact, Quintilian21 says that the defence patronus can claim, as an argument 
for acquittal, that the prosecutor has, as a last resort, introduced false slurs 
against the defendant so as to predispose the jurors to convict him.
hanc fiduciam fuisse accusatoribus falsa obiciendi, quod laesum et vulneratum 
reum speraverint hac invidia opprimi posse.
the prosecutors felt confident in making false allegations because they hoped that a 
damaged and wounded defendant could be crushed by the odium thus aroused.22
The legal reality of the specific charge or charges accepted by the court as the 
basis of the prosecution, both as a limitation on the scope of the charges that 
could provide the basis of the prosecution, and as a requirement that the 
prosecutor substantiate that charge or charges, is illustrated by an example of 
a constitutio translativa (‘procedural issue’) provided by Cicero in his rhetori-
cal treatise the De Inventione.23 Earlier in the De Inventione24 Cicero defined 
a constitutio translativa in the following manner:
At cum causa ex eo pendet, quia non aut is agere videtur quem oportet, aut non 
cum eo quicum oportet, aut non apud quos, quo tempore, qua lege, quo crimine, 
qua poena oportet, translativa dicitur constitutio, quia actio translationis et com-
mutationis indigere videtur.
But when the case depends on the fact that it is brought by the wrong person, and 
that it is brought against the wrong person, or in the wrong court, at the wrong 
time, under the wrong statute, with the wrong charge, or with the wrong penalty, 
it is called a procedural issue, because the suit seems to need a different venue or 
procedural modification.
This specific example falls in the category of quo crimine. In a trial in which 
the defendant was accused of poisoning (venefici), the nominis delatio made 
a specific charge of parricide (parricidi). This specific kind of charge carried 
two legal consequences: the case was heard out of order (extra ordinem) 
and the penalty for the defendant, if found guilty, would be more severe 
(drowning in a sack, without the possibility of voluntary exile) than in an 
ordinary poisoning case.25 However, in the actual trial, while the prosecu-
tor was able to prove through testimony and argumentation other poison-
ing charges, he only barely mentioned the parricide charge. Therefore, in 
this case the defence should argue vociferously that since a guilty verdict 
will result in a specific penalty, and since the basis for this specific penalty 
21 Inst. 7.2.30.
22 Adapted from Russell 2001.
23 At 2.58; on translatio; see also Auct. ad. Her. 1.22.
24 At 1.10.
25 Cic. Rosc. Am. 30, 71; Inv. rhet. 2.149; Modestinus in D. 48.9.9 pr.
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has not been established, the defendant should be acquitted.26 While 
Cicero does not say, and therefore we cannot assume, that this defence 
was successful, his account suggests that it had a chance of success, and 
(we may conclude) that the court had registered a specific charge or charges 
that needed to be proven. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Cicero recom-
mends that the defence counsel should, in addition to pursuing this legal 
line of defence, also attempt to refute the other charges of poisoning;27 this 
recommendation suggests that it can be unwise to rely too much on a legal 
technicality.28
3. PROBABILE EX VITA ANTE ACTA
It may be objected that we know from rhetorical manuals, as well as from 
Cicero’s forensic orations, that the character of the defendant played a large 
role in a trial, and that the prosecutor levelled many allegations against the 
defendant that are not formal charges, but rather personal slurs meant to 
arouse the jurors’ emotions against the defendant and thus make a convic-
tion more likely, even those these slurs did not relate directly to the charges. 
However, an analysis of the advice offered in the rhetorical literature sug-
gests that a more nuanced understanding of the strategies of the opposing 
advocates is needed. This understanding bears out the truth of what Powell 
and Paterson suggest about the role that character played in Roman courts:29
It is evident from Cicero that a defence counsel had to be ready to fend off personal 
abuse of the defendant, as well as substantive allegations; and it can be difficult for 
a modern reader to take seriously Cicero’s own protestations of the unimpeach-
able character of some of his clients. It is easy to get the impression that, in Roman 
courts, issues of general character were more important than the actual charges. 
Perhaps, however, the phenomena are better accounted for by supposing that the 
Roman courts were indeed interested in guilt and innocence, but that they regarded 
questions of general character as supremely relevant to deciding such issues.
In an era in which scientific forensic evidence (fingerprints, DNA, blood 
types, electronic digital records, and so on) was not available, it was natural 
that the character of the defendant, along with eyewitness testimony, 
assumed great probative importance. Nevertheless, rather than simply 
throwing mud against defendants in the hope that something would stick, 
the prosecutors used (or at least were advised to use) the probabile ex vita ante 
acta in a highly disciplined way to corroborate, in the best possible way given 
the facts available to each prosecutor, the charges brought by them, and the 
26 See Santalucia 1997: 416, and Giuffrè 2009: 259–63.
27 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.59.
28 See Alexander 2000.
29 Powell and Paterson 2004: 36.
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patroni similarly used the defendant’s prior life to undermine those charges 
according to the same logic.
A belief in the fixity of an individual’s character, at least in adulthood, was 
strong in ancient thinking. How strong it was may be debated, and in any era 
people may be able to entertain simultaneous contrary ideas in their belief 
system, but fixed character was certainly one belief in the jurors’ minds, 
and both prosecutor and defence speaker needed to take it into account.30 
Directly relevant to the theme of multiple charges is Riggsby’s observation, 
‘A belief that character predicts action tends to increase the burden of proof 
for the prosecution, who must prove multiple crimes, not one’,31 since it 
did not appear plausible that someone would commit just one crime and no 
more. (Quintilian does offer a way for a prosecutor to attack a defendant 
whose past life furnishes no obvious corroboration that the defendant was 
likely to commit the crime with which he is now being charged [below, 198], 
but clearly this was a tactic of last resort.) The strength of argument from 
character is revealed in an account given in the second century ad by a young 
Aulus Gellius about his first experience of serving as an iudex in a case of 
private law.32 A plaintiff of good character was suing a defendant with a bad 
reputation for repayment of a loan. The defence maintained vociferously that 
the parties’ past lives and characters should play no role in a private lawsuit 
such as this: ‘rem enim de petenda pecunia apud iudicem privatum agi, non 
apud censores de moribus’ (‘this was a case conducted before a private judge 
about money, not before the censors about character’).33 Because the plaintiff 
lacked adequate support in documents or witnesses, Gellius received advice 
from friends that the case should be dismissed. He writes that he was reluc-
tant to do so, and, torn between finding for the plaintiff against the defendant 
because of their characters, and finding for the defendant because of a lack of 
evidence, in the end he prevaricated by ruling non liquet.34 Although this case 
could be viewed in legal terms as simply revolving around the credibility of 
the two parties, it is clear that the layman Gellius found it very hard to rule 
in favour of a man whom he regarded as wicked, and against a man whom 
he regarded as virtuous, and perhaps we can extrapolate that many jurors, 
who were of course also laymen, would have been similarly swayed by their 
perception of the parties’ probity.
The rhetorical writers advise the speaker to use the most relevant and 
30 Riggsby 2004: 165–6 summarises recent discussion. Berry 1996: 275 argues that the idea of 
fixed character is used by orators to suit their own purposes, and that their expression of it 
may not convey their sincere belief. As Riggsby 2004: 167 points out, however, while foren-
sic orations do not necessarily provide reliable evidence for Cicero’s beliefs about character, 
they do provide better evidence about the beliefs held by his audience, the jurors.
31 Idem: 169.
32 Gell. NA 14.2.
33 Idem. 14.2.8.
34 Idem. 14.2.25. On this episode, see Holford- Strevens 2003: 295–7.
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convincing argument that the defendant’s character and past deeds make 
available:
et in eo debebit esse occupatus ut ad eam causam peccati quam paulo ante exposu-
erit vita hominis possit adcommodari, hoc modo: si dicet pecuniae causa fecisse, 
ostendat eum semper avarum fuisse, si honoris, ambitiosum; ita poterit animi 
vitium cum causa peccati conglutinare.
and it will devolve upon him (the prosecutor) to make every effort to relate the 
defendant’s manner of life to the motive which he has just exposed. For example, 
if the prosecutor contends that the motive for the crime was money, let him show 
that the defendant has always been covetous; if the motive was public honour, 
ambitious; he will thus be able to link the flaw in the defendant’s character with 
the motive for the crime.35
The author of this early- first-century bc treatise advises prosecutors to 
find the kind of character flaws in the defendant that would plausibly have 
induced him to commit the crime or crimes with which he has been charged.
In Cicero’s early treatise on rhetoric, he gives similar advice, but with one 
better option, if it is available to the prosecutor, and a less desirable, but still 
usable option, if it is not:
Quare vitam eius, quem arguit, ex ante factis accusator inprobare debebit et 
ostendere, si quo in pari ante peccato convictus sit: si id non potuerit, si quam 
in similem ante suspicionem venerit, ac maxime, si fieri poterit, simili quo in 
genere eiusdemmodi causa aliqua commotum peccasse aut in aeque magna re aut 
in maiore aut in minore, ut si qui, quem pecunia dicat inductum fecisse, possit 
demonstrare aliqua in re eius aliquod factum avarum.
Therefore the prosecutor ought to discredit the life of the accused on the basis of 
his past acts, and to point out if he has previously been convicted of any similar 
crime. If this is impossible, he should prove the defendant has been under sus-
picion of a crime of the same kind before, and particularly, if possible, that in 
similar circumstances he committed an offence because under the influence of 
some motive of the same kind, either in a matter of equal, or greater or less impor-
tance; an example would be a case in which a prosecutor could prove that the man 
who he alleges acted from desire for money, has acted avariciously on some other 
occasion.36
The first choice of the prosecutor is to show that the defendant has already 
been convicted of a similar crime. Failing that, he should show that the 
defendant has been suspected of a crime of the same kind, and specifically, 
if possible, has acted on a motive such as would also lead him to commit the 
crime with which he has been charged in this trial. Thus, in an extortion trial 
35 Rhet. Her. 2.5. Translation Caplan 1954.
36 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.32. Adapted from translation by H. M. Hubbell (1949).
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it would be relevant to show that the defendant had previously committed 
theft or embezzlement or some other crime in which the motive is greed. 
Cicero does not recommend that the prosecutor list other offences of the 
same kind as the one or ones with which the defendant has been charged 
in this trial, but which are not formal charges in this trial, because, I would 
argue in keeping with my understanding of the scope of a criminal trial, 
that line of argument would raise the issue as to why the prosecutor did not 
present those offences as formal charges.
Cicero goes on to advise that if it is not possible to find faults of a similar 
kind, to make use of any faults of a different nature. Further down the chain 
of desirability, from the point of view of the prosecutor, is that if the defend-
ant has a clean reputation, then the crimes with which he has been charged 
demonstrate that he must have been concealing his true nature, and as a 
last resort, the prosecutor should resort to the argument that the defend-
ant’s unblemished reputation only shows that there has to be a first time for 
everything.37
This order of desirable arguments from the defendant’s past life is 
reversed for the defence speaker, who if possible will show that the defend-
ant’s blameless life renders the current charges implausible. If the defendant 
has a bad reputation, the patronus will argue, if possible, that while his client 
has displayed faults, they are not faults that would logically lead to the com-
mission of the crime with which he has been charged, and as a last resort, 
negare oportebit de vita eius et de moribus quaeri, sed de eo crimine quo de argua-
tur; quare, ante factis omissis, illud quod instet id agi oportere (‘he will have to 
say that the investigation is not about his life and character, but about that 
charge with which he is accused; therefore, his past deeds should be set aside, 
and only the case at hand should be pursued’).38
Quintilian offers similar advice. Like Cicero, he focuses on faults revealed 
in the defendant’s past life that are consistent with the charges levelled at the 
defendant:
Accusatoris autem est efficere, ut, si quid obiecerit, non solum turpe sit, sed etiam 
crimini, de quo iudicium est, quam maxime conveniat. Nam si reum caedis inpu-
dicum vel adulterum vocet, laedat quidem infamia, minus tamen hoc ad fidem 
valeat quam si audacem, petulantem, crudelem, temerarium ostenderit.
It is the accuser’s business to ensure that any attacks on character he makes are 
not only shaming but, so far as possible, appropriate to the charge which is before 
the court. If he calls a man accused of murder a debauchee or an adulterer, the 
discredit would indeed be damaging, but it would not do as much for the accuser’s 
credibility as if he showed him to be bold, insolent, cruel, and reckless.39
37 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.33–4.
38 Idem. 2.35–7
39 Quint. Inst. 7.2.28, translation Russell 2001.
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Quintilian goes on to point out that the defence must deny these character 
allegations, or show that they are not relevant to the issue at hand. In fact, 
some allegations, although shameful, may make the charges less plausible. 
Quintilian gives the example of someone charged with theft who has been 
described as extravagant; the contempt for money implied by extravagance 
is not consistent with the desire for money implied by theft. As a last resort, 
the defence should argue that the character aspersions are irrelevant to the 
business of the court, which is to investigate the actual charges.40 On the 
other hand, if the defendant has led a blameless life, the patronus will use 
that fact in support of his client, while it will be the prosecutor who will 
argue that the charge or charges are the only business of the court. Clearly, 
in making this argument the prosecutor is making the best of what is for him 
a bad situation. Quintilian advises that if the prosecutor cannot attack the 
defendant’s character with aspersions that are significant and true, he would 
be better off not to attack the defendant’s past life at all, because false alle-
gations will lessen the credibility of everything that he says, but he should 
convey the impression that he has chosen not to attack the defendant’s char-
acter rather than that he was unable to do so.41
For example, in the trial of Caelius, charged under the lex Plautia de vi, 
the defendant was charged with (by my reckoning) seven offences against 
that statute: assault on a senator42 sexually molesting women,43 causing 
disturbances at Naples,44 attacking an Alexandrian delegation at Puteoli,45 
something to do with goods of Pallas,46 borrowing money from Clodia to 
bribe slaves to commit the murder of Dio,47 and finally bribing the slaves 
of Clodia to murder their mistress.48 The prosecution endeavoured to cor-
roborate these seven charges with eight maledicta: the low status of Caelius’ 
father,49 Caelius’ lack of respect for his father,50 Caelius’ low repute among 
his own townsmen, the Interamnates Praetuttiani,51 Caelius’ support for 
Catiline in the 60s,52 Caelius’ violation of campaign laws,53 serious per-
sonal debts,54 disloyalty: first supporting a candidate and then prosecuting 
40 Quint. Inst. 7.2.29–30.
41 Idem. 7.2.33–4. See Riggsby 2004: 175.





47 Idem: 23–5, 51–5.
48 Idem: 56–7. See Alexander 2002: 236–8; Dyck 2013: 2–4.
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him55 and finally, and most notoriously, impudicitia.56 These personal fail-
ings render more plausible the specific charges, because someone who is of 
low status, who fails to respect his father, whom his neighbours dislike, who 
supports the (in Cicero’s eyes) archetypical man of violence and sedition, 
who will do anything to get elected to office, whose debts render him desper-
ate, who stabs his friends in the back, and who flouts sexual strictures, is the 
sort of person who is likely to commit the violent and desperate offences 
with which Caelius has been charged.
In the case of Roscius of Ameria, the defendant is not charged with any 
other murder than the murder of his father. In the apparent absence of mis-
deeds in the defendant’s past, either criminal in nature or merely opprobri-
ous, the prosecution tries to make the charge plausible by portraying him 
as an antisocial rube.57 One might expect that Cicero, as the speaker for the 
defence, would simply point out to the court the failure of the prosecutor 
to provide examples of specific acts committed in the past by the defendant. 
Instead, ‘C[icero] does not so much contradict as reinterpret the prosecu-
tion’s picture. He puts a positive face on Roscius’ rustic life, emphasising his 
skill at and devotion to agriculture (§49); the failure to appear in society is 
the inevitable concomitant (§52)’.58
Giuffrè and Santalucia, in two short articles, have debated with each other 
whether in the standing criminal courts a sharp line was drawn between the 
crimen proprium quaestionis and the vita anteacta, with Santalucia taking the 
more restrictive viewpoint.59 This debate revolves around the proper inter-
pretation of one passage in Quintilian.60 As Santalucia points out, the con-
trast is here not between all imperial trials and all Republican trials, because 
trials in the standing criminal courts were also held certa lege;61 Quintilian 
sees a similarity between senatorial and imperial trials, on the one hand, and 
trials before the Roman people (iudicia populi), on the other. Therefore, I 
would reject the view of Giuffrè that various considerations were taken into 
consideration even if there was no connection stricto iure between the prin-
cipal crime and the other facts that were charged.62 Conceptually, there was 
a difference between the two, although individual jurors might put more or 
less weight on that distinction.
55 Idem: 1, 16, 26, 56, 76, and 78.
56 Idem: 25, 44. See Alexander 2002: 230–3; Dyck 2013: 7–8.
57 Cic. Rosc. Am. 74.
58 Dyck 2010: 5.
59 Giuffrè 1998, Santalucia 1998.
60 Quint. Inst. 3.10.1, quoted above, 188.
61 Santalucia 1998: 463.
62 Giuffrè 1998: 99.
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4. UNITARY PUNISHMENT
Having established that multiple charges were normal in the criminal courts 
of Cicero’s time, I turn now to what might seem to be a characteristic con-
trary to multiple charges: unitary punishment. By ‘unitary punishment’ I 
mean that in the standing criminal courts of this period, a single punishment 
was usually the only one available when the defendant was found guilty, 
rather than, as in modern times, a sliding scale, such as a range of fines or a 
range of years of incarceration. As Kunkel explains,63
Als erstes gilt es zu erkennen, welches der Gegenstand des römischen 
Strafverfahrens in dieser Periode gewesen ist: In dieser Hinsicht ist festzustellen, 
daß das Verfahren allein der Feststellung diente, ob der Beschuldigte die ihm zur 
Last gelegte Tat begangen hatte oder nicht. Dementsprechend lautete das vom 
Magistrat verkündete Urteil nicht, wie heute bei uns: der Angeklagte wird wegen 
Mordes zur Todesstrafe (oder zu lebenslänglichen Zuchthaus) verurteilt, sonder 
ganz schlicht: er hat es getan (fecisse videtur), oder er hat es nicht getan.
First it is worthwhile recognising what the object of the Roman criminal trial of 
this period was: in this respect, it is to determine that the trial served only for the 
determination whether the accused had committed the act that was ascribed to 
him as a charge or not. Accordingly, the verdict pronounced by the magistrate was 
not, as it is with us, the defendant is sentenced for murder to capital punishment 
(or to a lifelong penitentiary sentence), but quite simply: he did it (fecisse videtur) 
or he did not do it.
As Kunkel says, unitary punishment is related to a unitary form of a guilty 
verdict: fecisse videtur. If the defendant seems to have committed the  offence 
–  not necessarily every offence with which he had been charged, but possibly 
just one, he will suffer a fixed punishment.
In practice, in most of the standing criminal courts that punishment was a 
kind of exile from Rome. The convicted defendant was no longer part of the 
Roman citizen body. This was, however, not the only form of punishment. 
Each of the many ambitus laws stipulated some other punishment, which in 
each successive ambitus statute was more severe than in the previous one, 
but, as far as we know, each ambitus statute stipulated only one punishment 
for the convicted defendant. We have reason to believe that Sulla’s law de 
sicariis contained a more severe punishment for parricide than for other 
forms of murder (above, 193).
The exceptions to the principle that criminal courts stipulated one 
fixed punishment are those courts (repetundae and peculatus, as far as we 
know) that created a two- stage procedure: first the trial, with a verdict, and 
second a litis aestimatio (‘calculation of damages’) that assessed appropriate 
63 Kunkel 1968: 116.
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damages payable to the different victims. However, even in these courts the 
outcome of a guilty verdict became almost automatically bankruptcy and 
exile, though there might have been some variation in the consequences of 
a guilty verdict on the family members of the accused. Financial ruin and 
expulsion from the Roman citizen body became almost a certainty when the 
epigraphically preserved extortion law of the Gracchan period introduced 
double damages (for cases brought before 1 September of each year [line 6]), 
because, given the huge sums of money extorted, it was almost impossible 
that the defendant would be able to pay back twice that sum of money. A 
noteworthy  exception –  that is, an instance that was noted because it was so 
 exceptional –  was the case of C. Porcius Cato in 113 bc, who was charged 
and convicted with having extorted 4,000 HS, paid double that amount, and 
presumably walked away from court relatively unscathed, without having to 
go into exile.64 All this is not to say that the litis aestimatio was meaningless, 
because that procedure determined how much compensation each victim 
would receive.
5. CONCLUSION
The juxtaposition of multiple charges and unitary punishment can best 
be explained as a logical strategy pursued by prosecutors to increase their 
chances of convicting the defendant. Given that only one charge had to be 
proven to achieve a conviction (fecisse videtur), it made sense to bring several 
charges to increase the odds of a conviction. As Quintilian writes, it was 
impossible to tell what points would be most persuasive to the jurors:
Alius enim alio moveri solet: et qui factum putabit, iustum credere potest, qui 
tamquam iusto non movebitur, factum fortasse non credet. ut certa manus uno 
telo potest esse contenta, incerta plura spargenda sunt, ut sit et fortunae locus.
People are moved by different arguments; a person who believes in the killing may 
think it was justly done, and a person who is not to be moved by the plea of justice 
may perhaps not believe in the killing. A sure hand may be content with one shot; 
an unsure one needs to spray them around, to give fortune a chance too.65
In general, the prosecutor increased his chances of obtaining a guilty verdict 
from the jury the more charges he brought, with the proviso that any charges 
that were clearly unsubstantiated or very flimsy would tend to discredit the 
solid charges that the prosecutor had to offer.
This solution to the coexistence of multiple charges and unitary punish-
ment is based on the belief that orators used the guidelines of rhetoric to 
64 Cic. Verr. 2.3.184; Vell. Pat. 2.8.1. See Alexander 1990: 23, no. 45. ‘Exile’ is a mistake, and 
should be deleted.
65 Inst. 4.5.14; translation Russell 2001.
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fashion speeches that were most likely to achieve their  aim –  a conviction in 
the case of a prosecutor, and an acquittal in the case of a patronus. Rhetoric 
should not be viewed as at best a regrettable necessity that stood between the 
jury and the truth, and that stands as an obstacle between us and an accurate 
understanding of a legal case, but rather as part of a culture in which, to 
quote Crook, ‘persuasion by means of the word (was) the most fully worked- 
out technology’.66 While Cicero held first place among Roman orators after 
his successful prosecution of Verres in 70 bc, in his use of rhetorical guide-
lines to make a convincing legal case, his strategy and tactics must have been 
more typical than exceptional compared to the other orators of his day.
A remark made by Professor Fred Naiden (Department of History, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) helps put into focus the issue 
of squaring multiple charges with unitary punishment. He made the general 
observation that legal historians need to place their approach to legal history 
on a spectrum between the extremes of legal formalism and legal realism.67 
Legal formalism holds that the law functions apart from any normative or 
policy considerations as an autonomous, self- enclosed form of reasoning, 
like Euclidean geometry. Legal realism, on the contrary, holds that law is an 
instrument aimed at producing a desirable result, and that the outcome is the 
result not of logic but of experience. This chapter’s approach has inclined 
more to formalism than legal realism, because it has attempted to explain the 
nature of the charges in terms of a legal  norm –  the availability to the pros-
ecutor of all charges that were relevant to the statute under which the trial 
was being conducted, and could be made against the defendant. On the other 
hand, my approach avoids extreme formalism, and grants something to legal 
realism, in that it acknowledges that the verdict in a particular case was not 
totally determined by relevant legal norms and facts related to the case, but 
that the jurors had an opportunity and, indeed, an obligation to exercise 
their own independent judgement, and that, as a consequence, persuasion 
played a role in influencing their decision. Persuasion was exerted by advo-
cates on each side of the case, and often, and perhaps usually in cases where 
both sides opted to go forward with a full trial, the outcome was in question 
until the jurors made up their own minds, and cast their votes.
Frier provides a very valuable insight that helps us adopt a somewhat 
formalist approach to understand the trials themselves, while still allowing 
for social and economic factors to influence the events that led up to the 
trial. He suggests that we should locate law either in the ‘back region’ or the 
‘front region’ of people’s interactions, using as his example the trial in which 
Caecina was involved. According to him, the law moved from the back 
region of the participants’ minds to the front region, as social and economic 
factors that influenced whether or not they would turn to litigation yielded 
66 Crook 1995: 197.
67 Naiden and Harris 2013.
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to legal factors once litigation had actually begun. He argues that in the years 
before the trial, as the future parties sold or rented property, made dowries, 
and wrote wills, law was kept in the back region, and social and economic 
factors predominated in their thinking. After they began to quarrel over the 
will of Caecina’s deceased wife, the law moved to the front region, and social 
and economic considerations receded.68
The contrast between ‘back regions’ and ‘front regions’ can be applied 
to criminal cases, as well as to civil cases like the trial in which Caecina was 
involved. Many non- legal factors influenced whether a prosecutor would 
attempt to bring charges against an individual: political animosity, desire 
for fame and glory, and just possibly burning moral indignation.69 Once the 
case was admitted, however, the law became dominant, and the prosecutor 
marshalled all the evidence and his persuasive powers to persuade the jurors 
that the defendant had violated the statute in question on at least one count. 
If he was able to do that, the punishment for the convicted was, under most 
criminal statutes, fixed.
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Chapter 12
Early-career Prosecutors: Forensic Activity and 
Senatorial Careers in the Late Republic
Catherine Steel
1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between forensic and political activity in the Roman 
Republic is well known.1 Much of what the iudicia publica dealt with 
were offences in public office: embezzlement, extortion, bribery and 
various kinds of misconduct by military commanders. The increas-
ing prevalence of violence within domestic politics towards the end of 
the Republic further increased the overlap between politics and legal 
proceedings through the use of legislation de vi. Even if juries generally 
reached their decision on the basis of the evidence presented to them, 
rather than their pre- existing political dispositions, it is nonetheless the 
case that many of the trials heard by the quaestiones that dealt with the 
offences of repetundae, ambitio and maiestas involved defendants who 
were prominent in public life.2 This aspect of Roman public  life –  the 
fact that prominent men were vulnerable to legal proceedings arising 
from their public activities, whose outcome, if a conviction, could have 
career- ending  consequences –  would not necessarily lead to forensic 
activity on the part of politicians, particularly since the Roman legal 
system allowed advocacy.3 But in fact senators are found engaged in both 
prosecution and defence within the iudicia publica. This can be seen as an 
aspect of that distinctive lack of specialisation, or at least involvement in 
a range of activities, which is so characteristic a feature of the Republican 
elite.4 In addition, prosecution in Rome depended on a private individual 
bringing a charge, rather than any action by the state: thus prosecution 
was, or was often perceived to be, motivated by personal animosity 
between politically active individuals, and undertaken by men who were 
 1 Gruen 1968; Riggsby 1999.
 2 A similar proportional confidence cannot be expressed about the quaestio de vi, given the 
breadth of its scope, though political significant trials de vi are numerous. On the relation-
ship between the offences tried in the iudicia publica and the interests of the res publica, 
Riggsby 1999.
 3 Crook 1995.
 4 Beard and Crawford 1985: 56–9.
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themselves engaged in a political career.5 Consequently, forensic ability is 
generally regarded in modern research on the Roman Republic as a valu-
able skill for a politician to possess.6
The purpose of this chapter is to explore in more detail the ways in which 
forensic activity played a part in the public careers of late Republican politi-
cians through a close examination of cases where prosecution was under-
taken by very young men. Roman writers on rhetoric from Cicero onwards 
acknowledge the existence of a convention by which a young man prosecuted 
a senior political figure with a view to becoming known favourably in the 
community.7 This convention is regularly acknowledged in modern treat-
ments of Republican oratory.8 However, the narrow and precise constraints 
within which this convention of early- career prosecution operated are often 
ignored. Close analysis of the known cases demonstrates the criteria that 
those who aspired to prosecute in this way needed to meet, and the charac-
teristics their opponents had to possess. These parameters set this kind of 
prosecution apart from other forms of prosecution, ensuring that it could 
play a recognisable and constructive role in the creation of elite careers. In 
addition, undertaking a prosecution at an early age did not necessarily mean 
that the prosecutor subsequently became a specialist forensic orator, nor did 
those members of the elite who specialised as forensic orators necessarily 
begin their careers with a prosecution of this kind.
Early- career prosecution thus illuminates the role of forensic activity 
in senatorial careers more generally, with particular relevance to how we 
should understand that of Cicero. His is highly anomalous, despite his 
attempts to present his trajectory as normative. Finally, this chapter also 
illuminates the kinds of support from specialist advisors that members of 
the senatorial  elite –  particularly those who were not experienced when they 
 prosecuted –  could access.
The period studied is the century 149–49, that is from the establishment 
of the first permanent quaestio at Rome to the outbreak of civil war between 
Caesar and the res publica.9 Within this period it is possible to identify more 
than twenty trials, which form the basis of the following discussion.10
 5 Consequently, prosecution was itself a high- stakes activity: Cic. Off. On prosecution more 
generally in the Republic, David 1992: 497–569; Crook 1995; Van der Blom forthcoming, 
chapter 1.
 6 Fantham 1997; Van der Blom forthcoming.
 7 See below, section 2.
 8 So, for example, Fantham 1997: 120–21; Alexander 2002: 7.
 9 This is also the period covered by Alexander 1990, to whose data I acknowledge my debt.
10 See Table 12.1
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2. EARLY-CAREER PROSECUTION AS AN IDENTIFIABLE 
CONVENTION
In 119 L. Licinius Crassus prosecuted C. Papirius Carbo in one of the iudicia 
publica; Carbo was found guilty and subsequently committed suicide.11 The 
case is unusually well attested and a recurrent interest in accounts of the 
trial is Crassus’ age at the time of the prosecution. Cicero, who was certainly 
in a position to be accurate, given his personal connections to Crassus and 
his circle, gives his age as twenty- one.12 The prosecution was the occasion 
of Crassus’ first public speech; it also, almost certainly, marked his entry 
into public life more generally. Crassus, and his prosecution of Carbo, is 
regularly used as an example when Roman writers on oratory discuss the age 
of practitioners at the start of their careers. In addition to the discussion of 
the case in De Oratore and Brutus, Cicero puts Crassus at the head of his list 
when he discusses in De Officiis (2.49) the phenomenon of prosecution by 
adulescentes: his other examples are M. Antonius (cos. 99) and Sulpicius (tr. 
pl. 88).13 Tacitus’ list in Dialogus contains (in addition to Crassus, who is 
again mentioned first) Caesar, Calvus and Pollio.14
The significance of this case is not restricted simply to Crassus’ age. It is 
an example of a phenomenon that could later be presented as a distinctive 
tactic: a prosecution undertaken by a young man in order to secure public 
recognition.15 In Pro Caelio, one of the many difficulties that Cicero faces 
11 Cic. Fam. 9.21.3; De or. 1.121, 2.170, 3.74; Brut.159; Off. 2.47; Tac. Dial. 34.7; see further 
Gruen 1968: 107–9; Fantham 2004: 30–1.
12 Tacitus has nineteen, probably an error.
13 Interestingly, Antonius’ prosecution of Carbo was not his first known public speech: that 
happened when he was prosecuted for sex with a Vestal in 113, a case to which Cicero does 
not refer. Moreover, he had already by then been elected quaestor. Fantham (2004: 29) sug-
gests that he may have been active in civil cases. Cicero’s attempt to make Antonius’ career 
fit the more Crassan model is noteworthy, and may be related to the presentation of his own 
career: see below.
14 Quint. (Inst. 12.6.1) gives Caesar, Calvus and Pollio as examples of men who undertook 
prosecutions well before they reached the age of eligibility to the quaestorship, but does not 
include Crassus, and concludes his list with Augustus; cf. Inst. 12.7.3–4 (prosecution of bad 
citizens).
15 M. Fulvius Flaccus prosecuted Nasica Serapio in 132 (Alexander 18) for his part in Tiberius 
Gracchus’ death, perhaps before he had been enrolled in the senate (consul in 125, his prae-
torship may be as late as 128, and if he did not hold the aedileship he may not have been 
enrolled by the censors of 130); but he was at least ten years older than Crassus. Numidicus’ 
prosecution of Messalla (Alexander 1990, no. 29) cannot be dated with any precision; if it 
is as early as 119, as Alexander suggests, then it offers a parallel to Crassus that may even 
be prior to his prosecution of Carbo (Numidicus was consul in 109, and therefore at least a 
decade older than Crassus; but would not have been a senator in 119). But Gellius, our only 
source for this trial, does not comment on the prosecutor’s youth, and Numidicus does not 
feature as an example of a youthful prosecutor in the lists that Tacitus and Apuleius provide, 
which perhaps point to a later date. Examples can be found pre- 149 of young men initiating 
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in defending his protégé Caelius is the latter’s active and provocative judi-
cial career, including the successful prosecution of Gaius Antonius in 59 
with which Caelius began his forensic activity. In justifying Caelius’ action, 
Cicero invokes what he claims was precedent for this behaviour if under-
taken to secure a good reputation with the Roman people:
He wished, following the established practice and the example of those young 
men who later emerged in the community as outstanding men and distinguished 
citizens to let his diligence become known to the Roman people through some 
noteworthy prosecution.16
Two centuries later, when Apuleius wanted to construct a list of justifiable 
prosecutions by young men, to contrast with the behaviour of his own pros-
ecutor Aemilianus, he invoked a very similar pattern of behaviour, using 
cases that can be found in Cicero’s works:
He does not prosecute me for the sake of glory, as Marcus Antonius did Gnaeus 
Carbo, Gaius Mucius Aulus Albucius, Publius Sulpicius Gnaeus Norbanus, Gaius 
Furius Marcus Aquillius and Gaius Curio Quintus Metellus. These learned young 
men underwent this, for the sake of praise, as the first task of forensic activity, so 
that they might be known to their fellow citizens through some striking trial.17
Apuleius’ treatment poses its own problems.18 It is, however, a clear dem-
onstration of the persistence of a particular model of understanding forensic 
activity in the Roman Republic, where prosecution was a justifiable activity 
for young men as a means to becoming known by the Roman people.19
judicial proceedings, though direct comparison is difficult with the circumstances under 
which trials took place prior to the establishment of quaestiones. Livy’s description of Ser. 
Galba’s attempt to disrupt Paullus’ triumph in 167 as ‘si in L.Paulo accusando tirocinium 
ponere et documentum eloquentiae dare voluit’ (45.37.3, ‘if he wished by prosecuting Lucius 
Paullus to lay aside his apprenticeship and give evidence of his eloquence’), a description 
he includes in a speech he ascribes to M. Servilius, may well reflect later understandings 
of forensic careers; Galba himself acted during the passage of the law authorising Paullus’ 
triumph, speaking in response to an invitation from the tribune of the plebs Sempronius 
Gracchus.
16 Cic. Cael. 73, ‘voluit vetere instituto et eorum adulescentium exemplo qui post in civitate 
summi viri et clarissimi cives exstiterunt industriam suam a populo Romano ex aliqua illustri 
accusatione cognosci.’
17 Apul. Apol. 66, ‘neque autem gloriae causa me accusat, ut M. Antonius Cn. Carbonem, 
C. Mucius A. Albucium, P. Sulpicius Cn. Norbanum, C. Furius M. Aquilium, C. Curio 
Q. Metellum. quippe homines eruditissimi iuvenes laudis gratia primum hoc rudimentum 
forensis operae subibant, ut aliquo insigni iudicio civibus suis noscerentur.’
18 On Apuleius’ Ciceronian sources, and his errors, Hammerstaedt et al. 2002: 269. One pecu-
liarity is the way that Apuleius avoids cases that seem elsewhere to compose a standard list, 
and relies instead on more obscure names and cases.
19 Compare Tac. Dial. 34.7: Tacitus similarly looks back to Republican oratory as a model of 
good practice but his focus is on the nature of training that young orators received and, as a 
result, their capacity to engage in prosecution at very young ages; he does not share Apuleius’ 
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Table 12.1 lists cases that may fall under this heading. The criteria for 
inclusion are that (1) the case is the first in which the prosecutor is known to 
have spoken at a iudicia publica; (2) the prosecutor was not, or probably not, 
a senator at the time of the trial because he was too young to have stood for a 
qualifying magistracy; and (3) the prosecutor went on to enter the senate.20 I 
give the prosecutor, the defendant, date, whether the prosecutor had consular 
ancestry, whether he is known to have continued as a forensic speaker after 
this prosecution, and, for convenience, the reference number in Alexander’s 
Trials. There is a degree of imprecision about some of these examples: the 
dating of the trial is often not secure; consequently it is not always possible 
to define beyond doubt the relationship between the act of prosecuting and 
the prosecutor’s career. In addition, we seldom know whether men reached 
the offices they are attested to have held suo anno, and as a result when they 
might have held earlier magistracies, which can be hypothesised even if not 
attested. Finally, our knowledge of specific forensic cases is evidently very 
patchy, insofar as a number of the men under consideration are discussed 
in Cicero’s Brutus in terms that suggest that they were forensically active, yet 
cases in which they were involved other than a career- starting prosecution 
cannot be identified. Absence of specific evidence about subsequent forensic 
careers needs to be interpreted with some care. These caveats in place, the 
cases identified are ones where the probable age and stage of the prosecutor 
are compatible with the prosecution being his first major public act, where 
no earlier occasion on which he spoke in public is known, and where a 
public career is known to have followed this initial prosecution.21 It does 
observation that prosecution can be a route to gloria and public recognition. Another point 
of contrast is that those whom Tacitus identifies, Crassus, Caesar, Asinius and Calvus, all 
continued their forensic careers after these débuts and were known as orators.
20 P. Valerius Triarius is included although his subsequent career is not attested, as he is spoken 
of in Pro Scauro as though he intended to pursue a political career. 
21 This second caveat is worth making insofar as it is usually impossible to say anything about 
the relationship between career development and a particular prosecution if the prosecutor 
did not hold public office. The wider implication that underlies the distinction,  however – 
 namely, that there was such a thing as a prosecutor within the Roman forensic system who 
regularly brought charges, itself deserves scrutiny. The problem is well illustrated by the 
case of Cicero’s cousin Gratidius and his prosecution of Fimbria (Alexander 1990, no. 61) in 
perhaps 106. Gratidius’ death in 102 ruled out a senatorial career, but this case may repre-
sent ambition for public life, particularly as he was a protégé of M. Antonius. M.  Antonius 
himself is not included as a possibility, despite his identification by Cicero in De Officiis 
as an example, since his prosecution of Carbo was apparently preceded by a trial at which 
he defended himself, on a charge of sexual relations with a Vestal: see above, fn.13. I do 
however include Sulpicius, despite the fact that he had spoken in a civil case before he pros-
ecuted Norbanus (Cic. De or. 2.88), since civil cases were less high profile than those in the 
iudicia publica. The prosecution of Eburnus (Alexander 62) is not included, because of uncer-
tainty over the identification of the prosecutor and, if he was Pompeius Strabo, the relative 
dating of this trial and Strabo’s quaestorship. The trial of P. Sulla in 62 (Alexander 201) is not 
included, despite the involvement of L. Manlius Torquatus, because of the likelihood that 
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not however include cases where the prosecutor was holding the tribunate 
of the plebs at the time of the trial or those where a man was prosecuted de 
repetundis by his quaestor,22 even though such prosecutors may well, prior 
to Sulla’s constitutional changes, not yet have been members of the senate, 
since the holding of either office indicates that a public career had begun.23
Prosecution was an activity that might be undertaken at a very early stage 
of a career, in contrast to most other forms of public activity, particularly 
those that involved public speech. Roman public life was hierarchical: what 
an individual could do was heavily constrained by what he had already done 
and what he had been authorised to do by the Roman people and by those to 
whom they delegated their authority. In particular, citizens had no right to 
address their peers at an assembly: they required an invitation from the mag-
istrate who had summoned the meeting.24 Within this context, the forensic 
sphere offered unusual flexibility. A prosecutor had to convince the praetor 
to permit him to bring the charge; in some cases he had also to demonstrate 
at a divinatio that he was more competent to prosecute than another.25 But 
that was the only barrier that a prosecutor had to clear: he did not need to 
hold or have held any office, and there were no formal qualifications that 
those speaking in the courts needed to possess. Even fewer constraints sur-
rounded defence oratory: someone facing charges could, as far as we know, 
ask whomever he or she wished to speak on their behalf. But in selecting an 
advocate, we must assume, defendants looked for competence, ideally dem-
onstrated by prior performance, particularly in cases where the defendant 
was a prominent public figure and the charge one that related to his conduct 
in public life. So forensic prosecution provided a way to speak to an audi-
ence of Roman citizens about weighty topics of wide public concern and 
interest earlier in a man’s career than any other form of public speaking. Its 
the lead prosecutor was his father. Cotta’s prosecution of Carbo (Alexander 244) is omitted 
because nothing is known of the prosecutor’s subsequent career, though senatorial ambi-
tion can be expected from the son of a consul (identification with the senatorial governor of 
Sardinia in 49 [Caes. bciv. 1.30.2] is tempting but chronologically difficult given that Cotta 
embarked on his prosecution on the day he took up the toga virilis and that this is probably 
to be dated to 60 or 59.) In other respects this prosecution fits some of the patterns identified 
in this chapter well, in terms of the youth of the prosecutor, his senatorial connectedness and 
the motive of familial revenge.
22 Cf. Cic. Div. Caec. 63.
23 The lex Atinia did not, it seems, circumvent the actual procedure of senatorial lectio.
24 A magistrate who could summon a contio could ask anyone he chose to address the people: 
but it is not clear what benefit the holder of contio might gain from an inexperienced and 
unknown speaker, particularly given what is known of the volatility of contional audiences. 
Interestingly, both Lucius Crassus and Hortensius are known to have addressed contiones 
very early in their  careers –  but in both cases after their initial prosecution. On procedure in 
the contio, Pina Polo 1996; Hiebel 2009.
25 Of the cases considered in this chapter, Caesar Strabo’s prosecution of Albucius involved a 
divinatio (Cic. Div. Caec. 63).
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attractiveness to those looking to pursue a public career, and particularly to 
those who did not wish to invest heavily in military activity, is not surpris-
ing. Of all the forms of public speaking at Rome, it was the one over which 
the potential speaker had the greatest control: he did not need to be invited 
to speak or elected to a particular office. If he could identify a target and 
convince the praetor that a case existed, he could autonomously create an 
opportunity to speak in a system that otherwise tightly controlled access to 
a public audience.
Nonetheless, the act of bringing a prosecution was not without its risks. 
Because the act of bringing a prosecution was that of an individual, not the 
community, it was easily interpreted as the act of an inimicus and one that 
would almost inevitably sour subsequent relationships between prosecutor 
and defendant. Even if the prosecution was successful, and the defend-
ant convicted, his family might undertake a revenge prosecution at a later 
date; if the defendant was acquitted, his hostility could affect his former 
prosecutor’s subsequent career and success. Although the development of 
a convention around a career- starting prosecution may have provided some 
justification for the activity, care was needed, as is evident from Cicero’s 
attempts to explain away Caelius’ behaviour. There were also practical 
issues. Although there were no requirements of a prosecutor in terms of his 
formal qualifications, to bring a prosecution successfully to court required 
technical knowledge and understanding of forensic procedure. These skills 
and knowledge were acquired through the tirocinium fori, a process of shad-
owing and practice, which introduced young men to the legal system. As a 
result, prosecution was in practice an option available only to those who had 
access to a network containing more experienced individuals.
3. EARLY-CAREER PROSECUTIONS: A CHRONOLOGICAL 
SURVEY
Analysis of the prosecutions that fall into this category of early- career pros-
ecution, as defined above, reveals recurrent features as well as a range of 
differences between the men involved and the circumstances of the trials.26 
The nature of the evidence for most of these trials makes systematic com-
parison across each example impossible. However, a more impressionistic 
survey does reveal some suggestive variation around the circumstances 
behind decisions to prosecute and the relationship between initial forensic 
activity and subsequent career, as well as similarities in the profiles of the 
objects of prosecution.
In the case of Crassus’ prosecution of Carbo, assessment is potentially 
clouded by the way in which the trial became exemplary of a career- initiating 
26 For the careers of these men, see Sumner 1973; David 1992: 721–902.
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prosecution and the fundamental role that Crassus played in Cicero’s 
repeated attempts to create a history of Roman oratory. Nonetheless, 
Crassus’ youth at the time of prosecution is a fixed point, as is the promi-
nence of the man he prosecuted: Carbo had been consul the previous year. 
The trial seems to been related to the continuing reverberations from the 
recent death of Gaius Gracchus, insofar as Crassus’ speech referred to the 
fact that Carbo had defended Opimius the previous year despite what were 
thought to be Gracchan sympathies earlier in his career.27
It is however not entirely clear how far Crassus used the speech to articu-
late a political stance of his own, though it seems likely that his performance 
in this case, which ended in Carbo’s conviction, paved the way for his par-
ticipation as tresvir in the foundation of a colony in Gaul, at Narbo, the fol-
lowing year, despite his age.28 Crassus also had close links to powerful men; 
his consular father Mucianus had died a decade earlier but he was connected 
to the Mucii Scaevolae through both his father’s biological family and his 
wife Mucia.
In the same year, 119, T. Albucius prosecuted Scaevola, Crassus’ father- 
in-law, on repetundae charges arising from his proconsulship in Asia Minor; 
Scaevola, who spoke for himself, was acquitted. Albucius’ inclusion in 
this category is questionable to the extent that he may possibly have held 
the quaestorship by this point; he was praetor in the first half of the 100s. 
Unlike Crassus, he was a new man; according to Lucilius, Scaevola claimed 
Albucius was motivated by hostility towards Scaevola, who had publicly 
mocked Albucius’ philhellenic tendencies when the two met in Athens.29 
Lucilius seems to have dedicated an entire book of Satires to the case, which 
suggests it attracted considerable attention; though it is difficult to deter-
mine from the surviving fragments and testimony what line Lucilius took in 
his treatment. Scaevola was acquitted, and Albucius is not known to have 
been forensically active after this case. Finally he himself was the victim of a 
successful repetundae prosecution after his praetorship, and went into exile 
at Athens; the case is discussed in more detail below, as it appears to have 
marked his prosecutor Strabo’s forensic début.
The next example chronologically in the table is Gaius Claudius Pulcher’s 
prosecution of a Calpurnius Piso on repetundae charges, though the recon-
struction of the case is rather less secure than the two considered so far. 
It depends on the combination of two pieces of information. The first is 
evidence from De Oratore of a trial or trials of a Piso, defended by Scaurus 
and by Crassus.30 The second is an anecdote from Valerius Maximus about 
27 Cic. De or. 2.170. The quotation also suggests that Crassus disseminated a written version of 
his speech.
28 Fantham 2004: 31–2.
29 Lucil. 2.87–93; Gruen 1992: 289–91.
30 Cic. De or. 2.265 (Scaurus as advocate; a hint that the charge was repetundae, as one witness 
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a trial in which the prosecutor, L. Claudius Pulcher, lost an almost certain 
conviction of a Lucius Piso because the defendant’s emotional appeal was 
powerfully supplemented by a shower of rain.31 The praenomen ‘Lucius’ 
raises suspicions as it was not generally used by the patrician Claudii, and 
if this case in Valerius Maximus is to be connected with the one discussed 
in De Oratore the consul of 92 is the best fit for the prosecutor. But the 
reconstruction cannot bear very much weight, though it does seem to be an 
example of the Claudii Pulchri as prosecutors, a trend that is continued in 
subsequent generations.
Caesar Strabo’s prosecution of Albucius, on repetundae charges arising 
from his governorship of Sardinia following his praetorship, is unambigu-
ously attested, including as one of Apuleius’ examples, and can be dated to 
the second half of the 100s.32 According to Cicero in De Officiis, Strabo took 
care to present it as a defence of the Sardinians; some care is needed in inter-
preting this passage, as Strabo acts as parallel to Cicero’s own prosecution of 
Verres. But it seems unlikely that Cicero could have radically recast Strabo’s 
tactics, even if he had chosen where to place the emphasis, particularly if a 
written text was still in existence. Strabo was aedile only in 90, so this pros-
ecution probably dates from his early twenties; he was also exceptionally 
well connected in political terms. This case is also the only one discussed in 
this chapter where a divinatio is known: Strabo won the right to prosecute 
ahead of Albucius’ quaestor Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89). Unfortunately, the 
account of how Caesar Strabo managed this derives entirely from Cicero’s 
account in his Divinatio in Caecilium, and his attempts there to find parallels 
for his prosecution of Verres (ahead of Verres’ quaestor Caecilius); Caesar 
Strabo’s arguments may have involved more than a eulogy of the bond 
between quaestor and pro- magistrate and the fact that the Sardinians had 
asked him to act, though if so they are not recoverable.33
The prosecution that the Luculli launched against a Servilius can be 
datable only broadly: it followed their father’s prosecution, and convic-
tion, on repetundae charges by the same Servilius after the elder Lucullus’ 
promagistracy in Sicily, which followed his praetorship in 104. It appears to 
have been the prosecutors’ first public act, and they may have been not yet 
twenty at the time; but the open motive of revenge sets this trial apart from 
was a Gallus); 2.285 (Crassus as advocate). We cannot, however, be completely sure that 
these two anecdotes refer to the same trial.
31 Val. Max. 8.1.absol.6.
32 Cic. Div. Caec. 63 links Albucius and Caesar Strabo; Strabo’s prosecution is also mentioned 
at Off. 2.50 and Suet. Iul. 55 (the latter passage suggesting also that a written version of the 
prosecution speech was disseminated); the fact of Albucius’ conviction at Cic. Scaur. 40 and 
Pis. 92. On the trial, Gruen 1964.
33 See also Thompson 1969, who argues that Pompeius Strabo was attempting a collusive 
prosecution.
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the others considered hitherto.34 The Luculli may have acquired public rec-
ognition through their actions, but this was recognition ultimately derived 
from their defence of their father’s interests (unsuccessfully, as Servilius 
was acquitted) rather than from an entirely new affair. Neither brother is 
known to have spoken in the courts again; Cicero does describe L. Lucullus 
as spending his youth in forensi opera,35 but as the point of that passage is to 
bring out how surprising his later military competence was the impression of 
a great deal of activity may be misleading.
C. Scribonius Curio’s prosecution of Metellus Nepos is one of Apuleius’ 
examples, but precise dating is elusive; Asconius36 implies that the trial took 
place after Nepos’ consulship in 98, which would put Curio in his mid- 
twenties. Nothing is known about the charge or the outcome, though Curio 
did go on to a successful if at times idiosyncratic career as a forensic orator, 
as well as reaching the consulship in 76.37 The inclusion of Fufius’ prosecu-
tion of Aquillius as an example of an early-career prosecution is not very 
secure: it is not identified as his first forensic speech.38 However, Cicero cites 
the prosecution in De Officiis (2.50) as an example in a context that implies 
that Fufius was not a habitual prosecutor, and perhaps even that he initiated 
his career by so doing. Fufius was a new man, as far as can be ascertained, and 
sufficiently active as an orator to have a distinctive style, criticised by Crassus 
in De Oratore (3.50), and one who spoke in deliberative as well as forensic 
contexts.39 Sulpicius too built an oratorical career before his early death after 
his prosecution of Norbanus de maiestate, the case that forms the centrepiece 
of Cicero’s De Oratore;40 he is regularly spoken of by Cicero and those who 
follow his rhetorical history as one of the two pre- eminent younger orators 
of the period immediately prior to the Social War, the other being Cotta.41 
There is however no specific forensic case in which Sulpicius is known to 
have participated after his unsuccessful prosecution of Norbanus (which was 
not his first forensic case: he was involved in what Antonius in De Oratore42 
describes as a causa parvula a year before the Norbanus case, possibly a civil 
34 Cic. Acad. 2.1 describes L. Lucullus as admodum adulescens at the time of the prosecution; he 
was probably about fifteen at the time of his father’s conviction, assuming his quaestorship 
in the early 80s was not significantly delayed. Revenge: Cic. Off. 2.50; Plut. Luc. 1; Quint. 
Inst. 12.7.3–4. On revenge and the courts, Flaig 2003: 145–7. 
35 Cic. Acad. 2.1.
36 At 63 C.
37 On Curio as an orator, Rosillo Lopez 2013: 294–6.
38 It gave Antonius the opportunity to deliver one of his most notorious defences, involving 
the ripping off of Aquillius’ tunic to reveal his scars: Cic. Verr. 2.5.3; De or. 2.194–9; Hall 
2014: 19–21. 
39 Cic. De or. 2.91, where furit in re publica implies deliberative oratory, perhaps in the context 
of a tribunate.
40 At 2.197–204.
41 On Sulpicius, see Powell 1990.
42 At 2.88.
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law case). Hortensius’ forensic début can be dated firmly to 95, with his age 
as nineteen, on the basis of the discussion of his career in De Oratore and 
Brutus.43 More detail of his first case is however hard to secure.44 What is 
evident however is that it was one with significant broader political implica-
tions that led to Hortensius addressing the senate in the same year, where ‘he 
defended the cause of Africa’.45 This opportunity for a nineteen- year-old to 
speak in the senate is remarkable and difficult to parallel. The final possible 
example of an early- career prosecution datable prior to the Social War is 
Marcius Censorinus’ attempt to prosecute Sulla after his proconsulship in 
Cilicia on what seem to have been repetundae charges.46 However, the case 
was dropped before it came to trial.47
There is a hiatus in prosecutions by young men from the outbreak of the 
Social War until the re- establishment of the courts during Sulla’s dictator-
ship: the intense judicial activity that was sparked by the lex Varia in 90 
did not, as far as we know, provide opportunities for début activity. Sulla’s 
transformation in the respublica affected, if it did not fundamentally alter, 
the framework for this kind of prosecution. In the early 70s particularly, the 
prosecution of high- profile public figures inevitably involved engagement 
with recent history. It is possible, too, that the heightened competition that 
followed from the rise in the number of junior magistracies relative to senior 
ones increased the pressure on political aspirants to find ways to become 
known to the voting public. In 79 the Metelli brothers Celer and Nepos (the 
future consuls of 60 and 57 respectively) brought a prosecution of Aemilius 
Lepidus for repetundae following his proconsulship in Sicily; the prosecution 
was dropped, apparently because the praetor refused to bring the case to 
trial. Lepidus was about to secure the consulship for 78, apparently against 
Sulla’s wishes, and seek to unravel some aspects of his political reforms; 
how far his political programme was an element in the Metelli’s decision 
to prosecute is unclear. More can be said about the following two pros-
ecutions, of the homonymous Cn. Cornelii Dolabellae. Aemilius Scaurus, 
Sulla’s stepson, successfully prosecuted the praetor of 81; the following 
year, Julius Caesar (having narrowly escaped death during the proscriptions) 
unsuccessfully prosecuted the consul of 81. That we have here a contrast 
between a piece of self- regulation by the ruling elite and an attack on it seems 
43 Especially De or. 3.228–9 and Brut. 228–30. The calculation that the latter passage does of the 
period of time (from this forensic début down to his death) as one in which Hortensius was 
a patronus confirms that 95 involved a forensic case, even though it is only described here as 
in foro.
44 The object of Hortensius’ prosecution is not identifiable, nor the outcome of the trial.
45 Cic. De or. 3.229, ‘in senatu causam defendit Africae[.]’
46 Plut. Sull. 5.
47 Censorinus’ qualities as an orator are noted by Cicero in Brut. 237, where he is also described 
as ‘iners et inimicus fori’ (‘lazy, and an enemy of the forum’); no occasion when he actually 
spoke in public is attested.
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a  convincing interpretation.48 Scaurus and Caesar are both known to have 
continued their forensic careers.
The trial of Terentius Varro in 74 for extortion in Asia is perhaps best 
known for the blatant bribery of the jury that took place during it. The pros-
ecutor was App. Claudius Pulcher, then in his mid- twenties; he was faced 
with Hortensius as Varro’s advocate, and Varro was acquitted. The next pos-
sible case is nine years later, when his younger brother Publius Clodius pros-
ecuted Catilina, also on repetundae charges. Cicero’s allegation that Clodius 
prosecuted Catilina in order to ensure his acquittal is difficult to disentangle 
from the later hostility between the two men. Clodius was perhaps twenty- 
seven at the time; he had already spent some years with Lucullus’ army in 
the east and been involved in the mutiny of Lucullus’ troops, though how 
far that episode coloured his reputation once back in Rome is far from clear, 
particularly as the emphasis on his role as instigator of the mutiny depends 
heavily on the way that his subsequent political career developed.49
Caelius Rufus’ prosecution of Antonius in 59 has already been men-
tioned; his is the name most closely linked as prosecutor to this trial, though 
he was in fact part of a team; the other two prosecutors cannot be securely 
identified, though neither appears to have been experienced.50 How far the 
jurors shared the hostility to Antonius, which led sympathisers with Catilina 
to rejoice in his conviction is unclear, but his reputation more generally 
(including expulsion from the senate in 70) may have made him vulnerable. 
Cicero felt obliged to defend him because of their shared tenure of the con-
sulship.51 Also in 59 D. Laelius prosecuted Valerius Flaccus, again as part 
of a team.52 The most visible of the other prosecutors was C. Appuleius 
Decianus, a Roman eques resident in Asia. It could be argued that this case 
involved an inexperienced but ambitious speaker, Laelius, joining forces 
with a collaborator, Decianus, who supplied a detailed understanding of the 
case and whose own motives were not related to political life in Rome but 
to the maintenance of his interests outside Italy.53 But Laelius had been in 
Asia himself, as a legate of Pompeius, and could therefore present the pros-
ecution as one in which he had some personal stake. Furthermore, Cicero 
records in his defence of Flaccus complaints by Laelius that Decianus had 
been suborned by Flaccus.54 It seems unlikely that Laelius would have made 
so damaging an admission in his speech itself, and it is clearly in Cicero’s 
interests to suggest a divided prosecution; but the fact that Cicero makes 
48 Gruen 1966.
49 On Clodius’ early career, Tatum 1999: 44–55.
50 See Alexander 1990: 119–20.
51 Crawford 1984: 124–31
52 Alexander 2002: 79–81.
53 On Decianus, Steel 2001: 58–66.
54 Cic. Flac. 81.
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this point at least suggests that the prosecution team looked heterogenous 
and could be presented as motivated by different factors. It was not suc-
cessful, and Laelius himself is not known to have been involved in forensic 
cases subsequently. Licinius Calvus’ prosecutions of Vatinius were canoni-
cal texts for subsequent generations, pre- eminent among an extensive corpus 
of written works by one who was regularly identified, with Caelius, as the 
greatest orator of the generation after Cicero.55 There appear to have been at 
least three speeches against Vatinius, and the chronology of Calvus’ attacks 
on Vatinius is difficult to establish securely.56 However, Tacitus Dialogus 34 
implies that an attack on Vatinius marked Calvus’ forensic début.57 That 
is probably to be dated to 58, since Calvus’ involvement in other forensic 
cases is attested for the year 56, and he was constantly active in the courts 
throughout the 50s until his death. Sempronius Atratinus’ prosecution of 
Caelius de vi in 56 had the justification of revenge, as Caelius was prosecuting 
his natural father Calpurnius Bestia; this was also an occasion where there 
was a large prosecution team, though Atratinus was the nominis delator. No 
further forensic activity by Atratinus is known, though he survived the Civil 
War and held a suffect consulship in the 30s. Asinius Pollio’s first prosecu-
tion or prosecutions, of Gaius Cato in 54, are mentioned in Tacitus Dialogus 
34; Pollio may have been prosecuting alongside Calvus, though the precise 
circumstances are difficult to unravel.58 Pollio went on to an oratorical career 
of considerable distinction, though only after the Civil War; the prosecution 
or prosecutions of Cato are his only known forensic activity prior to 49.
Valerius Triarius, the prosecutor of Scaurus in 54 on repetundae charges 
following the latter’s proconsulship in Sardinia, is described by Asconius (at 
18 C) as adulescente parato ad dicendum et notae industriae; Douglas suggests 
that the praenomen Publius, given to him by Asconius, may be an error for 
Gaius and the prosecutor of Scaurus identical to the C. Valerius Triarius 
whom Cicero praises in Brutus but whose forensic activity cannot otherwise 
be identified.59 Triarius had a connection with Sardinia: his father had been 
governor there in the 70s bc. Thanks to the survival of large fragments from 
Cicero’s speech defending Scaurus, and Asconius’ commentary on it, it 
is possible to say more about the backing that Triarius might have drawn 
on. There was a team of prosecutors, though its other members were not 
politically active; Appius Claudius Pulcher, one of the consuls of the year, 
55 Tac. Dial. 21.1–2 identifies twenty- one libri by Calvus.
56 Gruen 1967; Sumner 1973: 149.
57 Gruen 1967: 217–18 is sceptical, though, on the grounds only that information in the scholia 
Bobiensia (the only source for Calvus’ involvement in the trial of Vatinius in 58, in other 
respects well- attested) is often unreliable. But it seems unlikely that Tacitus would, in a 
passage about the youth of prosecutors in the Republic, chosen a case that was not Calvus’ 
first.
58 Sen. Controv. 7.4.7.
59 Douglas 1966:194; Alexander 2002: 99 fn.3. 
218 On Legal Practice
supported the prosecutors; and Asconius notes that Scaurus was initially 
apprehensive that the close friendship of Triarius and his mother Flaminia 
with M. Cato’s half- sister Servilia might affect Cato’s impartiality as pre-
siding praetor. It was a case where we know a young prosecutor drew on 
support and advice from more senior and experienced men.
The inclusion of Pompeius Rufus’ prosecution of Messalla Rufus in 54 is 
questionable, because of the age of the prosecutor: he was born no later than 
the early months of 87 and so well into his thirties; his quaestorship is not 
attested but could well be prior to this prosecution.60 The Claudii Pulchri’s 
prosecution of Milo for the murder of their uncle Clodius was driven imme-
diately by the external necessity of the death of a relative, though that motive 
was compatible with the reputational and career development aspects of 
these prosecutions. In addition, the Pulchri must have seemed to the rest of 
Clodius’ family capable of carrying out the task.
The final case of a youthful prosecutor attested before the outbreak of the 
Civil War is P. Cornelius Dolabella, who prosecuted App. Claudius twice 
after his return from Cilicia early in 50: first for maiestas and then, when that 
was unsuccessful, for bribery, probably in relation to Appius’ campaign 
for the censorship. This too was unsuccessful. At the second trial one of 
Appius’ advocates was Hortensius, in what turned out to be his final case. 
This was Dolabella’s first (and only) attested forensic activity as a speaker, 
but he had already faced two prosecutions himself, on capital charges, and 
had Cicero as his advocate.61 This was not, then, Dolabella’s first appear-
ance on the public scene, and it is possible that he had already been elected 
quaestor. Dolabella’s actions were a considerable embarrassment to Cicero, 
whose daughter had just married him, and Cicero had been trying very hard 
to maintain good relations with Appius. In an attempt to distance himself, 
he describes Dolabella’s action, in a letter to Appius, as permirum (rather 
strange), and comments that Dolabella lacks ornamenta and praesidia, marks 
of distinction and resources, in comparison to Appius. Elsewhere, however, 
Dolabella’s motivation becomes clearer: Caelius notes that the invidia 
against Appius is less than he expected.62 This suggests that Dolabella had 
opportunistically identifed a target, action against whom he hoped would be 
popular.63
On the basis of these cases, we can amplify the pattern that Cicero and 
subsequent writers describe by identifying further features, which many or 
60 The terminus ante quem for his birth is his father’s death during violent disturbances in Rome 
during 88.
61 Cic. Fam. 3.10.5.
62 Idem: 8.6.1
63 Idem: 3.10.5 implies that there was no pre- existing ill- feeling between the two men, as he 
describes the prosecution as one through which Dolabella will assume a state of enmity with 
Appius.
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all of them share. Perhaps the most obvious is the social position of these 
early- career prosecutors. Of the twenty- five prosecutors in the twenty- two 
cases I have identified, seventeen were the descendants of consuls; two more 
were the sons of praetors. Ten were patricians.64 Thus in most cases youth-
ful prosecutors possessed considerable social and political capital in terms of 
their ancestry. If we consider the small number of prosecutions undertaken 
by men who did not have consular or immediately praetorian ancestry, we 
can see that in most cases there were some other relationships that could 
approximate. Sulpicius was a protégé of Antonius, a consular and leading 
orator (even if the prosecution in question involved his facing Antonius as 
the defence advocate). Laelius’ father had served with Pompeius as a legate 
during the campaign against Sertorius and died there; and the family connec-
tion with Pompeius continued. Caelius had the support and friendship of 
Cicero, if not specifically for the prosecution of Antonius; and Pollio may 
have been working with Calvus who, although very junior in career terms, 
had already made a considerable impact as a forensic speaker. Caelius and 
Pollio were also making their débuts in the 50s, by which point the role of 
forensic oratory in political life had shifted somewhat. Not only had the 
volume of activity seemingly increased following Sulla’s reforms to the law 
courts; Hortensius and above all Cicero had established forensic activity 
as the basis for a highly successful public career in a way that is difficult 
to parallel in the period before Sulla. Caelius and Pollio were both very 
talented speakers; given that forensic brilliance was now demonstrably a 
credible route to political eminence their willingness to take on the risks of 
an early- career prosecution despite the lack of robust family connections 
makes sense.65 It may also be relevant that neither Antonius nor Gaius Cato 
commanded wide support among the elite.66 The exceptions to this pattern 
are Albucius and Fufius, where we can only hypothesise strong motives for 
prosecution and engagement by both men with the forensic sphere. An early- 
career prosecution was in most cases only undertaken by men who had the 
support of experienced political actors, whether that was family support or 
not.
In most cases the man prosecuted was senior, a former praetor or former 
consul: this confirms that the search for reputation was a major factor in 
motivating such prosecutions. Obscure defendants and trivial crimes would 
not have the same effect. More speculatively, there is some indication that 
even when undertaken by a young man as his début, a prosecution needed to 
64 Cicero’s remarks about Dolabella are a useful check on assuming that patrician status 
automatically conferred significant advantage; however, in that case he is comparing two 
patricians.
65 Sulpicius is an important precursor in this respect.
66 Antonius’ shortcomings are discussed above; for Gaius Cato’s career and alliances, see 
Gruen 1967.
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be justified by appeal to the motives that Cicero claims justified prosecution 
more generally: either the interests of the res publica, or revenge, or the obli-
gations of patronage. The Luculli, Cotta and the Claudii Pulchri were acting 
on behalf of a close relative; Caesar Strabo and Triarius, prosecutors in 
repetundae cases dealing with Sardinia, could both point to connections with 
the island. Too little is known about the tactics and backgrounds of most of 
these prosecutions to make a confident assertion, but it seems that prosecu-
tors in these cases needed to justify their actions in the same way as any other 
prosecutor, even if the audience understood that there were distinct motives 
of personal ambition involved as well.
Early- career prosecutions were almost always undertaken by young men 
who belonged to the elite or who had already secured significant support 
and backing from an eminent individual. The eminence of their targets sup-
ports the ambition inherent in the activity: it was a designedly high- profile 
act, to draw the attention of the citizen body to a young man of energy and 
talent and prepare voters to accept him in subsequent years as an appropriate 
recipient of their support for public office. However, this route to notoriety 
did not, at least prior to the fifties bc, open the door to talented outsiders, 
but rather offered the elite another forum for internal competition that did 
not seriously undermine their overall dominance of the system. Indeed, 
the senatorial class was probably an important element within the audience 
who evaluated these initial performances. Whilst the acquisition of elected 
office required candidates to develop a public profile among the Roman 
citizen body as a whole, other opportunities could follow from impressing 
members of the senate, the body to which this group of young prosecutors, 
we can assume, aspired to join as soon as possible. Forensic activity was also 
a method by which young men could demonstrate how promising they were 
as potential members of the governing elite.
4. EARLY-CAREER PROSECUTION AND FORENSIC CAREERS
Despite these recurrent features there is one respect in which these cases are 
not uniform. Some of these prosecutors continued to be active in the courts; 
others did not. Prosecution was not the inevitable precursor to a forensic 
career.
If we look in more detail at the prosecutors, it is evident that many, 
though by no means all, of the most distinguished orators of the late 
Republic began their careers with a prosecution. In addition to Crassus’ 
exemplary prosecution, such a list would include Caesar Strabo, Sulpicius, 
Hortensius, Julius Caesar, Clodius, Calvus and Pollio. On the other hand, 
it does not include Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115), M. Antonius, Gaius Cotta, 
Q. Calidius, M. Crassus, M. Marcellus or Cicero himself. A forensic career 
could be built without this initial step; but for the young man whose training 
indicated that he possessed the necessary talent it does seem to have been an 
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attractive route. However, it was also a route followed by men who did not 
continue to be forensically active: of our twenty- five orators, thirteen are not 
known to have spoken in the courts subsequently, whether in prosecution 
or defence. It seems likely, as noted above, that this proportion is inflated by 
under- reporting of cases; for example, both Furius and Sulpicius are spoken 
of in De Oratore as though they were active in the courts, though in fact no 
other forensic case in which either was involved is securely known. The 
violence of the period plays a part, too: Censorinus was killed during the 
civil war of 84–82 and the orators who made their débuts in the late 50s had 
little time to take their careers forward before the hiatus in legal activity of 
the Civil War, during which Dolabella and Triarius died. Nonetheless, there 
are still examples of men whose public careers are known to have continued 
with great success, yet who apparently did not exercise their forensic skills 
after this first foray: L. Licinius Lucullus, his brother M. Lucullus Varro, 
Metellus Nepos, Metellus Celer and Appius Claudius, all of whom reached 
the consulship.67 There are at least two possible lines of interpretation of this 
phenomenon. One is that a single prosecution was enough: it announced the 
young man’s identity and commitment to public service, whether successful 
or not, and once completed he could turn his attention to the other tasks 
that should occupy the aspirant politician. There was no need for him to 
continue with the time- consuming business of defending men in court in 
order to demonstrate his skill or cement his reputation. Another possibility 
is that actual experience of the courts revealed aptitude and ability in ways 
that training had not done; that is, those who did not continue with foren-
sic activity made that decision at least in part because they found the work 
uncongenial or realised that they were not effective. This latter observation 
is much more speculative: there is no direct evidence for it (though Cicero’s 
emphasis on the sheer hard work involved in successful forensic pleading 
may suggest that he thought his contemporaries underestimated what was 
involved), but we may note that Censorinus abandoned his prosecution 
of Sulla and the Metelli theirs of Lepidus, examples where a decision by a 
young man or men to prosecute was not even carried through to the trial 
itself.
The practical inexperience of these prosecutors combined with the signifi-
cance of the cases they undertook should also prompt us to reflect further 
on the ways in which they prepared for their first cases. As discussed above, 
these young men were in general well connected to the political elite. Their 
education hitherto involved not only theoretical training in rhetoric but 
also exposure to what happened in the Forum in the company of senior and 
67 At Brut. 247, describing the Metelli, most manuscripts read non nihil in causis versati, but 
L’s reading of nihil is attractive. It may imply more than this initial prosecution of Servilius. 
Nonetheless, there is nothing to suggest that they were significant figures on the forensic 
scene.
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 experienced participants, whose oratorical performances they could  witness 
–  as any citizen  could –  but in addition discuss and study from the inside.68 
They could also participate in the meetings in private space, which preceded 
and underpinned forensic proceedings.69 Their introduction to public life 
took place within an intimate network that involved  competition –  elite 
young Romans were surely alert from a very young age to their contemporar-
ies, who would be their electoral rivals in the  future –  but also collaboration, 
as established men sought to ensure the success of their protégés, whether 
they were sons, nephews or other connections. In this context, it strains 
credulity that early- career prosecutors were acting on their own in any sub-
stantial sense. Rather, we should assume that the decisions to undertake a 
prosecution and the choice of target were reached through debate and dis-
cussion, and that the legal tactics to be adopted were also the object of col-
lective consideration. The support available may even have involved some 
degree of speech writing. Speechwriters are attested in the late Republic; 
whilst the available evidence clusters around the trials that took place under 
the lex Varia and funeral speeches, it is at least possible that the help that 
inexperienced prosecutors received extended in some cases as far as detailed 
drafting.
Different orators will have used these kinds of support in different ways. 
Nor did every début prosecution necessarily have the unanimous support 
of all the speaker’s circle. Cicero makes it clear that he did not approve 
of Caelius’ prosecution of Antonius in 59, and he was clearly appalled by 
Dolabella’s move against Appius Claudius in 50.70 The key point to emerge 
is that early- career prosecutions were not a phenomenon confined to the ora-
torically and forensically brilliant. The support networks existed to enable 
the less talented still to make a credible appearance in the role of prosecutor. 
Forensic procedure, and the conventions of elite society, combined to create 
a space in Rome, which could be put to a variety of different uses. Early- 
career prosecution was a tactic that could enable the young and brilliant to 
make their mark on public life at an advantageously early stage. But it was 
also a means by which the elite could police itself whilst using the licence 
extended to young men as prosecutors to prevent the escalation of internal 
conflicts. And in many cases it will have served both ends. But it did not 
involve a commitment, or even an expectation, that the prosecutor himself 
would remain forensically active.
Consideration of this aspect of Republican forensic practice also throws 
important light on Cicero’s early career. It becomes strikingly obvious that 
68 On rhetorical education in the Republic, see Bonner 1977; Bloomer 2015.
69 The locus classicus for this aspect of elite training in the Republic is the opening of Cicero’s 
De Amicitia 1–3, which describes young men, including Cicero and Atticus, attending con-
sultations held by Mucius Scaevola the Augur.
70 Cic. Cael. 74; Fam. 3.10.5.
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Cicero’s prosecution of Verres becomes even more distinctive, and in need 
of explanation, when viewed alongside these examples. Verres himself was 
a target who shared many characteristics with those prosecuted in the cases 
considered so far. He had held the praetorship and was planning his consular 
campaign. The charges against him were repetundae in the province, which he 
had governed after his praetorship. And his behaviour in Sicily had already 
faced unfavourable scrutiny in the senate, a fact that might reassure a pros-
ecutor about the support he could expect and the grounds on which he could 
justify the prosecution. But Cicero could not claim the protection of early- 
career prosecution. He himself was a member of the senate, an aedile- elect, 
and a man with a decade’s worth of forensic practice and experience. The 
contrasts between his position and those of the other prosecutors discussed 
in this chapter support the view that his prosecution of Verres was not only 
unusual but also risky, and thus perhaps, in a career whose early stages are in 
general marked by caution and restraint, an indication that Cicero’s forensic 
career was not proceeding as smoothly as his later presentations of it would 
suggest.71
Early- career prosecution existed as a distinct tactic within the forensic 
sphere, though with defined conditions. The prosecutor needed to have the 
support and advice of established figures. The less integrated he was with 
the elite through birth, the more likely it is that he possessed considerable 
oratorical talent, and that this talent was a key motivator in choosing this 
route towards a political career. The target was a senior figure, someone 
who had been elected to an imperium-holding office, and the charge was 
one of concern to the res publica such as repetundae or maiestas. And the 
existence of the convention of prosecution by the very young helped the 
prosecutor in such cases evade the social disapprobation that generally 
attended the act of prosecuting, though did not entirely dispel it. However, 
there is no clear link between undertaking a prosecution of this kind and 
subsequent forensic distinction: it was neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition. And since it was not an essential part of forensic career devel-
opment, each case should be analysed as the result of a significant choice 
on the part both of the prosecutor and his circle. Finally, these prosecu-
tions imply the existence of technically skilled support networks available 
to these young men as they planned their prosecutions. In this case, as in 
others, the Republican elite supported its ‘myth of universal aristocratic 
competence’ through effective teams as much as through native ability and 
individual training.72
71 Steel 2013.
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Postscript
Paul J. du Plessis
The authors included in this volume were asked to revisit the traditional 
narratives of Roman law during the late Republic with a view to establishing 
whether and to what extent a greater focus on Cicero and his works would 
affect these. They were instructed not to treat Cicero as ‘an outsider’, but as 
part of a broader ‘legal culture’ of the late Republic, while at the same time 
remaining aware of the biases inherent in his œuvre.
The first section of this book focused on various interrelated narra-
tives regarding the state of Roman law during the late Republic. Thomas 
shows the extent to which much of the modern narrative regarding the 
rise of the Roman jurists and the Roman legal profession remains subtly, 
yet profoundly affected by notions of specialisation and intellectual isola-
tion created at the turn of the nineteenth century in German legal schol-
arship. This, in turn, affects modern understanding of the significance 
of Republican Roman law for the emergence of classical Roman law. By 
counterbalancing this narrative with the evidence provided by Cicero (while 
at the same time making allowances for the biases present in his works), it 
allows the modern reader to obtain a broader, more inclusive picture and, 
in turn, to reflect more closely on the importance of issues such as rheto-
ric and of philosophy for the development of Roman law during the late 
Republic. This latter point finds a natural locus in the chapter of Tellegen- 
Couperus and Tellegen who, using an aspect of the law of succession as 
their example, proceed to question the commonly held belief that Stoicism 
was the driving force behind much of Republican Roman law. In fact, as 
they show, the jurists drew on a variety of philosophical influences, often 
also from the New Academy, when debating matters of law. This chapter, 
in turn, allows the modern reader to draw greater inferences regarding the 
impact of philosophy upon Republican Roman law, especially in light of 
the claims often made regarding the philosophical inclinations of some of 
the great Republican jurists. This insight percolates into the final chapter in 
this section in which Forschner grapples with the knotty issue of Cicero’s 
‘theory of law’. Using a variety of sources, Forschner concludes that Cicero 
did in fact arrive at a ‘general theory of law’ in the latter part of his life. This 
theory was not based on a juxtaposition between human and divine law, as is 
often assumed, but was rather a holistic theory about law in general based on 
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human nature. In sum, these three contributions show that Cicero, despite 
his self- representation, remains indispensable to any reconstruction of the 
law and the legal culture of the period.
The legal profession is the focus of the second part of this volume. 
Benferhat cautions that Cicero’s utterances about the jurists of his time 
need to be viewed in the larger context of his political ambitions. While he 
admired the jurists, he was also critical of them. For Cicero, juristic expertise 
was not enough. In order to make an impact on the Republic and to secure 
its survival, more was needed. Never a shrinking violet, Cicero believed that 
only a blend of skilful eloquence and juristic knowledge, visible in himself, 
could effect real and meaningful change. Issues of perspective dominate the 
remainder of this section. Lehne- Gstreinthaler demonstrates that Cicero’s 
presentation of the jurists was undoubtedly coloured by his social position 
as a novus homo wishing to be accepted in Rome’s upper classes. In reality the 
legal profession was much more diverse and open- ended. This contribution 
does much to argue against a narrow conception of the jurist prevalent in 
nineteenth- century scholarship. It also demonstrates how much work still 
needs to be done on the Roman legal profession in all its forms. The final 
two chapters in this section focus on Cicero’s subsequent legacy. Wibier, 
tracing Cicero’s reception by the jurists of the early Empire, demonstrates 
that the Roman jurists at times treated Cicero as one of their own and used 
his works to answer substantive points of law. This raises interesting ques-
tions about the persistent view in modern literature about Cicero as ‘an out-
sider’. Harries takes a long perspective and investigates the idea of the loss of 
constituent power of the citizenry towards the end of the Republic and the 
role of the intellectual in facilitating such change from collective government 
to autocracy. This insightful contribution does much to uncover Cicero’s 
views of the role of the people in the preservation of the Roman Republic. 
In sum, Cicero was a many- sided figure who played an important part, not 
only in the development of law, but also in the transformation of the Roman 
state (even if not consciously). As these chapters collectively show, the ‘legal 
culture’ of the late Republic by no means operated in isolation from politics. 
Furthermore, despite the biases visible in Cicero’s work, he remains an indis-
pensable source for uncovering the legal culture of the late Republic.
The final section of this volume deals with the legal environment in 
which Cicero operated. Roselaar shows the close relationship between the 
expansion of the Roman state and the availability of Roman law in the late 
Republic. This is a point that bears reinforcing. The legal environment of 
the late Republic was a pluralist one where differing peoples of differing 
legal statuses were obliged to engage (not without legal prejudice) using the 
legal framework created piecemeal by the Roman authorities. In such a situ-
ation, where different laws applied to different peoples and the principle of 
personality of law reigned supreme, we see glimpses of what is to come in 
the Roman Empire thereafter. This theme is taken up further by Hilder. She 
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convincingly shows that those studying Roman law of this period need to 
take more account of manuals of rhetoric in order to form an appreciation 
of context. Rhetorical manuals can indeed provide us with much informa-
tion of law and legal practice. The final two chapters in this section paint a 
broader picture of this environment. Alexander, making various important 
points about the relationship between formalism and realism when investi-
gating the law, examines the practice of bringing multiple charges in criminal 
trials and the relationship between said charges and the unitary punishment 
that resulted from a conviction. In doing so, he engages with the important 
debate about the significance of the rhetoric of character in the Roman court-
room in the late Republic and its impact on proof of guilt. Steel, carries this 
theme further through her investigation of the peculiar practice of young 
men prosecuting more established public figures as a test of ‘fitness for 
office’. This important contribution underscores the centrality of social net-
works in upper class Roman society of the late Republic as well as the very 
public nature of reputation and standing in this period.
So what does this all amount to? In their pithy introduction to the late 
Republic, Beard and Crawford observed that: ‘Cicero would not have 
approved of this [their] book’.1 I am not sure Cicero would have approved of 
this one either. But, at the very least, it is an attempt to start a conversation 
about Cicero, not as ‘an outsider’, but as a valuable source for uncovering the 
legal culture of the late Republic. And once this has been done, it becomes 
possible to ask further questions about the state and the shape of the law and 
legal institutions during this period. As Lawrence Rosen famously put it: ‘To 
understand how a culture is put together and operates, therefore, one cannot 
fail to consider law, one cannot fail to see it as part of culture’.2 Given the 
importance of late Republican Roman law for the classical period, we owe 
it to ourselves as scholars of Roman law to revisit this period with much 
greater care. A systematic study of Roman legal culture of the late Republic 
remains to be written. This is the first attempt to start the conversation.
 1  Beard, M. and Crawford, M. (1999)2. Rome and the Late Republic: Problems and interpretations. 
London. Introduction.
2  Rosen, L. (2006). Law As Culture: An invitation. Princeton. At 5.
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